m 


sj 

\. 


• 


AN  EXAMINATION 


OF 


SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S 

. -...    — 

PHILOSOPHY/ 

AND    OF 

THE  PRINCIPAL  PHILOSOPHICAL  QUESTIONS 
DISCUSSED  IN  HIS  WRITINGS. 

BY 

JOHN  STUART,  MILL. 


IN    TWO   VOLUMES. 

VOL.  I. 


BOSTON: 
WILLIAM    V.    SPENCER, 

134  WASHINGTON  STREET. 
1865. 


Presswork  by  John  Wilson  &  Son,  Boston. 


f? 

mi 

A/53" 


CONTENTS    OF    VOL 


.1.    l/.l 


CHAPTER    I. 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTORY   REMARKS..  9 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE .13 

CHAPTER    III. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN    KNOWL- 
EDGE, AS  HELD  BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON.      ...    28 

CHAPTER    IV. 

IN    WHAT   RESPECT    SIR   W.   HAMILTON   REALLY   DIFFERS 

FROM  THE  PHILOSOPHERS  OF  THE  ABSOLUTE.  ...    46 

CHAPTER    V. 

WHAT  IS  REJECTED  AS  KNOWLEDGE  BY  SIR  W.  HAMILTON, 
BROUGHT  BACK  UNDER  THE  NAME  OF  BELIEF.  ...    70 

CHAPTER    VI. 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  .      .      .      .      .      .82 

(7) 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

PAGE 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE'  CONDITIONED,  AS  APPLIED  BY 
ME.  MANSEL  TO  THE  LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT.  113 

CHAPTER    VIII. 

OF  CONSCIOUSNESS,  AS  UNDERSTOOD  BY  SIR  W.  HAMILTON.  135 

CHAPTER    IX. 

OF  THE  INTERPRETATION  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS 159 

CHAPTER    X. 

SIR  W.  HAMILTON'S  VIEW  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  THEORIES 

RESPECTING  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  .  190 

CHAPTER    XI. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN  EX- 
TERNAL WORLD 234 

CHAPTER    XII. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE  BELIEF  IN  MATTER, 

HOW  FAR  APPLICABLE  TO  MIND 251 

CHAPTER    XIII. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL   THEORY   OF  THE  PRIMARY  QUALI- 
TIES OF  MATTER 263 

CHAPTER    XIV. 

HOW  SIR  W.  HAMILTON  AND  MR.  MANSEL  DISPOSE  OF  THE 

LAW  OF  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION.  .      .      .307 


AN  EXAMINATION 


OF 


SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  PHILOSOPHY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS. 

AMONG  the  philosophical  writers  of  the  present  cen- 
tury in  these  islands,  no  one  occupies  a  higher  position 
than  Sir  William  Hamilton.  He  alone,  of  our  meta- 
physicians of.  this  and  the  preceding  generation,  has 
acquired,  merely  as  such,  a  European  celebrity ;  while, 
in  our  own  country,  he  has  not  only  had  power  to  pro- 
duce a  revival  of  interest  in  a  study  which  had  ceased 
to  be  popular,  but  has  made  himself,  in  some  sense,  the 
founder  of  a  school  of  thought.  The  school,  indeed,  is 
not  essentially  new;  for  its  fundamental  doctrines  are 
those  of  the  philosophy  which  has  everywhere  been  in 
the  ascendant  since  the  setting  in  of  the  reaction  against 
Locke  and  Hume,  which  dates  from  Reid  among  our- 
selves and  from  Kant  for  the  rest  of  Europe.  But  that 
general  scheme  of  philosophy  is  split  into  many  divis- 
ions, and  the  Hamiltonian  form  of  it  is  distinguished 
by  as  marked  peculiarities  as  belong  to  any  other  of  its 
acknowledged  varieties.  From  the  later  German  and 

(9) 


10  INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS. 

French  developments  of  the  common  doctrine,  it  is  sep- 
arated by  differences  great  in  reality,  and  still  greater 
in  appearance ;  while  it  stands  superior  to  the  earlier 
Scottish  and  English  forms  by  the  whole  difference  of 
level  which  has  been  gained  to  philosophy  through  the 
powerful  negative  criticism  of  Kant.  It  thus  unites  to 
the  prestige  of  independent  originality  the  recommenda- 
tion of  a  general  harmony  with  the  prevailing  tone  of 
thought.  These  advantages,  combined  with  an  intellect 
highly  trained  and  in  many  respects  highly  fitted  for  the 
subject,  and  a  knowledge  probably  never  equalled  in 
extent  and  accuracy  of  whatever  had  been  previously 
thought  and  written  in  his  department,  have  caused  Sir 
William  Hamilton  to  be  justly  recognized  as,  in  the 
province  of  abstract  speculation,  one  of  the  important 
figures  of  the  age. 

The  acknowledged  position  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  at 
the  head,  so  far  as  regards  this  country,  of  the  school  of 
philosophy  to  which  he  belongs,  has  principally  deter- 
mined me  to  connect  with  his  name  and  writings  the 
speculations  and  criticisms  contained  in  the  present 
work.  The  justification  of  the  work  itself  lies  in  the 
importance  of  the  questions,  to  the  discussion  of  which 
it  is  a  contribution.  England  is  often  reproached,  by 
Continental  thinkers,  with  indifference  to  the  higher 
philosophy.  But  England  did  not  always  deserve  this 
reproach,  and  is  already  showing,  by  no  doubtful  symp- 
toms, that  she  will  not  deserve  it  much  longer.  Her 
thinkers  are  again  beginning  to  see,  what  they  had  only 
temporarily  forgotten,  that  a  true  Psychology  is  the  in- 
dispensable scientific  basis  of  Morals,  of  Politics,  of  the 
science  and  art  of  Education;  that  the  difficulties  of 


INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS.  11 

Metaphysics  lie  at  the  root  of  all  science;  that  those 
difficulties  can  only  be  quieted  by  being  resolved,  and 
that  until  they  are  resolved,  positively  if  possible,  but 
at  any  rate  negatively,  we  are  never  assured  that  any 
human  knowledge,  even  physical,  stands  on  solid  foun- 
dations. 

My  subject,  therefore,  is  not  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  but 
the  questions  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  discussed.  It  is, 
however,  impossible  to  write  on  those  questions  in  our 
own  country  and  in  our  own  time,  without  incessant 
reference,  express  or  tacit,  to  his  treatment  of  them.  On 
all  the  subjects  on  which  he  touched,  he  is  either  one 
of  the  most  powerful  allies  of  what  I  deem  a  sound 
philosophy,  or  (more  frequently)  by  far  its  most  formi- 
dable antagonist ;  both  because  he  came  the  latest,  and 
wrote  with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  flaws  which  had  been 
detected  in  his  predecessors,  and  because  he  was  one  of 
the  ablest,  the  most  clear-sighted,  and  the  most  candid. 
Whenever  any  opinion  which  he  deliberately  expressed 
is  contended  against,  his  form  of  the  opinion,  and  his 
arguments  for  it,  are  those  which  especially  require  to 
be  faced  and  carefully  appreciated ;  and  it  being  thus 
impossible  that  any  fit  discussion  of  his  topics  should 
not  involve  an  estimate  of  his  doctrines,  it  seems  worth 
while  that  the  estimate  should  be  rendered  as  complete 
as  practicable,  by  being  extended  to  all  the  subjects  on 
which  he  has  made,  or  on  which  he  is  believed  to  have 
made,  any  important  contribution  to  thought. 

In  thus  attempting  to  anticipate,  as  far  as  is  yet  pos- 
sible, the  judgment  of  posterity  on  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
labors,  I  sincerely  lament  that  on  the  many  points  on 
which  I  am  at  issue  with  him,  I  have  the  unfair  advan- 


12  INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS. 

tage  possessed  by  one  whose  opponent  is  no  longer  in  a 
condition  to  reply.  Personally  I  might  have  had  small 
cause  to  congratulate  myself  on  the  reply  which  I  might 
have  received,  for  though  a  strictly  honorable,  he  was 
a  most  unsparing  controversialist,  and  whoever  assailed 
even  the  most  unimportant  of  his  opinions,  might  look 
for  hard  blows  in  return.  But  it  would  have  been  worth 
far  more,  even  to  myself,  than  any  polemical  success,  to 
have  known  with  certainty  in  what  manner  he  would 
have  met  the  objections  raised  in  the  present  volume.  I 
feel  keenly,  with  Plato,  how  much  more  is  to  be  learned 
by  discussing  with  a  man,  who  can  question  and  answer, 
than  with  a  book,  which  cannot.  But  it  was  not  pos- 
sible to  take  a  general  review  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
doctrines  while  they  were  only  known  to  the  world  in  the 
fragmentary  state  in  which  they  were  published  during 
his  life.  His  Lectures,  the  fullest  and  the  only  con- 
secutive exposition  of  his  philosophy,  are  a  posthumous 
publication ;  while  the  latest  and  most  matured  expres- 
sion of  many  of  his  opinions,  the  Dissertations  on 
Reid,  left  off,  scarcely  half  finished,  in  the  middle  of  a 
sentence ;  and  so  long  as  he  lived,  his  readers  were  still 
hoping  for  the  remainder.  The  Lectures,  it  is  true, 
have  added  less  than  might  have  been  expected  to  the 
knowledge  we  already  possessed  of  the  author's  doc- 
trines ;  but  it  is  something  to  know  that  we  have  now 
all  that  is  to  be  had ;  and  though  we  should  have  been 
glad  to  have  his  opinions  on  more  subjects,  we  could 
scarcely  have  known  more  thoroughly  than  we  are  now 
at  last  enabled  to  do,  what  his  thoughts  were  on  the 
points  to  which  he  attached  the  greatest  importance,  and 
which  are  most  identified  with  his  name  and  fame. 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  13 


CHAPTER  H. 

THE   RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 

THE  doctrine  which  is  thought  to  belong  in  the  most 
especial  manner  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  and  which  was  the 
ground  of  his  opposition  to  the  transcendentalism  of  the 
later  French  and  German  metaphysicians,  is  that  which 
he  and  others  have  called  the  Relativity  of  Human 
Knowledge.  It  is  the  subject  of  the  most  generally 
known,  and  most  impressive,  of  all  his  writings,  the  one 
which  first  revealed  to  the  English  metaphysical  reader 
that  a  new  power  had  arisen  in  philosophy  :  and,  together 
with  its  developments,  it  composes  the  "Philosophy  of 
the  Conditioned,"  which  he  opposed  to  the  German  and 
French  philosophies  of  the  Absolute,  and  which  is  re- 
garded by  most  of  his  admirers  as  the  greatest  of  his 
titles  to  a  permanent  place  in  the  history  of  metaphys- 
ical thought. 

But  the  "relativity  of  human  knowledge,"  like  most 
other  phrases  into  which  the  words  relative  or  relation 
enter,  is  vague,  and  admits  of  a  great  variety  of  meanings. 
In  one  of  its  senses,  it  stands  for  a  proposition  respecting 
the  nature  and  limits  of  our  knowledge,  in  my  judgment 
true,  fundamental,  and  full  of  important  consequences 
in  philosophy.  From  this  amplitude  of  meaning,  its 
significance  shades  down  through  a  number  of  gradations, 
successively  more  thin  and  unsubstantial,  till  it  fades 
into  a  truism  leading  to  no  consequences,  and  hardly 
i* 


14  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 

worth  enunciating  in  words.  When,  therefore,  a  phi- 
losopher lays  great  stress  upon  the  relativity  of  our 
knowledge,  it  is  necessary  to  cross-examine  his  writings, 
and  compel  them  to  disclose  in  which  of  its  many  de- 
grees of  meaning  he  understands  the  phrase. 

There  is  one  of  its  acceptations  which,  for  the  pur- 
pose now  in  view,  may  be  put  aside,  though  in  itself 
defensible,  and  though,  when  thus  employed,  it  expresses 
a  real  and  important  law  of  our  mental  nature.  This  is, 
that  we  only  know  anything,  by  knowing  it  as  distin- 
guished from  something  else ;  that  all  consciousness  is 
of  difference ;  that  two  objects  are  the  smallest  number 
required  to  constitute  consciousness ;  that  a  thing  is  only 
seen  to  be  what  it  is,  by  contrast  with  what  it  is  not. 
The  employment  of  the  proposition,  that  all  human 
knowledge  is  relative,  to  express  this  meaning,  is  sanc- 
tioned by  high  authorities,*  and  I  have  no  fault  to  find 
with  that  use  of  the  phrase.  But  we  are  not  concerned 
with  it  in  the  present  case ;  for  it  is  not  in  this  sense 
that  the  expression  is  ordinarily  or  intentionally  used  by 
Sir  W.  Hamilton ;  though  he  fully  recognizes  the  truth 
which,  when  thus  used,  it  serves  to  express.  In  gen- 
eral, when  he  says  that  all  our  knowledge  is  relative, 
the  relation  he  has  in  view  is  not  between  the  thing 
known  and  other  objects  compared  with  it,  but  between 
the  thing  known  and  the  mind  knowing. 

All  language  recognizes  a  distinction  between  myself, 
the  Ego,  and  a  world,  either  material,  or  spiritual,  or 
both,  external  to  me,  but  of  which  I  can,  in  some  mode 
and  measure,  take  cognizance.  The  most  fundamental 

*  In  particular  by  Mr.  Bain,  who  habitually  uses  the  phrase  "  relativity 
of  knowledge  "  in  this  sense. 


THE   RELATIVITY   OP   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  15 

questions  in  philosophy  are  those  which  seek  "to  deter- 
mine what  we  are  able  to  know  of  these  external  objects, 
and  by  what  evidence  we  know  it. 

In  examining  the  different  opinions  which  are  or 
may  be  entertained  on  this  subject,  it  will  simplify  the 
exposition  very  much,  if  we  at  first  limit  ourselves  to 
the  case  of  physical,  or  what  are  commonly  called  ma- 
terial objects.  These  objects  are  of  course  known  to  us 
through  the  senses.  By  those  channels,  and  no  otherwise, 
do  we  learn  whatever  we  do  learn  concerning  them. 
Without  the  senses  we  should  not  know  nor  suspect  that 
such  things  existed.  We  know  no  more  of  what  they 
are,  than  the  senses  tell  us ;  nor  does  nature  afford  us 
any  means  of  knowing  more.  Thus  much,  in  the  ob- 
vious meaning  of  the  terms,  is  denied  by  no  one,  though 
there  are  thinkers  who  prefer  to  express  the  meaning  in 
other  language. 

There  are,  however,  conflicting  opinions  as  to  what 
it  is  that  the  senses  tell  us  concerning  objects.  About 
one  part  of  the  information  they  give  there  is  no  dispute. 
They  tell  us  our  sensations.  The  objects  excite,  or 
awaken  in  us,  certain  states  of  feeling.  A  part,  at  least, 
of  what  we  know  of  the  objects,  is  the  feelings  to  which 
they  give  rise.  What  we  term  the  properties  of  an 
object,  are  the  powers  it  exerts  of  producing  sensations 
in  our  consciousness.  Take  any  familiar  object,  such  as 
an  orange.  It  is  yellow ;  that  is,  it  affects  us,  through 
our  sense  of  sight,  with  a  particular  sensation  of  color. 
It  is  soft ;  in  other  words,  it  produces  a  sensation,  through 
our  muscular  feelings,  of  resistance  overcome  by  a  slight 
effort.  It  is  sweet ;  for  it  causes  a  peculiar  kind  of 
pleasurable  sensation  through  our  organ  of  taste.  It  if 


16  THE  RELATIVITY  OP  HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 

of  a  globular  figure,  somewhat  flattened  at  the  ends  :  we 
affirm  this  on  account  of  sensations  that  it  causes  in  us, 
respecting  which  it  is  still  in  dispute  among  psycholo- 
gists whether  they  originally  came  to  us  solely  through 
touch  and  the  muscles,  or  also  through  the  organ  of 
sight.  When  it  is  cut  open,  we  discover  a  certain  ar- 
rangement of  parts,  distinguishable  as  being,  in  certain 
respects,  unlike  one  another ;  but  of  their  unlikeness  we 
have  no  measure  or  proof  except  that  they  give  us  dif- 
ferent sensations.  The  rind,  the  pulp,  the  juice,  differ 
from  one  another  in  color,  in  taste,  in  smell,  in  degree 
of  consistency  (that  is,  of  resistance  to  pressure),  all  of 
which  are  differences  in  our  feelings.  The  parts  are, 
moreover,  outside  one  another,  occupying  different  por- 
tions of  space  :  and  even  this  distinction,  it  is  maintained 
(though  the  doctrine  is  vehemently  protested  against  by 
some) ,  may  be  resolved  into  a  difference  in  our  sensations. 
(When  thus  analyzed,  it  is  affirmed  that  all  the  attributes 
which  we  ascribe  to  objects,  consist  in  their  having  the 
power  of  exciting  one  or  another  variety  of  sensation  in 
our  minds ;  that  to  us  the  properties  of  an  object  have 
this  and  no  other  meaning;  that  an  object  is  to  us 
nothing  else  than  that  which  affects  our  senses  in  a  cer- 
tain manner ;  that  we  are  incapable  of  attaching  to  the 
word  object,  any  other  meaning ;  that  even  an  imaginary 
object  is  but  a  conception,  such  as  we  are  able  to  form, 
of  something  which  would  affect  our  senses  in  some  new 
way ;  so  that  our  knowledge  of  objects,  and  even  our 
fancies  about  objects,  consist  of  nothing  but  the  sensa- 
tions which  they  excite,  or  which  we  imagine  them  ex- 
citing, in  ourselves?^ 

This  is  the  doctrine  of  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge 


TUB   RELATIVITY   OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  17 

to  the  knowing  mind,  in  the  simplest,  purest,  and,  as  I 
think,  the  most  proper  acceptation  of  the  words.  There 
are,-  however,  two  forms  of  this  doctrine,  which  differ 
materially  from  one  another. 

According  to  one  of  the  forms,  the  sensations  which, 
in  common  parlance,  we  are  said  to  receive  from  objects, 
are  not  only  all  that  we  can  possibly  know  of  the  objects, 
but  are  all  that  we  have  any  ground  for  believing  to 
exist.  What  we  term  an  object  is  but  a  complex  con- 
ception made  up  by  the  laws  of  association,  out  of  the 
ideas  of  various  sensations  which  we  are  accustomed  to 
receive  simultaneously.  There  is  nothing  real  in  the 
process  but  these  sensations.  They  do  not,  indeed,  ac- 
company or  succeed  one  another  at  random ;  they  are 
held  together  by  a  law ;  that  is,  they  occur  in  fixed 
groups,  and  a  fixed  order  of  succession  ;  but  we  have  no 
evidence  of  anything  which,  not  being  itself  a  sensation, 
is  a  substratum  or  hidden  cause  of  sensations.  The  idea 
of  such  a  substratum  is  a  purely  mental  creation,  to 
which  we  have  no  reason  to  think  that  there  is  any  cor- 
responding reality  exterior  to  our  minds.  Those  who 
hold  this  opinion  are  said  to  doubt  or  deny  the  existence 
of  matter.  They  are  sometimes  called  by  the  name 
Idealists,  sometimes  by  that  of  Sceptics,  according  to 
the  other  opinions  which  they  hold.  They  include  the 
followers  of  Berkeley  and  those  of  Hume.  Among  re- 
cent thinkers,  the  acute  and  accomplished  Professor 
Terrier,  though  by  a  circuitous  path,  and  expressing 
himself  in  a  very  different  phraseology,  seems  to  have 
arrived  at  essentially  the  same  point  of  view.  These 
philosophers  maintain  the  Relativity  of  our  knowledge 
in  the  most  extreme  form  in  which  the  doctrine  can  be 


18  THE  RELATIVITY  OP  HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 

understood,  since  they  contend,  not  merely  that  all  we 
can  possibly  know  of  anything  is  the  manner  in  which 
it  affects  the  human  faculties,  but  that  there  is  nothing 
else  to  be  known ;  that  affections  of  human  or  of  some 
other  minds  are  all  that  we  can  know  to  exist. 

This,  however,  is  far  from  being  the  shape  in  which 
the  doctrine  of  the  Kelativity  of  our  knowledge  is  usually 
held.  To  most  of  those  who  hold  it,  the  difference 
between  the  Ego  and  the  Non-Ego  is  not  one  of  lan- 
guage only,  nor  a  formal  distinction  between  two  aspects 
of  the  same  reality,  but  denotes  two  realities,  each  self- 
existent,  and  neither  dependent  on  the  other.  In  the 
phraseology  borrowed  from  the  Schoolmen  by  the 
German  Transcendentalists,  they  regard  the  Noumenon 
as  in  itself  a  different  thing  from  the  Phenomenon,  and 
equally  real ;  many  of  them  would  say,  much  more  real, 
being  the  permanent  Reality,  of  which  the  other  is  but 
the  passing  manifestation.  They  believe  that  there  is  a 
real  universe  of  "Things  in  Themselves,"  and  that 
whenever  there  is  an  impression  on  our  senses,  there  is  a 
"  Thing  in  itself,"  which  is  behind  the  phenomenon,  and 
is  the  cause  of  it.  But  as  to  what  this  Thing  is  "in 
itself,"  we,  having  no  organ  except  our  senses  for  com- 
municating with  it,  can  only  know  what  our  senses  tell 
us  ;  and  as  they  tell  us  nothing  but  the  impression  which 
the  thing  makes  upon  us,  we  do  not  know  what  it  is  in 
itself  at  all.  We  suppose  (at  least  these  philosophers 
suppose)  that  it  must  be  something  "  in  itself,"  but  all 
that  we  know  it  to  be  is  merely  relative  to  us,  consisting 
in  the  power  of  affecting  us  in  certain  ways,  or,  as  it  is 
technically  called,  of  producing  Phenomena.  External 
things  exist,  and  have  an  inmost  nature,  but  their  inmost 


THE  RELATIVITY  OP  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  19 

nature  is  inaccessible  to  our  faculties.  We  know  it  not, 
and  can  assert  nothing  of  it  with  a  meaning.  Of  the 
ultimate  Realities,  as  such,  we  know  the  existence,  and 
nothing  more.  But  the  impressions  which  these  Reali- 
ties make  on  us  —  the  sensations  they  excite,  the  simili- 
tudes, groupings,  and  successions  of  those  sensations, 
or,  to  sum  up  all  this  in  a  common  though  improper 
expression,  the  representations  generated  in  our  minds 
by  the  action  of  the  Things  themselves  —  these  we  may 
know,  and  these  are  all  that  we  can  know  respecting 
them.  In  some  future  state  of  existence  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  we  may  know  more,  and  more  may  be 
known  by  intelligences  superior  to  us.  Yet  even  this 
can  only  be  true  in  the  same  sense  in  which  a  person 
with  the  use  of  his  eyes  knows  more  than  is  known  to 
one  born  blind,  or  in  which  we  should  know  more  than 
we  do  if  we  were  endowed  with  two  or  three  additional 
senses.  We  should  have  more  sensations ;  phaenomena 
would  exist  to  us  of  which  we  have  at  present  no  con- 
ception ;  and  we  should  know  better  than  we  now  do, 
many  of  those  which  are  within  our  present  experience ; 
for  since  the  new  impressions  would  doubtless  be  linked 
with  the  old,  as  the  old  are  with  one  another,  by  uni- 
formities of  succession  and  coexistence,  we  should  now 
have  new  marks  indicating  to  us  known  phaenomena  in 
cases  in  which  we  should  otherwise  have  been  unaware 
of  them.  But  all  this  additional  knowledge  would  be, 
like  that  which  we  now  possess,  merely  phenomenal. 
We  should  not,  any  more  than  at  present,  know  things 
as  they  are  in  themselves,  but  merely  an  increased 
number  of  relations  between  them  and  us.  And  in  the 
only  meaning  which  we  are  able  to  attach  to  the  term, 


20  THE   RELATIVITY  OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 

all  knowledge,  by  however  exalted  an  Intelligence,  can 
only  be  relative  to  the  knowing  Mind.  If  Things  have 
an  inmost  nature,  apart  not  only  from  the  impressions 
which  they  produce,  but  from  all  those  which  they  are 
fitted  to  produce,  on  any  sentient  being,  this  inmost 
nature  is  unknowable,  inscrutable,  and  inconceivable, 
not  to  us  merely,  but  to  every  other  creature.  To  say 
that  even  the  Creator  could  know  it,  is  to  use  language 
which  to  us  has  no  meaning,  because  we  have  no  facul- 
ties by  which  to  apprehend  that  there  is  any  such  thing 
for  him  to  know. 

It  is  in  this  form  that  the  doctrine  of  the  Relativity  of 
Knowledge  is  held  by  the  greater  number  of  those  who 
profess  to  hold  it,  attaching  any  definite  idea  to  the  term. 
These  again  are  divided  into  several  distinct  schools  of 
thinkers,  by  some  of  whom  the  doctrine  is  held  with  a 
modification  of  considerable  importance. 

Agreeing  in  the  opinion  that  what  we  know  of  Nou- 
mena,  or  Things  in  themselves,  is  but  their  bare  exist- 
ence, all  our  other  knowledge  of  Things  being  but  a 
knowledge  of  something  in  ourselves  which  derives  its 
origin  from  them ;  there  is  a  class  of  thinkers  who  hold 
that  our  mere  sensations,  and  an  outward  cause  which 
produces  them,  do  not  compose  the  whole  of  this  relative 
knowledge.  The  Attributes  which  we  ascribe  to  out- 
ward things,  or  such  at  least  as  are  inseparable  from 
them  in  thought,  contain,  it  is  affirmed,  other  elements, 
over  and  above  sensations  plus  an  unknowable  cause. 
These  additional  elements  are  still  only  relative,  for  they 
are  not  in  the  objects  themselves,  nor  have  we  evidence 
of  any  thing  in  the  objects  that  answers  to  them.  They 
are  added  by  the  mind  itself,  and  belong,  not  to  the 


THE  RELATIVITY  OP   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE.  21 

Things,  but  to  our  perceptions  and  conceptions  of  them. 
Such  properties  as  the  objects  can  be  conceived  divested 
of,  such  as  sweetness  or  sourness,  hardness  or  softness, 
hotness  or  coldness,  whiteness,  redness,  or  blackness  — 
these,  it  is  sometimes  admitted,  exist  in  our  sensations 
only.  But  the  attributes  of  filling  space,  and  occupying 
a  portion  of  time,  are  not  properties  of  our  sensations  in 
their  crude  state,  neither,  again,  are  they  properties  of 
the  objects,  nor  is  there  in  the  objects  any  prototype 
of  them.  They  result  from  the  nature  and  structure  of 
the  Mind  itself;  which  is  so  constituted  that  it  cannot 
take  any  impressions  from  objects  except  in  those  par- 
ticular modes.  We  see  a  thing  in  a  place,  not  because 
the  Noumenon,  the  Thing  in  itself,  is  in  any  place,  but 
because  it  is  the  law  of  our  perceptive  faculty  that  we 
must  see  as  in  some  place,  whatever  we  see  at  all.  Place 
is  not  a  property  of  the  Thing,  but  a  mode  in  which  the 
mind  is  compelled  to  represent  it.  Time  and  Space  are 
only  modes  of  our  perceptions,  not  modes  of  existence, 
and  higher  Intelligences  are  possibly  not  bound  by 
them.  Things,  in  themselves,  are  neither  in  time  nor 
in -space,  though  we  cannot  represent  them  to  ourselves 
except  under  that  twofold  condition.  Again,  when  we 
predicate  of  a  thing  that  it  is  one  or  many,  a  whole  or  a 
part  of  a  whole,  a  Substance  possessing  Accidents,  or  an 
Accident  inhering  in  a  Substance — when  we  think  of  it 
as  producing  Effects,  or  as  produced  by  a  Cause  (I  omit 
other  attributes  not  necessary  to  be  here  enumerated) , 
we  are  ascribing  to  it  properties  which  do  not  exist  in 
the  Thing  itself,  but  with  which  it  is  clothed  by  the 
laws  of  our  conceptive  faculty  —  properties  not  of  the 
Things,  but  of  our  mode  of  conceiving  them.  We  are 


in 
&*      co 


22  THE  RELATIVITY  OP   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 

compelled  by  our  nature  to  construe  things  to  ourselves 
under  these  forms,  but  they  are  not  forms  of  the  Things. 
The  attributes  exist  only  in  relation  to  us,  and  as  in- 
herent laws  of  the  human  faculties  ;  but  differ  from  Suc- 
cession and  Duration  in  being  laws  of  our  intellectual, 
not  our  sensitive  faculty  ;  technically  termed  Categories 
of  the  Understanding.  Tin's  is  the  doctrine  of  the 
Relativity  of  our  knowledge  as  held  by  Kant,  who  has 
been  followed  in  it  by  many  subsequent  thinkers,  Ger- 
man, English,  and  French. 

By  the  side  of  this  there  is  another  philosophy,  older 
date,  which,  though  temporarily  eclipsed  and  often 
contemptuously  treated  by  it,  is,  according  to  present 
appearances,  likely  to  survive  it.  (Taking  the  same  view 
with  Kant  of  the  unknowableness  of  Things  in  them- 
selves, and  also  agreeing  with  him  that  we  mentally 
invest  the  objects  of  our  perceptions  with  attributes 
which  do  not  all  point,  like  whiteness  and  sweetness,  to 
specific  sensations,  but  are  in  some  cases  constructed 
by  the  mind's  own  laws  ;  this  philosophy,  however,  does 
not  think  it  necessary  to  ascribe  to  the  mind  certain 
innate  forms,  in  which  the  objects  are  (as  it  were) 
moulded  into  these  appearances,  but  holds  that  Place, 
Extension,  Substance,  Cause,  and  the  rest,  are  concep- 
tions put  together  out  of  ideas  of  sensation  by  the  known 
laws  of  association^)  This,  the  doctrine  of  Hartley,  of 
James  Mill,  of  Professor  Bain,  and  other  eminent  think- 
ers, and  which  is  compatible  with  either  the  acceptance 
or  the  rejection  of  the  Berkeleian  theory,  is  the  extreme 
form  of  one  mode  of  the  doctrine  of  Relativity,  as  Kant's 
is  of  another.  (Both  schemes  accept  the  doctrine  in  its 
widest  sense  —  the  entire  inaccessibility  to  our  faculties 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  23 

>f  any  other  knowledge  of  Things   than   that  of  the 
mpressions   which   they  produce   in   our   mental   con- 


ciousness. 

. 


Between  these  there  are  many  intermediate  systems, 
iccording  as  different  thinkers  have  assigned  more  or 
ess  to  the  original  furniture  of  the  mind  on  the  one 
land,  or  to  the  associations  generated  by  experience  on 
he  other.  Brown,  for  example,  regards  our  notion  of 
Space  or  Extension  as  a  product  of  association,  while 
many  of  our  intellectual  ideas  are  regarded  by  him  as 
ultimate  and  undecomposable  facts.  But  he  accepts,  in 
ts  full  extent,  the  doctrine  of  the  Relativity  of  our 
knowledge,  being  of  opinion  that  though  we  are  assured 
f  the  objective  existence  of  a  world  external  to  the 
mind,  our  knowledge  of  that  world  is  absolutely  limited 
o  the  modes  in  which  we  are  affected  by  it.  The  same 
octrine  is  very  impressively  taught  by  one  of  the  acutest 
netaphysicians-  of  recent  times,  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer, 
vho,  in  his  "First  Principles,"  insists  with  equal  force 
pon  the  certainty  of  the  existence  of  Things  in  Them- 
elves,  and  upon  their  absolute  and  eternal  relegation  to 
he  region  of  the  Unknowable.  TJiis  is  also,  appa- 
ently,  the  doctrine  of  Auguste  Comte :  though  while 
maintaining  with  great  emphasis  the  unknowableness  of 
^oumena  by  our  faculties,  his  aversion  to  metaphysics 
invented  him  from  giving  any  definite  opinion  as  to 
heir  real  existence,  which,  however,  his  language  al- 
vays  by  implication  assumes. , 

It  is  obvious  that  what  has  been  said  respecting  the 
unknowableness  of  Things  "  in  themselves,"  forms  no 
bstacle  to  our  ascribing  attributes  or  properties  to  them, 
>rovided  these  are  always  conceived  as  relative  to  us. 


24  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE. 

If  a  thing  produces  effects  of  which  our  sight,  hearing, 
or  touch  can  take  cognizance,  it  follows,  and  indeed  is 
but  the  same  statement  in  other  words,  that  the  thing 
has  power  to  produce  those  effects.  These  various 
powers  are  its  properties,  and  of  such,  an  indefinite  mul- 
titude is  open  to  our  knowledge.  But  this  knowledge  is 
merely  phaenomenal.  ;The  object  is  known  to  us  only  in 
one  special  relation,  namely,  as  that  which  produces,  or 
is  capable  of  producing,  certain  impressions  on  our 
senses  ;  and  all  that  we  really  know  is  these  impressions. 
This  negative  meaning  is  all  that  should  be  understood 
by  the  assertion,  that  we  cannot  know  the  Thing  in 
itself;  that  we  cannot  know  its  inmost  nature  or  es- 
sence..>  The  inmost  nature  or  essence  of  a  Thing  is  apt 
to  be  regarded  as  something  unknown,  which,  if  we 
knew  it,  would  explain  and  account  for  all  the  phenom- 
ena which  the  thing  exhibits  to  us.  But  this  unknown 
something  is  a  supposition  without  evidence.  We  have 
no  ground  for  supposing  that  there  is  anything  which  if 
known  to  us  would  afford  to  our  intellect  this  satisfac- 
tion ;  would  sum  up,  as  it  were,  the  knowable  attributes 
of  the  object  in  a  single  sentence.  Moreover,  if  there 
were  such  a  central  property,  it  would  not  answer  to  the 
idea  of  an  "  inmost  nature ;  "  for  if  knowable  by  any  in- 
telligence, it  must,  like  other  properties,  be  relative  to 
the  intelligence  which  knows  it,  that  is,  it  must  consist 
in  impressing  that  intelligence  in  some  specific  way ;  for 
this  is  the  only  idea  we  have  of  knowing ;  the  only  sense 
in  which  the  verb  "  to  know  "  means  anything. 

It  would,  no  doubt,  be  absurd  to  assume  that  our 
words  exhaust  the  possibilities  of  Being.  There  may  be 
innumerable  modes  of  it  which  are  inaccessible  to  our 


THE   RELATIVITY   OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  25 

faculties,  and  which  consequently  we  are  unable  to  name. 
But  we  ought  not  to  speak  of  these  modes  of  Being  by 
any  of  the  names  we  possess.  These  are  all  inapplica- 
ble, because  they  all  stand  for  known  modes  of  Being. 
We  might  invent  new  names  for  the  unknown  modes ; 
but  the  new  names  would  have  no  more  meaning  than 
the  x,  y,  z,  of  Algebra.  The  only  name  we  can  give 
them  which  really  expresses  an  attribute,  is  the  word 
Unknowable. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Relativity  of  our  knowledge,  in 
the  sense  which  has  now  been  explained,  is  one  of  great 
weight  and  significance,  which  impresses  a  character  on 
the  whole  mode  of  philosophical  thinking  of  whoever 
receives  it,  and  is  the  key-stone  of  one  of  the  only  two 
possible  systems  of  Metaphysics  and  Psychology.  But 
the  doctrine  is  capable  of  being,  and  is,  understood  in  at 
least  two  other  senses.  In  one  of  them,  instead  of  a 
definite  and  important  tenet,  it  means  something  quite 
insignificant,  which  no  one  ever  did  or  could  call  in 
question.  Suppose  a  philosopher  to  maintain  that  cer- 
tain properties  of  objects  are  in  the  Thing,  and  not  in 
our  senses ;  in  the  thing  itself,  not  as  whiteness  may  be 
said  to  be  in  the  Thing  (namely,  that  there  is  in  the 
Thing  a  power  whereby  it  produces  in  us  the  sensation 
of  white) ,  but  in  quite  another  manner ;  and  are  known 
to  us  not  indirectly,  as  the  inferred  causes  of  our  sensa- 
tions, but  by  direct  perception  of  them  in  the  outward 
object.  Suppose  the  same  philosopher,  nevertheless,  to 
affirm  strenuously  that  all  our  knowledge  is  merely 
phenomenal,  and  relative  to  ourselves ;  that  we  do  not 
and  cannot  know  anything  of  outward  objects,  except 
relatively  to  our  own  faculties.  I  think  our  first  feeling 


26  THE  RELATIVITY  OF   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE. 

respecting  a  thinker  who  professed  both  these  doctrines, 
would  be  to  wonder  what  he  could  possibly  mean  by  the 
latter  of  them.  It  would  seem  that  he  must  mean  one 
of  two  trivialities  :  either  that  we  can  only  know  what  we 
have  the  power  of  knowing,  or  else  that  all  our  knowl- 
edge is  relative  to  us,  inasmuch  as  it  is  we  that  know  it. 
There  is  another  mode  of  understanding  the  doctrine 
of  Eelativity,  intermediate  between  these  insignificant 
truisms  and  the  substantial  doctrine  previously  ex- 
pounded. The  position  taken  may  be,  that  perception 
of  Things  as  they  are  in  themselves  is  not  entirely 
denied  to  us,  but  is  so  mixed  and  confused  with  im- 
pressions derived  from  their  action  on  us,  as  to  give  a 
relative  character  to  the  whole  aggregate.  Our  absolute 
knowledge  may  be  vitiated  and  disguised  by  the  presence 
of  a  relative  element.  Our  faculty  (it  may  be  said)  of 
perceiving  things  as  they  are  in  themselves,  though  real, 
has  its  own  laws,  its  own  conditions,  and  necessary  mode 
of  operation :  our  cognitions  consequently  depend,  not 
solely  on  the  nature  of  the  things  to  be  known,  but  also 
on  that  of  the  knowing  faculty,  as  our  sight  depends  not 
solely  upon  the  object  seen,  but  upon  that  together  with 
the  structure  of  the  eye.  If  the  eye  were  not  achromatic, 
we  should  see  all  visible  objects  with  colors  derived  from 
the  organ,  as  well  as  with  those  truly  emanating  from 
the  object.  Supposing,  therefore,  that  Things  in  them- 
selves are  the  natural  and  proper  object  of  our  knowing 
faculty,  and  that  this  faculty  carries  to  the  mind  a  report 
of  what  is  in  the  Thing  itself,  apart  from  its  effects  on 
us,  there  would  still  be  a  portion  of  uncertainty  in  these 
reports,  inasmuch  as  we  could  not  be  sure  that  the  eye 
of  our  mind  is  achromatic,  and  that  the  message  it 


THE  RELATIVITY  OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE.  27 

brings  from  the  Noumenon  does  not  arrive  tinged  and 
alsified,  in  an  unknown  degree,  through  an  influence 
trising  from  the  necessary  conditions  of  the  mind's  ac- 
ion.     We  may,  in  short,  be  looking  at  Things  in  them- 
selves, but  through  imperfect  glasses  :  what  we  see  may 
>e  the  very  Thing,  but  the  colors  and  forms  which  the 
lass  conveys  to  us  may  be  partly  an  optical  illusion. 
This  is  a  possible  opinion :  and  one  who,  holding  this 
opinion,  should  speak  of  the  Relativity  of  our  knowl- 
edge, would  not  use  the  term  wholly  without  meaning. 
But  he  could  not,  consistently,  assert  that  all  our  knowl- 
edge is  relative  ;  since  his  opinion  would  be  that  we  have 
a  capacity  of  Absolute  knowledge,  but  that  we  are  liable 
to  mistake  relative  knowledge  for  it. 

In  which,  if  in  any,  of  these  various  meanings,  was 
the  doctrine  of  Relativity  held  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton? 
To  this  question,  a  more  puzzling  one  than  might  have 
been  expected,  we  shall  endeavor  in  the  succeeding 
chapter  to  find  an  answer. 


28  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE, 


CHAPTER  HI. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN  KNOWL- 
EDGE,  AS    HELD   BY   SIR   WILLIAM   HAMILTON. 

IT  is  hardly  possible  to  affirm  more  strongly  or  more 
explicitly  than  Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  done,  that  Things 
in  themselves  are  to  us  altogether  unknowable,  and  that 
all  we  can  know  of  any  thing  is  its  relation  to  us,  com- 
posed of,  and  limited  to,  the  Phenomena  which  it 
exhibits  to  our  organs.  Let  me  cite  a  passage  from  one 
of  the  Appendices  to  the  "Discussions."  * 

"  Our  whole  knowledge  of  mind  and  of  matter  is 
relative,  conditioned  —  relatively  conditioned.  Of  things 
absolutely  or  in  themselves,  be  they  external,  be  they 
internal,  we  know  nothing,  or  know  them  only  as  incog- 
nizable ;  and  become  aware  of  their  incomprehensible 
existence,  only  as  this  is  indirectly  and  accidentally 
revealed  to  us,  through  certain  qualities  related  to  our 
faculties  of  knowledge,  and  which  qualities,  again,  we 
cannot  think  as  unconditioned,  irrelative,  existent  in  and 
of  themselves.  All  that  we  know  is  therefore  phenome- 
nal,—  phaenomenal  of  the  unknown.  .  .  .  Nor  is  this 
denied ;  for  it  has  been  commonly  confessed,  that,  as 
substances,  we  know  not  what  is  Matter,  and  are 
ignorant  of  what  is  Mind." 

This  passage  might  be  matched  by  many  others, 
equally  emphatic,  and  in  appearance  equally  decisive, 

*  "  Discussions  on  Philosophy,"  p.  643. 


AS   HELD  BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  29 

several  of  which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  quote.  Yet  in 
the  sense  which  the  author's  phrases  seem  to  convey  — 
in  the  only  substantial  meaning  capable  of  being 
attached  to  them  —  the  doctrine  they  assert  was  cer- 
tainly not  held  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  He  by  no  means 
admits  that  we  know  nothing  of  objects,  except  their 
existence,  and  the  impressions  produced  by  them  upon 
the  human  mind.  He  affirms  this  in  regard  to  what 
have  been  called  by  metaphysicians  the  Secondary 
Qualities  of  Matter,  but  denies  it  of  the  Primary. 

On  this  point  his  declarations  are  very  explicit.  One 
of  the  most  elaborate  of  his  Dissertations  on  Reid  is 
devoted  to  expounding  the  distinction.  The  Dissertation 
begins  thus :  * 

"The  developed  doctrine  of  Eeal  Presentationism, 
the  basis  of  Natural  Realism"  (the  doctrine  of  the 
author  himself) ,  "  asserts  the  consciousness  or  immediate 
perception  of  certain  essential  attributes  of  Matter  ob- 
jectively existing ;  while  it  admits  that  other  properties 
of  body  are  unknown  in  themselves,  and  only  inferred  as 
causes  to  account  for  certain  subjective  affections  of 
which  we  are  cognizant  in  ourselves.  This  discrimina- 
tion, which  to  other  systems  is  contingent,  superficial, 
extraneous,  but  to  Natural  Realism  necessary,  radical, 
intrinsic,  coincides  with  what  since  the  time  of  Locke 
has  been  generally  known  as  the  distinction  of  the 
Qualities  of  Matter  or  Body,  using  these  terms  as  con- 
vertible, into  Primary  and  Secondary." 

Further  on,f  he  states,  in  additional  development  of 

*  Dissertations  appended  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Edition  of  Reid's  Works, 
p.  825. 
t  Ibid.  p.  842. 

VOL.  i.  2 


80  THE  RELATIVITY  OP  HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE, 

so-called  Natural  Realism,  "  that  we  have  not  merely  a 
notion,  a  conception,  an  imagination,  a  subjective  repre- 
sentation—  of  Extension,  for  example  —  called  up  or 
suggested  in  some  incomprehensible  manner  to  the  mind, 
on  occasion  of  an  extended  object  being  presented  to  the 
sense ;  but  that  in  the  perception  of  such  an  object  we 
really  have,  as  by  nature  we  believe  we  have,  an  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  that  external  object  as  extended." 

"If*  we  are  not  percipient  of  any  extended  reality, 
we  are  not  percipient  of  body  as  existing ;  for  body 
exists,  and  can  only  be  known  immediately  and  in  itself, 
as  extended.  The  material  world,  on  this  supposition, 
sinks  into  something  unknown  and  problematical ;  and 
its  existence,  if  not  denied,  can,  at  least,  be  only 
precariously  affirmed,  as  the  occult  cause,  or  incom- 
prehensible occasion,  of  certain  subjective  affections  we 
experience  in  the  form  either  of  a  sensation  of  the 
secondary  quality  or  of  a  perception  of  the  primary." 

Not  only,  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  opinion,  do  we  know, 
by  direct  consciousness  or  perception,  certain  propensities 
of  Things  as  they  exist  in  the  Things  themselves,  but 
we  may  also  know  those  properties  as  in  the  Things,  by 
demonstration  d  priori.  tf  The  notion  f  of  body  being 
given,  every  primary  quality  is  to  be  evolved  out  of  that 
notion,  as  necessarily  involved  in  it,  independently  alto- 
gether of  any  experience  of  sense."  "TheJ  Primary 
Qualities  may  be  deduced  d  priori,  the  bare  notion  of 
matter  being  given  ;  they  being,  in  fact,  only  evolutions 
of  the  conditions  which  that  notion  necessarily  implies." 
He  goes  so  far  as  to  say,  that  our  belief  of  the  Primary 
Qualities  is,  not  merely  necessary  as  involved  in  a  fact 

*  Dissertations,  p.  842.  f  Ibid.  p.  844.  J  Ibid.  p.  846. 


AS  HELD   BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  31 

of  which  we  have  a  direct  perception,  but  necessary  in 
itself,  by  our  mental  constitution.  He  speaks  *  of  "  that 
absolute  or  insuperable  resistance  which  we  are  compelled, 
independently  of  experience,  to  think  that  every  part  of 
matter  would  oppose  to  any  attempt  to  deprive  it  of  its 
space,  by  compressing  it  into  an  inextended." 

The  following  is  still  more  specific,  f  "  The  Primary  " 
Qualities  "  are  apprehended  as  they  are  in  bodies ;  the 
Secondary,  as  they  are  in  us  ;  the  Secundo-primary  "  (a 
third  class  created  by  himself,  comprising  the  mechani- 
cal as  distinguished  from  the  geometrical  properties  of 
Body) ,"  as  they  are  in  bodies  and  as  they  are  in  us.  ... 
We  know  the  Primary  qualities  immediately  as  objects 
of  perception ;  the  Secundo-primary  both  immediately 
as  objects  of  perception  and  mediately  as  causes  of  sensa- 
tion ;  the  Secondary  only  mediately  as  causes  of  sensation. 
In  other  words  :  The  Primary  are  known  immediately  in 
themselves ;  the  Secundo-primary,  both  immediately  in 
themselves  and  mediately  in  their  effects  on  us ;  the 
Secondary,  only  mediately,  in  their  effects  on  us.  ... 
We  are  conscious,  as  objects,  in  the  Primary  Qualities, 
of  the  modes  of  a  not-self;  in  the  Secondary,  of  the 
modes  of  self;  in  the  Secundo-primary,  of  the  modes 
of  self  and  of  a  not-self  at  once." 

There  is  nothing  wonderful  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
entertaining  these  opinions  ;  they  are  held  by  perhaps  a 
majority  of  metaphysicians.  But  it  is  surprising  that, 
entertaining  them,  he  should  have  believed  himself,  and 
been  believed  by  others,  to  maintain  the  Relativity  of  all 
our  knowledge.  What  he  deems  to  be  relative,  in  any 
sense  of  the  term  that  is  not  insignificant,  is  only  our 

*  Dissertations,  p.  848.  t  Ibid.  pp.  857,  858. 


32  THE  RELATIVITY  OP  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE, 

knowledge  of  the  Secondary  Qualities  of  objects.  Exten- 
sion and  the  other  Primary  Qualities  he  positively  asserts 
that  we  have  an  immediate  intuition  of,  "  as  they  are  in 
bodies  " — "  as  modes  of  a  not-self;  "  in  express  contradis- 
tinction to  being  known  merely  as  causes  of  certain 
impressions  on  our  senses  or  on  our  minds.  As  there 
cannot  have  been,  in  his  own  thoughts,  a  flat  contradic- 
tion between  what  he  would  have  admitted  to  be  the  two 
cardinal  doctrines  of  his  philosophy,  the  only  question 
that  can  arise  is,  which  of  the  two  is  to  be  taken  in  a 
non-natural  sense.  Is  it  the  doctrine  that  we  know 
certain  properties  as  they  are  in  the  Things  ?  Were  we 
to  judge  from  a  foot-note  to  the  same  Dissertation,  we 
might  suppose  so.  He  there  observes* — "In  saying 
that  a  thing  is  known  in  itself,  I  do  not  mean  that  this 
object  is  known  in  its  absolute  existence,  that  is,  out  of 
relation  to  us.  This  is  impossible ;  for  our  knowledge 
is  only  of  the  relative.  To  know  a  thing  in  itself  or 
immediately,  is  an  expression  I  use  merely  in  contrast  to 
the  knowledge  of  a  thing  in  a  representation,  or  medi- 
ately :  "  in  other  words,  he  merely  means  that  we  perceive 
objects  directly,  and  not  through  the  species  sensibiles 
of  Lucretius,  the  Ideas  of  Berkeley,  or  the  Mental 
Modifications  of  Brown.  Let  us  suppose  tlu's  granted, 
and  that  the  knowledge  we  have  of  objects  is  gained  by 
direct  perception.  Still  the  question  has  to  be  answered 
whether  the  knowledge  so  acquired  is  of  the  objects  as 
they  are  in  themselves,  or  only  as  they  are  relatively  to 
us.  Now,  what,  according  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  is  this 
knowledge  ?  Is  it  a  knowledge  of  the  Thing,  merely  in 
its  effects  on  us,  or  is  it  a  knowledge  of  somewhat  in  the 

*P.866. 


A3  HELD  BY  SIB  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  33 

Thing,  ulterior  to  any  effect  on  us  ?  He  asserts  in  the 
plainest  terms  that  it  is  the  latter.  Then  it  is  not  a 
knowledge  wholly  relative  to  us.  If  what  we  perceive 
in  the  Thing  is  something  of  which  we  are  only  aware 
as  existing,  and  as  causing  impressions  on  us,  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  Thing  is  only  relative.  But  if  what  we 
perceive  and  cognize  is  not  merely  a  cause  of  our  sub- 
jective impressions,  but  a  Thing  possessing,  in  its  own 
nature  and  essence,  a  long  list  of  properties,  Extension, 
Impenetrability,  Number,  Magnitude,  Figure,  Mobility, 
Position,  all  perceived  as  "essential  attributes"  of  the 
Thing  as  "  objectively  existing "  —  all  as  "  Modes  of  a 
Not-Self,"  and  by  no  means  as  an  occult  cause  or  causes 
of  any  Modes  of  Self  (and  that  such  is  the  case  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  asserts  in  every  form  of  language,  leaving 
no  stone  unturned  to  make  us  apprehend  the  breadth  of 
the  distinction)  —  then  I  am  willing  to  believe  that  in 
affirming  this  knowledge  to  be  entirely  relative  to  Self, 
such  a  thinker  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton  had  a  meaning,  but 
I  have  no  small  difficulty  in  discovering  what  it  is. 

The  place  where  we  should  expect  to  find  this  difficulty 
cleared  up,  is  the  formal  exposition  of  the  Relativity  of 
Human  Knowledge,  in  the  first  volume  of  the  Lectures. 

He  declares  his  intention  *  of  "  now  stating  and  ex- 
plaining the  great  axiom  that  all  human  knowledge, 
consequently  that  all  human  philosophy,  is  only  of  the 
relative  or  phenomenal.  In  this  proposition,  the  term 
relative  is  opposed  to  the  term  absolute;  and  therefore, 
in  saying  that  we  know  only  the  relative,  I  virtually 
assert  that  we  know  nothing  absolute, — nothing  exist- 
ing absolutely,  that  is,  in  and  for  itself,  and  without 

*  Lectures,  i.  136-8. 


34  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE, 

relation  to  us  and  our  faculties.  I  shall  illustrate  this  by 
its  application.  Our  knowledge  is  either  of  matter  or 
of  mind.  Now,  what  is  matter?  What  do  we  know 
of  matter?  Matter,  or  body,  is  to  us  the  name  either  of 
something  known,  or  of  something  unknown.  In  so  far 
as  matter  is  a  name  for  something  known,  it  means  that 
wluch  appears  to  us  under  the  forms  of  extension,  solid- 
ity, divisibility,  figure,  motion,  roughness,  smoothness, 
color,  heat,  cold,  &c.  ;  in  short,  it  is  a  common  name 
for  a  certain  series,  or  aggregate,  or  complement  of 
appearances  or  phenomena  manifested  in  coexistence. 

"But  as  these  phenomena  appear  only  in  conjunction, 
we  are  compelled  by  the  constitution  of  our  nature  to 
think  them  conjoined  in  and  by  something ;  and  as  they 
are  phenomena,  we  cannot  think  them  the  phenomena 
of  nothing,  but  must  regard  them  as  the  properties  or 
qualities  of  something  that  is  extended,  solid,  figured, 
&c.  But  this  something,  absolutely  and  in  itself,  i.  e., 
considered  apart  from  its  phenomena  —  is  to  us  as  zero. 
It  is  only  in  its  qualities,  only  in  its  effects,  in  its  rela- 
tive or  phenomenal  existence,  that  it  is  cognizable  or 
conceivable ;  and  it  is  only  by  a  law  of  thought  which 
compels  us  to  think  something  absolute  and  unknown, 
as  the  basis  or  condition  of  the  relative  and  known,  that 
this  something  obtains  a  kind  of  incomprehensible  reality 
to  us.  Now,  that  which  manifests  its  qualities  —  in 
other  words,  that  in  which  the  appearing  causes  inhere, 
that  to  which  they  belong  —  is  called  their  subject, 
or  substance,  or  substratum.  To  this  subject  of  the 
phenomena  of  extension,  solidity,  &c.,  the  term  matter, 
or  material  substance,  is  commonly  given ;  and  there- 
fore, as  contradistinguished  from  these  qualities,  it  is  the 
name  of  something  unknown  and  inconceivable. 


AS   HELD   BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON.  35 

"  The  same  is  true  in  regard  to  the  term  mind.  In 
so  far  as  mind  is  the  common  name  for  the  states  of 
knowing,  willing,  feeling,  desiring,  <fec.,  of  which  I  am 
conscious,  it  is  only  the  name  for  a  certain  series  of 
connected  phasnomena  or  qualities,  and,  consequently, 
expresses  only  what  is  known.  But  in  so  far  as  it 
denotes  that  subject  or  substance  in  which  the  phenom- 
ena of  knowing,  willing,  &c.,  inhere,  —  something  be- 
hind or  under  these  phenomena,  —  it  expresses  what,  in 
itself  or  in  its  absolute  existence,  is  unknown. 

"Thus,  mind  and  matter,  as  known  or  knowable,  are 
only  two  different  series  of  phenomena  or  qualities ; 
mind  and  matter,  as  unknown  and  unknowable,  are  the 
two  substances  in  which  these  two  different  series  of 
phenomena  or  qualities  are  supposed  to  inhere.  The 
existence  of  an  unknown  substance  is  only  an  infer- 
ence we  are  compelled  to  make  from  the  existence  of 
known  phenomena;  and  the  distinction  of  two  sub- 
stances is  only  inferred  from  the  seeming  incompatibility 
of  the  two  series  of  phenomena  to  coinhere  in  one. 

"Our  whole  knowledge  of  mind  and  matter  is  thus, 
as  we  have  said,  only  relative  ;  of  existence,  absolutely 
and  in  itself,  we  know  nothing  :  and  we  may  say  of  man 
what  Virgil  said  of  ./Eneas,  contemplating  in  the  pro- 
phetic sculpture  of  his  shield  the  future  glories  of 
Rome  — 

"  Rerumque  ignarus,  imagine  gaudet." 

Here  is  an  exposition  of  the  nature  and  limits  of  our 
knowledge  which  would  have  satisfied  Hartley,  Brown, 
and  even  Comte.  It  cannot  be  more  explicitly  laid 
down,  that  Matter,  as  known  to  us,  is  but  the  incom- 


36  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE, 

prehensible  and  incognizable  basis  or  substratum  of  a 
bundle  of  sensible  qualities,  appearances,  phenomena ; 
that  we  know  it  w  only  in  its  effects  ;  "  that  its  very  exist- 
ence is  "  only  an  inference  we  are  compelled  to  make  " 
from  those  sensible  appearances  ;  a  doctrine,  by  the  way, 
which,  under  the  name  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  is 
elsewhere  the  object  of  some  of  his  most  cutting  attacks. 
On  the  subject  of  Mind,  again,  could  it  have  been  more 
explicitly  affirmed,  that  all  we  know  of  Mind  is  its 
successive  states  "  of  knowing,  willing,  feeling,  desiring, 
<&c.,"  and  that  Mind,  considered  as  "something  behind 
or  under  these  phenomena,"  is  to  us  unknowable? 

Subsequently  he  says,  that  not  only  all  the  knowl- 
edge we  have  of  anything,  but  all  which  we  could  have 
if  we  were  a  thousandfold  better  endowed  than  we  are, 
would  still  be  only  knowledge  of  the  mode  in  which  the 
thing  would  affect  us.  Had  we  as  many  senses  (the 
illustration  is  his  own)  as  the  inhabitants  of  Sirius,  in 
the  "  Micro megas  "  of  Voltaire ;  were  there,  as  there 
may  well  be,  a  thousand  modes  of  real  existence  as 
definitely  distinguished  from  one  another  as  are  those 
which  manifest  themselves  to  our  present  senses,  and 
"  had  we,*  for  each  of  these  thousand  modes,  a  separate 
organ  competent  to  make  it  known  to  us,  —  still  would 
our  whole  knowledge  be,  as  it  is  at  present,  only  of  the 
relative.  Of  existence,  absolutely  and  in  itself,  we 
should  then  be  as  ignorant  as  we  are  now.  We  should 
still  apprehend  existence  only  in  certain  special  modes  — 
onlj  in  certain  relations  to  our  faculties  of  knowledge." 
(Nothing  can  be  truerjor  more  clearly  stated  than  all 
this :  but  the  clearer  it  is,  the  more  irreconcilable  docs 

*  Lectures,  i.  153. 


AS   HELD   BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  87 

it  appear  with  our  author's  doctrine  of  the  direct  cog- 
noscibility  of  the  Primary  Qualities.  If  it  be  true  that 
Extension,  Figure,  and  the  other  qualities  enumerated, 
are  known  "  immediately  in  themselves,"  and  not,  like 
Secondary  qualities,  "  in  their  effects  on  us  ;  "  if  the  for- 
mer are  "apprehended  as  they  are  in  bodies,"  and  not, 
like  the  Secondary,  "  as  they  are  in  us  ;  "  if  it  is  these 
last  exclusively  that  are  "  unknown  in  themselves,  and 
only  inferred  as  causes  to  account  for  certain  subjective 
affections  in  ourselves ; "  while,  of  the  former,  we  are 
immediately  conscious  as  "  attributes  of  matter  objec- 
tively existing ; "  and  if  it  is  not  to  be  endured  that 
matter  should  "  sink  into  something  unknown  and 
problematical,"  whose  existence  "  can  be  only  precari- 
ously affirmed  as  the  occult  cause  or  incomprehensible 
occasion  of  certain  subjective  affections  we  experience 
in  the  form  either  of  a  sensation  of  the  secondary  qual- 
ity or  of  a  perception  of  the  primary  "  (being  precisely 
what  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  in  the  preceding  quotations, 
appeared  to  say  that  it  is)  ;  if  these  things  be  so,  our 
faculties,  as  far  as  the  Primary  Qualities  are  concerned, 
do  cognize  and  know  Matter  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  not 
merely  as  an  unknowable  and  incomprehensible  substra- 
tum ;  they  do  cognize  and  know  it  as  it  exists  absolutely, 
and  not  merely  in  relation  to  us ;  it  is  krown  to  us 
directly,  and  not  as  a  mere  "inference"  from  Phae- 
nomena. 

Will  it  be  said  that  the  attributes  of  extension,  figure, 
number,  magnitude,  and  the  rest,  though  known  as  in 
the  Things  themselves,  are  yet  known  only  relatively 
to  us,  because  it  is  by  our  faculties  that  we  know  them, 
and  because  appropriate  faculties  are  the  necessary  con- 

2* 


38  THE  RELATIVITY  OF   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE, 

dition  of  knowledge?  If  so,  the  "great  axiom"  of 
Relativity  is  reduced  to  this,  that  we  can  know  Things 
as  they  are  in  themselves,  but  can  know  no  more  of 
them  than  our  faculties  are  competent  to  inform  us  of. 
If  such  be  the  meaning  of  Relativity,  our  author  might 
well  maintain*  that  it  is  a  truth  "  harmoniously  re-echoed 
by  every  philosopher  of  every  school ; "  nor  need  he 
have  added  "with  the  exception  of  a  few  late  Abso- 
lute theorizers  in  Germany ; "  for  certainly  neither 
Schelling  nor  Hegel  claims  for  us  any  other  knowledge 
than  such  as  our  faculties  are,  in  their  opinion,  compe- 
tent to  give. 

Is  it  possible,  that  by  knowledge  of  qualities  "  as 
they  are  in  Bodies,"  no  more  was  meant  than  knowing 
that  the  Body  must  have  qualities  whereby  it  produces 
the  affection  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  ourselves  ? 
But  this  is  the  very  knowledge  which  our  author  pred- 
icates of  Secondary  Qualities,  as  contradistinguished 
from  the  Primary.  Secondary  he  frankjy  acknowledges 
to  be  occult  qualities  :  we  really,  in  his  opinion,  have  no 
knowledge,  and  no  conception,  what  that  is  in  an  object, 
by  virtue  of  which  it  has  its  specific  smell  or  taste.  But 
Primary  qualities,  according  to  him,  we  know  all  about : 
there  is  nothing  occult  or  mysterious  to  us  in  these  ;  we 
perceive  and  conceive  them  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
and  as  they  are  in  the  body  they  belong  to.  They  are 
manifested  to  us,  not,  like  the  Secondary  qualities,  only 
in  their  effects,  in  the  sensations  they  excite  in  us,  but  in 
their  own  nature  and  essence. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  surmised,  that  in  calling  knowledge 
of  this  sort  by  the  epithet  Relative,  Sir  W.  Hamilton 

*  Discnss'.ons,  Appendix,  p.  644. 


AS   HELD  BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON^  39 

meant  that  though  we  know  those  qualities  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  we  only  discover  them  through  their  relation 
to  certain  effects  in  us ;  that  in  order  that  there  may  be 
Perception  there  must  also  be  Sensation ;  and  we  thus 
know  the  Primary  Qualities,  in  their  effects  on  us  and 
also  in  themselves.  But  neither  will  this  explanation 
serve.  This  theory  of  Primary  Qualities  does  not  clash 
with  the  Secondary,  but  it  runs  against  the  Secundo- 
primary.  It  is  this  third  class,  which,  as  he  told  us,  are 
known  "  both  immediately  in  themselves  and  mediately 
in  their  effects  on  us."  The  Primary  are  only  known 
"immediately  in  themselves."  He  has  thus  with  his  own 
hands  deliberately  extruded  from  our  knowledge  of  the 
Primary  qualities  the  element  of  relativity  to  us  :  -£  ex- 
cept, to  be  sure,  in  the  acceptation  in  which  knowing  is 
itself  a  relation,  inasmuch  as  it  implies  a  knower ; 
whereby  instead  of  the  doctrine  that  Things  in  them- 
selves are  not  possible  objects  of  knowledge,  we  obtain 
the  "great  axiom"  that  they  cannot  be  known  unless 
there  is  somebody  to  know  them. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  suspected  (and  some  phrases  in  the 
longest  of  our  extracts  might  countenance  the  idea)  that 
in  calling  our  knowledge  relative,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  was 
not  thinking  of  the  knowledge  of  qualities,  but  of  Sub- 
stances, of  Matter  and  Mind ;  and  meant  that  qualities 
might  be  cognized  absolutely,  but  that  Substances  being 
only  known  through  their  qualities,  the  knowledge  of 
Substances  can  only  be  regarded  as  relative.  But  this 
interpretation  of  his  doctrine  is  again  inadmissible.  For 
the  relativity  of  which  he  is  continually  speaking  is 
relativity  to  us,  while  the  relativity  which  this  theory 
ascribes  to  Substances  is  relativity  to  their  attributes; 


40  THE  RELATIVITY  OF  HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE, 

and  if  the  attributes  are  known  otherwise  than  relatively 
to  us,  so  must  the  substances  be.  Besides,  we  have  seen 
him  asserting  the  necessary  relativity  of  our  knowledge 
of  Attributes,  no  less  positively  than  of  Substances. 
Speaking  of  Things  in  themselves,  we  found  him  saying 
that  we  "  become  aware  of  their  incomprehensible  exist- 
ence only  as  this  is  revealed  to  us  through  certain 
qualities  .  .  .  which  qualities,  again,  we  cannot  think 
as  unconditioned,  irrelative,  existent  in  and  of  them- 
selves." There  is  no  reservation  here  in  favor  of  the 
Primary  Qualities.  Whatever,  in  his  theory,  was  meant 
by  relativity  of  knowledge,  he  intended  it  of  qualities 
as  much  as  of  substances,  of  Primary  Qualities  as  much 
as  of  Secondary. 

Can  any  light  be  derived  from  the  statement  that  we 
do  not  know  any  qualities  of  things  except  those  which 
are  in  connection  with  our  faculties,  or,  as  our  author 
expresses  it  (surely  by  a  very  strained  use  of  language) , 
which  are  "  analogous  to  our  faculties  "  ?  *  If,  by  "  our 
faculties,"  is  to  be  understood  our  knowing  faculty,  this 
proposition  is  but  the  trivial  one  already  noticed,  that 
we  can  know  only  what  we  can  know.  And  this  is  what 
the  author  actually  seems  to  mean ;  for  in  a  sentence 
immediately  following  f  he  paraphrases  the  expression 
"analogous  to  our  faculties,"  by  the  phrase  that  we  must 
"  possess  faculties  accommodated  to  their  apprehension." 
To  be  able  to  see,  we  must  have  a  faculty  accommodated 
to  seeing.  Is  this  what  we  are  intended  to  understand 
by  the  "  great  axiom  "  ? 

But  if  "  our  faculties  "  does  not  here  mean  our  know- 
ing faculty,  it  must  mean  our  sensitive  faculties ;  and 

*  Lectures,  i.  141,  153.  f  P-  153. 


AS   HELD   BY  SIR   WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  41 

the  statement  is,  that  to  be  known  by  us,  a  quality  must 
be  "analogous"  (meaning,  I  suppose,  related)  to  our 
senses.  But  what  is  meant  by  being  related  to  our 
senses?  That  it  must  be  fitted  to  give  us  sensations. 
We  thus  return  as  before  to  an  identical  proposition. 

The  conclusion  I  cannot  help  drawing  from  this  col- 
lation of  passages  is,  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  either  never 
held,  or,  when  he  wrote  the  Dissertations,  had  ceased  to 
hold,  the  doctrine  for  which  he  has  been  so  often  praised, 
and  nearly  as  often  attacked,  — the  Relativity  of  Human 
Knowledge.  He  certainly  did  sincerely  believe  that  he 
held  it.  But  he  repudiated  it  in  every  sense  which 
makes  it  other  than  a  barren  truism.  In  the  only  mean- 
ing in  which  he  really  maintained  it,  there  is  nothing  to 
maintain.  It  is  an  identical  proposition  and  nothing 
more. 

And  to  this,  or  something  next  to  this,  he  openly 
reduces  it  in  the  summary  with  which  he  concludes  its 
exposition.  "  From  what  has  been  said,"  he  observes,* 
"you  will  be  able,  I  hope,  to  understand  what  is  meant 
by  the  proposition,  that  all  our  knowledge  is  only  rela- 
tive. It  is  relative,  1st.  Because  existence  is  not  cog- 
nizable, absolutely  in  itself,  but  only  in  special  modes ; 
2d.  Because  these  modes  can  be  known  only  if  they 
stand  in  a  certain  relation  to  our  faculties."  Whoever 
can  find  anything  more  in  these  two  statements,  than 
that  we  do  not  know  all  about  a  Thing,  but  only  as 
much  about  it  as  we  are  capable  of  knowing,  is  more 
ingenious  or  more  fortunate  than  myself. 

He  adds,  however,  to  these  reasons  why  our  knowl- 
edge is  only  relative,  a  third  reason.  "  3d.  Because  the 

*  Lectures,  i.  148. 


42  THE  RELATIVITY   OF   HUMAN  KNOWLEDGE, 

modes,  thus  relative  to  our  faculties,  are  assented  to, 
and  known  by,  the  mind  only  under  modifications  deter- 
mined by  those  faculties  themselves."  Of  this  addition 
to  the  theory  we  took  notice  near  the  conclusion  of  the 
preceding  chapter.  It  shall  have  the  advantage  of  a 
fuller  explanation  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  words. 

"  In  *  the  perception  of  an  external  object,  the  mind 
does  not  know  it  in  immediate  relation  to  itself,  but 
mediately,  in  relation  to  the  material  organs  of  sense. 
If,  therefore,  we  were  to  throw  these  organs  out  of 
consideration,  and  did  not  take  into  account  what  they 
contribute  to,  and  how  they  modify,  our  knowledge  of 
that  object,  it  is  evident  that  our  conclusion  in  regard 
to  the  nature  of  external  perception  would  be  erroneous. 
Again,  an  object  of  perception  may  not  even  stand  in 
immediate  relation  to  the  organ  of  sense,  but  may  make 
its  impression  on  that  organ  through  an  intervening 
medium.  Now,  if  this  medium  be  thrown  out  of  ac- 
count, and  if  it  be  not  considered  that  the  real  external 
object  is  the  sum  of  all  that  externally  contributes  to 
affect  the  sense,  we  shall,  in  like  manner,  run  into  error. 
For  example,  I  see  a  book  —  I  see  that  book  through 
an  external  medium  (what  that  medium  is,  we  do  not 
now  inquire) ,  and  I  see  it  through  my  organ  of  sight, 
the  eye.  Now,  as  the  full  object  presented  to  the  mind 
(observe  that  I  say  the  mind)  in  perception,  is  an  object 
compounded  of  the  external  object  emitting  or  reflecting 
light,  i.  e.,  modifying  the  external  medium  —  of  this 
external  medium  —  and  of  the  living  organ  of  sense, 
in  their  mutual  relation,  let  us  suppose,  in  the  example 
I  have  taken,  that  the  full  or  adequate  object  perceived 
*  Lectures,  i.  pp.  146-148. 


AS   HELD   BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  43 

is  equal  to  twelve,  and  that  this  amount  is  made  up  of 
three  several  parts,  of  four,  contributed  by  the  book, — 
of  four,  contributed  by  all  that  intervenes  between  the 
book  and  the  organ.  —  and  of  four,  contributed  by  the 
living  organ  itself.  I  use  this  illustration  to  show  that 
the  phenomenon  of  the  external  object  is  not  presented 
immediately  to  the  mind,  but  is  known  by  it  only  as 
modified  through  certain  intermediate  agencies ;  and  to 
show,  that  sense  itself  may  be  a  source  of  error,  if  we 
do  not  analyze  and  distinguish  what  elements,  in  an 
act  of  perception,  belong  to  the  outward  reality,  what 
to  the  outward  medium,  and  what  to  the  action  of  sense 
itself.  But  this  source  of  error  is  not  limited  to  our 
perceptions :  and  we  are  liable  to  be  deceived,  not 
merely  by  not  distinguishing  in  an  act  of  knowledge 
what  is  contributed  by  sense,  but  by  not  distinguishing 
what  is  contributed  by  the  mind  itself.  This  is  the 
most  difficult  and  important  function  of  philosophy ; 
and  the  greater  number  of  its  higher  problems  arise  in 
the  attempt  to  determine  the  shares  to  which  the  know- 
ing subject,  and  the  object  known,  may  pretend  in  the 
total  act  of  cognition.  For  according  as  we  attribute 
a  larger  or  a  smaller  proportion  to  each,  we  either  run 
into  the  extremes  of  Idealism  and  Materialism,  or  main- 
tain an  equilibrium  between  the  two." 

The  proposition,  that  our  cognitions  of  objects  are 
only  in  part  dependent  on  the  objects  themselves,  and  in 
part  on  elements  superadded  by  our  organs  or  by  our 
minds,  is  not  identical,  nor  prim  a  facie  absurd.  It  can- 
not, however,  warrant  the  assertion  that  all  our  knowl- 
edge, but  only  that  the  part  so  added,  is  relative.  If  our 
author  had  gone  as  far  as  Kant,  and  had  said  that  all 


44  THE  RELATIVITY  OF   HUMAN   KNOWLEDGE, 

which  constitutes  knowledge  is  put  in  by  the  mind  itself, 
he  would  have  really  held,  in  one  of  its  forms,  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Relativity  of  our  knowledge.  But  what  he 
does  say,  far  from  implying  that  the  whole  of  our  knowl- 
edge is  relative,  distinctly  imports  that  all  of  it  which  is 
real  and  authentic  is  the  reverse.  If  any  part  of  what 
we  fancy  that  we  perceive  in  the  objects  themselves, 
originates  in  the  perceiving  organs  or  in  the  cognizing 
mind,  thus  much  is  purely  relative ;  but  since,  by  sup- 
position, it  does  not  all  so  originate,  the  part  that  does 
not,  is  as  much  absolute  as  if  it  were  not  liable  to  be 
mixed  up  with  these  delusive  subjective  impressions. 
The  admixture  of  the  relative  element  not  only  does  not 
take  away  the  absolute  character  of  the  remainder,  but 
does  not  even  (if  our  author  is  right)  prevent  us  from 
recognizing  it.  The  confusion,  according  to  him,  is  not 
inextricable.  It  is  for  us  to  "analyze  and  distinguish 
what  elements "  in  an  "  act  of  knowledge "  are  con- 
tributed by  the  object,  and  what  by  our  organs,  or  by 
the  mind.  We  may  neglect  to  do  this,  and  as  far  as  the 
mind's  share  is  concerned,  can  only  do  it  by  the  help  of 
philosophy ;  but  it  is  a  task  to  which  in  his  opinion 
philosophy  is  equal.  By  thus  stripping  off  such  of  the 
elements  in  our  apparent  cognitions  of  Things  as  are  but 
cognitions  of  something  in  us,  and  consequently  rela- 
tive, we  may  succeed  in  uncovering  the  pure  nucleus, 
the  direct  intuitions  of  Things  in  themselves ;  as  wre 
correct  the  observed  positions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  by 
allowing  for  the  error  due  to  the  refracting  influence  of 
the  atmospheric  medium,  an  influence  which  does  not 
alter  the  facts,  but  only  our  perception  of  them. 

It  has  thus  been  shown,  by  accumulated  proof,  that 


AS   HELD   BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  45 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  did  not  hold  any  opinion  in  virtue  of 
which  it  could  rationally  be  asserted  that  all  human 
knowledge  is  relative ;  but  did  hold,  as  one  of  the  main 
elements  of  his  philosophical  creed,  the  opposite  doc- 
trine, of  the  cognoscibility  of  external  Things,  in  certain 
of  their  aspects,  as  they  are  in  themselves,  absolutely. 

But  if  this  be  true,  what  becomes  of  his  dispute  with 
Cousin,  and  with  Cousin's  German  predecessors  and 
teachers?  That  celebrated  controversy  surely  meant 
something.  Where  there  was  so  much  smoke  there 
must  have  been  some  fire.  Some  difference  of  opinion 
must  really  have  existed  between  Sir  W.  Hamilton  and 
his  antagonists. 

Assuredly  there  was  a  difference,  and  one  of  great 
importance  from  the  point  of  view  of  cither  disputant ; 
not  unimportant  in  the  view  of  those  who  dissent  from 
them  both.  In  the  succeeding  chapter  I  shall  endeavor 
to  point  out  what  the  difference  was. 


46  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

IN  WHAT  RESPECT  SIR   W.  HAMILTON    REALLY   DIFFERS 
FROM   THE   PHILOSOPHERS   OF   THE   ABSOLUTE. 

THE  question  really  at  issue  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
celebrated  and  striking  review  of  Cousin's  philosophy,  is 
this  :  Have  we,  or  have  we  not,  an  immediate  intuition 
of  God?  The  name  of  God  is  veiled  under  two  ex- 
tremely abstract  phrases,  "The  Infinite"  and  "The 
Absolute,"  perhaps  from  a  reverential  feeling :  such,  at 
least,  is  the  reason  given  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  disciple, 
Mr.  Mansel,*  for  preferring  the  more  vague  expressions. 
But  it  is  one  of  the  most  unquestionable  of  all  logical 
maxims,  that  the  meaning  of  the  abstract  must  be 
sought  for  in  the  concrete,  and  not  conversely ;  and  we 
shall  see,  both  in  the  case  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  and  of 
Mr.  Mansel,  that  the  process  cannot  be  reversed  with 
impunity. 

I  proceed  to  state,  chiefly  in  the  words  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  the  opinions  of  the  two  parties  to  the  con- 
troversy. Both  undertake  to  decide  what  are  the  facts 
which  (in  their  own  phraseology)  are  given  in  Con- 
sciousness ;  or,  as  others  say,  of  which  we  have  intuitive 
knowledge.  According  to  Cousin,  there  are,  in  every 
act  of  consciousness,  three  elements ;  three  things  of 
which  we  are  intuitively  aware.  There  is  a  finite  ele- 

*  Bampton  Lectures.     (The  Limits  of  Religious  Thought.)     Fourth 
edition,  p.  42. 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AGAINST  COUSIN.  47 

ment ;  an  element  of  plurality,  compounded  of  a  Self 
or  Ego,  and  something  different  from  Self,  or  Non-ego. 
There  is  also  an  infinite  element ;  a  consciousness  of 
something  infinite.  "At  *  the  same  instant  when  we  are 
conscious  of  these  [finite]  existences,  plural,  relative, 
and  contingent,  we  are  conscious  likewise  of  a  superior 
unity  in  which  they  are  contained,  and  by  which  they 
are  explained ;  a  unity  absolute  as  they  are  conditioned, 
substantive  as  they  are  phenomenal,  and  an  infinite 
cause  as  they  are  finite  causes.  This  unity  is  God." 
The  first  two  elements  being  the  Finite  and  God,  the 
third  element  is  the  relation  between  the  Finite  and  God, 
which  is  that  of  cause  and  effect.  Thes'e  three  things 
are  immediately  given  in  every  act  of  consciousness,  and 
are,  therefore,  apprehended  as  real  existences  by  direct 
intuition. 

Of  these  alleged  elements  of  Consciousness,  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  only  admits  the  first ;  the  finite  element,  com- 
pounded of  Self  and  a  Not-self,  "  limiting  and  condition- 
ing one  another."  He  denies  that  God  is  given  in 
immediate  consciousness,  is  apprehended  by  direct  intu- 
ition. It  is  in  no  such  way  as  this  that  God,  according 
to  him,  is  known  to  us ;  and  as  an  Infinite  and  Absolute 
Being  he  is  not,  and  cannot  be,  known  to  us  at  all ;  for 
we  have  no  faculties  capable  of  apprehending  the  Infinite 
or  the  Absolute.  The  second  of  M.  Cousin's  elements 
being  thus  excluded,  the  third  (the  Relation  between  the 
first  and  second)  falls  with  it ;  and  Consciousness  re- 
mains limited  to  the  finite  element,  compounded  of  an 
Ego  and  a  Non-ego. 

In  this  contest  it  is  almost  superfluous  for  me  to  say 

*  Discussions,  p.  9. 


48  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON   AGAINST  COUSIN. 

that  I  am  entirely  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  The  doctrine, 
that  we  have  an  immediate  or  intuitive  knowledge  of 
God,  I  consider  to  be  bad  metaphysics,  involving  a  false 
conception  of  the  nature  and  limits  of  the  human  facul- 
ties, and  grounded  on  a  superficial  and  erroneous  psy- 
chology. (Whatever  relates  to  God  I  hold  with  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  to  be  matter  of  inference ;  I  would  add,  of 
inference  a  posteriori^  And  in  so  far  as  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton has  contributed,  which  he  has  done  very  materially, 
towards  discrediting  the  opposite  doctrine,  he  has  ren- 
dered, in  my  estimation,  a  good  service  to  philosophy. 
But  though  I  assent  to  his  conclusion,  his  arguments 
seem  to  me  very  far  from  inexpugnable ;  a  sufficient 
answer,  I  conceive,  might  without  difficulty  be  given  to 
all  of  them,  though  I  do  not  say  that  it  was  always 
competent  to  M.  Cousin  to  give  it.  And  the  arguments, 
in  the  present  case,  are  of  as  much  importance  as  the 
conclusion  ;  not  only  because  they  are  quite  as  essential 
a  part  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  philosophy,  but  because 
they  afford  the  premises  from  which  some  of  his  fol- 
lowers, if  not  himself,  have  drawn  inferences  which  I 
venture  to  think  extremely  mischievous.  While,  there- 
fore, I  sincerely  applaud  the  scope  and  purpose  of  this 
celebrated  piece  of  philosophical  criticism,  I  think  it  im- 
portant to  sift  with  some  minuteness  the  reasonings  it 
employs,  and  the  general  mode  of  thought  which  it 
exemplifies. 

The  question  is,  as  already  remarked,  whether  we 
have  a  direct  intuition  of  "  the  Infinite  "  and  rr  the  Ab- 
solute ; "  M.  Cousin  maintaining  that  we  have,  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  that  we  have  not ;  that  the  Infinite  and  the 
Absolute  are  inconceivable  to  us,  and,  by  consequence, 
unknowable. 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN.  49 

It  is  proper  to  explain  to  any  reader  not  familiar  with 
these  controversies  the  meaning  of  the  terms.  Infinite 
requires  no  explanation.  It  is  universally  understood 
to  signify  that  to  the  magnitude  of  which  there  is  no 
limit.  If  we  speak  of  infinite  duration,  or  infinite  space, 
we  are  supposed  to  mean  duration  which  never  ceases, 
and  extension  which  nowhere  comes  to  an  end.  Abso- 
lute is  much  more  obscure,  being  a  word  of  several 
meanings ;  but  in  the  sense  in  which  it  stands  related 
to  Infinite,  it  means  (conformably  to  its  etymology)  that 
which  is  finished  or  completed.  There  are  some  things 
of  which  the  utmost  ideal  amount  is  a  limited  quantity, 
though  a  quantity  never  actually  reached.  In  this  sense, 
the  relation  between  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  is  (as 
Bentham  would  have  said)  a  tolerably  close  one,  namely, 
a  relation  of  contrariety.  For  example,  to  assert  an 
absolute  minimum  of  matter,  is  to  deny  its  infinite 
divisibility.  Again,  we  may  speak  of  absolutely,  but 
not  of  infinitely,  pure  water.  The  purity  of  water  is  not 
a  fact  of  which,  whatever  degree  we  suppose  attained, 
there  remains  a  greater  beyond.  It  has  an  absolute 
limit;  it  is  capable  of  being  finished  or  complete,  in 
thought,  if  not  in  reality.  The  extraneous  substances 
existing  in  any  vessel  of  water  cannot  be  of  more  than 
finite  amount,  and  if  we  suppose  them  all  withdrawn, 
the  purity  of  the  water  cannot,  even  in  idea,  admit  of 
further  increase. 

Though  the  idea  of  Absolute  is  thus  contrasted  with 
that  of  Infinite,  the  one  is  equally  fitted  with  the  other 
to  be  predicated  of  God ;  but  not  in  respect  of  the  same 
attributes.  There  is  no  incorrectness  of  speech  in  the 
phrase  Infinite  Power ;  because  the  notion  it  expresses  is 


50  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST   COUSIN. 

that  of  a  Being  who  has  the  power  of  doing  all  things 
which  we  know,  or  can  conceive,  and  more.  But  in 
speaking  of  knowledge,  Absolute  is  the  proper  word, 
and  not  Infinite.  The  highest  degree  of  knowledge  that 
can  be  spoken  of  with  a  meaning,  only  amounts  to 
knowing  all  that  there  is  to  be  known  :  when  that  point 
is  reached,  knowledge  has  attained  its  utmost  limit.  So 
of  goodness,  or  justice ;  they  cannot  be  more  than  per- 
fect. "  There  are  not  infinite  degrees  of  right.  The  will 
is  either  entirely  right,  or  wrong  in  different  degrees : 
downwards  there  are  as  many  gradations  as  we  choose  to 
distinguish,  but  upwards  there  is  an  ideal  limit.  Good- 
ness (unlike  time  or  space)  can  be  imagined  complete  — 
such  that  there  can  be  no  greater  goodness  beyond  it. 

Such  is  the  signification  of  the  term  Absolute,  when 
coupled  and  contrasted  with  Infinite.  But  the  word  has 
other  meanings,  though  often  mixed  and  confounded 
with  this ;  the  more  readily  as  they  are  all  liable  to  be 
predicated  of  God.  By  Absolute  is  often  meant  the 
opposite  of  Relative ;  and  this  is  rather  many  meanings 
than  one ;  for  Relative  also  is  a  term  used  very  indefi- 
nitely, and  wherever  it  is  employed,  the  word  Absolute 
always  accompanies  it  as  its  negative.  In  another  of  its 
senses,  Absolute  means  that  which  is  independent  of 
anything  else ;  which  exists,  and  is  what  it  is,  by  its 
own  nature,  and  not  because  of  any  other  thing.  In 
this  third  sense,  as  in  the  second,  Absolute  stands  for  the 
negation  of  a  relation ;  not  now  of  Relation  in  general, 
but  of  the  specific  relation  expressed  by  the  term  Effect. 
In  this  signification  it  is  synonymous  with  a  First  Cause. 
The  meaning  of  a  First  Cause  is,  that  all  other  things 
exist,  and  are  what  they  are,  by  reason  of  it  and  of  its 


SIB  WILLIAM  HAMILTON   AGAINST  COUSIN.  51 

properties,  but  that  it  is  not  itself  made  to  exist,  nor  to 
be  what  it  is,  by  anything  else.  It  does  not  depend,  for 
its  existence  or  attributes,  on  other  things :  there  is 
nothing  upon  the  existence  of  which  its  own  is  condi- 
tional :  it  exists  absolutely.* 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  (after  Kant)  unites  the  Infinite  and 
the  Absolute  under  a  larger  abstraction,  the  Uncondi- 
tioned, regarding  it  as  a  genus  of  which  they  are  the 
two  species,  f  Having  often  occasion  to  speak  of  the 
two  in  conjunction,  he  is  entitled  to  a  form  of  abridged 
expression  :  let  us  hope  he  takes  due  care  that  it  shall  be 
nothing  more.  But  when  the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite 
are  thus  spoken  of  as  two  species  of  the  Unconditioned, 
it  is  necessary  to  know  in  which  of  the  senses  just  dis- 
criminated the  word  Absolute  is  to  be  understood.  Sir 
"VV.  Hamilton  professes  that  it  is  in  the  first  sense  —  that 
of  finished,  perfected,  completed.  He  adds  that  this  is 
the  only  sense  in  which,  for  himself,  he  uses  the  term.J 
If  we  should  find,  then,  that  he  does  not  strictly  keep  to 
this  resolution,  we  may  conclude  that  the  falling  off  is 
not  intentional. 

In  accordance  with  his  professions  he  defines  the  In- 
finite as  "the  unconditionally  unlimited,"  the  Absolute 
as  the  "  unconditionally  limited."  §  Here  is  a  new  word 
introduced,  the  word  "  unconditionally,"  of  which  we 
look  in  vain  for  any  direct  explanation,  and  which  is  far 

*  Sir  W.  Hamilton  (Discussions,  note  to  p.  14)  distinguishes  and  defines 
the  first  two  of  these  meanings  :  Absolute  in  the  sense  of  "  finished,  per- 
fected, completed,"  and  Absolute  as  opposed  to  Relative.  The  third  mean- 
ing he  does  not  expressly  notice,  but  seems  to  confuse  it  with  the  second. 
The  meaning,  however,  with  which  it  is  really  allied,  and  to  which  it  may 
in  a  certain  sense  be  reduced,  is  the  first :  as  will  be  seen  hereafter. 

f  See  the  same  note.  %  Note,  ut  supra. 

§  Discussions,  p.  13. 


52  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN. 

from  conveying  so  distinct  a  meaning,  as,  considering  its 
great  importance  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  philosophy,  it 
ought.  Indeed,  throughout  his  writings,  he  uses  the 
word  Condition,  and  its  derivatives,  Conditioned  and 
Unconditioned,  as  if  it  was  impossible  to  understand 
them  in  more  than  one  meaning,  and  as  if  nobody  could 
require  to  be  told  what  that  meaning  is ;  though  in 
English  metaphysics  two  of  the  three  phrases,  until  he 
introduced  them,  were  new,  and  though  there  are  no 
expressions  in  all  philosophy  which  require  definition  and 
illustration  more.* 

Having  premised  these  verbal  explanations,  I  proceed 
to  state,  as  far  as  possible  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  own 
words,  the  heads  of  his  argumentation  to  prove  that  the 
Unconditioned  is  unknowable.  His  first  summary  state- 
ment of  the  doctrine  is  as  follows  :  f  — 

"  The  unconditionally  unlimited,  or  the  Infinite,  the 
unconditionally  limited,  or  the  Absolute,  cannot  posi- 
tively be  construed  to  the  mind :  they  can  be  conceived 
only  by  a  thinking  away  from,  or  abstraction  of,  those 
very  conditions  under  which  thought  itself  is  realized ; 

*  In  page  8  of  the  Discussions,  speaking  of  the  one  of  M.  Cousin's  three 
elements  of  Consciousness  which  that  author  "  variously  expresses  by  the 
terms  unity,  identity,  substance,  absolute  cause,  the  infinite,  pure  thought, 
&c.,"  Sir  W.  Hamilton  says,  "  we  will  briefly  call  it  the  Unconditioned." 
What  M.  Cousin  u  denominates  plurality,  difference,  phcenomenon,  relative 
cause,  the  finite,  determined  thought,  &c.,"  Sir  W.  Hamilton  says,  "  we 
would  style  the  Conditioned."  This,  I  think,  is  as  near  as  he  ever  comes 
to  an  explanation  of  what  he  means  by  these  words.  It  is  obviously  no 
explanation  at  all.  It  tells  us  what  (in  logical  language)  the  terms  denote, 
but  not  what  they  connote.  An  enumeration  of  the  things  called  by  a 
name  is  not  a  definition.  If  the  name,  for  instance,  were  "  dog,"  it  would 
be  no  definition  to  say  that  what  are  variously  denominated  spaniels, 
mastiffs,  and  so  forth,  "  we  would  style  "  dogs.  The  thing  wanted  is  to 
know  what  attributes  common  to  all  these  the  word  signifies,  —  what  is 
affirmed  of  a  thing  by  calling  it  a  dog.  / 

t  Discussions,  p.  13. 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN.  53 

consequently,  the  notion  of  the  Unconditioned  is  only 
negative  ;  negative  of  the  conceivable  itself.  For  exam- 
ple :  On  the  one  hand,  we  can  positively  conceive  neither 
an  absolute  whole,  that  is,  a  whole  so  great  that  we  can- 
not also  conceive  it  as  a  relative  part  of  a  still  greater 
whole ;  nor  an  absolute  part,  that  is,  a  part  so  small  that 
we  cannot  also  conceive  it  as  a  relative  whole  divisible 
into  smaller  parts.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  pos- 
itively represent,  or  realize,  or  construe  to  the  mind  (as 
here  Understanding  and  Imagination  coincide)  an  infinite 
whole,  for  this  could  only  be  done  by  the  infinite  syn- 
thesis in  thought  of  finite  wholes,  which  would  itself 
require  an  infinite  time  for  its  accomplishment ;  nor,  for 
the  same  reason,  can  we  follow  out  in  thought  an  infinite 
divisibility  of  parts.  The  result  is  the  same,  whether 
we  apply  the  process  to  limitation  in  space,  in  time,  or 
in  degree.  The  unconditional  negation  and  the  uncon- 
ditional affirmation  of  limitation  —  in  other  words,  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  properly  so  called  —  are  thus 
equally  inconceivable  to  us." 

This  argument,  that  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute  are 
unknowable  by  us  because  the  only  conceptions  we  are 
able  to  form  of  them  are  negative,  is  stated  still  more 
emphatically  a  few  pages  later.*  "Kant  has  clearly 
shown,  that  the  Idea  of  the  Unconditioned  can  have  no 
objective  reality,  — that  it  conveys  no  knowledge,  —  and 
that  it  involves  the  most  insoluble  contradictions.  But 
he  ought  to  have  shown  that  the  Unconditioned  had  no 
objective  application,  because  it  had,  in  fact,  no  subjec- 
tive affirmation  ;  that  it  afforded  no  real  knowledge,  be- 
cause it  contained  nothing  even  conceivable  ;  and  that  it  is 

*  Discussions,  p.  17. 
VOL.  i.  3 


54  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST   COUSIN. 

self-contradictory,  because  it  is  not  a  notion,  either  sim- 
ple or  positive,  but  only  a  fasciculus  of  negations  — 
negations  of  the  Conditioned  in  its  opposite  extremes, 
and  bound  together  merely  by  the  aid  of  language  and 
their  common  character  of  incomprehensibility." 

Let  us  note,  then,  as  the  first  and  most  fundamental 
of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  arguments,  that  our  ideas  of  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute  are  "  only  a  fasciculus  of  nega- 
tions." I  reserve  consideration  of  the  validity  of  this 
and  every  other  part  of  the  argumentation  until  we  have 
the  whole  before  us.  He  proceeds  :  *  — 

"  As  the  conditionally  limited  (which  we  may  briefly 
call  the  Conditioned)  is  thus  the  only  possible  object  of 
knowledge  and  of  positive  thought,  —  thought  neces- 
sarily supposes  condition.  To  think  is  to  condition; 
and  conditional  limitation  is  the  fundamental  law  of  the 
possibility  of  thought.  For,  as  the  greyhound  cannot 
outstrip  his  shadow,  nor  (by  a  more  appropriate  simile) 
the  eagle  outsoar  the  atmosphere  in  which  he  floats,  and 
by  which  alone  he  is  supported,  so  the  mind  cannot 
transcend  that  sphere  of  limitation,  within  and  through 
which  exclusively  the  possibility  of  thought  is  realized. 
Thought  is  only  of  the  conditioned  ;  because,  as  we  have 
said,  to  think  is  simply  to  condition.  The  Absolute  is 
conceived  merely  by  a  negation  of  conceivability ;  and 
all  that  we  know,  is  known  as  — 

'  Won  from  the  cold  and  formless  Infinite.' 

"  How,  indeed,  it  could  ever  be  doubted  that  thought 
is  only  of  the  conditioned,  may  well  be  deemed  a  mat- 
ter of   the  profoundest  admiration.       Thought  cannot 
transcend  consciousness ;  consciousness  is  only  possible 
*  Discussions,  p.  13. 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN.  55 

under  the  antithesis  of  a  subject  and  object  of  thought 
known  only  in  correlation,  and  mutually  limiting  each 
other ;  while,  independently  of  this,  all  that  we  know 
either  of  subject  or  object,  either  of  mind  or  matter,  is 
only  a  knowledge  in  each  of  the  particular,  of  the  plural, 
of  the  different,  of  the  modified,  of  the  phsenomenal. 
We  admit  that  the  consequence  of  this  doctrine  is  — 
that  philosophy,  if  viewed  as  more  than  a  science  of  th& 
conditioned,  is  impossible.  Departing  from  the  partic- 
ular, we  admit,  that  we  can  never,  in  our  highest 
generalizations,  rise  above  the  Finite ;  that  our  knowl- 
edge, whether  of  mind  or  matter,  can  be  nothing  more 
than  a  knowledge  of  the  relative  manifestations  of  an 
existence  which  in  itself  it  is  our  highest  wisdom  to 
recognize  as  beyond  the  reach  of  philosophy.  This  is 
what,  in  the  language  of  St.  Austin,  (Jognoscendo 
ignoratur,  et  ignoratione  cognoscitur" 

The  dictum  that  "to  think  is  to  condition,"  whatever 
be  meant  by  it,  may  be  noted  as  our  author's  second 
argument.  And  here  ends  the  positive  part  of  his  argu- 
mentation. There  remains  his  refutation  of  opponents. 
After  an  examination  of  Schelling's  opinion,  into  which 
I  need  not  follow  him,  he  grapples  with  M.  Cousin, 
against  whom  he  undertakes  to  show,*  that  "his  argu-/, 
ment  to  prove  the  correality  of  his  three  Ideas  proves 
directly  the  reverse  ;  "  "  that  the  conditions  under  which 
alone  he  allows  intelligence  to  be  possible,  necessarily 
exclude  the  possibility  of  a  knowledge,  not  to  say  a  con- 
ception, of  the  Absolute  ;  "  and  "  that  the  Absolute,  as 
defined  by  him,  is  only  a  relative  and  a  conditioned." 
Of  this  argument  in  three  parts,  if  we  pass  over  (or,  as 

*  Discussions,  p.  25. 


56  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AGAINST   COUSIN. 

our  author  would  say,  discount)  as  much  as  is  only  ad 
hominem,  what  is  of  general  application  is  as  follows  :  — 

Under  the  first  head ;  that  the  Unconditioned  is  not  a 
possible  object  of  thought,  because  it  includes  both  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  and  these  are  exclusive  of  one 
another.* 

Under  the  second ;  M.  Cousin  and  our  author  are 
•agreed  that  there  can  be  no  knowledge  except  "  where 
there  exists  a  plurality  of  terms,"  there  are  at  least  a 
perceived  and  a  perceiver,  a  knower  and  a  known.  But 
this  necessity  of  "  difference  and  plurality  "  as  a  condi- 
tion of  knowledge,  is  inconsistent  with  the  meaning  of 
the  Absolute,  which  "  as  absolutely  universal,  is  abso- 
lutely one.  Absolute  unity  is  convertible  with  the 
absolute  negation  of  plurality  and  difference.  .  .  .  The 
condition  of  the  Absolute  as  existing,  and  under  which  it 
must  be  known,  and  the  condition  of  intelligence,  as 
capable  of  knowing,  are  incompatible.  For,  if  we  sup- 
pose the  Absolute  cognizable,  it  must  be  identified 
either  —  1°,  with  the  subject  knowing;  or,  2°,  with  the 
object  known ;  or,  3°,  with  the  indifference  of  both. 
The  first  hypothesis,  and  the  second,  are  contradictory 
of  the  absolute.  For  in  these  the  Absolute  is  supposed 
to  be  known,  either  as  contradistinguished  from  the 
knowing  subject,  or  as  contradistinguished  from  the  ob- 
ject known  :  in  other  words,  the  Absolute  is  asserted  to 
be  known  as  absolute  unity,  i.  e.9  as  the  negation  of  ah1 
plurality,  while  the  very  act  by  which  it  is  known 
affirms  plurality  as  the  condition  of  its  own  possibility 
The  third  hypothesis,  on  the  other  hand,  is  contradictor 
of  the  plurality  of  intelligence ;  for  if  the  subject  and  th< 

*  Discussions,  p.  28  et  scqq. 


Sill  WILLIAM  HAMILTON   AGAINST  COUSIN.  57 

object  of  consciousness  be  known  as  one,  a  plurality  of 
terms  is  not  the  necessary  condition  of  intelligence. 
The  alternative  is  therefore  necessary  :  either  the  Abso- 
lute cannot  be  known  or  conceived  at  all ;  or  our  author 
is  wrong  in  subjecting  thought  to  the  conditions  of 
plurality  and  difference."  * 

We  now  arrive  at  the  third  head.  In  order  to  make 
the  Absolute  knowable  by  us,  M.  Cousin,  says  the 
author,  is  obliged  to  present  it  in  the  light  of  an  absolute 
cause :  now  causation  is  a  relation ;  therefore  M.  Cou- 
sin's Absolute  is  but  a  relative.  Moreover,  "  what  exists 
merely  as  a  cause,  exists  merely  for  the  sake  of  some- 
thing else  —  is  not  final  in  itself,  but  simply  a  mean  to- 
wards an  end.  .  .  .  Abstractly  considered,  the  effect  is 
therefore  superior  to  the  cause."  Hence  an  absolute 
cause  is  "  dependent  on  the  effect  for  its  perfection ; " 
and,  indeed,  w  even  for  its  reality.  For  to  what  extent 
a  thing  exists  necessarily  as  a  cause,  to  that  extent  it  is 
not  all-sufficient  to  itself;  since  to  that  extent  it  is  de- 
pendent on  the  effect,  as  on  the  condition  through  which 
it  realizes  its  existence  ;  and  what  exists  absolutely  as  a 
cause,  exists  therefore  in  absolute  dependence  on  the 
effect  for  the  reality  of  its  existence.  An  absolute  cause, 
in  truth,  only  exists  in  its  effects :  it  never  is,  it  always 
becomes:  for  it  is  an  existence  in  potentia,  and  not  an 
existence  in  actu,  except  through  and  by  its  effects. 
The  Absolute  is  thus,  at  best,  something  merely  in- 
choative and  imperfect,  "f 

Let  me  ask,  en  passant,  where  is  the  necessity  for 
supposing  that  if  the  Absolute,  or,  to  speak  plainly,  if 
God,  is  only  known  to  us  in  the  character  of  a  cause,  he 

*  Discussions,  pp.  32,  33.  t  Ibid.  pp.  34,  35. 


58  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN. 

must  therefore  "  exist  merely  as  a  cause,"  and  be  merelj 
w  a  mean  towards  an  end"  ?     It  is  surely  possible  to  mail 
tain  that  the  Deity  is  known  to  us  only  as  he  who  fe 
the   ravens,  without  supposing  that  the  Divine  Intelli- 
gence exists  solely  in  order  that  the  ravens  may  be  fed.* 

In  reviewing  the  series  of  arguments  adduced  by  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  for  the  incognoscibility  and  inconceivability 
of  the  Absolute,  the  first  remark  that  occurs  is,  that  most 
of  them  lose  their  application  by  simply  substituting  for 
the  metaphysical  abstraction  "  The  Absolute,"  the  more 
intelligible  concrete  expression  "  Something  absolute." 
If  the  first  phrase  has  any  meaning,  it  must  be  capable 
of  being  expressed  in  terms  of  the  other.  When  we  are 
told  of  an  "  Absolute "  in  the  abstract,  or  of  an  Abso- 
lute Being,  even  though  called  God,  we  are  entitled,  and 

*  A  passage  follows,  which  being  only  directed  against  a  special  doc- 
trine of  M.  Cousin  (that  God  is  determined  to  create  by  the  necessity  of 
his  own  nature — that  an  absolute  creative  force  cannot  but  pass  into  crea- 
tive activity)  —  I  should  have  left  unmentioned,  were  it  not  worth  notice 
as  a  specimen  of  the  kind  of  arguments  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  can  some- 
times use.  On  M.  Cousin's  hypothesis,  says  our  author  (p.  36),  "  One 
of  two  alternatives  must  be  admitted.  God,  as  necessarily  determined  to 
pass  from  absolute  essence  to  relative  manifestation,  is  determined  to 
pass  either  from  the  better  to  the  worse,  or  from  the  worse  to  the  better.  A 
third  possibility,  that  both  states  are  equal,  as  contradictory  in  itself  and 
as  contradicted  by  our  author,  it  is  not  necessary  to  consider.  The  first 
supposition  must  be  rejected.  The  necessity  in  this  case  determines  God 
to  pass  from  the  better  to  the  worse,  that  is,  operates  to  his  partial  annihila- 
tion. The  power  which  compels  this  must  be  external  and  hostile,  for 
nothing  operates  willingly  to  its  own  deterioration  ;  and  as  superior  to  the 
pretended  God,  is  either  itself  the  real  deity,  if  an  intelligent  and  free 
cause,  or  a  negation  of  all  deity,  if  a  blind  force  or  fate.  The  second  is 
equally  inadmissible  :  that  God,  passing  into  the  universe,  passes  from  a 
state  of  comparative  imperfection  into  a  state  of  comparative  perfection. 
The  divine  nature  is  identical  with  the  most  perfect  nature,  and  is  also 
identical  with  the  first  cause.  If  the  first  cause  be  not  identical  with  the 
most  perfect  nature,  there  is  no  God,  for  the  two  essential  conditions  of  his 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST   COUSIN.  59 

if  we  would  know  what  we  are  talking  about,  are  bound 
to  ask,  absolute  in  what?  Do  you  mean,  for  example, 
absolute  in  goodness,  or  absolute  in  knowledge?  or  do 
you,  perchance,  mean  absolute  in  ignorance,  or  absolute 
in  wickedness  ?  for  any  one  of  these  is  as  much  an  Ab- 
solute as  any  other.  And  when  you  talk  of  something 
in  the  abstract  which  is  called  The  Absolute,  does  it  mean 
one,  or  more  than  one,  of  these?  or  does  it,  peradven- 
ture,  mean  all  of  them?  When  (descending  to  a  less 
lofty  height  of  abstraction)  we  speak  of  The  Horse,  we 
mean  to  include  every  object  of  which  the  name  horse 
can  be  predicated.  Or,  to  take  our  examples  from  tlie 
same  region  of  thought  to  which  the  controversy  belongs 
—  when  The  True  or  The  Beautiful  are  spoken  of,  the 
phrase  is  meant  to  include  all  things  whatever  that  are 
true,  or  all  things  whatever  that  are  beautiful.  If  this 

existence  are  not  in  combination.  Now,  on  the  present  supposition,  the 
most  perfect  nature  is  the  derived ;  nay,  the  universe,  the  creation,  the 
yivdpwov,  is,  in  relation  to  its  cause,  the  actual,  the  6Vrwj  Sv.  It  would  also 
be  the  divine,  but  that  divinity  supposes  also  the  notion  of  cause,  while 
the  universe,  ex  hypothesi,  is  only  an  effect." 

This  curious  subtlety,  that  creation  must  be  either  passing  from  the  bet- 
ter to  the  worse  or  from  the  worse  to  the  better  (which,  if  true,  would 
prove  that  God  cannot  have  created  anything  unless  from  all  eternity),  can 
be  likened  to  nothing  but  the  Eleatic  argument  that  motion  is  impossible, 
because  if  a  body  moves  it  must  either  move  where  it  is  or  where  it  is  not ; 
an  argument,  by  the  way,  for  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  often  expresses  high 
respect ;  and  of  which  he  has  here  produced  a  very  successful  imitation. 
If  it  were  worth  while  expending  serious  argument  upon  such  a  curiosity 
of  dialectics,  one  might  say  it  assumes  that  whatever  is  now  worse  must 
always  have  been  worse,  and  that  whatever  is  now  better  must  al- 
ways have  been  better.  For,  on  the  opposite  supposition,  perfect  wisdom 
would  have  begun  to  will  the  new  state  at  the  precise  moment  when  it 
began  to  be  better  than  the  old.  We  may  add  that  our  author's  argument, 
though  never  so  irrefragable,  in  no  way  avails  him  against  M.  Cousin  ;  for 
(as  he  has  himself  said,  only  a  sentence  before)  on  M.  Cousin's  theory  the 
universe  can  never  have  had  a  beginning,  and  God,  therefore,  never  was 
in  the  dilemma  supposed. 


GO  SIB  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AGAINST   COUSIN. 

rule  is  good  for  other  abstractions,  it  is  good  for  the  Ab- 
solute. The  word  is  devoid  of  meaning  unless  in  refer- 
ence to  predicates  of  some  sort.  'What  is  absolute  must 
be  absolutely  something;  absolutely  this  or  absolutely 
that.  The  Absolute,  then,  ought  to  be  a  genus  compre- 
hending whatever  is  absolutely  anything  —  whatever  pos- 
sesses any  predicate  in  finished  completeness.  If  we 
are  told  therefore  that  there  is  some  one  Being  who  is, 
or  which  is,  The  Absolute, — not  something  absolute, 
but  the  Absolute  itself,  —  the  proposition  can  be  under- 
stood in  no  other  sense  than  that  the  supposed  Being 
possesses  in  absolute  completeness  all  predicates  ;  is  ab- 
solutely good,  and  absolutely  bad ;  absolutely  wise  and 
absolutely  stupid  ;  and  so  forth.  The  conception  of  such 
a  being,  I  will  not  say  of  such  a  God,  is  worse  than  a 
"  fasciculus  of  negations ;  "  it  is  a  fasciculus  of  contra- 
dictions :  and  our  author  might  have  spared  himself  the 
trouble  of  proving  a  thing  to  be  unknowable,  which  can- 
not be  spoken  of  but  in  words  implying  the  impossibility 
of  its  existence.  To  insist  on  such  a  truism  is  not  super- 
fluous, for  there  have  been  philosophers  who  saw  that 
this  must  be  the  meaning  of  "  The  Absolute,"  and  yet 
accepted  it  as  a  reality.  "  What  kind  of  an  Absolute 
Being  is  that,"  asked  Hegel,*  "which  does  not  contain 
in  itself  all  that  is  actual,  even  evil  included?"  Un- 
doubtedly :  and  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  admit,  either 
that  there  is  no  Absolute  Being,  or  that  the  law,  that 
contradictory  propositions  cannot  both  be  true,  does  not 
apply  to  the  Absolute.  (Hegel  chose  the  latter  side  of 
the  alternative ;  and  by  this,  among  other  things,  has 
fairly  earned  the  honor,  which  will  probably  be  awarded 

*  Quoted  by  Mr.  Mansel,  "  The  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,"  p.  30. 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN.  61 

to  him  by  posterity,  of  having  logically  extinguished 
transcendental  metaphysics  by  a  series  of  reductiones 
ad  absurdissimum^)  - 

What  I  have  said  of  the  Absolute  is  true,  mutatis 
mutandis,  of  the  Infinite.  This  also  is  a  phrase  of  no 
meaning,  except  in  reference  to  some  particular  predi- 
cate j  it  must  mean  the  infinite  in  something  —  as  in 
size,  in  duration,  or  in  power.  These  are  intelligible 
conceptions.  But  an  abstract  Infinite,  a  Being  not 
merely  infinite  in  one  or  in  several  attributes,  but  which 
is  "  The  Infinite "  itself,  must  be  not  only  infinite  in 
greatness,  but  also  in  littleness ;  its  duration  is  not  only 
infinitely  long,  but  infinitely  short ;  it  is  not  only  infi- 
nitely awful,  but  infinitely  contemptible ;  it  is  the  same 
mass  of  contradictions  as  its  companion  the  Absolute. 
There  is  no  need  to  prove  that  neither  of  them  is  know- 
able,  since,  if  the  universal  law  of  Belief  is  of  objective 
validity,  neither  of  them  exists. 

It  is  these  unmeaning  abstractions,  however,  these 
muddles  of  self-contradiction,  which  alone  our  author 
has  proved,  against  Cousin  and  others,  to  be  unknowable. 
He  has  shown,  without  difficulty,  that  we  cannot  know 
The  Infinite  or  The  Absolute.  He  has  not  shown  that 
we  cannot  know  a  concrete  reality  as  infinite  or  as  abso- 
lute. Applied  to  this  latter  thesis,  his  reasoning  breaks 
down. 

We  have  seen  his  principal  argument,  the  one  on 
which  he  substantially  relies.  It  is,  that  the  Infinite  and 
the  Absolute  are  unknowable  because  inconceivable,  and 
inconceivable  because  the  only  notions  we  can  have  of 
them  are  purely  negative.  If  he  is  right  in  his  ante- 
cedent, the  consequent  follows.  A  conception  made  up 
3* 


6'2  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST   COUSIN. 

of  negations  is  a  conception  of  Nothing.     It  is  not  a 
conception  at  all. 

But  is  a  conception,  by  the  fact  of  its  being  a  con- 
ception of  something  infinite,  reduced  to  a  negation? 
This  is  quite  true  of  the  senseless  abstraction  "The 
Infinite."  That,  indeed,  is  purely  negative,  being  formed 
by  excluding  from  the  concrete  conceptions  classed  under 
it,  all  their  positive  elements.  But  in  place  of  "the 
Infinite,"  put  the  idea  of  Something  infinite,  and  the 
argument  collapses  at  once.  "  Something  infinite  "  is  a 
conception  which,  like  most  of  our  complex  ideas,  con- 
tains a  negative  element,  but  which  contains  positive 
elements  also.  Infinite  space,  for  instance  :  is  there  noth- 
ing positive  in  that  ?  The  negative  part  of  this  concep- 
tion is  the  absence  of  bounds.  The  positive  are,  the 
idea  of  space,  and  of  space  greater  than  any  finite  space. 
So  of  infinite  duration :  so  far  as  it  signifies  "  without 
end"  it  is  only  known  or  conceived  negatively ;  but  in 
so  far  as  it  means  time,  and  time  longer  than  any  given 
time,  the  conception  is  positive.  The  existence  of  a 
negative  element  in  a  conception  does  not  make  the  con- 
ception itself  negative,  and  a  non-entity.  It  would  sur- 
prise most  people  to  be  told  that  "  the  life  eternal "  is  a 
purely  negative  conception ;  that  immortality  is  incon- 
ceivable. Those  who  hope  for  it  for  themselves  have  a 
very  positive  conception  of  what  they  hope  for.  True, 
we  cannot  have  an  adequate  conception  of  space  or  dura- 
tion as  infinite  ;  but  between  a  conception  which  though 
inadequate  is  real,  and  correct  as  far  as  it  goes,  and  the 
impossibility  of  any  conception,  there  is  a  wide  difference. 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  does  not  admit  this  difference.  He 
thinks  the  distinction  without  meaning.  "  To  say  * 
*  Lectures,  ii.  375. 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST   COUSIN.  63 

that  the  infinite  can  be  thought,  but  only  inadequately 
thought,  is  a  contradiction  in  adjeclo;  it  is  the  same  as 
saying  that  the  infinite  can  be  known,  but  only  known 
as  finite."  I  answer,  that  to  know  it  as  greater  than  any- 
thing finite  is  not  to  know  it  as  finite.  The  conception 
of  Infinite  as  that  which  is  greater  than  any  given  quan- 
tity, is  a  conception  we  all  possess,  sufficient  for  all  human 
purposes,  and  as  genuine  and  good  a  positive  conception 
as  one  need  wish  to  have.  It  is  not  adequate  ;  our  con- 
ception of  a  reality  never  is.  But  it  is  positive ;  and 
the  assertion  that  there  is  nothing  positive  in  the  idea 
of  infinity  can  only  be  maintained  by  leaving  out  and 
ignoring,  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton  invariably  does,  the  very 
element  which  constitutes  the  idea.  Considering  how 
many  recondite  laws  of  physical  nature,  afterwards  veri- 
fied by  experience,  have  been  arrived  at  by  trains  of 
mathematical  reasoning  grounded  on  what,  if  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  doctrine  be  correct,  is  a  non-existent  concep- 
tion, one  would  be  obliged  to  suppose  that  conjuring  is 
a  highly  successful  mode  of  the  investigation  of  nature. 
If,  indeed,  we  trifle  by  setting  up  an  imaginary  Infinite 
which  is  infinite  in  nothing  in  particular,  our  notion  of  it 
is  truly  nothing,  and  a  "fasciculus  of  negations."  But 
this  is  a  good  example  of  the  bewildering  effect  of  putting 
nonsensical  abstractions  in  the  place  of  concrete  realities. 
Would  Sir  W.  Hamilton  have  said  that  the  idea  of  God 
is  but  a  "  fasciculus  of  negations  "  ?  As  having  nothing 
greater  than  himself,  he  is  indeed  conceived  negatively. 
But  as  himself  greater  than  all  other  real  or  imaginable 
existences,  the  conception  of  him  is  positive. 

Put  Absolute  instead  of  Infinite,  and  we  come  to  the 
same  result.     "The  Absolute,"  as  already  shown,  is  a 


64  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN. 

heap  of  contradictions, 'but  "absolute"  in  reference  to 
any  given  attribute,  signifies  the  possession  of  that 
attribute  in  finished  perfection  and  completeness.  A 
Being  absolute  in  knowledge,  for  example,  is  one  who 
knows,  in  the  literal  meaning  of  the  term,  everything. 
Who  will  pretend  that  this  conception  is  negative,  or 
unmeaning  to  us  ?  We  cannot,  indeed,  form  an  adequate 
conception  of  a  being  as  knowing  everything,  since  to 
do  this  we  must  have  a  conception,  or  mental  representa- 
tion, of  all  that  he  knows.  But  neither  have  we  an 
adequate  conception  of  any  person's  finite  knowledge. 
I  have  no  adequate  conception  of  a  shoemaker's  knowl- 
edge, since  I  do  not  know  how  to  make  shoes  :  but  my 
conception  of  a  shoemaker  and  of  his  knowledge  is  a 
real  conception  ;  it  is  not  a  fasciculus  of  negations.  If 
I  talk  of  an  Absolute  Being  (in  the  sense  in  which  we 
are  now  employing  the  term)  I  use  words  without  mean- 
ing :  but  if  I  talk  of  a  Being  who  is  absolute  in  wisdom 
and  goodness,  that  is,  who  knows  everything,  and  at  all 
times  intends  what  is  best  for  every  sentient  creature,  I 
understand  perfectly  what  I  mean  :  and  however  much 
the  fact  may  transcend  my  conception,  the  shortcoming 
can  only  consist  in  my  being  ignorant  of  the  details  of 
which  the  reality  is  composed ;  as  I  have  a  positive,  and 
may  have  a  correct  conception  of  the  empire  of  China, 
though  I  know  not  the  aspect  of  any  of  the  places,  nor 
the  physiognomy  of  any  of  the  human  beings,  compre- 
hended therein. 

It  appears,  then,  that  the  leading  argument  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  to  prove  the  inconceivability  and  consequent 
unknowability  of  the  Unconditioned,  namely,  that  our 
conception  of  it  is  merely  negative,  holds  good  only  of 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AGAINST   COUSIN.  65 

an  abstract  Unconditioned  which  cannot  possibly  exist, 
and  not  of  a  concrete  Being,  supposed  infinite  and  abso- 
lute in  certain  definite  attributes.  Let  us  now  see  if 
there  be  any  greater  value  in  his  other  arguments. 

The  first  of  them  is,  that  the  Unconditioned  is  incon- 
ceivable, because  it  includes  both  the  Infinite  and  the 
Absolute,  and  these  are  contradictory  of  one  another. 
This  is  not  an  argument  against  the  possibility  of  know- 
ing the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  but  against  jumbling 
the  two  together  under  one  name.  If  the  Infinite  and 
the  Absolute  are  each  cognizable  separately,  of  what  im- 
portance is  it  that  the  two  conceptions  are  incompatible  ? 
If  they  are  so,  the  fault  is  in  lumping  up  incompatible 
conceptions  into  an  incomprehensible  and  impossible 
compound.  The  argument  is  only  tenable  as  against 
the  knowability  and  the  possible  existence  of  something 
which  is  at  once  "The  Infinite"  and  "The  Absolute," 
abstractions  which  do  contradict  one  another,  but  not 
more  flagrantly  than  each  of  them  contradicts  itself. 
When,  instead  of  abstractions,  we  speak  of  Things  which 
are  infinite  and  absolute  in  respect  of  given  attributes, 
there  is  no  incompatibility.  There  is  nothing  contra- 
dictory in  the  notion  of  a  Being  infinite  in  some  attri- 
butes and  absolute  in  others,  according  to  the  different 
nature  of  the  attributes. 

The  next  argument  is,  that  all  knowledge  is  of  things 
plural  and  different ;  that  a  thing  is  only  known  to  us 
by  being  known  as  different  from  something  else ;  from 
ourselves  as  knowing  it,  and  also  from  other  known  tilings 
which  are  not  it.  Here  we  have  at  length  something 
which  the  mind  can  rest  on  as  a  fundamental  truth.  It 
is  one  of  the  profound  psychological  observations  which 


66  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN. 

the  world  owes  to  Hobbes  :  it  is  fully  recognized  both 
by  M.  Cousin  and  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  ;  and  it  has,  more 
recently,  been  admirably  illustrated  and  applied  by  Mr. 
Bain  and  by  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  That  to  know  a  thing 
is  to  distinguish  it  from  other  things,  is,  as  I  formerly 
remarked,  one  of  the  truths  which  the  very  ambiguous 
expression  "the  relativity  of  human  knowledge"  has 
been  employed  to  denote :  and  in  the  case  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  the  shadow  of  this  other  Relativity  always 
floats  over  his  discussion  of  the  doctrine  of  Relativity  in 
its  more  special  sense,  and  at  times  (as  in  the  paper 
w  Conditions  of  the  Thinkable,"  forming  an  Appendix  to 
the  Discussions)  entirely  obscures  it.  With  this  doc- 
trine I  have  no  quarrel.  But  Sir  W.  Hamilton  proceeds 
to  argue  that  the  Absolute,  being  "  absolutely  One," 
cannot  be  known  under  the  conditions  of  plurality  and 
difference,  and  as  these  are  the  acknowledged  conditions 
of  all  our  knowledge,  cannot,  therefore,  be  known  at  all. 
There  is  here,  as  it  seems  to  me,  a  strange  confusion  of 
ideas.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  seems  to  mean  that  being  ab- 
solutely One,  it  cannot  be  known  as  plural.  But  the 
proposition  that  plurality  is  a  condition  of  knowledge, 
does  not  mean  that  the  thing  known  must  be  known  as 
itself  plural.  It  means,  that  a  thing  is  only  known,  by 
being  known  as  distinguished  from  something  else.  The 
plurality  required  is  not  within  the  thing  itself,  but  is 
made  up  between  itself  and  other  things.  Again,  even 
if  we  concede  that  a  thing  cannot  be  known  at  all  unless 
known  as  plural,  does  it  follow  that  it  cannot  be  known 
as  plural  because  it  is  also  One  ?  Since  when  have  the 
One  and  the  Many  been  incompatible  things,  instead  of 
different  aspects  of  the  same  thing  ?  Sir  W.  Hamilton 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AGAINST  COUSIN.  67 

surely  does  not  mean  by  Absolute  Unity,  an  indivisible 
Unit ;  the  minimum,  instead  of  the  maximum  of  Being. 
He  must  mean,  as  M.  Cousin  certainly  means,  an  abso- 
lute Whole ;  the  Whole  which  comprehends  all  things. 
If  this  be  so,  does  not  this  Whole  not  only  admit  of,  but 
necessitate,  the  supposition  of  parts?  Is  not  a  Unity 
which  comprehends  everything,  ex  vi  termini  known  as 
a  plurality,  and  the  most  plural  of  all  pluralities,  plural 
in  an  unsurpassable  degree?  If  there  is  any  meaning 
in  the  words,  must  not  Absolute  Unity  be  Absolute 
Plurality  likewise  ?  There  is  no  escape  from  the  alter- 
native :  "  The  Absolute  "  either  means  a  single  atom  or 
monad,  or  it  means  Plurality  in  the  extreme  degree. 

Though  it  is  hardly  needful,  we  will  try  this  argument 
by  the  test  we  applied  to  a  previous  one  ;  by  substituting 
the  concrete,  God,  for  the  abstract  Absolute.  Would 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  have  said  that  God  is  not  cognizable 
under  the  condition  of  Plurality  —  is  -not  known  as  dis- 
tinguished from  ourselves,  and  from  the  objects  in  nature  ? 
Call  any  positive  Thing  by  a  name  which  expresses  only 
its  negative  predicates,  and  you  may  easily  prove  it 
under  that  name  to  be  incognizable  and  a  non-entity. 
Give  it  back  its  full  name  (if  Mr.  Mansel's  reverential 
feelings  will  permit) ,  its  positive  attributes  reappear,  and 
you  find,  to  your  surprise,  that  wThat  is  a  reality  can  be 
known  as  one. 

The  next  argument  is  chiefly  directed  against  the 
doctrine  of  M.  Cousin,  that  we  know  the  Absolute  as 
Absolute  Cause.  This  doctrine,  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
destroys  itself.  The  idea  of  a  Cause  is  irreconcilable 
with  the  Absolute,  for  a  Cause  is  relative,  and  implies  an 
Effect :  this  Absolute,  therefore,  is  not  an  Absolute  at 


68  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AGAINST   COUSIN. 

all.  Here,  surely,  is  one  of  the  most  unexpected  slips 
in  logic  ever  made  by  an  experienced  logician.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  discussion  we  noted  three  meanings  of 
the  word  Absolute.  Two  of  them  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
himself  discriminated  with  precision.  Of  these,  we 
thought  that  the  one  concerned  in  the  present  discussion 
was  that  of  "finished,  perfected,  completed."  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  said  so ;  and  added,  that  it  is  the  meaning 
which,  for  himself,  he  exclusively  employs :  and,  up  to 
this  time,  he  has  really  kept  to  it.  But  now,  suddenly 
and  without  notice,  that  meaning  is  dropped,  and  another 
substituted  —  that  in  which  absolute  is  the  reverse  of 
relative.  We  are  told,  as  a  sufficient  refutation  of  M. 
Cousin's  doctrine,  that  his  Absolute,  since  it  is  defined 
as  a  Cause,  is  only  a  Relative.  But  if  Absolute  means 
finished,  perfected,  completed,  may  there  not  be  a  fin- 
ished, perfected,  and  completed  Cause?  i.  e.,  the  most  a 
Cause  that  it  is  possible  to  be  —  the  cause  of  everything 
except  itself?  Has  Sir  W.  Hamilton  shown  that  an 
Absolute  Cause  thus  understood,  is  inconceivable  or  un- 
knowable? No:  all  he  shows  is,  that  though  absolute 
in  the  only  sense  relevant  to  the  question,  it  is  not  abso- 
lute in  another  and  a  totally  different  sense ;  since  what 
is  known  as  a  cause,  is  known  relatively  to  something 
else,  namely,  to  its  effects  ;  and  that  such  knowledge  of 
God  is  not  of  God  in  himself,  but  of  God  in  relation  to 
his  works.  The  truth  is,  M.  Cousin's  doctrine  is  too 
legitimate  a  product  of  the  metaphysics  common  to  them 
both,  to  be  capable  of  being  refuted  by  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton. For  this  knowledge  of  God  in  and  by  his  effects, 
according  to  M.  Cousin,  is  knowing  him  as  he  is  in  him- 
self; because  the  creative  power  whereby  he -causes,  is 


SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AGAINST   COUSIN.  69 

in  himself,  is  inseparable  from  him,  and  belongs  to  his 
essence.  And  as  far  as  I  can  see,  the  principles  com- 
mon to  the  two  philosophers  are  as  good  a  warrant  to 
M.  Cousin  for  saying  this,  as  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton  for 
maintaining  that  extension  and  figure  are  of  the  essence 
of  matter,  and  perceived  as  such  by  intuition. 

I  have  now  examined,  with  one  exception,  every  argu- 
ment (which  is  not  merely  ad  hominem)  advanced  by 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  to  prove  against  M.  Cousin  the  un- 
knowableness  of  the  Unconditioned.  The  argument 
which  I  have  reserved  is  the  emphatic  and  oracular 
one,  that  the  Unconditioned  must  be  unthinkable,  be- 
cause "to  think  is  to  condition."  I  have  kept  this  for 
the  last,  because  it  will  occupy  us  the  longest  time ;  for 
we  must  begin  by  finding  the  meaning  of  the  proposi- 
tion ;  which  cannot  be  done  very  briefly,  so  little  help  is 
afforded  us  by  the  author. 

According  to  the  best  notion  I  can  form  of  the  mean- 
ing of  "condition,"  either  as  a  term  of  philosophy  or  of 
common  life,  it  means  that  on  which  something  else  is 
contingent,  or  (more  definitely)  which  being  given,  some- 
thing else  exists,  or  takes  place.  I  promise  to  do  some- 
thing on  condition  that  you  do  something  else  :  that  is, 
if  you  do  this,  I  will  do  that ;  if  not,  I  will  do  as  I  please. 
A  Conditional  Proposition,  in  logic,  is  an  assertion  in 
this  form  :  "  If  so  and  so,  then  so  and  so."  The  con- 
ditions of  a  phenomenon  are  the  various  antecedent  cir- 
cumstances, which,  when  they  exist  simultaneously,  are 
followed  by  its  occurrence.  As  all  these  antecedent  cir- 
cumstances must  coexist,  each  of  them  in  relation  to  the 
others  is  a  conditio  sine  qua  non;  i.  e.9  without  it  the 
phenomenon  will  not  follow  from  the  remaining  condi- 


70  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN. 

tions,  though  it  perhaps  may  from  some  set  of  conditions 
totally  different. 

If  this  be  the  meaning  of  Condition,  the  Uncondi- 
tioned should  mean,  that  which  does  not  depend  for  its 
existence  or  its  qualities  on  any  antecedent ;  in  other 
words,  it  should  be  synonymous  with  the  First  Cause. 
This,  however,  cannot  be  the  meaning  intended  by  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  ;  for,  in  a  passage  already  quoted  from  his 
argument  against  Cousin,  he  speaks  of  the  effect  as  a 
condition  of  its  cause.  The  condition,  therefore,  as  he 
understands  it,  needs  not  be  an  antecedent,  and  may  be 
a  subsequent  fact  to  that  which  it  conditions. 

He  appears,  indeed,  in  his  writings  generally,  to  reckon 
as  a  condition  of  a  thing,  anything  necessarily  implied 
by  it ;  and  uses  the  word  Conditioned  almost  interchange- 
ably with  Relative.  For  relatives  are  always  in  pairs : 
a  term  of  relation  implies  the  existence  of  two  things  — 
the  one  which  it  is  affirmed  of,  and  another :  parent  im- 
plies child,  greater  implies  less,  like  implies  another  like, 
and  vice  versa.  Relation  is  an  abstract  name  for  all 
concrete  facts  which  concern  more  than  one  object. 
Wherever,  therefore,  a  relation  is  affirmed,  or  anything 
is  spoken  of  under  a  relative  name,  the  existence  of  the 
correlative  may  be  called  a  condition  of  the  relation,  as 
well  as  of  the  truth  of  the  assertion.  When,  accord- 
ingly, Sir  W.  Hamilton  calls  an  effect  a  condition  of  its 
cause,  he  speaks  intelligibly,  and  the  received  use  of  the 
term  affords  him  a  certain  amount  of  justification  for 
thus  speaking. 

But,  if  the  Conditioned  means  the  Relative,  the  Un- 
conditioned must  mean  its  opposite :  and  in  this  accep- 
tation, the  Unconditioned  would  mean  all  Noumena; 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AGAINST  COUSIN.  71 

Things  in  themselves,  considered  without  reference  to 
the  effects  they  produce  in  us,  which  are  called  their 
phenomenal  agencies  or  properties.  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
does,  very  frequently,  seem  to  use  the  term  in  this  sense. 
In  denying  all  knowledge  of  the  Unconditioned,  he 
often  seems  to  be  denying  any  other  than  phenomenal 
knowledge  of  Matter  or  of  Mind.  Not  only,  however, 
he  does  not  consistently  adhere  to  this  meaning,  but  it 
directly  conflicts  with  the  only  approach  he  ever  makes 
to  a  definition  or  an  explanation  of  the  term.  We  have 
seen  him  declaring  that  the  Unconditioned  is  the  genus 
of  which  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute  are  the  two 
species.  But  Things  in  themselves  are  not  all  of  them 
infinite  and  absolute.  Matter  and  Mind,  as  such,  are 
neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  It  is  evident  that  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  had  never  decided  what  extent  he  intended 
giving  to  the  term  Unconditioned.  Sometimes  he  gives 
it  one  degree  of  amplitude,  sometimes  another.  Be- 
tween the  meanings  in  which  he  uses  it  there  is  un- 
doubtedly a  link  of  connection ;  but  this  only  makes 
the  matter  still  worse  than  if  there  were  none.  The 
phrase  has  that  most  dangerous  kind  of  ambiguity,  in 
which  the  meanings,  though  essentially  different,  are 
so  nearly  allied  that  the  thinker  unconsciously  inter- 
changes them  one  with  another. 

But  now,  will  either  of  these  two  meanings  of  Con- 
dition —  the  condition  which  means  a  correlative,  or  the 
conditions  the  aggregate  of  which  composes  the  cause, 
—  will  either  of  them  give  a  meaning  to  the  proposition, 
"  To  think  is  to  condition  "  ?  The  second  we  may  at 
once  exclude.  Our  author  cannot  possibly  mean  that  to 
think  an  object  is  to  assign  to  it  a  cause.  But  he  may, 


72  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN. 

perhaps,  mean  that  to  think  it  is  to  give  it  a  correlative. 
For  this  is  true,  and  true  in  more  senses  than  one. 
Whoever  thinks  an  object,  gives  it  at  least  one  cor- 
relative, by  giving  it  a  thinker ;  and  as  many  more  as 
there  are  objects  from  which  he  distinguishes  it.  But 
is  this  any  argument  against  those  who  say  that  the 
Absolute  is  thinkable  ?  Did  any  of  them  ever  suggest 
the  possibility  of  thinking  it  without  a  thinker  ?  Or 
did  any  of  them  profess  to  think  it  in  any  other  manner 
than  by  distinguishing  it  from  other  things  ?  If  to  do 
this  is  to  condition,  those  who  say  that  we  can  think  the 
Absolute,  say  that  we  can  condition  it :  and  if  the  word 
Unconditioned  is  employed  to  make  an  apparent  hinder- 
ance  to  our  doing  so,  it  is  employed  to  beg  the  question. 
The  probability  is,  that  when  our  author  asserts  that 
"to  think  is  to  condition,"  he  uses  the  word  Condition 
in  neither  of  these  senses,  but  in  a  third  meaning, 
equally  familiar  to  him,  and  recurring  constantly  in  such 
phrases  as  "the  conditions  of  our  thinking  faculty," 
"  conditions  of  thought,"  and  the  like.  He  means  by 
Conditions  something  similar  to  Kant's  Forms  of  Sense 
and  Categories  of  Understanding ;  a  meaning  more  cor- 
rectly expressed  by  another  of  his  phrases,  "Necessary 
Laws  of  Thought."  He  is  applying  to  the  Mind  the 
scholastic  maxim  "  Quicquid  recipitur,  recipitur  ad 
modum  recipientis."  He  means  that  our  perceptive  and 
and  conceptive  faculties  have  their  own  laws,  which  not 
only  determine  what  we  are  capable  of  perceiving  and 
conceiving,  but  put  into  our  perceptions  and  conceptions 
elements  not  derived  from  the  thing  perceived  or  con- 
ceived, but  from  the  mind  itself:  That,  therefore,  we 
cannot  at  once  infer  that  whatever  we  find  in  our  percep- 


SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN.  73 

tion  or  conception  of  an  object,  has  necessarily  a  proto- 
type in  the  object  itself:  and  that  we  must,  in  each 
instance,  determine  this  question  by  philosophic  investi- 
gation. According  to  this  doctrine,  which  no  fault  can 
be  found  with  our  author  for  maintaining,  though  often 
for  not  carrying  it  far  enough  —  the  "  conditions  of 
thought"  would  mean  the  attributes  with  which,  it  is 
supposed,  the  mind  cannot  help  investing  every  object 
of  thought  —  the  elements  which,  derived  from  its  own 
structure,  cannot  but  enter  into  every  conception  it  is 
able  to  form ;  even  if  there  should  be  nothing  corre- 
sponding in  the  object  which  is  the  prototype  of  the  con- 
ception :  though  our  author,  in  most  cases  (therein 
differing  from  Kant) ,  believes  that  there  is  this  corre- 
spondence. 

We  have  here  an  intelligible  meaning  for  the  doctrine 
that  to  think  is  to  condition :  but  the  doctrine  is  of 
as  little  use  for  our  author's  purpose  in  this  interpreta- 
tion as  in  tne  two  preceding.  What  he  aims  at  proving 
against  Cousin  is,  that  the  Absolute  is  unthinkable. 
His  argument  for  this  (if  I  have  interpreted  him  right) 
is,  that  we  can  only  think  anything,  in  conformity  to  the 
laws  of  our  thinking  faculty.  But  his  opponents  never 
alleged  the  contrary.  Even  Schelling  was  not  so  gratui- 
tously absurd  as  to  deny  that  the  Absolute  must  be 
known  according  to  the  capacities  of  that  which  knows 
it  —  though  he  was  forced  to  invent  a  special  capacity 
for  the  purpose.  And  M.  Cousin  holds  that  the  Abso- 
lute is  known  by  the  same  faculties  by  which  we  know 
other  things.  They  both  maintained,  not  that  the  Abso- 
lute could  be  thought,  apart  from  the  conditions  of  our 
thinking  faculty,  but  that  those  conditions  are  com- 


74  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AGAINST  COUSIN. 

patible  with  thinking  the  Absolute  :  and  the  only  answer 
that  could  be  made  to  them  would  be  to  disprove  this ; 
which  the  author  has  been  trying  to  do  ;  by  what  incon- 
clusive arguments,  I  have  already  endeavored  to  show. 

If  we  now  ask  ourselves,  as  the  result  of  this  long 
discussion,  what  Sir  W.  Hamilton  can  be  considered  as 
having  accomplished  in  this  celebrated  Essay,  our  answer 
must  be :  That  he  has  established,  more  thoroughly 
perhaps  than  he  intended,  the  futility  of  all  speculation 
respecting  those  meaningless  abstractions  "  The  Infinite  " 
and  "  The  Absolute,"  notions  contradictory  in  themselves, 
and  to  which  no  corresponding  realities  do  or  can  exist. 
His  own  favorite  abstraction  "  The  Unconditioned,"  con- 
sidered as  the  sum  of  these  two,  necessarily  shares  the 
same  fate.  If,  indeed,  it  be  applied,  conformably  to 
either  of  the  received  meanings  of  the  word  condition  — 
if  it  be  understood  either  as  denoting  a  First  Cause,  or 
as  a  name  for  all  Noumena  —  it  has  in  each  case  a  sig- 
nification which  can  be  understood  and  reasoned  about. 
But  as  a  phrase  afflicted  with  incurable  ambiguity,  and 
habitually  used  by  its  introducer  in  several  meanings, 
with  no  apparent  consciousness  of  their  not  being  the 
same,  it  seems  to  me  a  very  infelicitous  creation,  and  a 
useless  and  hurtful  intruder  into  the  language  of  phi- 
losophy. 

Respecting  the  unknowableness,  not  of  "  the  Infinite," 
or  w  the  Absolute,"  but  of  concrete  persons  or  things 
possessing  infinitely  or  absolutely  certain  specific  attri- 
butes, I  cannot  think  that  our  author  has  proved  any- 
thing; nor  do  I  think  it  possible  to  prove  them  any 
otherwise  unknowable,  than  that  they  can  only  be  known 
in  their  relations  to  us,  and  not  as  Noumena,  or  Things 


SIB  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AGAINST  COUSIN.  75 

in  themselves.  This,  however,  is  true  of  the  finite  as 
well  as  of  the  Infinite,  of  the  imperfect  as  well  as  of  the 
completed  or  absolute.  Our  author  has  merely  proved 
the  uncognoscibility  of  a  being  which  is  nothing  but 
infinite,  or  nothing  but  absolute  :  and  since  nobody  sup- 
poses that  there  is  such  a  being,  but  only  beings  which 
are  something  positive  carried  to  the  infinite,  or  to  the 
absolute,  to  have  established  this  point  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  any  great  achievement.  (He  has  not  even 
refuted  M.  Cousin ;  whose  doctrine  of  an  intuitive  cog- 
nition of  the  Deity,  like  every  other  doctrine  relating  to 
intuition,  can  only  be  disproved  by  showing  it  to  be  a 
mistaken  interpretation  of  facts ;  which,  again,  as  we 
shall  see  hereafter,  can  only  be  done  by  pointing  out  in 
what  other  way  the  seeming  perceptions  may  have  ori- 
ginated, which  are  erroneously  supposed  to  be  intuitive^ 


76  BELIEF  WITHOUT  KNOWLEDGE. 


CHAPTER  V. 

WHAT  IS  REJECTED  AS   KNOWLEDGE  BY  SIR  W.  HAMIL- 
TON, BROUGHT  BACK  UNDER  THE  NAME  OF  BELIEF. 

WE  have  found  Sir  "W.  Hamilton  maintaining  with 
great  earnestness,  and  taking  as  the  basis  of  his  philos- 
ophy, an  opinion  respecting  the  limitation  of  human 
knowledge,  which,  if  he  did  not  mean  so  much  by  it  as 
the  language  in  which  he  often  clothed  it  seemed  to  im- 
ply, meant  at  least  this,  that  the  Absolute,  the  Infinite, 
the  Unconditioned,  are  necessarily  unknowable  by  us. 
I  have  discussed  this  opinion  as  a  serious  philosophical 
dogma,  expressing  a  definite  view  of  the  relation  between 
the  universe  and  human  apprehension,  and  fitted  to  guide 
us  in  distinguishing  the  questions  which  it  is  of  any 
avail  to  ask,  from  those  which  are  altogether  closed  to 
our  investigations. 

But  had  the  doctrine,  in  the  mind  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
meant  ten  times  more  than  it  did  —  had  he  upheld  the 
relativity  of  human  knowledge  in  the  fullest,  instead  of 
the  scantiest  meaning  of  which  the  words  are  susceptible 
—  the  question  would  still  have  been  reduced  to  nought, 
or  to  a  mere  verbal  controversy,  by  his  admission  of'  a 
second  source  of  intellectual  conviction  called  Belief; 
which  is  anterior  to  knowledge,  is  the  foundation  of  it, 
and  is  not  subject  to  its  limitations ;  and  through  the 
medium  of  which  we  may  have,  and  are  justified  in 
having,  a  full  assurance  of  all  the  things  which  he  has 


BELIEF  WITHOUT  KNOWLEDGE.  77 

pronounced  unknowable  to  us  ;  and  this  not  exclusively 
by  revelation,  that  is,  on  the  supposed  testimony  of  a 
Being  whom  we  have  ground  for  trusting  as  veracious, 
but  by  our  natural  faculties. 

From  some  philosophers,  this  distinction  would  have 
the  appearance  of  a  mere  fetch — one  of  those  transparent 
evasions  which  have  sometimes  been  resorted  to  by  the 
assailants  of  received  opinions,  that  they  might  have  an 
opportunity  of  ruining  the  rational  foundations  of  a 
doctrine  without  exposing  themselves  to  odium  by  its 
direct  denial :  as  the  writers  against  Christianity  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  after  declaring  some  doctrine  to  be 
contradictory  to  reason,  and  exhibiting  it  in  the  absurdest 
possible  light,  were  wont  to  add  that  this  was  not  of  the 
smallest  consequence,  religion  being  an  affair  of  faith, 
not  of  reason.  But  Sir  W.  Hamilton  evidently  meant 
what  he  says ;  he  was  expressing  a  serious  conviction, 
and  one  of  the  tenets  of  his  philosophy :  he  really 
recognized  in  Belief  a  substantive  source,  I  was  going 
to  say,  of  knowledge ;  I  may  at  all  events  say  of  trust- 
worthy evidence.  This  appears  in  the  following  pas- 
sages :  — 

"  The  *  sphere  of  our  belief  is  much  more  extensive 
than  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge,  and  therefore,  when 
I  deny  that  the  Infinite  can  by  us  be  known,  I  am  far 
from  denying  that  by  us  it  is,  must,  and  ought  to  be, 
believed.  This  I  have  indeed  anxiously  evinced,  both 
by  reasoning  and  authority." 

"St.  Austin  f  accurately  says,  '  We  know,  what  rests 
upon  reason;  but  believe,  what  rests  upon  authority.1 

*  Letter  to  Mr.  Caldcrwood,  in  Appendix  to  Lectures,  ii.  530,  531. 
t  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  760. 
VOL.  i.  4 


78  BELIEF  WITHOUT  KNOWLEDGE. 

But  reason  itself  must  rest  at  last  upon  authority ;  for 
the  original  data  of  reason  do  not  rest  on  reason,  but 
are  necessarily  accepted  by  reason  on  the  authority  of 
what  is  beyond  itself.  These  data  are,  therefore,  in 
rigid  propriety,  Beliefs  or  Trusts.  Thus  it  is  that  in  the 
last  resort  we  must  perforce  philosophically  admit,  that 
belief  is  the  primary  condition  of  reason,  and  not  reason 
the  ultimate  ground  of  belief.  We  are  compelled  to 
surrender  the  proud  Intellige  ut  credas  of  Abelard,  to 
content  ourselves  with  the  humble  Orede  ut  intelligas 
of  Anselm." 

And  in  another  part  of  the  same  Dissertation*  (he  is 
arguing  that  we  do  not  believe,  but  know,  the  external 
world)  —  "  If  asked,  indeed,  how  we  know  that  we 
know  it  ?  how  we  know  that  what  we  apprehend  in  sensi- 
ble perception  is,  as  consciousness  assures  us,  an  object, 
external,  extended,  and  numerically  different  from  the 
conscious  subject  ?  how  we  know  that  this  object  is  not 
a  mere  mode  of  mind,  illusively  presented  to  us  as  a 
mere  mode  of  matter ;  then,  indeed,  we  must  reply  that 
we  do  not  in  propriety  know  that  what  we  are  compelled 
to  perceive  as  not-self  is  not  a  perception  of  self,  and 
that  we  can  only  on  reflection  believe  such  to  be  the  case, 
in  reliance  on  the  original  necessity  of  so  believing,  im- 
posed on  us  by  our  nature." 

It  thus  appears  that,  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  opinion, 
Belief  is  a  higher  source  of  evidence  than  Knowledge ; 
Belief  is  ultimate,  Knowledge  only  derivative ;  Knowl- 
edge itself  finally  rests  on  Belief;  natural  beliefs  are  the 
sole  warrant  for  all  our  knowledge.  Knowledge,  there- 
fore, is  an  inferior  ground  of  assurance  to  natural  Belief; 

*  Pp.  749,  750. 


BELIEF  WITHOUT  KNOWLEDGE.  79 

and  as  we  have  beliefs  which  tell  us  that  we  know,  and 
without  which  we  could  not  be  assured  of  the  truth  of 
our  knowledge,  so  we  have,  and  are  warranted  in  having, 
beliefs  beyond  our  knowledge ;  beliefs  respecting  the 
Unconditioned  —  respecting  that  which  is  in  itself  un- 
knowable. 

I  am  not  now  considering  what  it  is  that,  in  our 
author's  opinion,  we  are  bound  to  believe  concerning  the 
unknowable.  What  here  concerns  us  is,  the  nullity  to 
which  this  doctrine  reduces  the  position  to  which  our 
author  seemed  to  cling  so  firmly,  viz.,  that  our  knowl- 
edge is  relative  to  ourselves,  and  that  we  have  no 
knowledge  of  the  infinite  and  absolute.  In  telling  us 
that  it  is  impossible  to  the  human  faculties  to  know  any- 
thing about  Things  in  themselves,  we  naturally  suppose 
he  intends  to  warn  us  off  the  ground  —  to  bid  us  under- 
stand that  this  subject  of  inquiry  is  closed  to  us,  and 
exhort  us  to  turn  our  attention  elsewhere.  It  appears 
that  nothing  of  the  kind  was  intended  ;  we  are  to  under- 
stand, on  the  contrary,  that  we  may  have  the  best  ground- 
ed and  most  complete  assurance  of  the  things  which  were 
declared  unknowable  —  an  assurance  not  only  equal  or 
greater  in  degree,  but  the  same  in  nature,  as  we  have  for 
the  truth  of  our  knowledge ;  and  that  the  matter  of  dis- 
pute was  only  whether  this  assurance  or  conviction  shall 
be  called  knowledge,  or  by  another  name.  If  this  be 
all,  I  must  say  I  think  it  not  of  the  smallest  conse- 
quence. If  no  more  than  this  be  intended  by  the  "great 
axiom"  and  the  elaborate  argument  against  Cousin,  a 
great  deal  of  trouble  has  been  taken  to  very  little  pur- 
pose ;  and  the  subject  would  have  been  better  left  where 
Reid  left  it,  who  did  not  trouble  himself  with  nice  dis- 


80  BELIEF   WITHOUT  KNOWLEDGE. 

tinctions  between  belief  and  knowledge,  but  was  content 
to  consider  us  as  knowing  that  which,  by  the  constitu- 
tion of  our  nature,  we  are  forced,  with  entire  conviction, 
to  believe.  According  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  we  believe 
premises,  but  know  the  conclusions  from  them.  The 
ultimate  facts  of  consciousness*  are  "given  less  in  the 
form  of  cognitions  than  of  beliefs  :  "  "  Consciousness  in 
its  last  analysis,  in  other  words,  our  primary  experience, 
is  a  faith."  But  if  we  know  the  theorems  of  Euclid, 
and  do  not  know  the  definitions  and  axioms  on  which 
they  rest,  the  word  knowledge,  thus  singularly  applied, 
must  be  taken  in  a  merely  technical  sense.  \In  common 
language,  when  Belief  and  Knowledge  are  distinguished, 
Knowledge  is  understood  to  mean  complete  conviction, 
Belief  a  conviction  somewhat  short  of  complete ;  or  else 
we  are  said  to  believe  when  the  evidence  is  probable  (as 
that  of  testimony) ,  but  to  know,  when  it  is  intuitive,  or 
demonstrative  from  intuitive  premises :  we  believe,  for 
example,  that  there  is  a  Continent  of  America,  but  know 
that  we  are  alive,  that  two  and  two  make  four,  and 
that  the  sum  of  any  two  sides  of  a  triangle  is  greater 
than  the  third  side.  This  is  a  distinction  of  practical 
value;  but  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  use  of  the  term,  it  is 
the  intuitive  convictions  that  are  the  Beliefs,  and  those 
which  are  dependent  and  contingent  upon  them,  compose 
our  knowledge.  Whether  a  particular  portion  of  our 
convictions,  which  are  not  more  certain,  but  if  anything 
less  certain,  than  the  remainder,  and  according  to  our 
author  rest  on  the  same  ultimate  basis,  shall,  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  common  usage  of  mankind,  receive  exclusively 
the  appellation  of  knowledge,  is  at  the  most  a  question  of 

*  Diseussions,  p.  86. 


BELIEF  WITHOUT  KNOWLEDGE.  81 

terminology,  and  can  only  be  made  to  appear  philosophi- 
cally important  by  confounding  difference  of  name  with 
difference  of  fact.  That  any  thing  capable  of  being  said 
on  such  a  subject  should  pass  for  a  fundamental  princi- 
ple of  philosophy,  and  be  the  chief  source  of  the  reputa- 
tion of  a  metaphysical  system ,  is  but  an  example  how  the 
mere  forms  of  logic  and  metaphysics  can  blind  mankind 
to  the  total  absence  of  their  substance. 


82  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE  CONDITIONED. 


CHAPTER  VI, 

THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF   THM   CONDITIONED. 

THE  "  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned,"  in  its  wider 
sense,  includes  all  the  doctrines  that  we  have  been  dis- 
cussing. In  its  narrower,  it  consists,  I  think,  mainly 
of  a  single  proposition,  which  Sir  "W.  Hamilton  often 
reiterates,  and  insists  upon  as  a  fundamental  law  of 
human  intellect.  Though  suggested  by  Kant's  Anti- 
nomies of  Speculative  Reason,  in  the  form  which  it  bears 
in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  writings  it  belongs,  I  believe, 
originally  to  himself.  No  doctrine  which  he  has  any- 
where laid  down  is  more  characteristic  of  his  mode  of 
thought,  and  none  is  more  strongly  associated  with  his 
fame. 

For  the  better  understanding  of  this  theory,  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  premise  some  explanations  respecting  another 
doctrine,  which  is  also  his,  but  not  peculiar  to  him.  He 
protests,  frequently  and  with  emphasis,  against  the  notion 
that  whatever  is  inconceivable  must  be  false.  "  There 
is  no  ground,"  he  says,*  "  for  inferring  a  certain  fact  to 
be  impossible,  merely  from  our  inability  to  conceive  its 
possibility."  I  regard  this  opinion  as  perfectly  just.  It 
is  one  of  the  psychological  truths,  highly  important,  and 
by  no  means  generally  recognized,  which  frequently  meet 
us  in  his  writings,  and  which  give  them,  in  my  eyes, 
most  of  their  philosophical  value.  I  am  obliged  to  add, 

*  Discussions,  p.  624. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE  CONDITIONED.  83 

that  though  he  often  furnishes  a  powerful  statement  and 
vindication  of  such  truths,  he  seldom  or  never  consist- 
ently adheres  to  them.  Too  often  what  he  has  affirmed 
in  generals  is  taken  back  in  details,  and  arguments  of  his 
own  are  found  to  rest  on  philosophical  commonplaces 
which  he  has  himself  repudiated  and  refuted.  I  am 
afraid  that  the  present  is  one  of  these  cases,  and  that  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  will  sometimes  be  found  contending  that  a 
thing  cannot  possibly  be  true  because  we  cannot  conceive 
it :  but  at  all  events  he  disclaims  any  such  inference,  and 
broadly  lays  down,  that  things  not  only  may  be,  but  are, 
of  which  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  even  the  pos- 
sibility. 

Before  showing  how  this  proposition  is  developed  into 
the  "  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned,"  let  us  make  the 
ground  safe  before  us,  by  bestowing  a  brief  consideration 
upon  the  proposition  itself,  its  meaning,  and  the  founda- 
tions on  which  it  rests. 

We  cannot  conclude  anything  to  be  impossible,  be- 
cause its  possibility  is  inconceivable  to  us ;  for  two  rea- 
sons. (First;  what  seems  to  us  inconceivable,  and,  so 
far  as  we  are  personally  concerned,  may  really  be  so, 
usually  owes  its  inconceivability  only  to  a  strong  associa- 
tionj  When,  in  a  prolonged  experience,  we  have  often 
had  a  particular  sensation  or  mental  impression,  and 
never  without  a  certain  other  sensation  or  impression  im- 
mediately accompanying  it,  there  grows  up  so  firm  an 
adhesion  between  our  ideas  of  the  two,  that  we  are  un- 
able to  think  of  the  former  without  thinking  the  latter  in 
close  combination  with  it.  And  unless  other  parts  of 
our  experience  afford  us  some  analogy  to  aid  in  disen- 
tangling the  two  ideas,  our  incapacity  of  imagining  the 


84      THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

one  fact  without  the  other  grows,  or  is  prone  to  grow, 
into  a  belief  that  the  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other. 
This  is  the  law  of  Inseparable  Association,  an  element 
of  our  nature  of  which  few  have  realized  to  themselves 
the  full  power.  It  was  for  the  first  time  largely  applied 
to  the  explanation  of  the  more  complicated  mental  phe- 
nomena by  Mr.  James  Mill;  and  is,  in  an  especial 
manner,  the  key  to  the  phenomenon  of  inconceivability. 
As  that  phenomenon  only  exists  because  our  powers  of 
conception  are  determined  by  our  limited  experience,  In- 
conceivables  are  incessantly  becoming  Conceivables  as 
our  experience  becomes  enlarged.  There  is  no  need  to 
go  farther  for  an  example  than  the  case  of  Antipodes. 
This  physical  fact  was,  to  the  early  speculators,  incon- 
ceivable :  not,  of  course,  the  fact  of  persons  in  that  posi- 
tion ;  this  the  mind  could  easily  represent  to  itself ;  but 
the  possibility  that  being  in  that  position,  and  not  being 
nailed  on,  nor  having  any  glutinous  substance  attached 
to  their  feet,  they  could  help  falling  off.  Here  was  an 
inseparable,  though,  as  it  proved  to  be,  not  an  indisso- 
luble association,  which  while  it  continued  made  a  real 
fact  what  is  called  inconceivable ;  and  because  incon- 
ceivable, it  was  unhesitatingly  believed  to  be  impossible. 
Inconceivabilities  of  similar  character  have,  at  many 
periods,  obstructed  the  reception  of  new  scientific  truths  : 
the  Newtonian  system  had  to  contend  against  several  of 
them  ;  and  we  are  not  warranted  in  assigning  a  different 
origin  and  character  to  those  which  still  subsist,  because 
the  experience  that  would  be  capable  of  removing  them 
has  not  occurred.  If  anything  which  is  now  inconceiv- 
able by  us  were  shown  to  us  as  a  fact,  we  should  soon 
find  ourselves  able  to  conceive  it.  We  should  even  be 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OP  THE   CONDITIONED.  85 

in  danger  of  going  over  to  the  opposite  error,  and  be- 
lieving that  the  negation  of  it  is  inconceivable.  There 
are  many  cases  in  the  history  of  science  (I  have  dilated 
on  some  of  them  in  another  work)  where  something 
which  had  once  been  inconceivable,  and  which  people 
had  with  great  difficulty  learned  to  conceive,  becoming 
itself  fixed  in  the  bonds  of  an  inseparable  association, 
scientific  men  came  to  think  that  it  alone  was  conceiv- 
able, and  that  the  conflicting  hypothesis  which  all  man- 
kind had  believed,  and  which  a  vast  majority  were 
probably  believing  still,  was  inconceivable.  In  Dr. 
Whewell's  writings  on  the  Inductive  Sciences,  this  tran- 
sition of  thought  is  not  only  exemplified,  but  defended. 
Inconceivability  is  thus  a  purely  subjective  thing,  arising 
from  the  mental  antecedents  of  the  individual  mind,  or 
from  those  of  the  human  mind  generally  at  a  particular 
period,  and  cannot  give  us  any  insight  into  the  possi- 
bilities of  Nature. 

But  secondly,  were  it  granted  that  inconceivability  is 
not  solely  the  consequence  of  limited  experience,  but 
that  some  incapacities  of  conceiving  are  inherent  in  the 
mind,  and  inseparable  from  it,  this  would  not  entitle  us 
to  infer,  that  what  we  are  thus  incapable  of  conceiving, 
cannot  exist.  Such  an  inference  would  only  be  warrant- 
able, if  we  could  know  a  priori  that  we  must  have  been 
created  capable  of  conceiving  whatever  is  capable  of 
existing;  that  the  universe  of  thought  and  that  of 
reality,  the  Microcosm  and  the  Macrocosm  (as  they 
once  were  called)  must  have  been  framed  in  complete 
correspondence  with  one  another.  That  this  is  really 
the  case  has  been  laid  down  expressly  in  some  systems 
of  philosophy,  by  implication  in  more,  and  is  the  foun- 


86  THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

dation  (among  others)  of  the  systems  of  Schelling  and 
Hegel :  but  an  assumption  more  destitute  of  evidence 
could  scarcely  be  made,  nor  can  one  easily  imagine  any 
evidence  that  could  prove  it,  unless  it  were  revealed 
from  above. 

What  is  inconceivable,  then,  cannot  therefore  be  in- 
ferred to  be  false.  But  let  us  vary  the  terms  of  the 
proposition,  and  express  it  thus  :  what  is  inconceivable, 
is  not  therefore  incredible.  We  have  now  a  statement, 
which  may  mean  either  exactly  the  same  as  the  other, 
or  more.  It  may  mean  only  that  our  inability  to  con- 
ceive a  tlu'ng,  does  not  entitle  us  to  deny  its  possibility, 
nor  its  existence.  Or  it  may  mean,  that  a  thing's  being 
inconceivable  to  us  is  no  reason  against  our  believing, 
and  legitimately  believing,  that  it  actually  is.  This  is  a 
very  different  proposition  from  the  preceding.  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  as  we  have  said,  goes  this  length.  It  is  now 
necessary  to  enter  more  minutely  than  at  first  seemed 
needful,  into  the  meaning  of  "inconceivable;"  which, 
like  almost  all  the  metaphysical  terms  we  are  forced  to 
make  use  of,  is  weighed  down  with  ambiguities. 

Reid  pointed  out  and  discriminated  two  meanings  of 
the  verb  "  to  conceive,"  *  giving  rise  to  two  different 

*  "  To  conceive,  to  imagine,  to  apprehend,  when  taken  in  the  proper 
sense,  signify  an  act  of  the  mind  which  implies  no  belief  or  judgment  at 
all.  It  is  an  act  of  the  mind  by  which  nothing  is  affirmed  or  denied,  and 
which,  therefore,  can  neither  be  true  nor  false.  But  there  is  another  and  a 
very  different  meaning  of  these  words,  so  common  and  so  well  authorized 
in  language  that  it  cannot  be  avoided ;  and  on  that  account  we  ought  to  be 
the  more  on  our  guard,  that  we  be  not  misled  by  the  ambiguity.  .  .  . 
When  we  would  express  our  opinion  modestly,  instead  of  saying,  '  This  is 
my  opinion,'  or  '  This  is  my  judgment,'  which  has  the  air  of  dogmatical- 
ness,  we  say,  '  I  conceive  it  to  be  thus  —  I  imagine,  or  apprehend,  it  to  be 
thus ; '  which  is  understood  as  a  modest  declaration  of  our  judgment.  In 
like  manner,  when  anything  is  said  which  we  take  to  be  impossible,  we 


THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  87 

meanings  of  inconceivable.  But  Sir  W.  Hamilton  uses 
"to  conceive"  in  three  meanings,  and  has  accordingly 
three  meanings  for  Inconceivable ;  though  he  does  not 
give  the  smallest  hint  to  his  readers,  nor  seems  ever  to 
suspect,  that  the  three  are  not  one  and  the  same. 

The  first  meaning  of  Inconceivable  is,  that  of  which 
the  mind  cannot  form  to  itself  any  representation  :  either 
(as  in  the  case  of  Noumena)  because  no  attributes  are 
given,  out  of  which  a  representation  could  be  framed, 
or  because  the  attributes  given  are  incompatible  with 
one  another  —  are  such  as  the  mind  cannot  put  together 
in  a  single  image.  Of  this  last  case  numerous  instances 
present  themselves  to  the  most  cursory  glance.  The 
fundamental  one  is  that  of  a  simple  contradiction.  We 
cannot  represent  anything  to  ourselves  as  at  once  being 
something,  and  not  being  it ;  as  at  once  having,  and 
not  having,  a  given  attribute.  The  following  are  other 
examples.  We  cannot  represent  to  ourselves  time  or 
space  as  having  an  end.  We  cannot  represent  to  our- 
selves two  and  two  as  making  five ;  nor  two  straight 
lines  as  enclosing  a  space.  We  cannot  represent  to 

say,  '  We  cannot  conceive  it : '  meaning  that  we  cannot  believe  it.  Thus 
we  see  that  the  words  conceive,  imagine,  apprehend,  have  two  meanings, 
and  are  used  to  express  two  operations  of  the  mind,  which  ought  never  to 
be  confounded.  Sometimes  they  express  simple  apprehension,  which  im- 
plies no  judgment  at  all ;  sometimes  they  express  judgment  or  opinion. . . . 
"When  they  are  used  to  express  simple  apprehension  they  arc  followed  by  a 
noun  in  the  accusative  case,  which  signifies  the  object  conceived  ;  but  when 
they  are  used  to  express  opinion  or  judgment,  they  are  commonly  followed 
by  a  verb  in  the  infinitive  mood.  '  I  conceive  an  Egyptian  pyramid.'  This 
implies  no  judgment.  '  I  conceive  the  Egyptian  pyramids  to  be  the  most 
ancient  monuments  of  human  art.'  This  implies  judgment.  When  they 
are  used  in  the  last  sense,  the  thing  conceived  must  be  a  proposition,  be- 
cause judgment  cannot  be  expressed  but  by  a  proposition." 

Reid  on  the  Intellectual  Powei-s,  p.  223  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  edition,  to 
which  edition  all  my  references  will  be  made. 


88  THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

ourselves  a  round  square ;  or  a  body  all  black,  and  at 
the  same  time  all  white. 

These  things  are  literally  inconceivable  to  us,  our 
minds  and  our  experience  being  what  they  are.  Whether 
they  would  be  inconceivable  if  our  minds  were  the  same 
but  our  experience  different,  is  open  to  discussion.  A 
distinction  may  be  made,  which,  I  think,  will  be  found 
pertinent  to  the  question.  (That  the  same  thing  should 
at  once  be  and  not  be — that  identically  the  same  state- 
ment should  be  both  true  and  false  —  is  not  only  incon- 
ceivable to  us,  but  we  cannot  conceive  that  it  could  be 
made  conceivable.  We  cannot  attach  sufficient  meaning 
to  the  proposition,  to  be  able  to  represent  to  ourselves 
the  supposition  of  a  different  experience  on  this  matter?) 
We  cannot  therefore  even  entertain  the  question,  whether 
the  incompatibility  is  in  the  original  structure  of  our 
minds,  or  is  only  put  there  by  our  experience.  The  case 
is  otherwise  in  all  the  other  examples  of  inconceivability. 
Our  incapacity  of  conceiving  the  same  thing  as  A  and  not 
A,  may  be  primordial :  but  our  inability  to  conceive  A 
without  B,  is  because  A,  by  experience  or  teaching,  has 
become  inseparably  associated  with  B  :  and  our  inability 
to  conceive  A  with  C,  is,  because,  by  experience  or  teach- 
ing, A  has  become  inseparably  associated  with  some 
mental  representation  which  includes  the  negation  of  C. 
(Thus  all  inconceivabilities  may  be  reduced  to  inseparable 
association,  combined  with  the  original  inconceivability 
of  a  direct  contradiction)  All  the  cases  which  I  have 
cited  as  instances  of  inconceivability,  and  which  are  the 
strongest  I  could  have  chosen,  may  be  resolved  in  this 
manner.  We  cannot  conceive  a  round  square,  not 
merely  because  no  such  object  has  ever  presented  itself 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   CONDITIONED.  89 

in  our  experience,  for  that  would  not  be  enough. 
Neither,  for  anything  we  know,  are  the  two  ideas  in 
themselves  incompatible.  To  conceive  a  round  square, 
or  to  conceive  a  body  all  black  and  yet  all  white,  would 
only  be  to  conceive  two  different  sensations  as  produced 
in  us  simultaneously  by  the  same  object ;  a  conception 
familiar  to  our  experience  ;  and  we  should  probably  be 
as  well  able  to  conceive  a  round  square  as  a  hard  square, 
or  a  heavy  square,  if  it  were  not  that,  in  our  uniform 
experience,  at  the  instant  when  a  thing  begins  to  be 
round  it  ceases  to  be  square,  so  that  the  beginning  of  the 
one  impression  is  inseparably  associated  with  the  de- 
parture or  cessation  of  the  other.  Thus  our  inability  to 
form  a  conception  always  arises  from  our  being  com- 
pelled to  form  another  contradictory  to  it.  We  cannot 
conceive  time  or  space  as  having  an  end,  because  the 
idea  of  any  portion  whatever  of  time  or  space  is  insepara- 
bly associated  with  the  idea  of  a  time  or  space  beyond  it. 
We  cannot  conceive  two  and  two  as  five,  because  an  in- 
separable association  compels  us  to  conceive  it  as  four ; 
and  it  cannot  be  conceived  as  both,  because  four  and  five, 
like  round  and  square,  are  so  related  in  our  experience, 
that  each  is  associated  with  the  cessation,  or  removal,  of 
the  other.  We  cannot  conceive  two  straight  lines  as 
enclosing  a  space,  because  enclosing  a  space  means 
approaching  and  meeting  a  second  time ;  and  the  mental 
image  of  two  straight  lines  which  have  once  met,  is 
inseparably  associated  with  the  representation  of  them 
as  diverging.  Thus  it  is  not  wholly  without  ground  that 
the  notion  of  a  round  square,  and  the  assertion  that  two 
and  two  make  five,  or  that  two  straight  lines  can  enclose 
a  space,  are  said,  in  common  and  even  in  scientific  par- 


90  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

lance,  to  involve  a  contradiction.  The  statement  is  not 
logically  correct,  for  contradiction  is  only  between  a  posi- 
tive representation  and  its  negative.  But  the  impossi- 
bility of  uniting  contradictory  conceptions  in  the  same 
representation,  is  the  real  ground  of  the  inconceivability 
in  these  cases.  And  we  should  probably  have  no  difficulty 
in  putting  together  the  two  ideas  supposed  to  be  incom- 
patible, if  our  experience  had  not  first  inseparably  asso- 
ciated one  of  them  with  the  contradictory  of  the  other.* 

*  That  the  reverse  of  the  most  familiar  principles  of  arithmetic  and 
geometry  might  have  been  made  conceivable,  even  to  our  present  mental 
faculties,  if  those  faculties  had  coexisted  with  a  totally  different  constitu- 
tion of  external  nature,  is  ingeniously  shown  in  the  concluding  paper  of  a 
recent  volume,  anonymous,  but  of  known  authorship,  "  Essays,  by  a 
Barrister." 

"  Consider  this  case.  There  is  a  world  in  which,  whenever  two  pairs  of 
things  are  either  placed  in  proximity  or  are  contemplated  together,  a  fifth 
thing  is  immediately  created  and  brought  within  the  contemplation  of  the 
mind  engaged  in  putting  two  and  two  together.  This  is  surely  neither  in- 
conceivable, for  we  can  readily  conceive  the  result  by  thinking  of  common 
puzzle  tricks,  nor  can  it  be  said  to  be  beyond  the  power  of  Omnipotence. 
Yet  in  such  a  world  surely  two  and  two  would  make  five.  That  is,  the 
result  to  the  mind  of  contemplating  two  two's  would  be  to  count  five.  This 
shows  that  it  is  not  inconceivable  that  two  and  two  might  make  five  :  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  perfectly  easy  to  see  why  in  this  world  we  are 
absolutely  certain  that  two  and  two  make  four.  There  is  probably  not  an 
instant  of  our  lives  in  which  we  are  not  experiencing  the  fact.  We  see  it 
whenever  we  count  four  books,  four  tables  or  chairs,  four  men  in  the  street, 
or  the  four  corners  of  a  paving  stone,  and  we  feel  more  sure  of  it  than  of 
the  rising  of  the  sun  to-morrow,  because  our  experience  upon  the  subject  is 
so  much  wider  and  applies  to  such  an  infinitely  greater  number  of  cases. 
Nor  is  it  true  that  every  one  who  has  once  been  brought  to  see  it,  is  equally 
sure  of  it.  A  boy  who  has  just  learned  the  multiplication  table  is  pretty 
sure  that  twice  two  are  four,  but  is  often  extremely  doubtful  whether  seven 
times  nine  are  sixty-three.  If  his  teacher  told  him  that  twice  two  made 
five,  his  certainty  would  be  greatly  impaired. 

"  It  would  also  be  possible  to  put  a  case  of  a  world  in  which  two  straight 
lines  should  be  universally  supposed  to  include  a  space.  Imagine  a  man 
who  had  never  had  any  experience  of  straight  lines  through  the  medium 
of  any  sense  whatever,  suddenly  placed  upon  a  railway  stretching  out  on 
a  perfectly  straight  line  to  an  indefinite  distance  in  each  direction.  He 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  91 

Thus  far,  of  the  first  kind  of  Inconceivability ;  the 
first  and  most  proper  meaning  in  which  the  word  is  used. 
But  there  is  another  meaning,  in  which  things  are  often 
said  to  be  inconceivable  which  the  mind  is  under  no 
incapacity  of  representing  to  itself  in  an  image.  It  is 
often  said,  that  we  are  unable  to  conceive  as  possible  that 
which,  in  itself,  we  are  perfectly  well  able  to  conceive  : 
we  are  able,  it  is  admitted,  to  conceive  it  as  an  imaginary 
object,  but  unable  to  conceive  it  realized.  This  extends 
the  term  inconceivable  to  every  combination  of  facts 
which,  to  the  mind  simply  contemplating  it,  appears  in- 
credible. It  was  in  this  sense  that  Antipodes  were  in- 
conceivable. They  could  be  figured  in  imagination ; 
they  could  even  be  painted,  or  modelled  in  clay.  The 
mind  could  put  the,  parts  of  the  conception  together,  but 
it  could  not  realize  the  combination  as  one  which  could 
exist  in  nature.  The  cause  of  the  inability  was  the 

would  sec  the  rails,  which  would  be  the  first  straight  lines  he  had  ever  seen, 
apparently  meeting,  or  at  least  tending  to  meet  at  each  horizon ;  and  he 
would  thus  infer,  in  the  absence  of  all  other  experience,  that  they  actually 
did  enclose  a  space  when  produced  far  enough.  Experience  alone  could 
undeceive  him.  A  world  in  which  every  object  was  round,  with  the  single 
exception  of  a  straight  inaccessible  railway,  would  be  a  world  in  which 
every  one  would  believe  that  two  straight  lines  enclosed  a  space.  In  such 
a  world,  therefore,  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  that  two  straight  lines 
can  enclose  a  space  would  not  exist." 

In  the  "Geometry  of  Visibles"  which  forms  part  of  Reid's  "Inquiry 
into  the  Human  Mind,"  it  is  contended  that  if  we  had  the  sense  of  sight, 
but  not  that  of  touch,  it  would  appear  to  us  that  "  every  right  line  being 
produced  will  at  last  return  into  itself,"  and  that  "  any  two  right  lines  being 
produced  will  meet  in  two  points."  Ch.  vi.  Sect.  9  (p.  148).  The  author 
adds,  that  persons  thus  constituted  would  firmly  believe  "that  two  or 
more  bodies  may  exist  in  the  same  place."  For  this  they  would  "  have 
the  testimony  of  sense,"  and  could  "  no  more  doubt  of  it  than  they  can 
doubt  whether  they  have  any  perception  at  all,  since  they  would  often  see 
two  bodies  meet  and  coincide  in  the  same  place,  and  separate  again,  with- 
out having  undergone  any  change  in  their  sensible  qualities  by  this 
penetration."  (P.  151.) 


92  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE   CONDITIONED. 

powerful  tendency,  generated  by  experience,  to  expect 
falling  off  when  a  body,  not  of  adhesive  quality,  was  in 
contact  only  with  the  under  side  of  another  body.  The 
association  was  not  so  powerful  as  to  disable  the  mind 
from  conceiving  the  body  as  holding  on ;  doubtless  be- 
cause other  facts  of  our  experience  afforded  models  on 
which  such  a  conception  could  be  framed.  But  though 
not  disabled  from  conceiving  the  combination,  the  mind 
was  disabled  from  believing  it.  The  difference  between 
belief  and  -conception,  and  between  the  conditions  of 
belief  and  those  of  simple  conception,  are  psychological 
questions  into  which  I  do  not  enter.  It  is  sufficient 
that  inability  to  believe  can  coexist  with  ability  to  con- 
ceive, and  that  a  mental  association  between  two  facts 
which  is  not  intense  enough  to  make  their  separation 
unimaginable,  may  yet  create,  and  if  there  are  no  coun- 
ter-associations, always  does  create,  more  or  less  of  diffi- 
culty in  believing  that  the  two  can  exist  apart :  a  difficulty 
often  amounting  to  a  local  or  temporary  impossibility. 

This  is  the  second  meaning  of  Inconceivability  ;  which 
by  Reid  is  carefully  distinguished  from  the  first ;  but  his 
editor,  Sir  "VV.  Hamilton,  employs  the  word  in  both 
senses  indiscriminately.  How  he  came  to  miss  the  dis- 
tinction is  tolerably  obvious  to  any  one  who  is  familiar 
with  his  writings,  and  especially  with  his  theory  of  Judg- 
ment ;  but  needs  not  be  pointed  out  here.  It  is  more 
remarkable  that  he  gives  the  term  a  third  sense,  answer- 
ing to  a  third  signification  of  the  verb  "to  conceive." 
To  conceive  anything,  has  with  him  not  only  its  two 
ordinary  meanings,  —  to  represent  the  thing  as  an  image, 
and  to  be  able  to  realize  it  as  possible,  —  but  an  addi- 
tional one,  which  he  denotes  by  various  phrases.  One 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  93 

of  his  common  expressions  for  it  is,  "  to  construe  to  the 
mind  in  thought."  This,  he  often  says,  can  only  be 
done  "  through  a  higher  notion."  "  We  *  think,  we  con- 
ceive, we  comprehend  a  thing,  only  as  we  think  it  as 
within  or  under  something  else."  So  that  a  fact,  or  a 
supposition,  is  conceivable  or  comprehensible  by  us  (con- 
ceive and  comprehend  being  with  him  in  this  case  synon- 
ymous) only  by  being  reduced  to  some  more  general 
fact,  as  a  particular  case  under  it.  Again, f  "to  con- 
ceive the  possibility  "  of  a  thing,  is  defined  "  conceiving 
it  as  the  consequent  of  a  certain  reason."  The  incon- 
ceivable, in  this  third  sense,  is  simply  the  inexplicable. 
Accordingly  all  first  truths  are,  according  to  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  inconceivable.  "  The  J  primary  data  of  con- 
sciousness, as  themselves  the  conditions  under  which  all 
else  is  comprehended,  are  necessarily  themselves  incom- 
prehensible .  .  .  that  is  ...  we  are  unable  to  con- 
ceive through  a  higher  notion  how  that  is  possible,  which 
the  deliverance  avouches  actually  to  be."  And  we  shall 
find  him  arguing  things  to  be  inconceivable,  merely  on 
the  ground  that  we  have  no  higher  notion  under  which 
to  class  them.  This  use  of  the  word  inconceivable, 
being  a  complete  perversion  of  it  from  its  established 
meanings,  I  decline  to  recognize.  If  all  the  general 
truths  which  we  are  most  certain  of  are  to  be  called 
inconceivable,  the  word  no  longer  serves  any  purpose. 
Inconceivable  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  unprovable 
or  unanalyzable.  A  truth  which  is  not  inconceivable  in 
either  of  the  received  meanings  of  the  term,  —  a  truth 
which  is  completely  apprehended,  and  without  difficulty 

*  Lectures,  iii.  102.  t  Ibid.  p.  100. 

%  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  745. 


94  THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

believed,  — I  cannot  consent  to  call  inconceivable  merely 
because  we  cannot  account  for  it  or  deduce  it  from  a 
higher  truth. 

These  being  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  three  kinds  of  incon- 
ceivability, is  the  inconceivability  of  a  proposition  in  any 
of  these  senses  consistent  with  believing  it  to  be  true  ? 
The  third  kind  we  may  disregard,  not  only  as  inadmis- 
sible, but  as  avowedly  compatible  with  belief.  An 
inconceivable  of  the  second  kind  can  not  only  be  believed, 
but  believed  with  full  understanding.  In  this  case  we 
are  perfectly  able  to  represent  to  ourselves  mentally  what 
is  said  to  be  inconceivable ;  only,  from  an  association  in 
our  mind,  it  does  not  look  credible ;  but,  this  association 
being  the  result  of  experience  or  of  teaching,  contrary 
experience  or  teaching  is  able  to  dissolve  it ;  and  even 
before  this  has  been  done,  —  while  the  thing  still  feels 
incredible, — the  intellect  may,  on  sufficient  evidence, 
accept  it  as  true.  An  inconceivable  of  the  first  kind, 
inconceivable  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  —  that 
which  the  mind  is  actually  unable  to  put  together  in  a 
representation,  —  may  nevertheless  be  believed,  if  we 
attach  any  meaning  to  it,  but  cannot  be  said  to  be  be- 
lieved with  understanding.  We  cannot  believe  it  on 
direct  evidence,  i.  e.,  through  its  being  presented  in  our 
experience,  for  if  it  were  so  presented,  it  would  imme- 
diately cease  to  be  inconceivable.  We  may  believe  it 
because  its  falsity  would  be  inconsistent  with  something 
which  we  otherwise  know  to  be  true.  Or  we  may  be- 
lieve it  because  it  is  affirmed  by  some  one  wiser  than 
ourselves,  who,  we  suppose,  may  have  had  the  experience 
which  has  not  reached  us,  and  to  whom  it  may  thus 
have  become  conceivable.  But  the  belief  is  without 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  95 

understanding,  for  we  form  no  mental  picture  of  what  we 
believe.  We  do  not  so  much  believe  the  fact,  as  believe 
that  we  should  believe  it,  if  we  could  have  the  needful 
presentation  in  our  experience ;  and  that  some  other 
being  has,  or  may  have,  had  that  presentation.  Our  in- 
ability to  conceive  it,  is  no  argument  whatever  for  its 
being  false,  and  no  hinderance  to  our  believing  it,  to  the 
above-mentioned  extent. 

But  though  facts,  which  we  cannot  join  together  in  an 
image,  may  be  united  in  the  universe,  and  though  we 
may  have  sufficient  ground  for  believing  that  they  are  so 
united  in  point  of  fact,  it  is  impossible  to  believe  a  prop- 
osition which  conveys  to  us  no  meaning  at  all.  If  any 
one  says  to  me,  Humpty  Dumpty  is  an  Abracadabra, 
I  neither  knowing  what  is  meant  by  an  Abracadabra, 
nor  what  is  meant  by  Humpty  Dumpty,  I  may,  if  I 
have  confidence  in  my  informant,  believe  that  he  means 
something,  and  that  the  something  which  he  means  is 
probably  true  ;  but  I  do  not  believe  the  very  thing  which 
he  means,  since  I  am  entirely  ignorant  what  it  is. 
Propositions  of  this  kind,  the  unmeaningness  of  which 
lies  in  the  subject  or  predicate,  are  not  those  generally 
described  as  inconceivable.  The  unmeaning  propositions 
spoken  of  under  that  name,  are  usually  those  which  in- 
volve contradictions.  That  the  same  thing  is  and  is  not 
—  that  it  did  and  did  not  rain  at  the  same  time  and 
place,  that  a  man  is  both  alive  and  not  alive  —  are  forms 
of  words  which  carry  no  signification  to  my  mind.  As 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  truly  says,*  one  half  of  the  statement 
simply  sublates  or  takes  away  the  meaning  which  the 
other  half  has  laid  down.  The  unmeaningness  here 

*  Lectures,  iii.  99. 


96      THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE  CONDITIONED. 

resides  in  the  copula.  The  word  is,  has  no  meaning 
except  as  exclusive  of  is  not.  The  case  is  more  hope- 
less than  that  of  Humpty  Dumpty,  for  no  explanation  by 
the  speaker  of  what  the  words  mean  can  make  the  assertion 
intelligible.  Whatever  may  be  meant  by  a  man,  and 
whatever  may  be  meant  by  alive,  the  statement  that  a 
man  can  be  alive  and  not  alive  is  equally  without  mean- 
ing to  me.  I  cannot  make  out  anything  which  the 
speaker  intends  me  to  believe.  The  sentence  affirms 
nothing  of  which  my  mind  can  take  hold.  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  indeed,  maintains  the  contrary.  He  says,* 
w  When  we  conceive  the  proposition  that  A  is  not  A,  we 
clearly  comprehend  the  separate  meaning  of  the  terms 
A  and  not  A,  and  also  the  import  of  the  assertion  of 
their  identity."  We  comprehend  the  separate  meaning 
of  the  terms,  but  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  assertion,  I 
think  we  only  comprehend  what  the  same  form  of  words 
would  mean  in  another  case.  The  very  import  of  the 
form  of  words  is  inconsistent  with  its  meaning  anything 
when  applied  to  terms  of  this  particular  kind.  Let  any 
one  who  doubts  this,  attempt  to  define  what  is  meant  by 
applying  a  predicate  to  a  subject,  when  the  predicate  and 
the  subject  are  the  negation  of  one  another.  To  make 
sense  of  the  assertion,  some  new  meaning  must  be 
attached  to  is  or  is  not,  and  if  this  be  done  the  proposi- 
tion is  no  longer  the  one  presented  for  our  assent. 
Here,  therefore,  is  one  kind  of  inconceivable  proposi- 
tion which  nothing  whatever  can  make  credible  to  us. 
oSjJt  being  able  to  attach  any  meaning  to  the  proposition, 
we  are  equally  incompetent  to  assert  that  it  is,  or  that  it 
is  not,  possible  in  itseTp  But  we  have  not  the  power 
of  believing  it ;  and  there  the  matter  must  rest. 
*  Lectures,  p.  113. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  97 

We  are  now  prepared  to  enter  on  the  peculiar  doctrine 
of  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  called  the  Philosophy  of  the  Con- 
ditioned. Not  content  with  maintaining  that  things 
which  from  the  natural  and  fundamental  laws  of  the 
human  mind  are  forever  inconceivable  to  us,  may,  for 
aught  we  know,  be  true,  he  goes  farther,  and  says,  we 
know  that  many  such  things  are  true.  "Things  *  there 
are  which  may,  nay,  must,  be  true,  of  which  the  under- 
standing is  wholly  unable  to  construe  to  itself  the  pos- 
sibility." Of  what  nature  these  things  are,  is  declared, 
in  many  parts  of  his  writings,  in  the  form  of  a  general 
law.  It  is  thus  stated  in  the  review  of  Cousin  :f  "The 
Conditioned  is  the  mean  between  the  two  extremes  — 
two  unconditionates,  exclusive  of  each  other,  neither  of 
which  can  be  conceived  as  possible,  but  of  which,  on  the 
principles  of  contradiction  and  excluded  middle,  one 
must  be  admitted  as  necessary.  .  .  .  The  mind  is  not 
represented  as  conceiving  two  propositions  subversive 
of  each  other  as  equally  possible ;  but  only,  as  unable 
to  understand  as  possible,  either  of  the  extremes ;  one 
of  which,  however,  on  the  ground  of  their  mutual  re- 
pugnance, it  is  compelled  to  recognize  as  true." 

In  the  Dissertations  on  ReidJ  he  enunciates,  in  still 
more  general  terms,  as  "the  Law  of  the  Conditioned: 
That  all  positive  thought  lies  between  two  extremes, 
neither  of  which  we  can  conceive  as  possible,  and  yet 
as  mutual  contradictories,  the  one  or  the  other  we  must 
recognize  as  necessary."  And  it  is  (he  says)  "  from  this 
impotence  of  intellect"  that  "we  are  unable  to  think 
aught  as  absolute.  Even  absolute  relativity  is  un- 
thinkable." 

*  Discussions,  p.  624.  t  Ibid.  p.  15.  t  ?•  911. 


98  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

The  doctrine  is  more  fully  expanded  in  the  Lectures 
on  Logic,*  from  which  I  shall  quote  at  greater  length. 

"  All  that  we  can  positively  think  .  .  .  lies  between 
two  opposite  poles  of  thought,  which,  as  exclusive  of 
each  other,  cannot,  on  the  principles  of  Identity  and 
Contradiction,  both  be  true,  but  of  which,  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  Excluded  Middle,  one  or  the  other  must.  Let 
us  take,  for  example,  any  of  the  general  objects  of  our 
knowledge.  Let  us  take  body,  or  rather,  since  body  as 
extended  is  included  under  extension,  let  us  take  exten- 
sion itself,  or  space.  Now,  extension  alone  will  exhibit 
to  us  two  pairs  of  contradictory  inconceivables,f  that  is, 
in  all,  four  incomprehensibles,  but  of  which,  though  all 
are  equally  unthinkable  ...  we  are  compelled,  by  the 
law  of  Excluded  Middle,  to  admit  some  two  as  true  and 
necessary. 

"  Extension  may  be  viewed  either  as  a  whole  or  as 
a  part ;  and  in  each  aspect  it  affords  us  two  incogitable 
contradictions.  1st.  Taking  it  as  a  whole  :  space,  it  is 
evident,  must  either  be  limited,  that  is,  have  an  end, 
and  circumference ;  or  unlimited,  that  is,  have  no  end, 
no  circumference.  These  are  contradictory  supposi- 
tions ;  both,  therefore,  cannot,  but  one  must,  be  true. 
Now,  let  us  try  positively  to  comprehend,  positively  to 
conceive,  J  the  possibility  of  either  of  these  two  mutually 
exclusive  alternatives.  Can  we  represent,  or  realize  in 
thought,  extension  as  absolutely  limited  ?  in  other  words, 
can  we  mentally  hedge  round  the  whole  of  space,  con- 

*  Lectures,  iii.  100,  et  seq. 

*•  To  save  words  in  the  text,  I  shall  simply  indicate  in  foot-notes  the 
places  at  which  the  author  passes  from  one  of  the  three  meanings  of  the 
word  Inconceivable  to  another.  In  this  place  he  is  using  it  in  the  first  or 
second  meaning,  probably  in  the  first. 

J  First  sense. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.      99 

ceive*  it  absolutely  bounded,  that  is,  so  that  beyond  its 
boundary  there  is  no  outlying,  no  surrounding  space? 
This  is  impossible.  Whatever  compass  of  space  we 
may  enclose  by  any  limitation  of  thought,  we  shall  find 
that  we  have  no  difficulty  in  transcending  these  limits. 
Nay,  we  shall  find  that  we  cannot  but  transcend  them ; 
for  we  are  unable  to  think  any  extent  of  space  except  as 
within  a  still  ulterior  space,  of  which,  let  us  think  till 
the  powers  of  thinking  fail,  we  can  never  reach  the  cir- 
cumference. It  is  thus  impossible  for  us  to  think  space 
as  a  totality,  that  is,  as  absolutely  bounded,  but  all-con- 
taining. We  may,  therefore,  lay  down  this  first  extreme 
as  inconceivable.f  We  cannot  think  space  as  limited. 

"  Let  us  now  consider  its  contradictory :  can  we  com- 
prehend the  possibility  of  infinite  or  unlimited  space? 
To  suppose  this  is  a  direct  contradiction  in  terms ;  it  is 
to  comprehend  the  incomprehensible.  We  think,  we 
conceive,  J  we  comprehend  a  thing,  only  as  we  think  it 
as  within  or  under  something  else ;  but  to  do  this  of  the 
infinite  is  to  think  the  infinite  as  finite,  which  is  contra- 
dictory and  absurd. 

"  Now,  here  it  may  be  asked,  how  have  we  then  the 
word  infinite?  How  have  we  the  notion  which  this 
word  expresses?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  con- 
tained in  the  distinction  of  positive  and  negative  thought. 
We  have  a  positive  concept  of  a  thing  when  we  think  it 
by  the  qualities  of  which  it  is  the  complement.  But  as 
the  attribution  of  qualities  is  an  affirmation,  as  affirmation 
and  negation  are  relatives,  and  as  relatives  are  known 
only  in  and  through  each  other,  we  cannot,  therefore, 
have  a  consciousness  of  the  affirmation  of  any  quality, 

*  First  sense.  t  First  sense.  J  Third  sense. 


100  THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

without  having  at  the  same  time  the  correlative  con- 
sciousness of  its  negation.  Now,  the  one  consciousness 
is  a  positive,  the  other  consciousness  is  a  negative  notion. 
But,  in  point  of  fact,  a  negative  notion  is  only  the  nega- 
tion of  a  notion ;  we  think  only  by  the  attribution  of 
certain  qualities,  and  the  negation  of  these  qualities  and 
of  this  attribution  is  simply,  in  so  far,  a  denial  of  our 
thinking  at  all.  As  affirmation  always  suggests  negation, 
every  positive  notion  must  likewise  suggest  a  negative 
notion :  and  as  language  is  the  reflex  of  thought,  the 
positive  and  negative  notions  are  expressed  by  positive 
and  negative  names.  Thus  it  is  with  the  infinite.  The 
finite  is  the  only  object  of  real  or  positive  thought ;  it  is 
that  alone  which  we  think  by  the  attribution  of  deter- 
minate characters ;  the  infinite,  on  the  contrary,  is  con- 
ceived only  by  the  thinking  away  of  every  character  by 
which  the  finite  was  conceived ;  in  other  words,  we  con- 
ceive it  only  as  inconceivable.*  .  .  . 

"It  is  manifest  that  we  can  no  more  realize  the 
thought  or  conception  of  infinite,  unbounded,  or  unlimit- 
ed space,  than  we  can  realize  the  conception  of  a  finite 
or  absolutely  bounded  space,  f  But  these  two  incon- 
ceivables  are  reciprocal  contradictories  :  we  are  unable 
to  comprehend  J  the  possibility  of  either,  while,  however, 
on  the  principle  of  Excluded  Middle,  one  or  other  must 
be  admitted.  .  .  . 

"  It  is  needless  to  show  that  the  same  result  is  given 
by  the  experiment  made  on  extension  considered  as  a 
part,  as  divisible.  Here  if  we  attempt  to  divide  exten- 

*  Third  sense,  gliding  back  into  the  first. 

t  Here  the  return  to  the  first  sense  is  completed. 

j  Here  the  second  sense  makes  its  appearance. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE   CONDITIONED.  101 

sion  in  thought ,  we  shall  neither,  on  the  one  hand, 
succeed  in  conceiving  the  possibility  *  of  an  absolute 
minimum  of  space,  that  is,  a  minimum  ex  hypothesl 
extended,  but  which  cannot  be  conceived  as  divisible  into 
parts,  f  nor,  on  the  other,  of  carrying  on  this  division  to 
infinity.  But  as  these  are  contradictory  opposites," 
one  or  the  other  of  them  must  be  true. 

In  other  passages  our  author  applies  the  same  order 
of  considerations  to  Time,  saying  that  we  can  neither 
conceive  an  absolute  commencement,  nor  an  infinite 
regress ;  an  absolute  termination,  nor  a  duration  infinite- 
ly prolonged ;  though  either  the  one  or  the  other  must 
be  true.  And  again,  of  the  Will :  we  cannot,  he  says, 
conceive  the  Will  to  be  Free,  because  this  would  be  to 
conceive  an  event  uncaused,  or,  in  other  words,  an  ab- 
solute commencement :  neither  can  we  conceive  the  Will 
not  to  be  Free,  because  this  would  be  supposing  an  in- 
finite regress  from  effect  to  cause.  The  will,  however, 
must  be  either  free  or  not  free ;  and  in  this  case  he 
thinks  we  have  independent  grounds  for  deciding  one 
way,  namely,  that  it  is  free,  because  if  it  were  not,  we 
could  not  be  accountable  for  our  actions,  which  our  con- 
sciousness assures  us  that  we  are. 

This,  then,  is  the  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned :  into 
the  value  of  which  it  now  remains  to  inquire. 

In  the  case  of  each  of  the  Antinomies  which  the 
author  presents,  he  undertakes  to  establish  two  things  : 
that  neither  of  the  rival  hypotheses  can  be  conceived  by 
us  as  possible,  and  that  we  are  nevertheless  certain  that 
one  or  the  other  of  them  is  true.  I  think  he  has  failed 
to  make  out  either  point. 

*  Second  sense.  t  First  sense. 

TOL.  i.  5 


102  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

To  begin  with  his  first  position,  that  we  can  neither 
conceive  an  end  to  space,  nor  space  without  end. 

That  we  are  unable  to  conceive  an  end  to  space  I  fully 
acknowledge.  To  account  for  this  there  needs  no  in- 
herent incapacity.  We  are  disabled  from  forming  this 
conception  by  known  psychological  laws.  We  have 
never  perceived  any  object,  or  any  portion  of  space, 
which  had  not  other  space  beyond  it.  And  we  have 
beeri  perceiving  objects  and  portions  of  space  from  the 
moment  of  birth.  How  then  could  the  idea  of  an  ob- 
ject, or  of  a  portion  of  space,  escape  becoming  insep- 
arably associated  with  the  idea  of  additional  space  beyond  ? 
Every  instant  of  our  lives  helps  to  rivet  this  association, 
and  we  never  have  had  a  single  experience  tending  to 
disjoin  it.  The  association,  under  the  present  constitu- 
tion of  our  existence,  is  indissoluble.  But  we  have  no 
ground  for  believing  that  it  is  so  from  the  original  struc- 
ture of  our  minds.  We  can  suppose  that  in  some  other 
state  of  existence  we  might  be  transported  to  the  end 
of  space,  when,  being  apprised  of  what  had  happened  by 
some  impression  of  a  kind  utterly  unknown  to  us  now, 
we  should  at  the  same  instant  become  capable  of  con- 
ceiving the  fact,  and  learn  that  it  was  true.  After  some 
experience  of  the  new  impression,  the  fact  of  an  end  to 
space  would  seem  as  natural  to  us  as  the  revelations  of 
sight  to  a  person  born  blind,  after  he  has  been  long 
enough  couched  to  have  become  familiar  with  them. 
But  as  this  cannot  happen  in  our  present  state  of  exist- 
ence, the  experience  which  would  render  the  association 
dissoluble  is  never  obtained;  and  an  end  to  space  re- 
mains inconceivable. 

One  half,  then,  of  our  author's  first  proposition,  must 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE  CONDITIONED.  103 

be  conceded.  But  the  other  half?  Is  it  true  that  we 
are  incapable  of  conceiving  infinite  space  ?  I  have  al- 
ready shown  strong  reasons  for  dissenting  from  this  asser- 
tion :  and  those  which  our  author,  in  this  and  other 
places,  assigns  in  its  support,  seem  to  ine  quite  untenable. 

He  says,  "  We  think,  we  conceive,  we  comprehend  a 
thing,  only  as  we  think  it  as  within  or  under  something 
else.  But  to  do  this  of  the  infinite  is  to  think  the 
infinite  as  finite,  which  is  contradictory  and  absurd." 
When  we  come  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  account  of  the 
Laws  of  Thought)  we  shall  have  some  remarks  to  make 
on  the  phrase  "to  think  one  thing  within  or  under 
another ; "  a  favorite  expression  with  the  Transcen- 
dental school,  one  of  whose  characteristics  it  is  that 
they  are  always  using  the  prepositions  in  a  metaphorical 
sense.  But  granting  that  to  think  a  thing  is  to  think 
it  under  something  else,  we  must  understand  this  state- 
ment as  it  is  interpreted  by  those  who  employ  it. 
According  to  them,  we  think  a  thing  when  we  make 
any  affirmation  respecting  it,  and  we  think  it  under  the 
notion  which  we  affirm  of  it.  Whenever  we  judge,  we 
think  the  subject  under  the  predicate.  Consequently 
when  we  say,  "  God  is  good,"  we  think  God  under  the 
notion  "good."  Is  this,  in  our  author's  opinion,  to 
think  the  infinite  as  finite,  and  hence  "contradictory  and 
absurd"? 

If  this  doctrine  hold,  it  follows  that  we  cannot  predi- 
cate anything  of  a  subject  which  we  regard  as  being  in 
any  of  its  attributes,  infinite.  We  are  unable,  without 
falling  into  a  contradiction,  to  assert  anything  not  only 
of  God,  but  of  Time,  and  of  Space.  Considered  as  a 
reductio  ad  absurdum,  this  is  sufficient.  But  we  may 


104  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE  CONDITIONED. 

go  deeper  into  the  matter,  and  deny  the  statement  that 
to  think  anything  "  under "  the  notion  expressed  by  a 
general  term  is  to  think  it  as  finite.  (\None  of  our  gen- 
eral predicates  are,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  finite  ; 
they  are  all,  at  least  potentially,  infinite.  "  Good "  is 
not  a  name  for  the  things  or  persons  possessing  that 
attribute  which  exist  now,  or  at  any  other  given  moment, 
and  which  are  only  a  finite  aggregate.  It  is  a  name  for 
all  those  which  ever  did,  or  ever  will,  or  even  in  hypoth- 
esis or  fiction  can,  possess  the  attribute^/  This  is  not  a 
limited  number.  It  is  the  very  nature  and  constituent 
character  of  a  general  notion  that  its  extension  (as  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  would  say)  is  infinite. 

But  he  might  perhaps  say,  that  though  its  extension, 
consisting  of  the  possible  individuals  included  in  it,  be 
infinite,  its  comprehension,  the  set  of  attributes  contained 
in  it  (or  as  I  prefer  to  say,  connoted  by  its  name)  is  a 
limited  quantity.  Undoubtedly  it  is.  But  see  what 
follows.  If,  because  the  comprehension  of  a  general 
notion  is  finite,  anything  infinite  cannot  without  contra- 
diction be  thought  under  it,  the  consequence  is,  that  a 
being  possessing  in  an  infinite  degree  a  given  attribute, 
cannot  be  thought  under  that  very  attribute.  Infinite 
goodness  cannot  be  thought  as  goodness,  because  that 
would  be  to  think  it  as  finite.  Surely  there  must  be 
some  great  confusion  of  ideas  in  the  premises,  when  this 
comes  out  as  the  conclusion. 

Our  author  goes  on  to  repeat  the  argument  used  in 
his  reply  to  Cousin,  that  Infinite  Space  is  inconceivable, 
because  all  the  conception  we  are  able  to  form  of  it  is 
negative,  and  a  negative  conception  is  the  same  as  no 
conception.  "The  infinite  is  conceived  only  by  the 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  105 

thinking  away  of  every  character  by  which  the  finite  was 
conceived."  To  this  assertion  I  oppose  my  former  reply. 
Instead  of  thinking  away  every  character  of  the  finite, 
we  think  away  only  the  idea  of  an  end,  or  a  boundary. 
Sir  W.  Hamilton's  proposition  is  true  of  "  The  Infinite," 
the  meaningless  abstraction ;  but  it  is  not  true  of  Infi- 
nite Space.  In  trying  to  form  a  conception  of  that,  we 
do  not  think  away  its  positive  characters.  We  leave  to 
it  the  character  of  Space  ;  all  that  belongs  to  it  as. space  ; 
its  three  dimensions,  with  all  their  geometrical  properties. 
We  leave  to  it  also  a  character  which  belongs  to  it  as 
Infinite,  that  of  being  greater  than  any  other  space.  If 
an  object  which  has  these  well-marked  positive  attributes 
is  unthinkable,  because  it  has  a  negative  attribute  as  well, 
the  number  of  thinkable  objects  must  be  remarkably  small. 
Nearly  all  our  positive  conceptions  which  are  at  all  com- 
plex, include  negative  attributes.  I  do  not  mean  merely 
the  negatives  which  are  implied  in  affirmatives,  as  in 
saying  that  snow  is  white  we  imply  that  it  is  not  black ; 
but  independent  negative  attributes  superadded  to  these, 
and  which  are  so  real  that  they  are  often  the  essential 
characters,  or  differentiae,  of  classes.  Our  conception 
of  dumb,  is  of  something  which  cannot  speak ;  of  the 
brutes,  as  of  creatures  which  have  not  reason ;  of  the 
mineral  kingdom,  as  the  part  of  Nature  which  has  not 
organization  and  life ;  of  immortal,  as  that  which  never 
dies.  Are  all  these  examples  of  the  Inconceivable  ?  So 
false  is  it  that  to  think  a  thing  under  a  negation  is  to 
think  it  as  unthinkable. 

In  other  passages,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  argues  that  we 
cannot  conceive  infinite  space,  because  we  should  require 
infinite  time  to  do  it  in.  It  would  of  course  require 


106     THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

infinite  time  to  carry  our  thoughts  in  succession  over 
every  part  of  infinite  space.  But  on  how  many  of  our 
finite  conceptions  do  we  think  it  necessary  to  perform 
such  an  operation?  Let  us  try  the  doctrine  upon  a 
complex  whole,  short  of  infinite ;  such  as  the  number 
695,788.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  would  not,  I  suppose,  have 
maintained  that  this  number  is  inconceivable.  How 
long  did  he  think  it  would  take  to  go  over  every  separate 
unit  of  this  whole,  so  as  to  obtain  a  perfect  knowledge 
of  that  exact  sum,  as  different  from  all  other  sums, 
either  greater  or  less?  Would  he  have  said  that  we 
could  have  no  conception  of  the  sum,  until  this  process 
had  been  gone  through?  We  could  not,  indeed,  have 
an  adequate  conception.  Accordingly  we  never  have  an 
adequate  conception  of  any  real  thing.  But  we  have  a 
real  conception  of  an  object  if  w*e  conceive  it  by  any  of 
its  attributes  that  are  sufficient  to  distinguish  it  from  all 
other  things.  We  have  a  conception  of  any  large  num- 
ber, when  we  have  conceived  it  by  some  one  of  its 
modes  of  composition,  such  as  that  indicated  by  the 
position  of  its  digits.  We  seldom  get  nearer  than  this 
to  an  adequate  conception  of  any  large  number.  But 
for  all  intellectual  purposes  this  limited  conception  is 
sufficient :  for  it  not  only  enables  us  to  avoid  confounding 
the  number,  in  our  calculations,  with  any  other  numerical 
whole  —  even  with  those  so  nearly  equal  to  it  that  no 
difference  between  them  would  be  perceptible  by  sight 
or  touch,  unless  the  units  were  drawn  up  in  a  manner 
expressly  adapted  for  displaying  it  —  but  we  can  also,  by 
means  of  this  attribute  of  the  number,  ascertain  and  add 
to  our  conception  as  many  more  of  its  properties  as  we 
please.  (j£  then,  we  can  obtain  a  real  conception  of  a 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.  107 

finite  whole  without  going  through  all  its  component 
parts,  why  deny  us  a  real  conception  of  an  infinite  whole 
because  to  go  through  them  all  is  impossible?)  Not  to 
mention  that  even  in  the  case  of  the  finite  number, 
though  the  units  composing  it  are  limited,  yet,  Number 
being  infinite,  the  possible  modes  of  deriving  any  given 
number  from  other  numbers  are  numerically  infinite  ;  and 
as  all  these  are  necessary  parts  of  an  adequate  conception 
of  any  number,  to  render  our  conception  even  of  this 
finite  whole  perfectly  adequate  would  also  require  an 
infinite  time. 

But  though  our  conception  of  infinite  space  can  never 
be  adequate,  since  we  can  never  exhaust  its  parts,  the 
conception,  as  far  as  it  goes,  is  a  real  conception.  We 
completely  realize  in  imagination  the  various  attributes 
composing  it.  We  realize  it  as  Space.  We  realize  it 
as  greater  than  any  given  space.  We  even  realize  it  as 
endless,  in  an  intelligible  manner,  that  is,  we  clearly 
represent  to  ourselves  that  however  much  of  space  has 
been  already  explored,  and  however  much  more  of  it  we 
may  imagine  ourselves  to  traverse,  we  are  no  nearer  to 
the  end  of  it  than  we  were  at  first  time ;  however  often  we 
repeat  the  process  of  imagining  distance  extending  in 
any  direction  from  us,  that  process  is  always  susceptible 
of  being  carried  farther.  This  conception  is  both  real 
and  perfectly  definite.  It  is  not  vague  and  indeter- 
minate, as  a  merely  negative  notion  is.  We  possess 
it  as  completely  as  we  possess  any  of  our  clearest  con- 
ceptions, and  we  can  avail  ourselves  of  it  as  well  for 
ulterior  mental  operations.  As  regards  the  Extent  of 
Space,  therefore,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  does  not  seem  to  have 
made  out  his  point :  one  of  the  two  contradictory  hy- 
potheses is  not  inconceivable. 


108     THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED. 

The  same  thing  may  be  said,  equally  decidedly,  re- 
specting the  Divisibility  of  Space.  According  to  our 
author,  a  minimum  of  divisibility,  and  a  divisibility  with- 
out limit,  are  both  inconceivable.  I  venture  to  think, 
on  the  contrary,  that  both  are  conceivable.  Divisibility, 
of  course,  does  not  here  mean  physical  separability  of 
parts,  but  their  mere  existence  ;  and  the  question  is,  can 
we  conceive  a  portion  of  extension  so  small  as  not  to  be 
composed  of  parts,  and  can  we,  on  the  other  hand,  con- 
ceive parts  consisting  of  smaller  parts,  and  these  of  still 
smaller,  without  end  ?  As  to  the  latter,  smallness  with- 
out limit  is  as  positive  a  conception  as  greatness  without 
limit.  (We  have  the  idea  of  a  portion  of  space,  and  to 
this  we  add  that  of  being  smaller  than  any  given  portion. 
The  other  side  of  the  alternative  is  still  more  evidently 
conceivable.  It  is  not  denied  that  there  is  a  portion  of 
extension  which  to  the  naked  eye  appears  an  indivisible 
point ;  it  has  been  called  by  philosophers  the  'minimum 
visibile.  This  minimum  we  can  indefinitely  magnify  by 
means  of  optical  instruments,  making  visible  the  still 
smaller  parts  which  compose  it.  In  each  successive  ex- 
periment there  is  still  a  minimum  visibile,  anything  less 
than  which,  cannot  be  discerned  with  that  instrument, 
but  can  with  one  of  a  higher  power.  Suppose,  now,  that 
as  we  increase  the  magnifying  power  of  our  instruments, 
and  before  we  have  reached  the  limit  of  possible  in- 
crease, we  arrive  at  a  stage  at  which  that  which  seemed 
the  smallest  visible  space  under  a  given  microscope, 
does  not  appear  larger  under  one  which,  by  its  mechani- 
cal construction,  is  adapted  to  magnify  more,  but  still 
remains  apparently  indivisible.  I  say,  that  if  this  hap- 
pened, we  should  believe  in  a  minimum  of  extension; 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED.     109 

or,  if  some  d  priori  metaphysical  prejudice  prevented  us 
from  believing  it,  we  should  at  least  be  enabled  to 
conceive  it. 

There  would  be  no  difficulty  in  applying  a  similar  line 
of  argument  to  the  case  of  Time,  or  to  any  other  of  the 
Antinomies  (there  is  a  long  list  of  them,*  to  some  of 
which  I  shall  have  to  return  for  another  purpose) ,  but  it 
would  needlessly  encumber  our  pages.  In  no  one  case 
mentioned  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  do  I  believe  that  he  could 
substantiate  his  assertion,  that  "the  Conditioned,"  by 
which  he  means  every  object  of  human  knowledge,  lies 
between  two  "  inconditionate"  hypotheses,  both  of  them 
inconceivable.  Let  me  add,  that  even  granting  the  in- 
conceivability of  the  two  opposite  hypotheses,  I  cannot 
see  that  any  distinct  meaning  is  conveyed  by  the  state- 
ment that  the  Conditioned  is  "  the  mean  "  between  them, 
or  that  "all  positive  thought,"  "  all  that  we  can  positively 
think,"  "lies  between"  these  two  "extremes,"  these  "two 
opposite  poles  of  thought."  The  extremes  are,  Space 
in  the  aggregate  considered  as  having  a  limit,  Space  in 
the  aggregate  considered  as  having  no  limit.  Neither 
of  these,  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  can  we  think.  But 
what  we  can  positively  think  (according  to  him)  is  not 
Space  in  the  aggregate  at  all ;  it  is  some  limited  space, 
and  this  we  think  as  square,  as  circular,  as  triangular,  or 
as  elliptical.  Are  triangular  and  elliptical  a  mean  be- 
tween infinite  and  finite  ?  They  are,  by  the  very  meaning 
of  the  words,  modes  of  the  finite.  So  that  it  would  be 
more  like  the  truth  to  say  that  we  think  the  pretended 
mean  under  one  of  the  extremes ;  and  if  infinite  and 

*  See  the  catalogue  at  length,  in  the  Appendix  to  the  second  volume  of 
the  Lectures,  pp.  527-529. 

6*  '     —  ~" 


110  THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THE   CONDITIONED. 

finite  are  "two  opposite  poles  of  thought,"  then  in  this 
polar  opposition,  unlike  voltaic  polarity,  all  the  matter  is 
accumulated  at  one  pole.  But  this  counter-statement 
would  be  no  more  tenable  than  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  ;  for 
in  reality,  the  thought  which  he  affirms  to  be  a  medium 
between  two  extreme  statements,  has  no  correlation  with 
those  statements  at  all.  It  does  not  relate  to  the  same 
object.  The  two  counter-hypotheses  are  suppositions 
respecting  Space  at  large,  Space  as  a  collective  whole. 
The  "  conditioned  "  thinking,  said  to  be  the  mean  between 
them,  relates  to  parts  of  Space,  and  classes  of  such  parts  : 
circles  and  triangles,  or  planetary  and  stellar  distances. 
The  alternative  of  opposite  inconceivabilities  never  pre- 
sents itself  in  regard  to  them  ;  they  are  all  finite,  and  are 
conceived  and  known  as  such.  What  the  notion  of  ex- 
tremes and  a  mean  can  signify,  when  applied  to  propo- 
sitions in  which  different  predicates  are  affirmed  of 
different  subjects,  passes  my  comprehension ;  but  it 
served  to  give  greater  apparent  profundity  to  the  "  Funda- 
mental Doctrine,"  in  the  eyes  not  of  disciples  (for  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  was  wholly  incapable  of  quackery) ,  but  of 
the  teacher  himself. 

We  have  now  to  examine  the  second  half  of  the  "  Law 
of  the  Conditioned,"  namely,  that  although  the  pair  of 
contradictory  hypotheses  in  each  Antinomy  are  both  of 
them  inconceivable,  one  or  the  other  of  them  must  be  true. 

I  should  not,  of  course,  dream  of  denying  this,  when 
the  propositions  are  taken  in  a  phenomenal  sense  ;  when 
the  subjects  and  predicates  of  them  are  interpreted  rela- 
tively to  us.  The  Will,  for  example,  is  wholly  a  phe- 
nomenon ;  it  has  no  meaning  unless  relatively  to  us ; 
and  I  of  course  admit  that  it  must  be  either  free  or 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF   THE   CONDITIONED.  Ill 

caused.  Space  and  Time,  in  their  phenomenal  character, 
or  as  they  present  themselves  to  our  perceptive  faculties, 
are  necessarily  either  bounded  or  boundless,  infinitely  or 
only  finitely  divisible.  The  law  of  Excluded  Middle, 
as  well  as  that  of  Contradiction,  is  common  to  all  phe- 
nomena. But  it  is  a  doctrine  of  our  author  that  these 
laws  are  true,  and  cannot  but  be  known  to  be  true,  of 
Noumena  likewise.  It  is  not  merely  Space  as  cognizable 
by  our  senses,  but  Space  as  it  is  in  itself,  which  he 
affirms  must  be  either  of  unlimited  or  of  limited  extent. 
Now,  not  to  speak  at  present  of  the  Principle  of  Contra- 
diction, I  demur  to  that  of  Excluded  Middle  as  applicable 
to  Things  in  themselves.  The  law  of  Excluded  Middle 
is,  that  whatever  predicate  we  suppose,  either  that  or  its 
negative  must  be  true  of  any  given  subject :  and  this  I 
do  not  admit  when  the  subject  is  a  Noumenon ;  inas- 
much as  every  possible  predicate,  even  negative,  except 
the  single  one  of  Non-entity,  involves,  as  apart  of  itself, 
something  positive,  which  part  is  only  known  to  us  by 
phenomenal  experience,  and  may  have  only  a  phenom- 
enal existence.  The  universe,  for  example,  must,  it  is 
affirmed,  be  either  infinite  or  finite :  but  what  do  these 
words  mean  ?  That  it  must  be  either  of  infinite  or  finite 
magnitude.  Magnitudes  certainly  must  be  either  infi- 
nite or  finite,  but  before  affirming  the  same  thing  of  the 
Noumenon  Universe,  it  has  to  be  established  that  the 
universe  as  it  is  in  itself  is  capable  of  the  attribute  mag- 
nitude. How  do  we  know  that  magnitude  is  not  exclu- 
sively a  property  of  our  sensations  —  of  the  states  of 
subjective  consciousness  which  objects  produce  in  us? 
Or  if  this  supposition  displeases,  how  do  we  know  that 
magnitude  is  not,  as  Kant  considered  it,  a  form  of  our 


112  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP   THE   CONDITIONED. 

minds,  an  attribute  with  which  the  laws  of  thought  in- 
vest every  conception  that  we  can  form,  but  to  which 
there  may  be  nothing  analogous  in  the  Noumenon,  the 
Thing  in  itself?  The  like  may  be  said  of  Duration, 
whether  infinite  or  finite,  and  of  Divisibility,  whether 
stopping  at  a  minimum  or  prolonged  without  limit. 
Either  the  one  proposition  or  the  other  must  of  course 
be  true  of  duration  and  of  matter  as  they  are  perceived 
by  us  —  as  they  present  themselves  to  our  faculties  ;  but 
duration  itself  is  held  by  Kant  to  have  no  real  existence 
out  of  our  minds  ;  and  as  for  matter,  not  knowing  what 
it  is  in  itself,  we  know  not  whether,  as  affirmed  of  matter 
in  itself,  the  word  divisible  has  any  meaning.  Believing 
divisibility  to  be  an  acquired  notion,  made  up  of  the  ele- 
ments of  our  sensational  experience,  I  do  not  admit  that 
the  Noumenon  Matter  must  be  either  infinitely  or  finitely 
divisible.  As  already  observed,  the  only  contradictory 
alternative  of  which  the  negative  side  contains  nothing 
positive  is  that  between  Entity  and  Non-entity,  Existing 
and  Non-existing ;  and  so  far  as  regards  that  distinction, 
I  admit  the  law  of  Excluded  Middle  as  applicable  to 
Noumena ;  they  must  either  exist  or  not  exist.  But  this 
is  all  the  applicability  I  can  allow  to  it. 

If  the  preceding  arguments  are  valid,  the  "Law  of 
the  Conditioned"  breaks  down  in  both  its  parts.  It  is 
not  proved  that  the  Conditioned  lies  between  two  hy- 
potheses concerning  the  Unconditioned,  neither  of  which 
hypotheses  we  can  conceive  as  possible.  And  it  is  not 
proved,  that,  as  regards  the  Unconditioned,  one  or  the 
other  of  these  hypotheses  must  be  true.  Both  propo- 
sitions must  be  placed  in  that  numerous  class  of  meta- 
physical doctrines,  which  have  a  magnificent  sound  but 
are  empty  of  the  smallest  substance. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE   CONDITIONED.  113 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED,  AS  APPLIED  BY 
MR.  MANSEL  TO  THE  LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT. 

MR.  MANSEL  may  be  affirmed,  by  a  fair  application 
of  the  term,  to  be,  in  metaphysics,  a  pupil  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton.  I  do  not  mean  that  he  agrees  with  him  in 
all  his  opinions  ;  for  he  avowedly  dissents  from  the  pecu- 
liar Hamiltonian  theory  of  Cause  ;  still  less  that  he  has 
learned  nothing  from  any  other  teacher,  or  from  his  own 
independent  speculations.  On  the  contrary,  he  has  shown 
considerable  power  of  original  thought,  both  of  a  good 
and  of  what  seems  to  me  a  bad  quality.  But  he  is  the 
admiring  editor  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Lectures ;  he  in- 
variably speaks  of  him  with  a  deference  which  he  pays 
to  no  other  philosopher ;  he  expressly  accepts,  in  lan- 
guage identical  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  own,  the  doc- 
trines regarded  as  specially  characteristic  of  the  Hamil- 
tonian philosophy,  and  may  with  reason  be  considered 
as  a  representative  of  the  same  general  mode  of  thought. 
Mr.  Mansel  has  bestowed  especial  cultivation  upon  a 
province  but  slightly  touched  by  his  master  —  the  ap- 
plication of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned  to  the 
theological  department  of  thought ;  the  deduction  of  such 
of  its  corollaries  and  consequences  as  directly  concern 
religion. 

The  premises  from  which  Mr.  Mansel  reasons  are 
those  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  He  maintains  the  necessary 


114  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE   CONDITIONED, 

relativity  of  all  our  knowledge.  He  holds  that  the  Ab- 
solute and  the  Infinite,  or,  to  use  a  more  significant  ex- 
pression, an  Absolute  and  an  Infinite  being,  are  incon- 
ceivable by  us  ;  and  that  when  we  strive  to  conceive  wjiat 
is  thus  inaccessible  to  our  faculties,  we  fall  into  self- 
contradiction.  That  we  are,  nevertheless,  warranted  in 
believing,  and  bound  to  believe,  the  real  existence  of  an 
absolute  and  infinite  being,  and  that  this  being  is  God. 
God,  therefore,  is  inconceivable  and  unknowable  by  us, 
and  cannot  even  be  thought  of  without  self-contradic- 
tion ;  that  is  (for  Mr.  Mansel  is  careful  thus  to  qualify 
the  assertion),  thought  of  as  Absolute,  and  as  Infinite. 
Through  this  inherent  impossibility  of  our  conceiving  or 
knowing  God's  essential  attributes,  we  are  disqualified 
from  judging  what  is  or  is  not  consistent  with  them. 
If,  then,  a  religion  is  presented  to  us,  containing  any 
particular  doctrine  respecting  the  Deity,  our  belief  or 
rejection  of  the  doctrine  ought  to  depend  exclusively 
upon  the  evidences  which  can  be  produced  for  the  divine 
origin  of  the  religion  :  and  no  argument  grounded  on  the 
incredibility  of  the  doctrine,  as  involving  an  intellectual 
absurdity,  or  on  its  moral  badness  as  unworthy  of  a 
good  or  wise  being,  ought  to  have  any  weight,  since  of 
these  things  we  are  incompetent  to  judge.  This,  at 
least,  is  the  drift  of  Mr.  Mansel's  argument :  but  I  am 
bound  to  admit  that  he  affirms  the  conclusion  with  a 
certain  limitation ;  for  he  acknowledges,  that  the  moral 
character  of  the  doctrines  of  a  religion  ought  to  count 
for  something  among  the  reasons  for  accepting  or  reject- 
ing, as  of  divine  origin,  the  religion  as  a  whole.  That 
it  ought  also  to  count  for  something  in  the  interpretation 
of  the  religion  when  accepted,  he  neglects  to  say ;  but 


AS  APPLIED  BY  MR.   MANSEL  TO   RELIGION.        115 

we  must  in  fairness  suppose  that  he  would  admit  it. 
These  concessions,  however,  to  the  moral  feelings  of 
mankind,  are  made  at  the  expense  of  Mr.  Mansel's  logic. 
If  his  theory  is  correct,  he  has  no  right  to  make  either 
of  them. 

There  is  nothing  new  in  this  line  of  argument  as  ap- 
plied to  theology.  That  we  cannot  understand  God ; 
that  his  ways  are  not  our  ways  ;  that  we  cannot  scrutinize 
or  judge  his  counsels  —  propositions  which,  in  a  reason- 
able sense  of  the  terms,  could  not  be  denied  by  any 
Theist  —  have  often  before  been  tendered  as  reasons 
why  we  may  assert  any  absurdities  and  any  moral  mon- 
strosities concerning  God,  and  miscall  them  Goodness 
and  Wisdom.  The  novelty  is  in  presenting  this  conclu- 
sion as  a  corollary  from  the  most  advanced  doctrines  of 
modern  philosophy  —  from  the  true  theory  of  the  powers 
and  limitations  of  the  human  mind,  on  religious  and  on 
all  other  subjects. 

My  opinion  of  this  doctrine,  in  whatever  way  pre- 
sented, is,  that  it  is  simply  the  most  morally  pernicious 
doctrine  now  current ;  and  that  the  question  it  involves 
is,  beyond  all  others  which  now  engage  speculative 
minds,  the  decisive  one  between  moral  good  and  evil  for 
the  Christian  world.  It  is  a  momentous  matter,  there- 
fore, to  consider  whether  we  are  obliged  to  adopt  it. 
Without  holding  Mr.  Mansel  accountable  for  the  moral 
consequences  of  the  doctrine,  further  than  he  himself 
accepts  them,  I  think  it  supremely  important  to  examine 
whether  the  doctrine  itself  is  really  the  verdict  of  a  sound 
metaphysic  ;  and  essential  to  a  true  estimation  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  philosophy  to  inquire,  whether  the  conclu- 
sion thus  drawn  from  his  principal  doctrine,  is  justly 


116  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   CONDITIONED, 

affiliated  on  it.  I  think  it  will  appear  that  the  conclu- 
sion not  only  does  not  follow  from  a  true  theory  of  the 
human  faculties,  but  is  not  even  correctly  drawn  from 
the  premises  from  which  Mr.  Mansel  infers  it. 

We  must  have  the  premises  distinctly  before  us  as 
conceived  by  Mr.  Mansel,  since  we  have  hitherto  seen 
them  only  as  taught  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  Clearness 
and  explicitness  of  statement  being  in  the  number  of 
Mr.  Mansel's  merits,  it  is  easier  to  perceive  the  flaws  in 
his  arguments  than  in  those  of  his  master,  because  he 
often  leaves  us  less  in  doubt  what  he  means  by  his  words. 

To  have  "  such  a  knowledge  of  the  Divine  Nature  "  as 
would  enable  human  reason  to  judge  of  theology,  would 
be,  according  to  Mr.  Mansel,*  "to  conceive  the  Deity 
as  he  is."  This  would  be  to  "  conceive  him  as  First 
Cause,  as  Absolute,  and  as  Infinite."  The  First  Cause 
Mr.  Mansel  defines  in  the  usual  manner.  About  the 
meaning  of  Infinite  there  is  no  difficulty.  But  when 
we  come  to  the  Absolute  we  are  on  more  slippery 
ground.  Mr.  Mansel,  however,  tells  us  his  meaning 
plainly.  By  the  Absolute,  he  does  not  mean  what  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  means  in  the  greater  part  of  his  argu- 
ment against  Cousin,  that  which  is  completed  or  fin- 
ished. He  means  what  Sir  W.  Hamilton  means  only 
once  (as  we  have  already  seen)  the  opposite  of  Relative. 
"  By  the  Absolute  is  meant  that  which  exists  in  and  by 
itself,  having  no  necessary  relation  to  any  other  Being." 

This  explanation,  by  Mr.  Mansel,  of  Absolute  in  the 
sense  in  which  it  is  opposed  to  Relative,  is  more  definite 
in  its  terms  than  that  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  gives' 
when  attempting  the  same  thing.  For  Sir  W.  Hamilton 

*  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  4th  edition,  pp.  29,  30. 


AS  APPLIED   BY  MR.   HANSEL  TO  RELIGION.         117 

recognizes  (as  already  remarked)  this  second  meaning  of 
Absolute,  and  this  is  the  account  he  gives  of  it :  *  — 
*  Absolutum  means  what  is  freed  or  loosed ;  in  which 
sense  the  Absolute  will  be  what  is  aloof  from  relation, 
comparison,  limitation,  condition,  dependence,  &c.,  and 
thus  is  tantamount  to  16  hnfamov  of  the  lower  Greeks." 
May  it  not  be  surmised  that  the  vagueness  in  which  the 
master  here  leaves  the  conception,  was  for  the  purpose 
of  avoiding  difficulties  upon  which  the  pupil,  in  his 
desire  of  greater  precision,  has  unwarily  run?  Mr. 
Mansel  certainly  gains  nothing  by  the  more  definite 
character  of  his  language.  The  first  words  of  his  defi- 
nition, "  that  which  exists  in  and  by  itself,"  would  serve 
for  the  description  of  a  Nournenon ;  but  Mr.  Mansel's 
Absolute  is  only  meant  to  denote  one  being,  identified 
with  God,  and  God  is  not  the  only  Noumenon.  This, 
however,  I  will  not  dwell  upon.  But  the  remaining 
words,  "  having  no  necessary  relation  to  any  other  Being," 
bring  him  into  a  much  greater  difficulty.  For  they 
admit  of  two  constructions.  The  words,  in  their  natural 
sense,  only  mean,  capable  of  existing  out  of  relation 
to  anything  else.  The  argument  requires  that  they 
should  mean,  incapable  of  existing  in  relation  with 
anything  else.  Mr.  Mansel  cannot  intend  the  latter. 
He  cannot  mean  that  the  Absolute  is  incapable  of  enter- 
ing into  relation  with  any  other  being ;  for  he  would  not 
affirm  this  of  God ;  on  the  contrary,  he  is  continually 
speaking  of  God's  relations  to  the  world  and  to  us. 
Moreover,  he  accepts,  from  Mr.  Calderwood,  an  inter- 
pretation inconsistent  with  this.f  This,  however,  is  the 

*  Discussions,  p.  14,  note. 

t  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  p.  200. 


118     THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE  CONDITIONED, 

meaning  necessary  to  support  his  case.  For  what  is  his 
first  argument?  That  God  cannot  be  known  by  us  as 
Cause,  as  Absolute,  and  as  Infinite,  because  these  attri- 
butes are,  to  our  conception,  incompatible  with  one  an- 
other. And  why  incompatible  ?  Because  *  "  a  Cause 
cannot,  as  such,  be  absolute ;  the  Absolute  cannot,  as 
such,  be  a  cause.  The  cause,  as  such,  exists  only  in 
relation  to  its  effect :  the  cause  is  a  cause  of  the  effect ; 
the  effect  is  an  effect  of  the  cause.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  conception  of  the  Absolute  involves  a  possible  ex- 
istence out  of  all  relation."  But  in  what  manner  is  a 
possible  existence  out  of  all  relation,  incompatible  with 
the  notion  of  a  cause  ?  Have  not  causes  a  possible  ex- 
istence apart  from  their  effects?  Would  the  sun  (for 
example)  not  exist  if  there  were  no  earth  or  planets  for 
it  to  illuminate  ?  Mr.  Mansel  seems  to  think  that  what 
is  capable  of  existing  out  of  relation,  cannot  possibly  be 
conceived  or  known  in  relation.  But  this  is  not  so. 
Anything  which  is  capable  of  existing  in  relation,  is 
capable  of  being  conceived  or  known  in  relation.  If  the 
Absolute  Being  cannot  be  conceived  as  Cause,  it  must 
be  that  he  cannot  exist  as  Cause  ;  he  must  be  incapable  of 
causing.  If  he  can  be  in  any  relation  whatever  to  any 
finite  thing,  he  is  conceivable  and  knowable  in  that  re- 
lation, if  no  otherwise.  Freed  from  this  confusion  of 
ideas,  Mr.  Mansel's  argument  resolves  itself  into  this  — 
The  same  Being  cannot  be  thought  by  us  both  as  Cause 
and  as  Absolute,  because  a  Cause  as  such  is  not  Abso- 
lute, and  Absolute,  as  such,  is  not  a  Cause ;  which  is 
exactly  as  if  he  had  said  that  Newton  cannot  be  thought 
by  us  both  as  an  Englishman  and  as  a  mathematician, 

*  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  p.  31. 


AS   APPLIED  BY  MR.   MANSEL  TO   RELIGION.         119 

because  an  Englishman,  as  such,  is  not  a  mathematician, 
nor  a  mathematician,  as  such,  an  Englishman. 

Again,  Mr.  Mansel  argues,*  that  "supposing  the  Ab- 
solute to  become  a  cause,"  since  ex  vi  termini  it  is  not 
necessitated  to  do  so,  it  must  be  a  voluntary  agent,  and 
therefore  conscious ;  for  "  volition  is  only  possible  in  a 
conscious  being."  But  consciousness,  again,  is  only 
conceivable  as  a  relation  ;  and  any  relation  conflicts  with 
the  notion  of  the  Absolute,  since  relatives  are  mutually 
dependent  on  one  another.  Here  it  comes  out  distinctly 
as  a  premise  in  the  reasoning,  that  to  be  in  a  relation  at 
all,  even  if  only  a  relation  to  itself,  the  relation  of  being 
"conscious  of  itself,"  is  inconsistent  with  being  the 
Absolute. 

Mr.  Mansel,  therefore,  must  alter  his  definition  of  the 
Absolute  if  he  would  maintain  his  argument.  He  must 
either  fall  back  on  the  happy  ambiguity  of  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton's definition,  "what  is  aloof  from  relation,"  which 
does  not  decide  whether  the  meaning  is  merely  that  it 
can  exist  out  of  relation,  or  that  it  is  incapable  of 
existing  in  it ;  or  he  must  take  courage,  and  affirm 
that  an  Absolute  Being  is  incapable  of  all  relation. 
But  as  he  will  certainly  refuse  to  predicate  this  of  God, 
the  consequence  follows,  that  God  is  not  an  Absolute 
Being. 

The  whole  of  Mr.  Mansel's  argument  for  the  incon- 
ceivability of  the  Infinite  and  of  the  Absolute  is  one  long 
ignoratio  elenchi.  It  has  been  pointed  out  in  a  former 
chapter  that  the  words  Absolute  and  Infinite  have  no 
real  meaning,  unless  we  understand  by  them  that  which 
is  absolute  or  infinite  in  some  given  attribute ;  as  space 

*  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  p.  32. 


120  THE   PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE   CONDITIONED, 

is  called  infinite,  meaning  that  it  is  infinite  in  extension ; 
and  as  God  is  termed  infinite  in  the  sense  of  possessing 
infinite  power,  and  absolute  in  the  sense  of  absolute 
goodness,  or  knowledge.  It  has  also  been  shown  that 
Sir  W.  Hamilton's  arguments  for  the  unknowableness 
of  the  Unconditioned,  do  not  prove  that  we  cannot  know 
an  object  which  is  absolute  or  infinite  in  some  specific 
attribute,  but  only  that  we  cannot  know  an  abstraction 
called  "The  Absolute"  or  "The  Infinite,"  which  is  sup- 
posed to  have  all  attributes  at  once.  The  same  remark 
is  applicable  to  Mr.  Mansel,  with  only  this  difference, 
that  he,  with  the  laudable  ambition  I  have  already 
noticed  of  stating  every  thing  explicitly,  draws  this  im- 
portant distinction  himself,  and  says,  of  his  own  motion, 
that  the  Absolute  he  means  is  the  abstraction.  He  says,* 
that  the  Absolute  can  be  "  nothing  less  than  the  sum  of 
all  reality,"  the  complex  of  all  positive  predicates,  even 
those  which  are  exclusive  of  one  another ;  and  ex- 
pressly identifies  it  with  Hegel's  Absolute  Being,  which 
contains  in  itself  "  all  that  is  actual,  even  evil  included." 
"  That  which  is  conceived  as  absolute  and  infinite,"  says 
Mr.  Mansel,  f  "must  be  conceived  as  containing  within 
itself  the  sum  not  only  of  all  actual,  but  of  all  possible 
modes  of  being."  One  may  well  agree  with  Mr.  Man- 
sel that  this  farrago  of  contradictory  attributes  cannot  be 
conceived ;  but  what  shall  we  say  of  his  equally  positive 
averment  that  it  must  be  believed  ?  If  this  be  what  the 
Absolute  is,  what  does  he  mean  by  saying  that  we  must 
believe  God  to  be  the  Absolute  ? 

The  remainder  of  Mr.  Mansel's  argumentation  is  suit- 
able to  this    commencement.      The  Absolute,  as   con- 

*  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  p.  30.  f  Ibid.  p.  31. 


AS  APPLIED  BY  MR.    M ANSEL  TO  RELIGION.         121 

ceived,  that  is,  as  he  defines  it,  cannot  be  "a  whole* 
composed  of  parts,"  or  "  a  substance  consisting  of  at- 
tributes," or  "  a  conscious  subject  in  antithesis  to  an 
object.  For  if  there  is  in  the  absolute  any  principle  of 
unity  distinct  from  the  mere  accumulation  of  parts  or 
attributes,  this  principle  alone  is  the  true  absolute.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  such  principle,  then  there 
is  no  absolute  at  all,  but  only  a  plurality  of  relatives. 
The  almost  unanimous  voice  of  philosophy,  in  pronoun- 
cing that  the  absolute  is  both  one  and  simple,  must 
be  accepted  as  the  voice  of  reason  also,  so  far  as  rea- 
son has  any  voice  in  the  matter.  But  this  absolute 
unity,  as  indifferent  and  containing  no  attributes,  can 
neither  be  distinguished  from  the  multiplicity  of  finite 
beings  by  any  characteristic  feature,  nor  be  identified 
with  them  in  their  multiplicity."  (it  will  be  noticed 
that  the  Absolute,  which  was  just  before  defined  as 
having  all  attributes,  is  here  declared  to  have  none  :  but 
this,  Mr.  Mansel  would  say,  is  merely  one  of  the  con- 
tradictions inherent  in  the  attempt  to  conceive  what  is 
inconceivable^  "  Thus  we  are  landed  in  an  inextricable 
dilemma.  The  Absolute  cannot  be  conceived  as  con- 
scious, neither  can  it  be  conceived  as  unconscious  :  it 
cannot  be  conceived  as  complex,  neither  can  it  be  con- 
ceived as  simple  :  it  cannot  be  conceived  by  difference, 
neither  can  it  be  conceived  by  the  absence  of  difference  : 
it  cannot  be  identified  with  the  universe,  neither  can  it 
be  distinguished  from  it."  Is  this  chimerical  abstraction 
the  Absolute  Being  whom  anybody  need  be  concerned 
about,  either  as  knowable  or  as  unknowable?  Is  the 
inconceivableness  of  this  impossible  fiction  any  argument 

*  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  p.  33. 


122  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OP  THE   CONDITIONED, 

against  the  possibility  of  -conceiving  God,  who  is  neither 
supposed  to  have  no  attributes  nor  to  have  all  attributes, 
but  to  have  good  attributes  ?  Is  it  any  hinderance  to  our 
being  able  to  conceive  a  Being  absolutely  just,  for 
example,  or  absolutely  wise?  Yet  it  is  of  this  that  Mr. 
Mansel  undertook  to  prove  the  impossibility. 

Again,  of  the  Infinite :  according  to  Mr.  Mansel,* 
being  "that  than  which  a  greater  is  inconceivable,"  it 
"  consequently  can  receive  no  additional  attribute  or  mode 
of  existence  which  it  had  not  from  all  eternity."  It  must 
therefore  be  the  same  complex  of  all  possible  predicates 
which  the  Absolute  is,  and  all  of  them  infinite  in  degree. 
It  "  cannot  be  regarded  as  consisting  of  a  limited  number 
of  attributes,  each  unlimited  in  its  kind.  It  cannot  be 
conceived,  for  example,  after  the  analogy  of  a  line,  infi- 
nite in  length,  but  not  in  breadth ;  or  of  a  surface,  infinite 
in  two  dimensions  of  space,  but  bounded  in  the  third ; 
or  of  an  intelligent  being,  possessing  some  one  or  more 
modes  of  consciousness  in  an  infinite  degree,  but  devoid 
of  others."  This  Infinite  which  is  infinite  in  all  attri- 
butes, and  not  solely  in  those  which  it  would  be  thought 
decent  to  predicate  of  God,  cannot,  as  Mr.  Mansel  very 
truly  says,  be  conceived.  Forf  "the  Infinite,  if  it  is  to 
be  conceived  at  all,  must  be  conceived  as  potentially 
everything  and  actually  nothing ;  for  if  there  is  anything 
general  which  it  cannot  become,  it  is  thereby  limited ; 
and  if  there  is  anything  in  particular  which  it  actually 
is,  it  is  thereby  excluded  from  being  any  other  thing. 
But  again,  it  must  also  be  conceived  as  actually  every- 
thing and  potentially  nothing ;  for  an  unrealized  poten- 
tiality is  likewise  a  limitation.  If  the  infinite  can  be  that 

*  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  p.  30.  t  Ibid-  P-  48. 


AS   APPLIED   BY  MR.   M ANSEL  TO   RELIGION.         128 

which  it  is  not,  it  is  by  that  very  possibility  marked  out 
as  incomplete,  and  capable  of  a  higher  perfection.  If  it 
is  actually  everything,  it  possesses  no  characteristic  fea- 
ture by  which  it  can  be  distinguished  from  anything  else, 
and  discerned  as  an  object  of  consciousness."  Here  cer- 
tainly is  an  Infinite  whose  infinity  does  not  seem  to  be 
of  much  use  to  it.  But  can  a  writer  be  serious  who  bids 
us  conjure  up  a  conception  of  something  which  possesses 
infinitely  all  conflicting  attributes,  and  because  we  cannot 
do  this  without  contradiction,  would  have  us  believe  that 
there  is  a  contradiction  in  the  idea  of  infinite  goodness, 
or  infinite  wisdom ?  Instead  of  "the  Infinite,"  substi- 
tute "  an  infinitely  good  Being,"  and  Mr.  Mansel's  argu- 
ment reads  thus  :  If  there  is  anything  which  an  infinitely 
good  Being  cannot  become — if  he  cannot  become  bad — 
that  is  a  limitation,  and  the  goodness  cannot  be  infinite. 
If  there  is  anything  which  an  infinitely  good  Being  actu- 
ally is  (namely  good) ,  he  is  excluded  from  being  any 
other  thing,  as  from  being  wise  or  powerful.  I  hardly 
think  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  would  patronize  this  logic, 
learned  though  it  be  in  his  school. 

It  cannot  be  necessary  to  follow  up  Mr.  ManseFs 
metaphysical  dissertation  any  farther.  It  is  all,  as  I  have 
said,  the  same  ignoratio  elenchi.  I  have  been  able  to 
find  only  one  short  passage  in  which  he  attempts  to  show 
that  we  are  unable  to  represent  in  thought  a  particular 
attribute  carried  to  the  infinite.  For  the  sake  of  fair- 
ness, I  cite  it  in  a  note.*  All  the  argument  that  I  can 

*  "  A  thing  —  an  object  —  an  attribute — a  person  —  or  any  other  term 
signifying  one  out  of  many  possible  objects  of  consciousness,  is  by  that 
very  relation  necessarily  declared  to  be  finite.  An  infinite  thing,  or  object, 
or  attribute,  or  person,  is  therefore  in  the  same  moment  declared  to  be  both 
finite  and  infinite.  .  .  .  And  on  the  other  hand,  if  all  human  attributes  are 


124  THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   CONDITIONED, 

discover  in  it,  I  conceive  that  I  have  already  answered, 
as  stated  much  better  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton. 

Mr.  Mansel  thinks  it  necessary  to  declare  *  that  the 
contradictions  are  not  in  "  the  nature  of  the  Absolute  " 
or  Infinite  "  in  itself,  but  only  "  in  "  our  own  conception 
of  that  nature."  He  did  not  mean  to  say  that  the 
Divine  Nature  is  itself  contradictory.  But  he  says,f 
"We  are  compelled,  by  the  constitution  of  our  minds, 
to  believe  in  the  existence  of  an  Absolute  and  Infinite 
Being."  Such  being  the  case,  I  ask,  is  the  Being,  whom 
we  must  believe  to  be  infinite  and  absolute,  infinite  and 
absolute  in  the  meaning  which  those  terms  bear  in  Mr. 
Mansel's  definitions  of  them?  If  not,  he  is  bound  to 
tell  us  in  what  other  meaning.  Believing  God  to  be  in- 
finite and  absolute  must  be  believing  something,  and  it 
must  be  possible  to  say  what.  If  Mr.  Mansel  means 
that  we  must  believe  the  reality  of  an  Infinite  and  Abso- 
lute Being  in  some  other  sense  than  that  in  which  he  has 
proved  such  a  Being  to  be  inconceivable,  his  point  is  not 
made  out,  since  he  undertook  to  prove  the  inconceiv- 
ability of  the  very  Being  in  whose  reality  we  are  required 
to  believe.  But  the  truth  is,  that  the  Infinite  and  Abso- 
lute which  he  says  we  must  believe  in,  are  the  very 
Infinite  and  Absolute  of  his  definitions.  The  Infinite  is 

conceived  under  the  conditions  of  difference,  and  relation,  and  time,  and 
personality,  we  cannot  represent  in  thought  any  such  attribute  magnified 
to  infinity ;  for  this  again  is  to  conceive  it  as  finite  and  infinite  at  the  same 
time.  We  can  conceive  such  attributes,  at  the  utmost,  only  indefinitely  ; 
that  is  to  say,  we  may  withdraw  our  thoughts,  for  the  moment,  from  the 
fact  of  their  being  limited  ;  but  we  cannot  conceive  them  as  infinite ;  that 
is  to  say,  we  cannot  positively  think  of  the  absence  of  the  limit ;  for,  the 
instant  we  attempt  to  do  so,  the  antagonist  elements  of  the  conception 
exclude  one  another,  and  annihilate  the  whole."  —  Limits  of  Religious 
Thought,  p.  60. 

*  Ibid.  p.  39.  t  Ibid.  p.  45. 


AS   APPLIED   BY  MB.   MANSEL   TO   RELIGION.         125 

that  which  is  opposed  to  the  Finite ;  the  Absolute,  that 
which  is  opposed  to  the  Relative.  He  has  therefore 
either  proved  nothing,  or  vastly  more  than  he  intended. 
For  the  contradictions  which  he  asserts  to  be  involved  in 
the  notions,  do  not  follow  from  an  imperfect  mode  of 
apprehending  the  Infinite  and  Absolute,  but  lie  in  the 
definitions  of  them ;  in  the  meaning  of  the  words  them- 
selves. The  contradictions  are  in  the  very  object  which 
we  are  called  upon  to  believe.  If,  therefore,  Mr.  Man- 
sel  would  escape  from  the  conclusion  that  an  Infinite 
and  Absolute  Being  is  intrinsically  impossible,  it  must 
be  by  affirming,  with  Hegel,  that  the  Law  of  Contra- 
diction does  not  apply  to  the  Absolute ;  that,  respecting 
the  Absolute,  contradictory  propositions  may  both  be 
true. 

Let  us  now  pass  from  Mr.  Mansel's  metaphysical 
argumentation  on  an  irrelevant  issue,  to  the  much  more 
important  subject  of  his  practical  conclusion,  namely, 
that  we  cannot  know  the  divine  attributes  in  such  a 
manner,  as  can  entitle  us  to  reject  any  statement  respect- 
ing the  Deity  on  the  ground  of  its  being  inconsistent 
with  his  character.  Let  us  examine  whether  this  asser- 
tion is  a  legitimate  corollary  from  the  relativity  of  human 
knowledge,  either  as  it  really  is,  or  as  it  is  understood  to 
be  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  and  by  Mr.  Mansel. 

The  fundamental  property  of  our  knowledge  of  God, 
Mr.  Mansel  says,  is,  that  we  do  not  and  cannot  know 
him  as  he  is  in  himself:  certain  persons,  therefore,  whom 
he  calls  nationalists,  he  condemns  as  unphilosophical, 
when  they  reject  any  statement  as  inconsistent  with 
the  character  of  God.  This  is  a  valid  answer,  as  far  as 
words  go,  to  some  of  the  later  Transcendentalists  —  to 

VOL.  I.  6 


126  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED, 

those  who  think  that  we  have  an  intuition  of  the  Divine 
Nature ;  though  even  as  to  them  it  would  not  be  difficult 
to  show  that  the  answ.er  is  but  skin-deep.  But  those 
"  Rationalists  "  who  hold,  with  Mr.  Mansel  himself,  the 
relativity  of  human  knowledge,  are  not  touched  by  his 
reasoning.  We  cannot  know  God  as  he  is  in  himself 
(they  reply)  ;  granted  :  and  what  then  ?  Can  we  know 
man  as  he  is  in  himself,  or  matter  as  it  is  in  itself? 
We  do  not  claim  any  other  knowledge  of  God  than  such 
as  we  have  of  man  or  of  matter.  Because  I  do  not 
know  my  fellow-men,  nor  any  of  the  powers  of  nature, 
as  they  are  in  themselves,  am  I  therefore  not  at  liberty 
to  disbelieve  anything  I  hear  respecting  them  as  being 
inconsistent  with  their  character?  I  know  something 
of  Man  and  Nature,  not  as  they  are  in  themselves,  but 
as  they  are  relatively  to  us  ;  and  it  is  as  relative  to  us, 
and  not  as  he  is  in  himself,  that  I  suppose  myself  to 
know  anything  of  God.  The  attributes  which  I  ascribe 
to  him,  as  goodness,  knowledge,  power,  are  all  relative. 
They  are  attributes  (says  the  rationalist)  which  my  expe- 
rience enables  me  to  conceive,  and  which  I  consider  as 
proved,  not  absolutely,  by  an  intuition  of  God,  but  phe- 
nomenally, by  his  action  on  the  creation,  as  known 
through  my  senses  and  my  rational  faculty.  These  rela- 
tive attributes,  each  of  them  in  an  infinite  degree,  are  all 
I  pretend  to  predicate  of  God.  When  I  reject  a  doctrine 
as  inconsistent  with  God's  nature,  it  is  not  as  being  in- 
consistent with  what  God  is  in  himself,  but  with  what 
he  is  as  manifested  to  us.  If  my  knowledge  of  him  is 
only  phenomenal,  the  assertions  which  I  reject  are  phe- 
nomenal too.  If  those  assertions  are  inconsistent  with 
my  relative  knowledge  of  him,  it  is  no  answer  to  say 


AS   APPLIED   BY  MB.   MANSEL  TO  RELIGION.         127 

that  all  my  knowledge  of  him  is  relative.  That  is  no 
more  a  reason  against  disbelieving  an  alleged  fact  as  un- 
worthy of  God,  than  against  disbelieving  another  alleged 
fact  as  unworthy  of  Turgot,  or  of  Washington,  whom 
also  I  do  not  know  as  Noumena,  but  only  as  Phenomena. 

There  is  but  one  way  for  Mr.  Mansel  out  of  this  diffi- 
culty, and  he  adopts  it.  He  must  maintain,  not  merely 
that  an  Absolute  Being  is  unknowable  in  himself,  but 
that  the  Relative  attributes  of  an  Absolute  Being  are 
unknowable  likewise.  He  must  say  that  we  do  not  know 
what  Wisdom,  Justice,  Benevolence,  Mercy,  are,  as  they 
exist  in  God.  Accordingly  he  does  say  so.  The  follow- 
ing are  his  direct  utterances  on  the  subject :  as  an 
implied  doctrine,  it  pervades  his  whole  argument. 

"It  is  a  fact*  which  experience  forces  upon  us,  and 
which  it  is  useless,  were  it  possible,  to  disguise,  that  the 
representation  of  God  after  the  model  of  the  highest 
human  morality  which  we  are  capable  of  conceiving,  is 
not  sufficient  to  account  for  all  the  phamomena  exhibited 
by  the  course  of  his  natural  Providence.  The  infliction 
of  physical  suffering,  the  permission  of  moral  evil,  the 
adversity  of  the  good,  the  prosperity  of  the  wicked,  the 
crimes  of  the  guilty  involving  the  misery  of  the  innocent, 
the  tardy  appearance  and  partial  distribution  of  moral 
and  religious  knowledge  in  the  world  —  these  are  facts 
which  no  doubt  are  reconcilable,  we  know  not  how,  with 
the  Infinite  Goodness  of  God,  but  which  certainly  are 
not  to  be  explained  on  the  supposition  that  its  sole  and 
sufficient  type  is  to  be  found  in  the  finite  goodness  of 
man."  In  other  words,  it  is  necessary  to  suppose  that 
the  infinite  goodness  ascribed  to  God  is  not  the  goodness 

*  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  Preface  to  the  fourth  edition,  p.  13. 


128  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  CONDITIONED, 

which  we  know  and  love  in  our  fellow-creatures,  distin- 
guished only  as  infinite  in  degree,  but  is  different  in  kind, 
and  another  quality  altogether.  When  we  call  the  one 
finite  goodness  and  the  other  infinite  goodness,  we  do  not 
mean  what  the  words  assert,  but  something  else :  we 
intentionally  apply  the  same  name  to  things  which  we 
regard  as  different. 

Accordingly  Mr.  Mansel  combats,  as  a  heresy  of  his 
opponents,  the  opinion  that  infinite  goodness  differs  only 
in  degree  from  finite  goodness.  The  notion  *  "that  the 
attributes  of  God  differ  from  those  of  man  in  degree 
only,  not  in  kind,  and  hence  that  certain  mental  and 
moral  qualities  of  which  we  are  immediately  conscious 
in  ourselves,  furnish  at  the  same  time  a  true  and  adequate 
image  of  the  infinite  perfections  of  God"  (the  word 
adequate  must  have  slipped  in  by  inadvertence,  since 
otherwise  it  would  be  an  inexcusable  misrepresentation) , 
he  identifies  with  "  the  vulgar  Rationalism  which  regards 
the  reason  of  man,  in  its  ordinary  and  normal  operation, 
as  the  supreme  criterion  of  religious  truth."  And  in 
characterizing  the  mode  of  arguing  of  this  vulgar  Ra- 
tionalism, he  declares  its  principles  to  be,  thatf  "all  the 
excellences  of  which  we  are  conscious  in  the  creature, 
must  necessarily  exist  in  the  same  manner,  though  in  a 
higher  degree,  in  the  Creator.  God  is  indeed  more  wise, 
more  just,  more  merciful,  than  man ;  but  for  that  very 
reason,  his  wisdom,  and  justice,  and  mercy  must  contain 
nothing  that  is  incompatible  with  the  corresponding 
attributes  in  their  human  character."  It  is  against  this 
doctrine  that  Mr.  Mansel  feels  called  on  to  make  an  em- 
phatic protest. 

*  Limits  of  Religious  Thought,  p.  26.  f  Ibid.  p.  28. 


AS  APPLIED  BY  MB.   HANSEL  TO  RELIGION.         129 

Here,  then,  I  take  my  stand  on  the  acknowledged 
principle  of  logic  and  of  morality,  that  when  we  mean 
different  things  we  have  no  right  to  call  them  by  the 
same  name,  and  to  apply  to  them  the  same  predicates, 
moral  and  intellectual.  (Language  has  no  meaning  for 
the  words  Just,  Merciful,  Benevolent,  save  that  in  which 
we  predicate  them  of  our  fellow-creatures ;  and  unless 
that  is  what  we  intend  to  express  by  them,  we  have  no 
business  to  employ  the  wordy  If  in  affirming  them 
of  God  we  do  not  mean  to  affirm  these  very  qualities, 
differing  only  as  greater  in  degree,  we  are  neither  philo- 
sophically nor  morally  entitled  to  affirm  them  at  all.  If 
it  be  said  that  the  qualities  are  the  same,  but  that  we 
cannot  conceive  them  as  they  are  when  raised  to  the 
infinite,  I  grant  that  we  cannot  adequately  conceive  them 
in  one  of  their  elements,  their  infinity.  But  we  can 
conceive  them  in  their  other  elements,  which  are  the 
very  same  in  the  infinite  as  in  the  finite  development. 
Anything  carried  to  the  infinite  must  have  all  the  prop- 
erties of  the  same  thing  as  finite,  except  those  which 
depend  upon  the  finiteness.  Among  the  many  who 
have  said  that  we  cannot  conceive  infinite  space,  did  any 
one  ever  suppose  that  it  is  not  space  ?  that  it  does  not 
possess  all  the  properties  by  which  space  is  characterized  ? 
Infinite  Space  cannot  be  cubical  or  spherical,  because 
these  are  modes  of  being  bounded :  but  does  any  one 
imagine  that  in  ranging  through  it  we  might  arrive  at 
some  region  which  was  not  extended ;  of  which  one  part 
was  not  outside  another ;  where,  though  no  Body  inter- 
vened, motion  was  impossible ;  or  where  the  sum  of  two 
sides  of  a  triangle  was  less  than  the  third  side  ?  The 
parallel  assertion  may  be  made  respecting  infinite  good- 


ICO 


ness.  What  belongs  to  it  as  Infinite  (or  more  properly 
as  Absolute)  I  do  not  pretend  to  know  ;  but  I  know  that 
infinite  goodness  must  be  goodness,  and  that  what  is  not 
consistent  with  goodness,  is  not  consistent  with  infinite 
goodness.  If  in  ascribing  goodness  to  God  I  do  not 
mean  what  I  mean  by  goodness ;  if  I  do  not  mean  the 
goodness  of  which  I  have  some  knowledge,  but  an  in- 
comprehensible attribute  of  an  incomprehensible  sub- 
stance, which  for  aught  I  know  may  be  a  totally  different 
quality  from  that  which  I  love  and  venerate  —  and  even 
must,  if  Mr.  Mansel  is  to  be  believed,  be  in  some  impor- 
tant particulars  opposed  to  this  —  what  do  I  mean  by 
calling  it  goodness  ?  and  what  reason  have  I  for  ven- 
erating it  ?  If  I  know  nothing  about  what  the  attribute 
is,  I  cannot  tell  that  it  is  a  proper  object  of  veneration. 
To  say  that  God's  goodness  may  be  different  in  kind 
from  man's  goodness,  what  is  it  but  saying,  with  a  slight 
change  of  phraseology,  that  God  may  possibly  not  be 
good?  To  assert  in  words  what  we  do  not  think  in 
meaning,  is  as  suitable  a  definition  as  can  be  given  of  a 
moral  falsehood.  Besides,  suppose  that  certain  unknown 
attributes  are  ascribed  to  the  Deity  in  a  religion  the 
external  evidences  of  which  are  so  conclusive  to  my  mind, 
as  effectually  to  convince  me  that  it  comes  from  God. 
Unless  I  believe  God  to  possess  the  same  moral  attri- 
butes which  I  find,  in  however  inferior  a  degree,  in  a 
good  man,  what  ground  of  assurance  have  I  of  God's 
veracity  ?  All  trust  in  a  Revelation  presupposes  a  con- 
viction that  God's  attributes  are  the  same,  in  all  but 
degree,  with  the  best  human  attributes. 

If,  instead  of  the  "  glad  tidings "  that  there  exists  a 
Being  in  whom  all  the  excellences  which  the  highest 


AS   APPLIED  BY  MR.   M ANSEL  TO   RELIGION.         131 

human  mind  can  conceive,  exist  in  a  degree  inconceivable 

to  us,  I  am  informed  that  the  world  is  ruled  by  a  being 

whose  attributes  are  infinite,  but  what  they  are  we  cannot 

learn,  nor  what  are  the  principles   of  his  government > 

except  that  "  the  highest  human  morality  which  we  are 

capable  of  conceiving  "  does  not  sanction  them  ;  convince 

me  of  it,  and  I  will  bear  my  fate  as  I  may.     But  when 

I  am  told  that  I  must  believe  this,  and  at  the  same  time 

call  this  being  by  the  names  which  express  and  affirm 

the  highest  human  morality,  I  say  in  plain  terms  that  I         ^ 

will  not.     Whatever  power  such  a  being  may  have  over 

me,  there  is  one  thing  which  he  shall  not  do  :  he  shall 

not  compel  me  to  worship  him.     I  will  call  no  being 

good,  who  is  not  what  I  mean  when  I  apply  that  epithet 

to  my  fellow-creatures  ;  and  if  such  a  being  can  sentence 

me  to  hell  for  not  so  calling  him,  to  hell  I  will  go. 

Neither  is  this  to  set  up  my  own  limited  intellect  as  a 
criterion  of  divine  or  of  any  other  wisdom.  If  a  person 
is  wiser  and  better  than  myself,  not  in  some  unknown 
and  unknowable  meaning  of  the  terms,  but  in  their 
known  human  acceptation,  I  am  ready  to  believe  that  what 
this  person  thinks  may  be  true,  and  that  what  he  does 
may  be  right,  when,  but  for  the  opinion  I  have  of  him, 
I  should  think  otherwise.  But  this  is  because  I  believe 
that  he  and  I  have  at  bottom  the  same  standard  of  truth 
and  rule  of  right,  and  that  he  probably  understands  bet- 
ter than  I  the  facts  of  the  particular  case.  If  I  thought 
it  not  improbable  that  his  notion  of  right  might  be  my 
notion  of  wrong,  I  should  not  defer  to  his  judgment. 
In  like  manner,  one  who  sincerely  believes  in  an  abso- 
lutely good  ruler  of  the  world,  is  not  warranted  in  dis- 
believing any  act  ascribed  to  him,  merely  because  the 

' 


132  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE   CONDITIONED, 

very  email  part  of  its  circumstances  which  we  can  pos- 
sibly know  does  not  sufficiently  justify  it.  But  if  what 
I  am  told  respecting  him  is  of  a  kind  which  no  facts  that 
can  be  supposed  added  to  my  knowledge  could  make  me 
perceive  to  be  right ;  if  his  alleged  ways  of  dealing  with 
the  world  are  such  as  no  imaginable  hypothesis  respect- 
ing things  known  to  him  and  unknown  to  me,  could 
make  consistent  with  the  goodness  and  wisdom  which  I 
mean  when  I  use  the  terms,  but  are  in  direct  contradic- 
tion to  their  signification ;  then,  if  the  law  of  contradic- 
tion is  a  law  of  human  thought,  I  cannot  both  believe 
these  things,  and  believe  that  God  is  a  good  and  wise 
being.  If  I  call  any  being  wise  or  good,  not  meaning 
the  only  qualities  which  the  words  import,  I  am  speaking 
insincerely ;  I  am  flattering  him  by  epithets  which  I 
fancy  that  he  likes  to  hear,  in  the  hope  of  winning  him 
over  to  my  own  objects.  For  it  is  worthy  of  remark 
that  the  doubt  whether  words  applied  to  God  have  their 
human  signification,  is  only  felt  when  the  words  relate 
to  his  moral  attributes ;  it  is  never  heard  of  in  regard  to 
his  power.  We  are  never  told  that  God's  omnipotence 
must  not  be  supposed  to  mean  an  infinite  degree  of  the 
power  we  know  in  man  and  nature,  and  that  perhaps  it 
does  not  mean  that  he  is  able  to  kill  us,  or  consign  us  to 
eternal  flames.  \The  Divine  Power  is  always  interpreted 
in  a  completely  human  signification,  but  the  Divine 
Goodness  and  Justice  must  be  understood  to  be  such 
only  in  an  unintelligible  senses)  Is  it  unfair  to  surmise 
that  this  is  because  those  who  speak  in  the  name  of  God 
have  need  of  the  human  conception  of  his  power,  since 
an  idea  which  can  overawe  and  enforce  obedience,  must 
address  itself  to  real  feelings ;  but  are  content  that  his 


AS  APPLIED  BY  MB.   MANSEL  TO  RELIGION.        133 

goodness  should  be  conceived  only  as  something  incon- 
ceivable, because  they  are  so  often  required  to  teach  doc- 
trines respecting  him  which  conflict  irreconcilably  with 
all  goodness  that  we  can  conceive  ? 

I  am  anxious  to  say  once  more,  that  Mr.  Hansel's 
conclusions  do  not  go  the  whole  length  of  his  arguments, 
and  that  he  disavows  the  doctrine  that  God's  justice  and 
goodness  are  wholly  different  from  what  human  beings 
understand  by  the  terms.  He  would,  and  does,  admit 
that  the  qualities  as  conceived  by  us  bear  some  likeness 
to  the  justice  and  goodness  which  belong  to  God,  since 
man  was  made  in  God's  image.  But  such  a  semi-con- 
cession, which  no  Christian  could  avoid  making,  since 
without  it  the  whole  Christian  scheme  would  be  subverted, 
cannot  save  him ;  he  is  not  relieved  by  it  from  any  diffi- 
culties, while  it  destroys  the  whole  fabric  of  his  argu- 
ment. The  Divine  goodness,  which  is  said  to  be  a 
different  thing  from  human  goodness,  but  of  which  the 
human  conception  of  goodness  is  some  imperfect  reflection 
or  resemblance,  does  it  agree  with  what  men  call  good- 
ness in  the  essence  of  the  quality — in  what  constitutes 
it  goodness?  If  it  does,  the  " Rationalists "  are  right; 
it  is  not  illicit  to  reason  from  the  one  to  the  other.  If 
not,  the  divine  attribute,  whatever  else  it  may  be,  is  not 
goodness,  and  ought  not  to  be  called  by  the  name. 
Unless  there  be  some  human  conception  which  agrees 
with  it,  no  human  name  can  properly  be  applied  to  it ; 
it  is  simply  the  unknown  attribute  of'  a  thing  unknown  ; 
it  has  no  existence  in  relation  to  us,  we  can  affirm 
nothing  of  it,  and  owe  it  no  worship.  Such  is  the  inev- 
itable alternative. 

To  conclude  :  Mr.  Mansel  has  not  made  out  any  con- 
6* 


134  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OP  THE   CONDITIONED. 

nection  between  his  philosophical  premises  and  his  theo- 
logical conclusion.  The  relativity  of  human  knowledge, 
the  uncognoscibility  of  the  Absolute,  and  the  contra- 
dictions which  follow  the  attempt  to  conceive  a  Being 
with  all  or  without  any  attributes,  are  no  obstacles  to 
our  having  the  same  kind  of  knowledge  of  God  which 
we  have  of  other  things,  namely,  not  as  they  exist  abso- 
lutely, but  relatively.  The  proposition,  that  we  cannot 
conceive  the  moral  attributes  of  God  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  be  able  to  affirm  of  any  doctrine  or  assertion  that 
it  is  inconsistent  with  them,  has  no  foundation  in  the 
laws  of  the  human  mind :  while  if  admitted,  it  would 
not  prove  that  we  should  ascribe  to  God  attributes  bear- 
ing the  same  name  as  human  qualities,  but  not  to  be 
understood  in  the  same  sense :  it  would  prove  that  we 
ought  not  to  ascribe  any  moral  attributes  to  God  at  all, 
inasmuch  as  no  moral  attributes  known  or  conceivable 
by  us  are  true  of  him,  and  we  are  condemned  to  abso- 
lute ignorance  of  him  as  a  moral  being. 


CONSCIOUSNESS.  135 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

OF   CONSCIOUSNESS    AS    UNDERSTOOD    BY   SIR   WILLIAM 
HAMILTON. 

IN  the  discussion  of  the  Relativity  of  human  knowl- 
edge and  the  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned,  we  have 
brought  under  consideration  those  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
metaphysical  doctrines  which  have  the  greatest  share  in 
giving  to  his  philosophy  the  color  of  individuality  which 
it  possesses,  and  the  most  important  of  those  which  can 
be  regarded  as  belonging  specially  to  himself.  On  a 
certain  number  of  minor  points,  and  on  one  of  primary 
importance,  Causation,  we  shall  again  have  to  examine 
opinions  of  his  which  are  original.  But  on  most  of  the 
subjects  which  remain  to  be  discussed,  at  least  in  the 
psychological  department  (as  distinguished  from  the  logi- 
cal) ,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  is  merely  an  eminent  representa- 
tive of  one  of  the  two  great  schools  of  metaphysical 
thought ;  that  which  derives  its  popular  appellation  from 
Scotland,  and  of  which  the  founder  and  most  celebrated 
champion  was  a  philosopher  whom,  on  the  whole,  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  seems  to  prefer  to  any  other  —  Dr.  Reid. 
For  the  future,  therefore,  we  shall  be  concerned  less 
with  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  philosophy  as  such,  than  with 
the  general  mode  of  thought  to  which  it  belongs.  We 
shall  be  engaged  in  criticising  doctrines  common  to  him 
with  many  other  thinkers  ;  but  in  doing  so  we  shall  take 
his  writings  as  text-books,  and  deal  with  the  opinions 


136  CONSCIOUSNESS  AS   UNDERSTOOD 

chiefly  in  the  form  in  which  he  presented  them.  No 
other  course  would  be  so  fair  to  the  opinions  themselves  : 
not  only  because  they  have  not,  within  the  last  half 
century,  had  so  able  a  teacher,  and  never  one  so 
well  acquainted  with  the  teachings  of  others,  but  also 
because  he  had  the  great  advantage  of  coming  last.  All 
theories,  at  their  commencement,  bear  the  burden  of  mis- 
takes and  inadvertences  not  inherent  in  the  theories  them- 
selves, but  either  personal  to  their  authors,  or  arising  from 
the  imperfect  state  of  philosophical  thought  at  the  time 
of  their  origin.  At  a  later  period,  the  errors  which  acci- 
dentally adhered  to  the  theory  are  stripped  off,  the  most 
obvious  objections  to  it  are  perceived,  and  more  or  less 
successfully  met,  and  it  is  rendered,  at  least  apparently, 
consistent  with  such  admitted  truths  as  it  at  first  seemed 
to  contradict.  One  of  the  unfairest,  though  common- 
est tricks  of  controversy,  is  that  of  directing  the  attack 
exclusively  against  the  first  crude  form  of  a  doctrine.^) 
Whoever  should  judge  Locke's  philosophy  as  it  is  in 
Locke,  Berkeley's  philosophy  as  it  is  in  Berkeley,  or 
Reid's  as  it  is  in  Reid,  would  often  condemn  them  on  the 
ground  of  incidental  misapprehensions,  which  form  no 
essential  part  of  their  doctrine,  and  from  which  its  later 
adherents  and  expositors  are  free.  Sir  \V.  Hamilton's 
is  the  latest  form  of  the  Reidian  theory  ;  and  by  no  other 
of  its  supporters  has  that  theory  been  so  well  guarded,  or 
expressed  in  such  discriminating  terms,  and  with  such 
studious  precision.  Though  there  are  a  few  points  on 
which  the  earlier  philosopher  seems  to  me  nearer  the 

*  This,  for  example,  is  the  secret  of  most  of  the  apparent  triumphs 
which  are  so  frequently  gained  over  the  population  theory  of  Malthus,  and 
the  political  economy  of  Ricardo. 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  137 

truth,  on  the  whole  it  is  impossible  to  pass  from  Eeid 
to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  or  from  Sir  W.  Hamilton  back  to 
Reid,  and  not  be  struck  with  the  immense  progress  which 
their  common  philosophy  has  made  in  the  interval 
between  them. 

All  theories  of  the  human  mind  profess  to  be  inter- 
pretations of  Consciousness ;  the  conclusions  of  all  of 
them  are  supposed  to  rest  on  that  ultimate  evidence,  either 
immediately  or  remotely.  What  Consciousness  directly 
reveals,  together  with  what  can  be  legitimately  inferred 
from  its  revelations,  composes,  by  universal  admission, 
all  that  we  know  of  the  mind,  or  indeed  of  any  other 
thing.  When  we  know  what  any  philosopher  considers 
to  be  revealed  in  Consciousness,  we  have  the  key  to  the 
entire  character  of  his  metaphysical  system. 

There  are  some  peculiarities  requiring  notice,  in  Sir 
W.  Hamilton's  mode  of  conceiving  and  defining  Con- 
sciousness. The  words  of  his  definition  do  not,  of  them- 
selves, indicate  those  peculiarities.  Consciousness,  he 
says,*  is  "the  recognition  by  the  mind  or  ego  of  its  own 
acts  or  affections ;  "  and  in  this,  as  he  truly  observes, 
"all  philosophers  are  agreed."  But  all  philosophers 
have  not,  by  any  means,  meant  the  same  thing  by  it. 
Most  of  them  (including  Reid  and  Stewart)  have  meant, 
as  the  words  naturally  mean,  Self-consciousness.  They 
have  held,  that  we  can  be  conscious  only  of  some  state 
of  our  own  mind.  The  mind's  "  own  acts  or  affections  " 
are  in  the  mind  itself,  and  not  external  to  it ;  accord- 
ingly we  have,  in  their  opinion,  the  direct  evidence  of 
consciousness,  only  for  the  internal  world.  An  external 
world  is  but  an  inference,  which,  according  to  most 

*  Lectures,  i.  193  and  201, 


188  CONSCIOUSNESS   AS  UNDERSTOOD 

philosophers,  is  justified,  or  even,  by  our  mental  con- 
stitution, compelled  ;  according  to  others,  not  justified. 

Nothing,  however,  can  be  farther  from  SirW.  Hamil- 
ton's mind  than  he  declares  this  opinion  to  be.  Though 
consciousness,  according  to  him,  is  a  recognition  of  the 
mind's  own  acts  and  affections,  we  are  nevertheless  con- 
scious of  things  outside  the  mind.  Some  of  the  mind's 
acts  are  perceptions  of  outward  objects ;  and  we  are,  of 
course,  conscious  of  those  acts  :  now,  to  be  conscious 
of  a  perception,  necessarily  implies  being  conscious  of 
the  thing  perceived.  "It  is*  palpably  impossible  that 
we  can  be  conscious  of  an  act,  without  being  conscious 
of  the  object  to  which  that  act  is  relative.  This,  how- 
ever, is  what  Dr.  Reid  and  Mr.  Stewart  maintain.  They 
maintain  that  I  can  know  that  I  know,  without  know- 
ing what  I  know  —  or  that  I  can  know  the  knowledge 
without  knowing  what  the  knowledge  is  about ;  for 
example,  that  I  am  conscious  of  perceiving  a  book, 
without  being  conscious  of  the  book  perceived,  — that  I 
am  conscious  of  remembering  its  contents  without  being 
conscious  of  these  contents  remembered  —  and  so  forth." 
"  An  act  f  of  knowledge  existing  and  being  what  it  is 
only  by  relation  to  its  object,  it  is  manifest  that  the  act 
can  be  known  only  through  the  object  to  which  it  is  cor- 
relative ;  and  Reid's  supposition  that  an  operation  can  be 
known  in  consciousness  to  the  exclusion  of  its  object,  is 
impossible.  For  example,  I  see  the  inkstand.  How 
can  I  be  conscious  that  my  present  modification  exists, 

—  that  it  is  a  perception,  and  not  another  mental  state, 

—  that  it  is  a  perception  of  sight,  to  the  exclusion  of 
every  other  sense,  —  and  finally,  that  it  is  a  perception 

*  Lectures,  i.  212.  t  Ibid.  i.  228. 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON.  139 

of  the  inkstand,  and  of  the  inkstand  only, —  unless  my 
own  consciousness  comprehend  within  its  sphere  the  ob- 
ject, which  at  once  determines  the  existence  of  the  act, 
qualifies  its  kind,  and  distinguishes  its  individuality? 
Annihilate  the  inkstand,  you  annihilate  the  perception ; 
annihilate  the  consciousness  of  the  object,  you  annihilate 
the  consciousness  of  the  operation.  It  undoubtedly 
sounds  strange  to  say,  I  am  conscious  of  the  inkstand, 
instead  of  saying,  I  am  conscious  of  the  perception  of 
the  inkstand.  This  I  admit,  but  the  admission  can  avail 
nothing  to  Dr.  Reid,  for  the  apparent  incongruity  of  the 
expression  arises  only  from  the  prevalence  of  that  doc- 
trine of  perception  in  the  schools  of  philosophy,  which  it 
is  his  principal  merit  to  have  so  vigorously  assailed." 

This  is  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  first  difference,  on  the  sub- 
ject of  Consciousness,  from  his  predecessor  Reid.  In 
being  conscious  of  those  of  our  mental  operations  which 
regard  external  objects,  we  are,  according  to  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  conscious  of  the  objects.  Consciousness, 
therefore,  is  not  solely  of  the  ego  and  its  modifications, 
but  also  of  the  non-ego. 

This  first  difference  is  not  the  only  one.  Conscious- 
ness, according  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  may  be  of  things 
external  to  self,  but  it  can  only  be  of  things  actually 
present.  In  the  first  place,  they  must  be  present  in 
time.  We  are  not  conscious  of  the  past.  Thus  far  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  agrees  with  Reid,  who  holds  that  memory 
is  of  the  past,  consciousness  only  of  the  present.  (Reid, 
however,  is  of  opinion  that  memory  in  an  "  immediate 
knowledge  of  the  past,"  exactly  as  consciousness  is  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  present^)  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
contends  *  that  this  opinion  of  Reid  is  "  not  only  false," 
*  Lectures,  i.  218-221. 


140  CONSCIOUSNESS   AS   UNDERSTOOD 

but  "involves  a  contradiction  in  terms."  Memory  is  an 
act,  and  an  act  "  exists  only  in  the  now :  "  it  can  therefore 
be  cognizant  only  of  what  now  is.  In  the  case  of  memory , 
what  now  is,  is  not  the  thing  remembered,  but  a  present 
representation  of  it  in  the  mind,  which  representation  is 
the  sole  object  of  consciousness.  We  are  aware  of  the 
past,  not  immediately,  but  mediately,  through  the  repre- 
sentation. "  An  act  of  memory  is  merely  a  present  state 
of  mind,  which  we  are  conscious  of,  not  as  absolute,  but 
as  relative  to,  and  representing,  another  state  of  mind, 
and  accompanied  with  the  belief  that  the  state  of  mind, 
as  now  represented,  has  actually  been.  .  .  .  All  that  is 
immediately  known  in  the  act  of  memory,  is  the  present 
mental  modification ;  that  is,  the  representation  and 
concomitant  belief.  ...  So  far  is  memory  from  being 
an  immediate  knowledge  of  the  past,  that  it  is  at  best 
only  a  mediate  knowledge  of  the  past ;  while,  in  philo- 
sophical propriety,  it  is  not  a  knowledge  of  the  past  at 
all,  but  a  knowledge  of  the  present,  and  a  belief  of  the 
past.  .  .  .  We  may  doubt,  we  may  deny  that  the  rep- 
resentation and  belief  are  true.  We  may  assert  that 
they  represent  what  never  was,  and  that  all  beyond  their 
present  mental  existence  is  a  delusion  :  "  but  it  is  impos- 
sible for  us  to  doubt  or  deny  that  of  which  we  have  im- 
mediate knowledge. 

Again,  that  of  which  we  are  conscious  must  not  only 
be  present  in  time,  it  must  also,  if  external  to  our  minds, 
be  present  in  place.  It  must  be  in  direct  contact  with 
our  bodily  organs.  We  do  not  immediately  perceive  a 
distant  object.  "  To  say,*  for  example,  that  we  perceive 
by  sight  the  sun  or  moon,  is  a  false,  or  an  elliptical  ex- 
pression. We  perceive  nothing  but  certain  modifications 

*  Lectures,  ii.  153. 


BY   SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  141 

of  light,  in  immediate  relation  to  our  organ  of  vision ; 
and  so  far  from  Dr.  Reid  being  philosophically  correct 
when  he  says  that  f  when  ten  men  look  at  the  sun  or 
moon,  they  all  see  the  same  individual  object,'  the  truth 
is,  that  each  of  these  persons  sees  a  different  object,  be- 
cause each  person  sees  a  different  complement  of  rays, 
in  relation  to  his  individual  organ  : "  to  which,  in  another 
place,  he  adds,  that  each  individual  sees  two  different 
objects,  with  his  right  and  with  his  left  eye.  "It  is  not 
by  perception,  but  by  a  process  of  reasoning,  that  we 
connect  the  objects  of  sense  with  existences  beyond  the 
sphere  of  immediate  knowledge.  It  is  enough  that  per- 
ception affords  us  the  knowledge  of  the  non-ego  at  the 
point  of  sense.  To  arrogate  to  it  the  power  of  immedi- 
ately informing  us  of  external  things  which  are  only  the 
causes  of  the  object  we  immediately  perceive,  is  either 
positively  erroneous,  or  a  confusion  of  language  arising 
from  an  inadequate  discrimination  of  the  phenomena."  * 
(There  can,  I  think,  be  no  doubt  that  these  remarks  on 
knowledge  of  the  past  and  perception  of  the  distant,  are 
correct,  and  a  great  improvement  upon  Rem) 

It  appears,  then,  that  the  true  definition'of  Conscious- 
ness in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  use  of  the  term,  would  be 
Immediate  Knowledge.  And  he  expressly  says,f  "Con- 
sciousness and  immediate  knowledge  are  thus  terms  uni- 

*  And  elsewhere  (foot-note  to  Reid,  p.  302) :  —  "  It  is  self-evident  that 
if  a  thing  is  to  be  an  object  immediately  known,  it  must  be  known  as  it 
exists.  Now,  a  body  must  exist  in  some  definite  part  of  space,  in  a  certain 
plftce;  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  immediately  known  as  existing,  except  it  be 
known  in  its  place.  But  this  supposes  the  mind  to  be  immediately  present 
to  it  in  space." 

I  do  not  guarantee  the  conclusiveness  of  this  reasoning ;  but  it  has  been 
an  error  of  philosophers  in  all  times  to  flank  their  good  arguments  with 
bad  ones. 

t  Discussions,  p.  51. 


142  CONSCIOUSNESS   AS  UNDERSTOOD 

versally  convertible ;  and  if  there  be  an  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  things  external,  there  is  consequently  the  Con- 
sciousness of  an  outer  world."  Immediate  knowledge, 
again,  he  treats  as  universally  convertible  with  Intuitive 
knowledge  :  *  and  the  terms  are  really  equivalent.  \Ve 
know  intuitively  what  we  know  by  its  own  evidence  —  by 
direct  apprehension  of  the  fact,  and  not  through  the  me- 
dium of  a  previous  knowledge  of  something  from  which 
we  infer  it.  Regarded  in  this  light,  our  author's  difference 
with  Reid  as  to  our  being  conscious  of  outward  objects, 
would  appear,  on  his  own  showing,  to  be  chiefly  a  dis- 
pute about  words  :  for  Reid  also  says  that  we  have  an 
immediate  and  intuitive  knowledge  of  things  without, 
though  he  does  not  call  it  a  consciousness.  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  stretches  the  word  Consciousness  so  as  to  in- 
clude this  knowledge,  while  Reid,  with  greater  regard 
for  the  origin  and  etymology  of  the  word,  restricts  it  to 
the  cases  in  which  the  mind  is  "  conscia  sibi."  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  has  a  right  to  his  own  use  of  the  term ;  but 
care  must  be  taken  that  it  do  not  serve  as  a  means  of 
knowingly  or  unknowingly  begging  any  question.  One 
of  the  most  disputed  questions  in  psychology  is  exactly 
this  — Have  we,  or  not,  an  immediate  intuition  of  mate- 
rial objects  ?  and  this  question  must  not  be  prejudged  by 
affirming  that  those  objects  are  in  our  consciousness. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  only  allowable  to  say  that  they  are 
in  our  consciousness,  after  it  has  been  already  proved 
that  we  cognize  them  intuitively. 

It  is  a  little  startling,  after  so  much  has  been  said  of 
the  limitation  of  Consciousness  to  immediate  knowledge, 
to  find  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  in  the  Dissertations  on  Reid,f 

*  Lectures,  i.  221,  note,  and  iv.  73.  f  P.  810. 


BY   SIR   WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  143 

maintaining  that  "  consciousness  comprehends  every 
cognitive  act;  in  other  words,  whatever  we  are  not  con- 
scious of,  that  we  do  not  know."  If  consciousness 
comprehends  all  our  knowledge,  but  yet  is  limited  to 
immediate  knowledge,  it  follows  that  all  our  knowledge 
must  be  immediate,  and  that  we  have,  therefore,  no 
knowledge  of  the  past  or  of  the  absent.  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton might  have  cleared  up  this  difficulty  by  saying,  as 
he  had  already  done,  that  our  mediate  cognitions  —  those 
of  the  past  and  the  absent  —  though  he  never  hesitates  to 
call  them  knowledge,  are  in  strict  propriety  Belief.  We 
could  then  have  understood  his  meaning.  But  the  ex- 
planation he  actually  gives  is  quite  different.  It  is,  that 
"  all  our  mediate  cognitions  are  contained  in  our  imme- 
diate." This  is  a  manifest  attempt  to  justify  himself  in 
calling  them,  not  belief,  but  knowledge,  like  our  imme- 
diate cognitions.  But  what  is  the  meaning  of  "con- 
tained "  ?  If  it  means  that^  our  mediate  cognitions  are 
part  of  our  immediate,  then  they  are  themselves  imme- 
diate, and  we  have  no  mediate  cognitions.  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  has  told  us,  that  in  the  case  of  a  remembered 
fact,  what  we  immediately  cognize  is  but  a  present  mental 
representation  of  it,  "  accompanied  with  the  belief  that 
the  state  of  mind,  as  now  represented,  has  actually 
been."  Having  said  this,  he  also  says  that  the  past  fact, 
which  does  not  now  exist,  is  "contained"  in  the  repre- 
sentation and  in  the  belief  which  do  exist.  But  if  it  is 
contained  in  them,  it  must  have  a  present  existence  too, 
and  is  not  a  past  fact.  Perhaps,  however,  by  the  word 
"  contained,"  all  that  is  meant  is,  that  it  is  implied  in 
them  ;  that  it  is  a  necessary  or  legitimate  inference  from 
them.  But  if  it  is  only  tin's,  it  remains  absent  in  time ; 


144  CONSCIOUSNESS   A3   UNDERSTOOD 

and  what  is  absent  in  time,  our  author  has  said,  is  not  a 
possible  object  of  consciousness.  If,  therefore,  a  past 
fact  is  an  object  of  knowledge,  we  can  know  what  we 
are  not  conscious  of;  consciousness  does  not  comprehend 
all  our  cognitions.  To  state  the  same  thing  in  another 
manner  :  a  remembered  fact  is  either  a  part  of  our  con- 
sciousness, or  it  is  not.  If  it  is,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  is 
wrong  when  he  says  that  we  are  not  conscious  of  the 
past.  If  not,  he  is  wrong,  either  in  saying  that  we  can 
know  the  past,  or  in  saying  that  what  we  are  not  con- 
scious of,  we  do  not  know. 

This  inconsistency,  which  emerges  only  in  the  Dis- 
sertations, I  shall  not  further  dwell  upon :  it  is  chiefly 
important  as  showing  that  the  most  complicated  and 
elaborate  version  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  speculations,  is 
not  always  the  freest  from  objection.  The  doctrine  of 
his  Lectures  is,  that  a  part  of  our  knowledge  —  the 
knowledge  of  the  past,  the  future,  and  the  distant  —  is 
mediate,  and  representative,  but  that  such  mediate  knowl- 
edge is  not  Consciousness  ;  consciousness,  and  immediate 
knowledge,  being  coextensive. 

From  our  author's  different  deliverances  as  above 
quoted,  it  appears  that  he  gives  two  definitions  of  Con- 
sciousness. In  the  one,  it  is  synonymous  with  direct, 
immediate,  or  intuitive  knowledge  ;  and  we  are  conscious 
not  only  of  ourselves,  but  of  outward  objects,  since,  in 
our  author's  opinion,  we  know  these  intuitively.  Ac- 
cording to  the  other  definition,  consciousness  is  the  mind's 
recognition  of  its  own  acts  and  affections.  It  is  not  at 
once  obvious  how  these  two  definitions  can  be  reconciled  : 
for  Sir  W.  Hamilton  would  have  been  the  last  person  to 
say  that  the  outward  object  is  identical  with  the  mental 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  145 

act  or  affection.  He  must  have  meant  that  consciousness 
is  the  mind's  recognition  of  its  own  acts  and  affections 
together  with  all  that  is  therein  implied,  or  as  he  would 
say,  contained.  But  this  involves  him  in  a  new  incon- 
sistency :  for  how  can  he  then  refuse  the  name  of  con- 
sciousness to  our  mediate  knowledge  —  to  our  knowledge 
or  belief  (for  instance)  of  the  past  ?  The  past  reality 
is  certainly  implied  in  the  present  recollection  of  which 
we  are  conscious  :  and  our  author  has  said  that  all  our 
mediate  knowledge  is  contained  in  our  immediate,  just 
as  knowledge  of  the  outward  object  is  contained  in  our 
knowledge  of  the  perception.  If,  then,  we  are  conscious 
of  the  outward  object,  why  not  of  the  past  sensation  or 
impression  ? 

From  the  definition  of  Consciousness  as  "  the  recog- 
nition by  the  mind  or  Ego  of  its  own  acts  or  affections," 
our  author  might  be  supposed  to  think  (as  has  been 
actually  thought  by  many  philosophers)  that  conscious- 
ness is  not  the  fact  itself  of  knowing  or  feeling,  but  a 
subsequent  operation  by  which  we  become  aware  of  that 
fact.  This,  however,  is  not  his  opinion.  By  "  the  mind's 
recognition  of  its  acts  and  affections  "  he  does  not  mean 
anything  different  from  the  acts  and  affections  them- 
selves. He  denies  that  we  have  one  faculty  by  which 
we  know  or  feel,  and  another  by  which  we  know  that 
we  know,  and  by  which  we  know  that  we  feel.  These 
are  not,  according  to  him,  different  facts,  but  the  same 
fact  seen  under  another  point  of  view.  And  he  takes 
this  occasion  for  making  a  remark,  of  wide  application 
in  philosophy,  which  it  would  be  of  signal  service  to  all 
students  of  metaphysics  to  keep  constantly  in  mind; 
that  difference  of  names  often  does  not  signify  difference 


146  CONSCIOUSNESS  AS   UNDERSTOOD 

of  things,  but  only  difference  in  the  particular  relation 
under  which  a  thing  is  considered.  On  the  real  identity 
between  our  various  mental  states  and  our  consciousness 
of  them,  he  seems  to  be  of  the  opinion  which  was  main- 
tained before  him  by  Brown,  and  which  is  stated  by  Mr. 
James  Mill,  with  his  usual  clearness  and  force,  in  the 
following  passage  :  *  — 

"Having  a  sensation,  and  having  a  feeling,  are  not 
two  things.  The  thing  is  one,  the  names  only  are  two. 
I  am  pricked  by  a  pin.  The  sensation  is  one ;  but  I 
may  call  it  sensation,  or  a  feeling,  or. a  pain,  as  I  please. 
Now,  when,  having  the  sensation,  I  say  I  feel  the  sen- 
sation, I  only  use  a  tautological  expression ;  the  sensa- 
tion is  not  one  thing,  the  feeling  another ;  the  sensation 
is  the  feeling.  When,  instead  of  the  word  feeling,  I 
use  the  word  conscious,  I  do  exactly  the  same  thing  — 
I  merely  use  a  tautological  expression.  To  say  I  feel  a 
sensation,  is  merely  to  say  that  I  feel  a  feeling ;  which 
is  an  impropriety  of  speech.  And  to  say  I  am  con- 
scious of  a  feeling,  is  merely  to  say  that  I  feel  it.  To 
have  a  feeling  is  to  be  conscious ;  and  to  be  conscious 
is  to  have  a  feeling.  To  be  conscious  of  the  prick  of  the 
pin,  is  merely  to  have  the  sensation.  And  though  I 
have  these  various  modes  of  naming  my  sensation,  by 
saying,  I  feel  the  prick  of  a  pin,  I  feel  the  pain  of  a 
prick,  I  have  the  sensation  of  a  prick,  I  have  the  feeling 
of  a  prick,  I  am  conscious  of  the  feeling ;  the  thing 
named  in  all  these  various  ways  is  one  and  the  same. 

"  The  same  explanation  will  easily  be  seen  to  apply  to 
ideas.  Though  at  present  I  have  not  the  sensation 
called  the  prick  of  a  pin,  I  have  a  distinct  idea  of  it. 

*  Analysis  of  the  Human  Mind,  i.  170-172. 


BY   SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  147 

The  having  an  idea,  and  the  not  having  it,  are  distin- 
guished by  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  a  certain 
feeling.  To  have  an  idea,  and  the  feeling  of  that  idea, 
are  not  two  things  ;  they  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
To  feel  an  idea,  and  to  be  conscious  of  that  feeling,  are 
not  two  things  ;  the  feeling  and  the  consciousness  arc  but 
two  names  for  the  same  thing.  In  the  very  word  feeling, 
all  that  is  implied  in  the  word  Consciousness  is  involved. 

"Those  philosophers,  therefore,  who  have  spoken  of 
Consciousness  as  a  feeling  distinct  from  all  other  feel- 
ings, committed  a  mistake,  and  one,  the  evil  conse- 
quences of  which  have  been  most  important  ;  for,  by 
combining  a  chimerical  ingredient  with  the  elements  of 
thought,  they  involved  their  inquiries  in  confusion  and 
mystery  from  the  very  commencement. 

"  It  is  easy  to  see  what  is  the  nature  of  the  terms 
Conscious  and  Consciousness,  and  what  is  the  marking 
function  which  they  are  destined  to  perform.  £lt  was 


of  great  importance,  for  the  purpose  of  naming,  that  we  * 
should  not  only  have  names  to  distinguish  the  different 
classes  of  our  feelings,  but  also  a  name  applicable 
equally  to  all  those  classes.  This  purpose  is  answered 
by  the  concrete  term,  Conscious  ;  and  the  abstract  of 
it,  Consciousness.  Thus,  if  we  are  in  any  way  sen- 
tient ;  that  is,  have  any  of  the  feelings  whatsoever  of  a 
living  creature  ;  the  word  Conscious  is  applicable  to 
the  feeler,  and  Consciousness  to  the  feeling  :  that  is  to 
say,  the  words  are  Generical  marks,  under  which  all  the 

names  of  the  subordinate  classes  of  the  feelings  of  a 

•^s 
sentient  creature  are  included^    When  I  smell  a  rose, 

I  am  conscious  ;  when  I  have  the  idea  of  a  fire,  I  am 
conscious  ;  when  I  remember,  I  am  conscious  ;   when  I 


148  CONSCIOUSNESS   AS   UNDERSTOOD 

reason,  and  when  I  believe,  I  am  conscious  ;  but  believing, 
and  being  conscious  of  belief,  are  not  two  things,  they 
are  the  same  thing :  though  this  same  thing  I  can  name 
at  one  time  without  the  aid  of  the  generical  mark,  while 
at  another  time  it  suits  me  to  employ  the  generical  mark." 
Sir  TV.  Hamilton's  doctrine  is  exactly  this,  except 
that  he  expresses  the  latter  part  of  it  in  less  perspicuous 
phraseology,  saying  that  Consciousness  is  "the  funda- 
mental form,  the  generic  condition,"  of  all  the  modes  of 
our  mental  activity  ;  *  "  in  fact,  the  general  condition  of 
their  existence."  f  But,  while  holding  the  same  theory 
with  Brown  and  Mr.  Mill,  he  completes  it  by  the  ad- 
dition, that  though  our  mental  states  and  our  conscious- 
ness of  them  are  only  the  same  fact,  they  are  the  same 
fact  regarded  in  different  relations.  Considered  in  them- 
selves, as  acts  and  feelings,  or  considered  in  relation  to 
the  external  object  with  which  they  are  concerned,  we 
do  not  call  them  consciousness.  It  is  when  these  mental 
modifications  are  referred  to  a  subject  or  ego,  and  looked 
at  in  relation  to  Self,  that  consciousness  is  the  term 
used  :  consciousness  being  "  the  self-affirmation  that  cer- 
tain modifications  are  known  by  me,  and  that  these 
modifications  are  mine."  J  In  this  self-affirmation,  how- 
ever, no  additional  fact  is  introduced.  It  "is  not  to 
be  viewed  as  anything  different  from  "  the  "  modifications 
themselves."  There  is  but  one  mental  phenomenon, 
the  act  of  feeling :  but  as  this  implies  an  acting  or 
feeling  Self,  we  give  it  a  name  which  connotes  its  re- 
lation to  the  Self,  and  that  name  is  Consciousness. 
Thus,  w  consciousness  and  knowledge,"  §  —  and  I  think 

*  Discussions,  p.  48.  t  Lectures,  i.  193. 

t  Ibid.  §  Ibid.  pp.  194,  195. 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  149 

he  would  have  added,  feeling  (the  mind's  "affections") 
as  well  as  knowledge  — "  are  not  distinguished  by  dif- 
ferent words  as  different  things,  but  only  as  the  same 
thing  considered  in  different  aspects.  The  verbal  dis- 
tinction is  taken  for  the  sake  of  brevity  and  precision, 
and  its  convenience  warrants  its  establishment.  .  .  . 
Though  each  term  of  a  relation  necessarily  supposes 
the  other,  nevertheless  one  of  these  terms  may  be  to 
us  the  more  interesting,  and  we  may  consider  that  term 
as  the  principal,  and  view  the  other  only  as  subordinate 
and  correlative.  Now,  this  is  the  case  in  the  present 
instance.  In  an  act  of  knowledge,  my  attention  may 
be  principally  attracted  either  to  the  object  known,  or 
to  myself,  as  the  subject  knowing;  and  in  the  latter 
case,  although  no  new  element  be  added  to  the  act,  the 
condition  involved  in  it  —  I  know  that  I  know  —  be- 
comes the  primary  and  permanent  matter  of  considera- 
tion. And  when,  as  in  the  philosophy  of  mind,  the 
act  of  knowledge  comes  to  be  specially  considered  in 
relation  to  the  knowing  subject,  it  is,  at  last,  in  the 
progress  of  the  science,  found  convenient,  if  not  abso- 
lutely necessary,  to  possess  a  scientific  word  in  which 
this  point  of  view  should  be  permanently  and  distinc- 
tively embodied." 

If  any  doubt  could  have  existed,  after  this  passage, 
of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  opinion  on  the  question,  it  would 
have  been  removed  by  one  of  the  fragments  recently 
published  by  his  editors,  in  continuation  of  the  Disser- 
tations on  Reid.  I  extract  the  words  :  *  — 

"Consciousness  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  aught  dif- 
ferent from  the  mental  modes  or  movements  themselves. 

*  Supplement  to  Reid,  p.  932. 
VOL.  i.  7 


150  CONSCIOUSNESS  AS   UNDERSTOOD 

It  is  not  to  be  viewed  as  an  illuminated  place  within 
which  objects  coming  are  presented  to,  and  passing  be- 
yond are  withdrawn  from,  observation ;  nor  is  it  to  be 
considered  even  as  an  observer  —  the  mental  modes 
as  phenomena  observed.  Consciousness  is  just  the 
movements  themselves,  rising  above  a  certain  degree 
of  intensity.  ...  It  is  only  a  comprehensive  word  for 
those  mental  movements  which  rise  at  once  above  a 
certain  degree  of  intension."  * 

We  now  pass  to  a  question  which  is  of  no  little  im- 
portance to  the  character  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  system 
of  philosophy.  We  found,  not  long  ago,  that  he  makes 
between  Knowledge  and  Belief  a  broad  distinction,  on 
which  he  lays  great  stress,  and  which  plays  a  conspicu- 
ous part  both  in  his  own  speculations  and  in  those  of 
some  of  his  followers.  Let  us  now  look  at  this  distinc- 
tion in  the  light  thrown  upon  it  by  those  doctrines  of  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  which  are  the  subject  of  the  present  chapter. 

Though  Sir  W.  Hamilton  allows  a  mediate,  or  repre- 

*  The  qualification  here  first  introduced,  of  *'  rising  above  a  certain  degree 
of  intensity,"  has  reference  to  a  doctrine  of  our  author,  to  be  fully  con- 
sidered hereafter — that  of  latent  mental  states.  It  makes  no  abatement 
from  the  doctrine  that  consciousness  of  a  feeling  is  the  feeling ;  for  mental 
states  which  are  not  intense  enough  to  rise  into  consciousness,  are,  accord- 
ing to  the  same  theory,  not  intense  enough  to  be  felt :  and  if  felt,  the  feel- 
ing, and  the  consciousness  of  the  feeling,  are  one  and  the  same. 

It  was  not  without  some  difficulty,  and  after  considerable  study,  that  I  was 
able  to  satisfy  myself  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  held  the  sound  and  rational 
theory  with  which  I  have  credited  him  in  the  text.  For  he  often  states 
and  defends  his  doctrine  in  a  manner  which  might  lead  one  to  think,  that 
in  saying  that  to  know,  and  to  know  that  we  know,  are  but  one  fact,  he 
does  not  mean  one  fact,  but  two  facts  which  are  inseparable.  This  misap- 
prehension of  his  meaning  is  favored  by  his  repeated  use  of  (what  we 
seldom  meet  with  in  his  writings)  a  false  illustration  ;  that  of  the  sides  and 
angles  of  a  triangle.  "  The  sides  suppose  the  angles  —  the  angles  suppose 
the  sides,  — and,  in  fact,  the  sides  and  angles  are  in  themselves,  in  reality, 
one  and  indivisible."  (Lectures,  i.  194.)  "  The  sides  and  angles  of  a 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  151 

sentative,  knowledge  of  the  past  and  the  absent,  he  has 
told  us  that  "  in  philosophical  propriety  "  it  ought  not  to 
be  called  knowledge,  but  belief.  We  do  not,  properly 
speaking,  know  a  past  event,  but  believe  it,  by  reason 
of  the  present  recollection  which  we  immediately  know. 
We  do  not,  properly  speaking,  perceive  or  know  the 
sun,  but  we  perceive  and  know  an  image  in  contact  with 
our  organs,  and  believe  the  existence  of  the  sun  through 
"  a  process  of  reasoning  "  which  connects  the  image  that 
we  directly  perceive,  with  something  else  as  its  cause. 
Again,  though  we  cannot  know  an  Infinite  or  an  Abso- 
lute Being,  we  may  and  ought  to  believe  in  the  reality 
of  such  a  Being.  But  in  all  these  cases  the  belief  itself, 
the  conviction  we  feel  of  the  existence  of  the  sun,  and 
of  the  reality  of  the  past  event,  and  which  according  to 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  we  ought  to  feel  of  the  existence  of  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute  —  this  belief  is  a  fact  present  in 
time  and  in  place  —  a  phenomenon  of  our  own  mind  ; 
of  this  we  are  conscious  ;  this  we  immediately  know. 

triangle  (or  trilateral)  as  mutually  correlative  —  as  together  making  up  the 
same  simple  figure  —  and  as,  without  destruction  of  that  figure,  actually 
inseparable  from  it,  and  from  each  other,  are  really  one  ;  but  inasmuch  as 
they  have  peculiar  relations,  which  may,  in  thought,  be  considered  sever- 
ally and  for  themselves,  they  are  logically  twofold."  (Dissertations  on 
Reid,  p.  806.)  According  to  this,  the  sides  are  in  reality  the  angles  looked 
at  in  a  particular  point  of  view  ;  and  the  angles  the  same  thing  as  the 
sides,  regarded  in  a  particular  relation  to  something  else.  "When  this  was 
the  illustration  selected  of  the  identity  between  Consciousness  and  Knowl- 
edge, it  was  natural  to  suppose  that  the  writer  regarded  these  two  as  no 
otherwise  one  than  the  sides  and  angles  of  a  triangle  are.  But  a  closer 
examination  has  satisfied  me  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  was  only  wrong 
respecting  sides  and  angles,  and  not  respecting  Consciousness  and  Knowl- 
edge. On  the  former  subject  he  has  against  him  not  only  the  reason  of 
the  case,  but  his  own  authority  ;  for  he  says,  when  discoursing  on  another 
subject  (foot-note  to  Reid,  p.  590)  :  "  It  is  not  more  reasonable  to  identify 
sense  with  judgment,  because  the  former  cannot  exist  without  an  act  of 
the  latter,  than  it  would  be  to  identify  the  sides  and  angles  of  a  mathemati- 
cal figure,  because  sides  and  angles  cannot  exist  apaftfrom  each  other" 


152  CONSCIOUSNESS  AS   UNDERSTOOD 

Such,  it  is  impossible  to  doubt,  is  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
opinion. 

Let  us  now  apply  to  this  the  general  principle  em- 
phatically affirmed  by  him,  and  forming  the  basis  of  his 
argument  against  Reid  and  Stewart  on  the  subject  of 
Consciousness.  "  It  is  palpably  impossible  that  we  can 
be  conscious  of  an  act,  without  being  conscious  of  the 
object  to  which  that  act  is  relative.  The  knowledge  of 
an  operation  necessarily  involves  the  knowledge  of  its 
object."  Cft  is  impossible  to  make  consciousness  con- 
versant abouF  the  intellectual  operations  to  the  exclusion 
of  their  objects,^  and  therefore,  since  we  are  conscious 
of  our  perceptions,  we  must  be  conscious  of  the  external 
objects  perceived.  Such  is  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  theory. 
But  perceptions  are  not  the  only  mental  operations  we 
are  conscious  of,  which  point  to  an  external  object. 
This  is  no  less  true  of  beliefs.  We  are  conscious  of 
belief  in  a  past  event,  in  the  reality  of  a  distant  body, 
and  (according  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton)  in  the  existence  of 
the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute.  Consequently,  on  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  principle,  we  are  conscious  of  the  objects 
of  those  beliefs ;  conscious  of  the  past  event,  conscious 
of  the  distant  body,  conscious  of  the  Infinite  and  of  the 
Absolute.  To  disclaim  this  conclusion  would  be  to  bring 
down  upon  himself  the  language  in  which  he  criticised 
Reid  and  Stewart ;  it  would  be  to  maintain  "  that  I  can 
know  that  I  [believe]  without  knowing  what  I  [be- 
lieve] —  or  that  I  can  know  the  [belief]  without  knowing 
what  the  [belief]  is  about :  for  example,  that  I  am 
conscious  of  [remembering  a  past  event]  without  being 
conscious  of  [the  past  event  remembered]  ;  that  I  am 
conscious  of  [believing  in  God] ,  without  being  conscious 


BY  SIB  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  153 

of  [the  God  believed  in] ."  If  it  be  true  that  "an  act  of 
knowledge  "  exists,  and  is  what  it  is,  "  only  by  relation 
to  its  object,"  this  must  be  equally  true  of  an  act  of  be- 
lief :  and  it  must  be  as  "  manifest "  of  the  one  act  as  of 
the  other,.  "  that  it  can  be  known  only  through  the  ob- 
ject to  which  it  is  correlative."  Therefore  past  events, 
distant  objects,  and  the  Absolute,  inasmuch  as  they  are 
believed,  are  as  much  objects  of  immediate  knowledge  as 
things  finite  and  present :  since  they  are  presupposed 
and  implicitly  contained  in  the  mental  fact  of  belief,  ex- 
actly as  a  present  object  is  implicitly  contained  in  the 
mental  fact  of  perception.  Either,  therefore,  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  was  wrong  in  his  doctrine  that  consciousness 
of  our  perceptions  implies  consciousness  of  their  external 
object,  or  if  he  was  right  in  this,  the  distinction  between 
Belief  and  Knowledge  collapses  :  all  objects  of  Belief 
are  objects  of  Knowledge  :  Belief  and  Knowledge  are 
the  same  thing :  and  he  was  wrong  in  asserting  that  the 
Absolute  ought  to  be  believed,  or  wrong  in  maintaining 
against  Cousin  that  it  is  incapable  of  being  known. 

Another  reasoner  might  escape  from  this  dilemma  by 
saying  that  the  knowledge  of  the  object  of  belief,  which 
is  implied  in  knowledge  of  the  belief  itself,  is  not  knowl- 
edge of  the  object  as  existing,  but  knowledge  of  it  as 
believed — the  mere  knowledge  what  it  is  that  we  believe. 
And  this  is  true ;  but  it  could  not  be  said  by  Sir  W. 
Hamilton ;  for  he  rejects  the  same  reasonable  explana- 
tion in  the  parallel  case.  He  will  not  allow  it  to  be 
said  that  when  we  have  what  we  call  a  perception,  and 
refer  it  to  an  external  object,  we  are  conscious  not  of  the 
external  object  as  existing,  but  of  ourselves  as  inferring 
an  external  existence.  He  maintains  that  the  actual 


154  CONSCIOUSNESS  AS   UNDERSTOOD 

outward  existence  of  the  object  is  a  deliverance  of  con- 
sciousness, because  "it  is  impossible  that  we  can  be 
conscious  of  an  act  without  being  conscious  of  the  object 
to  which  that  act  is  relative."  He  cannot,  then,  reject, 
as  applied  to  the  act  of  Belief,  a  law  which,  when  he 
has  occasion  for  applying  it  to  the  acts  of  Perception 
and  Knowledge,  he  affirms  to  be  common  to  all  our 
mental  operations.  If  we  can  be  conscious  of  an  opera- 
tion without  being  conscious  of  its  object,  the  reality  of 
an  external  world  is  not  indeed  subverted,  but  there  is  an 
end  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  theory  of  the  mode  in  which 
it  is  known,  and  to  his  particular  mode  of  proving  it. 

The  difficulty  in  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  is  thus  in- 
volved seems  to  have  become,  though  very  insufficiently, 
perceptible  to  himself.  Towards  the  end  of  his  Lectures 
on  Logic,  after  saying*  that  "we  may  be  equally  certain 
of  what  we  believe  as  of  what  we  know,"  and  that  "it 
has,  not  without  ground,  been  maintained  by  many  phi- 
losophers, both  in  ancient  and  modern  times,  that  the 
certainty  of  all  knowledge  is,  in  its  ultimate  analysis, 
resolved  into  a  certainty  of  belief,"  he  adds,f  "But,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  manifestation  of  this  belief  necessa- 
rily involves  knowledge ;  for  we  cannot  believe  without 
some  consciousness  or  knowledge  of  the  belief,  and  con- 
sequently without  some  consciousness  or  knowledge  of 
the  object  of  the  belief."  The  remark  which  this  tardy 
reflection  suggests  to  him  is  merely  this  :  "  The  consid- 
eration, however,  of  the  relation  of  Belief  and  Knowl- 
edge does  not  properly  belong  to  Logic,  except  so  far 
as  it  is  necessary  to  explain  the  nature  of  Truth  and 
Error.  It  is  altogether  a  metaphysical  discussion ;  and 

*  Lectures,  iv.  70.  f  Ibid.  p.  73. 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON.  155 

one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  of  which  Metaphys- 
ics attempts  the  solution."  Accordingly,  he  takes  the 
extremely  unphilosophical  liberty  of  leaving  it  unsolved. 
But  when  a  thinker  is  compelled  by  one  part  of  his 
philosophy  to  contradict  another  part,  he  cannot  leave 
the  conflicting  assertions  standing,  and  throw  the  respon- 
sibility of  his  scrape  on  the  arduousness  of  the  subject. 
A  palpable  self-contradiction  is  not  one  of  the  difficulties 
which  can  be  adjourned,  as  belonging  to  a  higher  de- 
partment of  science.  Though  it  may  be  a  hard  matter 
to  find  the  truth,  that  is  no  reason  for  holding  to  what 
is  self-convicted  of  error.  (Tf  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  theory 
of  consciousness  is  correct,  it  does  not  leave  the  differ- 
ence between  Belief  and  Knowledge  in  a  state  of  obscu- 
rity, but  abolishes  that  distinction  entirely,  and  along 
with  it  a  great  part  of  his  own  philosophy^  If  his 
premises  are  true,  we  not  only  cannot  believe  what  we 
do  not  know,  but  we  cannot  believe  that  of  which  we 
are  not  conscious  ;  the  distinction  between  our  immediate 
and  our  mediate  or  representative  cognitions,  and  the 
doctrine  of  things  believable  but  not  knowable,  must  both 
succumb ;  or  if  these  can  be  saved,  it  must  be  by  aban- 
doning the  proposition,  which  is  at  the  root  of  so  much 
of  his  philosophy,  that  consciousness  of  an  operation  is 
consciousness  of  the  object  of  the  operation. 

But  when  Sir  W.  Hamilton  began  to  perceive  that  if 
his  theory  is  correct  nothing  can  be  believed  except  in  so 
far  as  it  is  known,  he  did  not  therefore  renounce  the  at- 
tempt to  distinguish  Belief  from  Knowledge.  In  the  very 
same  Lecture,  he  says,*  "Knowledge  and  Belief  differ 
not  only  in  degree,  but  in  kind.  Knowledge  is  a  cer- 

*  Lectures,  iv.  62. 


156  CONSCIOUSNESS  AS  UNDERSTOOD 

tainty  founded  upon  insight ;  Belief  is  a  certainty  found- 
ed upon  feeling.  The  one  is  perspicuous  and  objective  ; 
the  other  is  obscure  and  subjective.  Each,  however, 
supposes  the  other :  and  an  assurance  is  said  to  be  a 
knowledge  or  a  belief,  according  as  the  one  element  or 
the  other  preponderates."  If  Sir  W.  Hamilton  had  be- 
stowed any  sufficient  consideration  on  the  difficulty,  he 
would  hardly  have  consented  to  pay  himself  with  such 
mere  words.  If  each  of  his  two  certainties  supposes  the 
other,  it  follows  that  whenever  we  have  a  certainty  found- 
ed upon  feeling,  we  have  a  parallel  certainty  founded 
upon  insight.  We  therefore  have  always  insight  when 
we  are  certain ;  and  we  are  never  certain  except  to  the 
extent  to  which  we  have  insight.  It  is  not  a  case  in 
which  we  can  talk  of  one  or  the  other  element  prepon- 
derating. They  must  be  equal  and  coextensive.  The 
whole  of  what  we  know  we  must  believe ;  and  the 
whole  of  what  we  believe  we  must  know  :  for  we  know 
that  we  believe  it,  and  the  act  of  belief  "  can  only  be 
known  through  the  object  to  which  it  is  correlative." 
Our  conviction  is  not  divided,  in  varying  proportions, 
between  knowledge  and  belief:  the  two  must  always 
keep  abreast  of  one  another. 

All  this  follows,  whatever  may  be  the  meaning  of  the 
"  insight"  which  forms  the  distinction  in  kind  between 
belief  and  knowledge.  But  what  is  this  insight  ?  "The 
immediate  consciousness  of  an  object "  (he  goes  on  to 
say)  "is  called  an  intuition,  an  insight."*  So  that  if 
knowledge  is  distinguished  from  belief  by  being  grounded 
on  insight,  it  is  distinguished  by  being  grounded  on 
immediate  consciousness.  But  belief  also  supposes 

*  Lectures,  iv.  73. 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON.  157 

immediate  consciousness,  since  "we  cannot  believe  with- 
out some  consciousness  or  knowledge  of  the  belief,  and 
consequently  without  some  consciousness  or  knowledge 
of  the  object  of  the  belief."  Not  merely  without  some 
consciousness,  but,  if  our  author's  theory  is  correct, 
without  a  consciousness  coextensive  with  the  belief.  As 
far  as  we  believe,  so  far  we  are  conscious  of  the  belief, 
and  so  far,  therefore,  if  the  theory  be  true,  we  are  con- 
scious of  the  thing  believed. 

But  though  Sir  W.  Hamilton  cannot  extricate  himself 
from  this  entanglement,  having,  by  the  premises  he  laid 
down,  cut  off  his  own  retreat,  other  thinkers  can  find  a 
way  through  it.  For,  in  truth,  what  can  be  more  absurd 
than  the  notion  that  belief  of  anything  implies  knowl- 
edge of  the  thing  believed?  Were  this  so,  there  could 
be  no  such  thing  as  false  belief.  Every  day's  experience 
shows  that  belief  of  the  most  peremptory  kind —  assurance 
founded  on  the  most  intense  "feeling,"  is  compatible 
with  total  ignorance  of  the  thing  which  is  the  object  of 
belief;  though  of  course  not  with  ignorance  of  the  belief 
itself.  And  this  absurdity  is  a  full  refutation  of  the 
theory  which  leads  to  it  —  that  consciousness  of  an 
operation  involves  consciousness  of  that  about  which  the 
operation  is  conversant.  The  theory  does  not  seem  so 
absurd  when  affirmed  of  knowledge  as  of  belief,  because 
(the  term  knowledge  being  only  applied  in  common  par- 
lance to  what  is  regarded  as  true,  while  belief  may  con- 
fessedly be  false)  to  say  that  if  we  are  conscious  of  our 
knowledge,  we  must  be  conscious  of  that  which  we  know, 
is  not  so  manifestly  ridiculous,  as  it  is  to  affirm  that  if 
we  are  conscious  of  a  mistaken  belief,  we  must  be  con- 
scious of  a  non-existent  fact.  Yet  the  one  proposition 
7* 


158  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

must  be  equally  true  with  the  other,  if  consciousness  of 
an  act  involves  consciousness  of  the  object  of  the  act. 
It  is  over  the  ruins  of  this  false  theory  that  we  must 
force  our  way  out  of  the  labyrinth  in  which  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  has  imprisoned  us.  It  may  be  true,  or  it  may 
not,  that  an  external  world  is  an  object  of  immediate 
knowledge.  But  assuredly  we  cannot  conclude  that  we 
have  an  immediate  knowledge  of  external  things,  because 
we  have  an  immediate  knowledge  of  our  cognitions  of 
them ;  whether  these  cognitions  are  to  be  termed  belief, 
with  Reid,  or  knowledge,  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton.* 

*  In  many  parts  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  writings,  it  seems  as  if  the  distinc- 
tion which  he  draws  between  knowledge  and  belief  was  meant  to  corre- 
spond to  the  difference  between  what  we  can  explain  by  reference  to  some- 
thing else,  and  those  ultimate  facts  and  principles  which  cannot  be  referred 
to  anything  higher.  He  often  speaks  of  knowledge  as  resting  ultimately 
on  belief,  and  of  ultimate  principles  as  not  known,  but  believed  by  a  ne- 
cessity of  our  nature.  The  distinction  is  real,  but  the  employment  of  the 
words  knowledge  and  belief  to  express  it,  is  arbitrary  and  incongruous. 
To  say  that  we  believe  the  premises,  but  know  the  conclusion,  would  be 
understood  by  every  one  as  meaning  that  we  had  other  independent  evi- 
dence of  the  conclusion.  If  we  only  know  it  through  the  premises,  the 
same  name  ought  in  reason  to  be  given  to  our  assurance  of  both.  Accord- 
ingly Sir  \V.  Hamilton  himself  says,  in  one  of  the  Dissertations  on  Reid 
(p.  763),  that  "  the  principles  of  our  knowledge  must  be  themselves  knowl- 
edge." And  there  are  few  who  will  not  approve  this  use  of  language,  and 
condemn  the  other. 


THE  INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.          159 


CHAPTER  IX. 

OF   THE    INTERPRETATION    OF   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

£A£CORDING  to  all  philosophers,  the  evidence  of  Con- 
sciousness, if  only  we  can  obtain  it  pure,  is  conclusive.) 
This  is  an  obvious,  but  by  no  means  a  mere  identical 
proposition.  If  consciousness  be  defined  as  intuitive 
knowledge,  it  is  indeed  an  identical  proposition  to  say, 
that  if  we  intuitively  know  anything,  we  do  know  it, 
and  are  sure  of  it.  But  the  meaning  lies  in  the  implied 
assertion,  that  we  do  know  some  things  immediately,  or 
intuitively.  That  we  must  do  so  is  evident,  if  we  know 
anything  ;  for  what  we  know  mediately,  depends  for  its 
evidence  on  our  previous  knowledge  of  something  else  : 
unless,  therefore,  we  knew  something  immediately,  we 
could  not  know  anything  mediately,  and  consequently 
could  not  know  anything  at  all.  That  imaginary  be- 
ing, a  complete  Sceptic,  might  be  supposed  to  answer, 
that  perhaps  we  do  not  know  anything  at  all.  I  shall 
not  reply  to  this  problematical  antagonist  in  the  usual 
manner,  by  telling  him  that  if  he  does  not  know  anything, 
I  do.  I  put  to  him  the  simplest  case  conceivable  of  im- 
mediate knowledge,  and  ask,  if  we  ever  feel  anything? 
If  so,  then,  at  the  moment  of  feeling,  do  we  know  that 
we  feel?  Or  if  he  will  not  call  this  knowledge,  will  he 
deny  that  when  we  have  a  feeling,  we  have  at  least  some 
sort  of  assurance,  or  conviction,  of  having  it?  This 
assurance  or  conviction  is  what  other  people  mean  by 


160  THE  INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

knowledge.  If  he  dislikes  the  word,  I  am  willing  in 
discussing  with  him  to  employ  some  other.  By  what- 
ever name  this  assurance  is  called,  it  is  the  test  to  which 
we  bring  all  our  other  convictions.  He  may  say  it  is 
not  certain ;  but  such  as  it  may  be,  it  is  our  model  of 
certainty.  We  consider  all  our  other  assurances  and 
convictions  as  more  or  less  certain,  according  as  they 
approach  the  standard  of  this.  I  have  a  conviction  that 
there  are  icebergs  in  the  Arctic  seas.  I  have  not  had 
the  evidence  of  my  senses  for  it ;  I  never  saw  an  iceberg. 
Neither  do  I  intuitively  believe  it  by  a  law  of  my  mind. 
My  conviction  is  mediate,  grounded  on  testimony,  and 
on  inferences  from  physical  laws.  When  I  say  I  am 
convinced  of  it,  I  mean  that  the  evidence  is  equal  to 
that  of  my  senses.  I  am  as  certain  of  the  fact  as  if  I 
had  seen  it.  And,  on  a  more  complete  analysis,  when  I 
say  I  am  convinced  of  it,  what  I  am  convinced  of  is, 
that  if  I  were  in  the  Arctic  seas  I  should  see  it.  OVe 
mean  by  knowledge,  and  by  certainty,  an  assurance  sim- 
ilar and  equal  to  that  afforded  by  our  senses  :  if  the 
evidence  in  any  other  case  can  be  brought  up  to  this,  we 
desire  no  more.)  If  a  person  is  not  satisfied  with  this 
evidence,  it  is  no  concern  of  anybody  but  himself,  nor, 
practically,  of  himself,  since  it  is  admitted  that  this  evi- 
dence is  what  we  must,  and  may  with  full  confidence,  act 
upon.  Absolute  scepticism,  if  there  be  such  a  thing, 
maybe  dismissed  from  discussion,  as  raising  an  irrelevant 
issue,  for  in  denying  all  knowledge  it  denies  none.  The 
dogmatist  may  be  quite  satisfied  if  the  doctrine  he  main- 
tains can  be  attacked  by  no  arguments  but  those  which 
apply  to  the  evidence  of  the  senses.  If  his  evidence  is 
equal  to  that,  he  needs  no  more ;  nay,  it  is  philosophi- 


THE   INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  161 

cally  maintainable,  that  by  the  laws  of  psychology  we 
can  conceive  no  more,  and  that  this  is  the  certainty  which 
we  call  perfect. 

The  verdict,  then,  of  consciousness,  or,  in  other 
words,  our  immediate  and  intuitive  conviction,  is  ad- 
mitted, on  all  hands,  to  be  a  decision  without  appeal. 
The  next  question  is,  to  what  does  consciousness  bear 
witness?  And  here,  at  the  outset,  a  distinction  manifests 
itself,  which  is  laid  down  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  and 
stated  in  a  very  lucid  manner  in  the  first  volume  of  his 
Lectures.  I  give  it  in  his  own  words.* 

"A  fact  of  consciousness  is  that  whose  existence  is 
given  and  guaranteed  by  an  original  and  necessary  belief. 
But  there  is  an  important  distinction  to  be  here  made, 
which  has  not  only  been  overlooked  by  all  philosophers, 
but  has  led  some  of  the  most  distinguished  into  no  incon- 
siderable errors. 

"  The  facts  of  consciousness  are  to  be  considered  in 
two  points  of  view ;  either  as  evidencing  their  own  ideal 
or  phenomenal  existence,  or  as  evidencing  the  objective 
existence  of  something  else  beyond  them.  A  belief  in 
the  former  is  not  identical  with  a  belief  in  the  latter. 
The  one  cannot,  the  other  may  possibly,  be  refused.  In 
the  case  of  a  common  witness,  we  cannot  doubt  the  fact 
of  his  personal  reality,  nor  the  fact  of  his  testimony  as 
emitted, — but  we  can  always  doubt  the  truth  of  that 
which  his  testimony  avers.  So  it  is  with  consciousness. 
We  cannot  possibly  refuse  the  fact  of  its  evidence  as 
given,  but  we  may  hesitate  to  admit  that  beyond  itself 
of  which  it  assures  us.  I  shall  explain  by  taking  an 
example.  In  the  act  of  External  Perception,  conscious- 

*  Lectures,  i.  271-275. 


162  THE  INTERPRETATION   OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

ness  gives  as  a  conjunct  fact,  the  existence  of  Me  or  Self 
as  perceiving,  and  the  existence  of  something  different 
from  Me  or  Self  as  perceived.  Now,  the  reality  of  this, 
as  a  subjective  datum  —  as  an  ideal  phenomenon  —  it  is 
absolutely  impossible  to  doubt  without  doubting  the  ex- 
istence of  consciousness,  for  consciousness  is  itself  this 
fact ;  and  to  doubt  the  existence  of  consciousness  is  abso- 
lutely impossible ;  for  as  such  a  doubt  could  not  exist 
except  in  and  through  consciousness,  it  would  conse- 
quently annihilate  itself.  We  should  doubt  that  we 
doubted.  As  contained — as  given  —  in  an  act  of  con- 
sciousness, the  contrast  of  mind  knowing  and  matter 
known  cannot  be  denied. 

"  But  the  whole  phenomenon  as  given  in  consciousness 
maybe  admitted,  and  yet  its  inference  disputed.  It  may 
be  said,  consciousness  gives  the  mental  subject  as  per- 
ceiving an  external  object,  contradistinguished  from  it  as 
perceived :  all  this  we  do  not,  and  cannot,  deny.  But 
consciousness  is  only  a  phenomenon ;  —  the  contrast 
between  the  subject  and  object  may  be  only  apparent, 
not  real ;  the  object  given  as  an  external  reality,  may 
only  be  a  mental  representation  which  the  mind  is,  by  an 
unknown  law,  determined  unconsciously  to  produce,  and 
to  mistake  for  something  different  from  itself.  All  this 
may  be  said  and  believed,  without  self-contradiction,  — 
nay,  all  this  has,  by  the  immense  majority  of  modern 
philosophers,  been  actually  said  and  believed. 

"  In  like  manner,  in  an  act  of  Memory,  consciousness 
connects  a  present  existence  with  a  past.  I  cannot  deny 
the  actual  phenomenon,  because  my  denial  would  be 
suicidal ;  but  I  can  without  self-contradiction  assert  that 
consciousness  may  be  a  false  witness  in  regard  to  any 


THE  INTERPRETATION  OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  163 


former  existence ;  and  I  may  maintain,  if  I  please,  that 
the  memory  of  the  past,  in  consciousness,  is  nothing  but 
a  phenomenon,  which  has  no  reality  beyond  the  present. 
There  are  many  other  facts  of  consciousness  which  we 
cannot  but  admit  as  ideal  phenomena,  but  may  discredit 
as  guaranteeing  aught  beyond  their  phenomenal  exist- 
ence itself.  The  legality  of  this  doubt  I  do  not  at  pres- 
ent consider,  but  only  its  possibility ;  all  that  I  have 
now  in  view  being  to  show  that  we  must  not  confound, 
as  has  been  done,  the  double  import  of  the  facts,  and  the 
two  degrees  of  evidence  for  their  reality.  This  mistake 
has,  among  others,  been  made  by  Mr.  Stewart.  .  .  . 

"  With  all  the  respect  to  which  the  opinion  of  so  dis- 
tinguished a  philosopher  as  Mr.  Stewart  is  justly  entitled, 
I  must  be  permitted  to  say,  that  I  cannot  but  regard  his 
assertion  that  the  present  existence  of  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness  and  the  reality  of  that  to  which  these  phe- 
nomena bear  witness,  rest  on  a  foundation  equally  solid 
—  as  wholly  untenable.  The  second  fact,  the  fact  testi- 
fied to,  may  be  worthy  of  all  credit  —  as  I  agree  with 
Mr.  Stewart  in  thinking  that  it  is ;  but  still  it  does  not 
rest  on  a  foundation  equally  solid  as  the  fact  of  the  testi- 
mony itself.  Mr.  Stewart  confesses  that  of  the  former 
no  doubt  had  ever  been  suggested  by  the  boldest  sceptic  ; 
and  the  latter,  in  so  far  as  it  assures  us  of  our  having  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  external  world.  —  which  is 
the  case  alleged  by  Mr.  Stewart,  —  has  been  doubted, 
nay,  denied,  not  merely  by  sceptics,  but  by  modern  philos- 
ophers almost  to  a  man.  This  historical  circumstance, 
therefore,  of  itself,  would  create  a  strong  presumption, 
that  the  two  facts  must  stand  on  very  different  founda- 
tions ;  and  this  presumption  is  confirmed  when  we  inves- 
tigate what  these  foundations  themselves  are. 


104          THE  INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

"The  one  fact — the  fact  of  the  testimony — is  an  act 
of  consciousness  itself;  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  invali- 
dated without  self-contradiction.  For,  as  we  have  fre- 
quently observed,  to  doubt  of  the  reality  of  that  of  which 
we  are  conscious  is  impossible  ;  for  as  we  can  only  doubt 
through  consciousness,  to  doubt  of  consciousness  is  to 
doubt  of  consciousness  by  consciousness.  If,  on  the  one 
hand,  we  affirm  the  reality  of  the  doubt,  we  thereby 
explicitly  affirm  the  reality  of  consciousness,  and  contra- 
dict our  doubt;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we  deny  the 
reality  of  consciousness,  we  implicitly  deny  the  reality 
of  our  denial  itself.  Thus,  in  the  act  of  perception, 
consciousness  gives,  as  a  conjunct  fact,  an  ego  or  rnind, 
and  a  non-ego  or  matter,  known  together,  and  contra- 
distinguished from  each  other.  Now,  as  a  present  phae- 
nomenon,  this  double  fact  cannot  possibly  be  denied.  I 
cannot,  therefore,  refuse  the  fact  that,  in  perception,  I  am 
conscious  of  a  phenomenon  which  I  am  compelled  to 
regard  as  the  attribute  of  something  different  from  my 
mind  or  self.  This  I  must  perforce  admit,  or  run  into 
self-contradiction.  But  admitting  this,  may  I  not  still, 
without  self-contradiction,  maintain  that  what  I  am  com- 
pelled to  view  as  the  phenomenon  of  something  different 
from  me  is  nevertheless  (unknown  to  me)  only  a  modifi- 
cation of  my  mind  ?  In  this  I  admit  the  fact  of  the  tes- 
timony of  consciousness  as  given,  but  deny  the  truth  of 
its  report.  Whether  this  denial  of  the  truth  of  con- 
sciousness as  a  witness,  is  or  is  not  legitimate,  we  are 
not  at  this  moment  to  consider :  all  I  have  in  view  at 
present  is,  as  I  said,  to  show  that  we  must  distinguish  in 
consciousness  two  kinds  of  facts — the  fact  of  conscious- 
ness testifying,  and  the  fact  of  which  consciousness  testi- 


THE   INTERPRETATION   OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.  1G5 

fies ;  and  that  we  must  not,  as  Mr.  Stewart  has  done, 
hold  that  we  can  as  little  doubt  of  the  fact  of  the  exist- 
ence of  an  external  world,  as  of  the  fact  that  conscious- 
ness gives  in  mutual  contrast  the  phenomenon  of  self, 
in  contrast  to  the  phenomenon  of  not-self. 

He  adds,  that  since  no  doubt  has  been,  or  can  be, 
entertained  of  the  facts  given  in  the  act  of  consciousness 
itself,  "  it  is  only  the  authority  of  these  facts  as  evidence 
of  something  beyond  themselves,  —  that  is,  only  the 
second  class  of  facts,  —  which  become  matter  of  discus- 
sion ;  it  is  not  the  reality  of  consciousness  that  we  have 
to  prove,  but  its  veracity." 

By  the  conception  and  clear  exposition  of  this  dis- 
tinction, Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  contributed  materially  to 
make  the  issues  involved  in  the  great  question  in  hand 
more  intelligible  ;  and  the  passage  is  a  considerable  item 
for  the  appreciation  both  of  his  philosophy  and  of  his 
philosophical  powers.  It  is  one  of  the  proofs  that,  what- 
ever be  the  positive  value  of  his  achievements  in  meta- 
physics, he  had  a  greater  capacity  for  the  subject  than 
many  metaphysicians  of  high  reputation,  and  particu- 
larly than  his  two  distinguished  predecessors  in  the  same 
school  of  thought,  Reid  and  Stewart. 

There  are,  however,  some  points  in  this  long  extract 
which  are  open  to  criticism.  The  distinction  it  draws 
is,  in  the  main,  beyond  question,  just.  Among  the  facts 
which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  considers  as  revelations  of  con- 
sciousness, there  is  one  kind  which,  as  he  truly  says,  no 
one  does  or  can  doubt,  another  kind  which  they  can  and 
do.  The  facts  which  cannot  be  doubted  are  those  to 
which  the  word  consciousness  is  by  most  philosophers 
confined ;  the  facts  of  internal  consciousness  ;  w  the  mind's 


166  THE  INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

own  acts  and  affections."  What  we  feel,  we  cannot 
doubt  that  we  feel.  It  is  impossible  to  us  to  feel,  and 
to  think  that  perhaps  we  feel  not,  or  to  feel  not,  and 
think  that  perhaps  we  feel.  What  admits  of  being 
doubted,  is  the  revelation  which  consciousness  is  sup- 
posed to  make  (and  which  our  author  considers  as  itself 
consciousness)  of  an  external  reality.  But  according  to 
him,  though  we  may  doubt  this  external  reality,  we  are 
compelled  to  admit  that  consciousness  testifies  to  it. 
We  may  disbelieve  our  consciousness ;  but  we  cannot 
doubt  what  its  testimony  is.  This  assertion  cannot  be 
granted  in  the  same  unqualified  manner  as  the  others. 
It  is  true  that  I  cannot  doubt  my  present  impression ;  I 
cannot  doubt  that  when  I  perceive  color  or  weight,  I 
perceive  them  as  in  an  object.  Neither  can  I  doubt 
that  when  I  look  at  two  fields,  I  perceive  which  of  them 
is  the  farthest  off.  The  majority  of  philosophers,  how- 
ever, would  not  say  that  perception  of  distance  by  the 
eye  is  testified  by  consciousness ;  because,  although  we 
really  do  so  perceive  distance,  they  believe  it  to  be  an 
acquired  perception.  It  is  at  least  possible  to  think  that 
the  reference  of  our  sensible  impressions  to  an  external 
object  is,  in  like  manner,  acquired;  and  if  so,  though  a 
fact  of  our  consciousness  in  its  present  artificial  state,  it 
would  have  no  claim  to  the  title  of  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness generally,  not  having  been  in  consciousness  from 
the  beginning.  This  point  of  psychology  we  shall  have 
to  discuss  farther  on. 

Another  remark  needs  to  be  made.  All  the  world 
admits,  with  our  author,  that  it  is  impossible  to  doubt  a 
fact  of  internal  consciousness.  To  feel,  and  not  to  know 
that  we  feel,  is  an  impossibility.  But  Sir  W.  Hamilton 


THE   INTERPRETATION   OP   CONSCIOUSNESS.  167 

is  not  satisfied  to  let  this  truth  rest  on  its  own  evidence. 
He  wants  a  demonstration  of  it.  As  if  it  were  not  suf- 
ficiently proved  by  consciousness  itself,  he  attempts  to 
prove  it  by  a  reductio  ad  absurdum.  No  one,  he  says, 
can  doubt  consciousness,  because,  doubt  being  itself  con- 
sciousness, to  doubt  consciousness  would  be  to  doubt  that 
we  doubt.  He  sets  so  high  a  value  on  this  argument, 
that  he  is  continually  recurring  to  it  in  his  writings  ;  it 
actually  amounts  to  a  feature  of  his  philosophy.*  Yet 
it  seems  to  me  no  better  than  a  fallacy.  It  treats  doubt 
as  something  positive,  like  certainty,  forgetting  that  doubt 
is  uncertainty.  Doubt  is  not  a  state  of  consciousness,  but 
the  negation  of  a  state  of  consciousness.  Being  nothing 
positive,  but  simply  the  absence  of  a  belief,  it  seems  to 
be  the  one  intellectual  fact  which  may  be  true  without 
self-affirrnation  of  its  truth  ;  without  our  either  believing 
or  disbelieving  that  we  doubt.  If  doubt  is  any  thing 
other  than  merely  negative,  it  means  an  insufficient 
assurance ;  a  disposition  to  believe,  with  an  inability  to 
believe  confidently.  But  there  are  degrees  of  insuffi- 
ciency ;  and  if  we  suppose,  for  argument's  sake,  that  it 
is  possible  to  doubt  consciousness,  it  may  be  possible  to 

*  It  is  rather  more  speciously  put  in  a  foot-note  on  Reid  (p.  231) :  "  To 
doubt  that  we  are  conscious  of  this  or  that,  is  impossible.  For  the  doubt 
must  at  least  postulate  itself;  but  the  doubt  is  only  a  datum  of  conscious- 
ness ;  therefore  in  postulating  its  own  reality,  it  admits  the  truth  of  con- 
sciousness, and  consequently  annihilates  itself."  In  another  foot-note 
(p.  442)  he  says,  "  In  doubting  the  fact  of  his  consciousness,  the  sceptic 
must  at  least  affirm  the  fact  of  his  doubt ;  but  to  affirm  a  doubt  is  to  affirm 
the  consciousness  of  it ;  the  doubt  would,  therefore,  be  self-contradictory 
—  t.  e.,  annihilate  itself."  And  again  (Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  744) :  "  As 
doubt  is  itself  only  a  manifestation  of  consciousness,  it  is  impossible  to 
doubt  that  what  consciousness  manifests,  it  does  manifest,  without,  in 
thus  doubting,  doubting  that,  we  actually  doubt ;  that  is,  without  the  doubt 
contradicting  and  therefore  annihilating  itself." 


168  THE  INTERPRETATION   OP  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

doubt  different  facts  of  consciousness  in  different  degrees. 
The  general  uncertainty  of  consciousness  might  be  the 
one  fact  that  appeared  least  uncertain.  The  saying  of 
Socrates,  that  the  only  thing  he  knew  was  that  he  knew 
nothing,  expresses  a  conceivable  and  not  inconsistent 
state  of  mind.  The  only  thing  he  felt  perfectly  sure  of 
may  have  been  that  he  was  sure  of  nothing  else.  Omit- 
ting Socrates  (who  was  no  sceptic  as  to  the  reality  of 
knowledge,  but  only  as  to  its  having  yet  been  attained) , 
and  endeavoring  to  conceive  the  hazy  state  of  mind  of  a 
person  who  doubts  the  evidence  of  his  senses,  it  is  quite 
possible  to  suppose  him  doubting  even  whether  he  doubts. 
Most  people,  I  should  think,  must  have  found  themselves 
in  something  like  this  predicament  as  to  particular  facts, 
of  which  their  assurance  is  all  but  perfect ;  they  are  not 
quite  certain  that  they  are  uncertain.* 

But  though  our  author's  proof  of  the  position  is  as 
untenable  as  it  is  superfluous,  all  agree  with  him  in  the 
position  itself,  that  a  real  fact 'of  consciousness  cannot 
be  doubted  or  denied.  Let  us  now,  therefore,  return  to 
his  distinction  between  the  facts  "  given  in  the  act  of 

*  In  another  passage  of  our  author  (Lectures,  iv.  69),  the  same  argument 
reappears  in  different  words,  and  for  a  different  purpose.  He  is  speaking 
of  the  Criterion  of  Truth.  This  criterion,  he  says,  "  is  the  necessity  de- 
termined by  the  laws  which  govern  our  faculties  of  knowledge,  and  the 
consciousness  of  this  necessity  is  certainty.  That  the  necessity  of  a  cogni- 
tion, that  is,  the  impossibility  of  thinking  it  other  than  as  it  is  presented  — 
that  this  necessity,  as  founded  on  the  laws  of  thought,  is  the  criterion  of 
truth,  is  shown  by  the  circumstance  that  where  such  necessity  is  found,  nil 
doubt  in  regard  to  the  correspondence  of  the  cognitive  thought  and  its  ob- 
ject must  vanish  ;  for  to  doubt  whether  what  we  necessarily  think  in  a  cer- 
tain manner,  actually  exists  as  we  conceive  it,  is  nothing  less  than  an  en- 
deavor to  think  the  necessary  as  the  not  necessary  or  the  impossible, 
which  is  contradictory." 

It  is  very  curious  to  find  Sir  W.  Hamilton  maintaining  that  our  necessi- 
ties of  thought  are  proof  of  corresponding  realities  of  existence  —  that 


THE   INTERPRETATION   OP   CONSCIOUSNESS.  169 

consciousness,"  and  those  "to  the  reality  of  which  it 
only  bears  evidence."  These  last,  or,  in  other  words, 
"the  veracity  of  consciousness,"  Sir  W.  Hamilton  thinks 
it  possible  to  doubt  or  deny ;  he  even  says,  that  such 
facts,  more  or  fewer  in  number,  have  been  doubted  or 
denied  by  nearly  the  whole  body  of  modern  philosophers. 
But  this  is  a  statement  of  the  point  in  issue  between 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  and  modern  philosophers,  the  correct- 
ness of  which,  I  will  venture  to  affirm  that  very  few  if 
any  of  them  would  admit.  He  represents  "  nearly  the 
whole  body  of  modern  philosophers  "  as  in  the  peculiar 
and  paradoxical  position  of  believing  that  consciousness 
declares  to  them  and  to  all  mankind  the  truth  of  cer- 
tain facts,  and  then  of  disbelieving  those  facts.  That 
great  majority  of  philosophers  of  whom  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
speaks,  would,  I  apprehend,  altogether  deny  this  state- 
ment. They  never  dreamed  of  disputing  the  veracity 
of  consciousness.  They  denied  what  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
thinks  impossible  to  deny  —  the  fact  of  its  testimony. 
They  thought  it  did  not  testify  to  the  facts  to  which  he 
thinks  it  testifies .  Had  they  thought  as  he  does  respect- 
things  must  actually  be  so  and  so  because  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  think 
them  as  being  -otherwise ;  forgetful  of  the  whole  "  Philosophy  of  the  Con- 
ditioned," and  the  principle  so  often  asserted  by  him,  that  things  may,  nay, 
must,  be  true,  of  which  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  even  the  possi- 
bility. But  we  are  here  only  concerned  with  his  argument,  and  in  that  he 
forgets  that  to  doubt  is  not  a  positive  but  a  negative  fact.  It  simply  means, 
not  to  have  any  knowledge  or  assured  belief  on  the  subject.  Now,  how 
can  it  be  asserted  that  this  negative  state  of  mind  is  "  an  endeavor  to 
think  "  anything  ?  And  (even  if  it  were)  an  endeavor  to  think  a  contradic- 
tion is  not  a  contradiction.  An  endeavor  to  think  what  cannot  be 
thought,  far  from  being  impossible,  is  the  test  by  which  we  ascertain  its  un- 
thinkability.  The  failure  of  the  endeavor  in  the  case  supposed,  would  not 
prove  that  what  we  were  endeavoring  to  think  was  unreal,  but  only  that 
it  was  unthinkable  ;  which  was  already  assumed  in  the  hypothesis  :  and 
our  author  has  earned  us  round  a  long  circuit,  to  return  to  the  point  from 
which  we  set  out. 


170  THE   INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

ing  the  testimony,  they  would  have  thought  as  he  does 
respecting  the  facts.  As  it  is,  many  of  them  maintained 
that  consciousness  gives  no  testimony  to  anything  beyond 
itself;  that  whatever  knowledge  we  possess,  or  whatever 
belief  we  find  in  ourselves,  of  anything  but  the  feelings 
and  operations  of  our  own  minds,  has  been  acquired 
subsequently  to  the  first  beginnings  of  our  intellectual 
life,  and  was  not  witnessed  to  by  consciousness  when  it 
received  its  first  impressions.  Others,  again,  did  be- 
lieve in  a  testimony  of  consciousness,  but  not  in  the 
testimony  ascribed  to  it  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  Facts, 
to  which  in  his  opinion  it  testifies,  some  of  them  did  not 
believe  at  all ;  others  did  not  believe  them  to  be  known 
intuitively;  nay,  many  of  them  both  believed  the  facts, 
and  believed  that  they  were  known  intuitively,  and  if 
they  differed  from  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  differed  in  the 
merest  shadow  of  a  shade ;  yet  it  is  with  these  last,  as 
we  shall  see,  that  he  has  his  greatest  quarrel.  In  his 
contest,  therefore,  with  (as  he  says)  the  majority  of 
philosophers,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  addresses  his  arguments 
to  the  wrong  point.  He  thinks  it  needless  to  prove  that 
the  testimony  to  which  he  appeals,  is  really  given  by 
Consciousness,  for  that  he  regards  as  undenied  and  un- 
deniable :  but  he  is  incessantly  proving  to  us  that  we 
ought  to  believe  our  consciousness,  a  thing  which  few, 
if  any,  of  his  opponents  denied.  It  is  true  his  appeal 
is  always  to  the  same  argument,  but  that  he  is  never 
tired  of  reiterating.  It  is  stated  the  most  systematically 
in  the  first  Dissertation  on  Reid,  that  "on  the  Philosophy 
of  Common  Sense."  After  saying  that  there  are  certain 
primary  elements  of  cognition,  manifesting  themselves 
to  us  as  facts  of  which  consciousness  assures  us,  he 


THE   INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  171 

continues,*  "How,  it  is  asked,  do  these  primary  proposi- 
tions —  these  cognitions  at  first  hand — these  fundamental 
facts,  feelings,  beliefs,  certify  us  of  their  own  veracity? 
To  this  the  only  possible  answer  is,  that  as  elements  of 
our  mental  constitution  —  as  the  essential  conditions  of 
our  knowledge  —  they  must  by  us  be  accepted  as  true. 
To  suppose  their  falsehood,  is  to  suppose  that  we  are 
created  capable  of  intelligence,  in  order  to  be  made  the 
victims  of  delusion ;  that  God  is  a  deceiver,  and  the 
root  of  our  nature  a  lie  :  "  that  man  is  "  organized  f  for 
the  attainment,  and  actuated  by  the  love  of  truth,  only 
to  become  the  dupe  and  victim  of  a  perfidious  creator." 
It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  testimony  of  consciousness 
must  be  believed,  because  to  disbelieve  it,  would  be  to 
impute  mendacity  and  perfidy  to  the  Creator. 

But  there  is  a  preliminary  difficulty  to  be  here  re- 
solved, which  may  be  stated  without  irreverence.  If 
the  proof  of  the  trustworthiness  of  consciousness  is  the 
veracity  of  the  Creator,  on  what  does  the  Creator's 
veracity  itself  rest  ?  Is  it  not  on  the  evidence  of  con- 
sciousness ?  The  divine  veracity  can  only  be  known  in 
two  ways  :  1st,  by  intuition,  or  2dly,  through  evidence. 
If  it  is  known  by  intuition,  it  is  itself  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness, and  to  have  ground  for  believing  it,  we  must  assume 
that  consciousness  is  trustworthy.  Those  who  say  that 
we  have  a  direct  intuition  of  God,  are  only  saying  in 
other  words  that  consciousness  testifies  to  him.  If  wo 
hold,  on  the  contrary,  with  our  author,  that  God  is  not 
known  by  intuition,  but  proved  by  evidence,  that  evi- 
dence must  rest,  in  the  last  resort,  on  consciousness. 
All  proofs  of  religion,  natural  or  revealed,  must  be  de- 
rived either  from  the  testimony  of  the  senses,  or  from 
*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  743.  *  t  Ibid.  p.  725. 


172  THE  INTERPRETATION   OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

internal  feelings  of  the  mind,  or  from  reasonings  of 
which  one  or  other  of  these  sources  supplied  the  prem- 
ises. Religion,  thus  itself  resting  on  the  evidence  of 
consciousness,  cannot  be  invoked  to  prove  that  con- 
sciousness ought  to  be  believed.  We  must  already  trust 
our  consciousness,  before  we  can  have  any  evidence  of 
the  truth  of  religion. 

I  know  not  whether  it  is  from  an  obscure  sense  of  this 
objection  to  his  argument,  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  adopts 
what,  in  every  other  point  of  view,  is  a  very  extraordi- 
nary ^limitation  of  it.  After  representing  the  veracity 
of  the  Creator  as  staked  on  the  truth  of  the  testimony  of 
Consciousness,  he  is  content  to  claim  this  argument  as 
not  amounting  to  proof,  but  only  to  a  prima  facie  pre- 
sumption. "Such*  a  supposition"  as  that  of  a  perfidi- 
ous creator,  "if  gratuitous,  is  manifestly  illegitimate." 
"  The  data  of  our  original  consciousness  must,  it  is  evi- 
dent, in  the  first  instance"  (the  italics  are  the  author's), 
"  be  presumed  true.  It  is  only  if  proved  false,"  which 
can  only  be  by  showing  them  to  be  inconsistent  with  one 
another,  "  that  their  authority  can,  in  consequence  of 
that  proof,  be,  in  the  second  instance,  disallowed." 
"  Neganti  incumbit  probatio.  Nature  is  not  gratuitously 
to  be  assumed  to  work,  not  only  in  vain,  but  in  counter- 
action of  herself;  our  faculty  of  knowledge  is  not,  with- 
out a  ground,  to  be  supposed  an  instrument  of  illusion." 
It  is  making  a  very  humble  claim  for  the  veracity  of  the 
Creator,  that  it  should  be  held  valid  merely  as  a  pre- 
sumption, in  the  absence  of  contrary  evidence  ;  that  the 
Divine  Being,  like  a  prisoner  at  the  bar,  should  be  pre- 
sumed innocent  until  proved  guilty.  Far,  however,  from 
intending  this  remark  in  any  invidious  sense  against  Sir 
*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  pp.  743-745. 


THE   INTERPRETATION   OP   CONSCIOUSNESS.  173 

"VV.  Hamilton,  I  regard  it  as  one  of  his  titles  to  honor, 
that  he  has  not  been  afraid,  as  many  men  would  have 
been,  to  subject  a  proposition  surrounded  by  reverence  to 
the  same  logical  treatment  as  any  other  statement,  and 
has  not  felt  himself  obliged,  as  a  philosopher,  to  consider 
it  from  the  first  as  final.  My  complaint  is,  that  his  logic 
is  not  sufficiently  consistent.  The  divine  veracity  is 
entitled  either  to  more  or  to  less  weight  than  he  accords 
to  it.  He  is  bound  by  the  laws  of  correct  reasoning  to 
prove  his  premise  without  the  aid  of  the  conclusion  which 
he  means  to  draw  from  it.  If  he  can  do  this  —  if  the 
divine  veracity  is  certified  by  stronger  evidence  than  the 
testimony  of  consciousness,  it  may  be  appealed  to,  not 
merely  as  a  presumption,  but  as  a  proof.  If  not,  it  is 
entitled  to  no  place  in  the  discussion,  even  as  a  presump- 
tion. There  is  no  intermediate  position  for  it,  good 
enough  for  the  one  purpose,  but  not  good  enough  for  the 
other.  It  would  be  a  new  view  of  the  fallacy  of  petitio 
principii,  to  contend  that  a  conclusion  is  no  proof  of 
the  premises  from  which  it  is  deduced,  but  is  prima  facie 
evidence  of  them. 

Our  author,  however,  cannot  be  convicted  of  petitio 
principii.  Though  he  has  not  stated,  I  think  he  has 
enabled  us  to  see,  in  what  manner  he  avoided  it.  True, 
he  has  deduced  the  trustworthiness  of  consciousness  from 
the  veracity  of  the  Deity ;  and  the  veracity  of  the  Deity 
can  only  be  known  from  the  evidence  of  consciousness. 
But  he  may  fall  back  upon  the  distinction  between  facts 
given  in  consciousness  itself,  and  facts  "  to  the  reality  of 
which  it  only  bears  evidence."  It  is  for  the  trustworthi- 
ness of  these  last,  that  he  assigns  as  presumptive  evi- 
dence (which  the  absence  of  counter-evidence  raises  into 


174  THE   INTERPRETATION  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

proof)  the  divine  veracity.  That  veracity  itself,  he  may 
say,  is  proved  by  consciousness,  but  to  prove  it  requires 
only  the  other  class  of  facts  of  consciousness,  those  given 
in  the  act  of  consciousness  itself.  There  are  thus  two 
steps  in  the  argument.  "  The  pha^nomena  of  conscious- 
ness considered  merely  in  themselves,"  with  reference  to 
which  "scepticism  is  confessedly  impossible,"*  suffice 
(we  must  suppose  him  to  think)  for  proving  the  divine 
veracity ;  and  that  veracity,  being  proved,  is  in  its  turn 
a  reason  for  trusting  the  testimony  which  consciousness 
pronounces  to  facts  without  and  beyond  itself. 

Unless,  therefore,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  was  guilty  of  a 
paralogism,  by  adducing  religion  in  proof  of  what  is  ne- 
cessary to  the  proof  of  religion,  his  opinion  must  have 
been  that  our  knowledge  of  God  rests  upon  the  affirma- 
tion which  Consciousness  makes  of  itself,  and  not  of 
anything  beyond  itself;  that  the  divine  existence  and 
attributes  may  be  proved  without  assuming  that  con- 
sciousness testifies  to  anything  but  our  own  feelings  and 
mental  operations.  If  this  be  so,  we  have  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  authority  for  affirming,  that  even  the  most 
extreme  form  of  philosophical  scepticism,  the  Nihilism 
(as  our  author  calls  it)  of  Hume,  which  denies  the  ob- 
jective existence  of  both  Matter  and  Mind,  does  not 
touch  the  evidences  of  Natural  Religion.  And  it  really 
does  not  touch  any  evidences  but  such  as  religion  can 
well  spare.  But  what  a  mass  of  religious  prejudice  has 
been  directed  against  this  philosophical  doctrine,  on  the 
strength  of  what  we  have  now  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  au- 
thority for  treating  as  a  mere  apprehension  !  f 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  745. 

t  Accordingly  Sir  W.  Hamilton  says  elsewhere  (Appendix  to  Lectures, 


THE  INTERPRETATION  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS.          175 

Cut  something  more  is  necessary  to  render  the  divine 
veracity  available  in  support  of  the  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness, against  those,  if  such  there  be,  who  admit 
the  fact  of  the  testimony,  but  hesitate  to  admit  its  truth. 
The  divine  veracity  can  only  be  implicated  in  the  truth 
of  anything,  by  proving  that  the  Divine  Being  intended 
it  to  be  believed.  As  it  is  not  pretended  that  he  has 
made  any  revelation  in  the  matter,  his  intention  can  only 
be  inferred  from  the  fact :  and  our  author  draws  the  in- 
ference from  his  having  made  it  an  original  and  inde- 
structible part  of  our  nature  that  our  consciousness 
should  declare  to  us  certain  facts.  Now,  this  is  what  the 
philosophers  who  disbelieve  the  facts,  would  not,  any  of 
them,  admit.  Many  indeed  have  admitted  that  we  have 
a  natural  tendency  to  believe  something  which  they  con- 
sidered to  be  an  illusion  :  but  it  cannot  be  affirmed  that 
God  intended  us  to  do  whatever  we  have  a  natural  ten- 
dency to.  On  every  theory  of  the  divine  government, 
it  is  carried  on,  intellectually  as  well  as  morally,  not  by 
the  mere  indulgence  of  our  natural  tendencies,  but  by 
the  regulation  and  control  of  them.  One  philosopher, 
Hume,  has  said  t"hat  the  tendency  in  question  seems  to 
be  an  "  instinct,"  and  has  called  a  psychological  doctrine, 
which  he  regarded  as  groundless,  a  "  universal  and 
primary  opinion  of  all  men."  But  he  never  dreamed  of 
saying  that  we  are  compelled  by  our  nature  to  believe  it ; 
on  the  contrary,  he  says  that  this  illusive  opinion  "  is 

i.  394),  "  Religious  disbelief  and  philosophical  scepticism  are  not  merely 
not  the  same,  but  have  no  natural  connection."  I  regret  that  this  state- 
ment is  followed  by  a  declaration  that  the  former  "  must  ever  be  a  mat- 
ter" not  merely  "of  regret,"  but  of  "reprobation."  This  imputation  of 
moral  blame  to  an  opinion  sincerely  entertained  and  honestly  arrived  at, 
is  a  blot  which  one  would  willingly  not  have  found  in  a  thinker  of  so  much 
ability,  and  in  general  of  so  high  a  moral  tone. 


176  THE  INTERPRETATION   OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

soon  destroyed  by  the  slightest  philosophy."  Of  all 
eminent  thinkers,  the  one  who  comes  nearest  to  our 
author's  description  of  those  who  reject  the  testimony  of 
consciousness,  is  Kant.  That  philosopher  did  maintain 
than  there  is  an  illusion  inherent  in  our  constitution ; 
that  we  cannot  help  conceiving  as  belonging  to  Things 
themselves,  attributes  with  which  they  are  only  clothed 
by  the  laws  of  our  sensitive  and  intellectual  faculties. 
But  he  did  not  believe  in  a  mystification  practised  on  us 
by  the  Supreme  Being,  nor  would  he  have  admitted  that 
God  intended  us  permanently  to  mistake  the  conditions 
of  our  mental  conceptions  for  properties  of  the  things 
themselves.  If  God  has  provided  us  with  the  means  of 
correcting  an  error,  it  is  probable  that  he  does  not  intend 
us  to  be  misled  by  it :  and  in  matters  speculative  as  well 
as  practical,  it  surely  is  more  religious  to  see  the  pur- 
poses of  God  in  the  dictates  of  our  deliberate  reason, 
than  in  those  of  a  "  blind  and  powerful  instinct  of 
nature." 

As  regards  almost  all,  however,  if  not  all  philosophers, 
it  may  truly  be  said,  that  the  questions  which  have 
divided  them  have  never  turned  on  the  veracity  of  con- 
sciousness. Consciousness,  in  the  sense  usually  attached 
to  it  by  philosophers,  —  consciousness  of  the  mind's  own 
feelings  and  operations,  — cannot,  as  our  author  truly  says, 
be  disbelieved.  The  inward  fact,  the  feeling  in  our  own 
minds,  was  never  doubted,  since  to  do  so  would  be  to 
doubt  that  we  feel  what  we  feel.  What  our  author  calls 
the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  something  beyond  it- 
self, may  be,  and  is,  denied;  but  what  is  denied  has 
almost  always  been  that  consciousness  gives  the  testi- 
mony ;  not  that,  if  given,  it  must  be  believed. 


THE  INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  177 

At  first  sight  it  might  seem  as  if  there  could  not  pos- 
sibly be  any  doubt  whether  our  consciousness  does  or 
does  not  affirm  any  given  thing.  Nor  can  there,  if  con- 
sciousness means,  as  it  usually  does,  self-consciousness. 
If  consciousness  tells  me  that  I  have  a  certain  thought 

O 

or  sensation,  I  assuredly  have  that  thought  or  sensation. 
But  if  consciousness,  as  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  means  a 
power  which  can  tell  me  things  that  are  not  phenomena 
of  my  own  mind,  there  is  immediately  the  broadest 
divergence  of  opinion  as  to  what  are  the  things  which 
consciousness  testifies.  There  is  nothing  which  people 
do  not  think  and  say  that  they  know  by  consciousness, 
provided  they  do  not  remember  any  time  when  they  did 
not  know  or  believe  it,  and  are  not  aware  in  what  man- 
ner they  came  by  the  belief.  For  Consciousness,  in  this 
extended  sense,  is,  as  we  have  so  often  observed,  but  an- 
other word  for  Intuitive  knowledge  :  and  whatever  other 
things  we  may  know  in  that  manner,  we  certainly  do  not 
know  by  intuition  what  knowledge  is  intuitive.  It  is  a 
subject  on  which  both  the  vulgar  and  the  ablest  thinkers 
are  constantly  making  mistakes.  No  one  is  better  aware 
of  this  than  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  I  transcribe  a  few  of 
the  many  passages  in  which  he  has  acknowledged  it. 
"  Errors  "  *  may  arise  by  attributing  to  "  intelligence,  as 
necessary  and  original  data,  what  are  only  contingent 
generalizations  from  experience,  and  consequently  make 
no  part  of  its  complement  of  native  truths."  f  And 

*  Lectures,  iv.  137. 

t  There  are  writers  of  reputation  in  the  present  day,  who  maintain  in 
unqualified  terms,  that  we  know  by  intuition  the  impossibility  of  miracles. 
"  La  negation  du  miracle,"  says  M.  Nefftzer  (Revue  Germanique  for  Sep- 
tember, 1863,  p.  183),  "n'est  pas  subordonnee  a  1'experience  ;  elle  est  une 
necessite  logique  et  un  fait  de  certitude  interne  ;  elle  doit  etre  le  premier 
article  du  credo  de  tout  historien  et  de  tout  penseur." 


178  THE  INTERPRETATION  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

again  :*  "  Many  philosophers  have  attempted  to  establish 
on  the  principles  of  common  sense  propositions  which 
are  not  original  data  of  consciousness  ;  while  the  original 
data  of  consciousness,  from  which  their  propositions  were 
derived,  and  to  which  they  owed  their  whole  necessity 
and  truth  —  these  data  the  same  philosophers  were 
(strange  to  say)  not  disposed  to  admit."  It  fares  still 
worse  with  the  philosophers  chargeable  with  this  error, 
when  Sir  W.  Hamilton  comes  into  personal  controversy 
with  them.  M.  Cousin's  mode  of  proceeding,  for  ex- 
ample, he  characterizes  thus  :  f  "  Assertion  is  substituted 
for  proof;  facts  of  consciousness  are  alleged,  which  con- 
sciousness never  knew;  and  paradoxes,  that  baffle  argu- 
ment, are  promulgated  as  intuitive  truths,  above  the 
necessity  of  confirmation."  M.  Cousin's  particular  mis- 
interpretation of  consciousness  was,  as  we  saw,  that  of 
supposing  that  each  of  its  acts  testifies  to  three  things, 
of  which  three  Sir  W.  Hamilton  thinks  that  it  testifies 
only  to  one.  Besides  the  finite  element,  consisting  of  a 
Self  and  a  Not-self,  M.  Cousin  believes  that  there  are 
directly  revealed  in  Consciousness  an  Infinite  (God)  and 
a  relation  between  this  Infinite  and  the  Finite.  But  it  is 
not  only  M.  Cousin  who,  in  our  author's  opinion,  mis- 
takes the  testimony  of  consciousness.  He  brings  the 
same  charge  against  a  thinker  with  whom  he  agrees  much 
oftener  than  with  M.  Cousin —  against  Reid.  That  phi- 
losopher, as  we  have  seen,  is  of  opinion,  contrary  to  Sir 
W.  Hamilton,  that  we  have  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
things  past.  This  is  to  be  conscious  of  them  in  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  sense  of  the  word,  though  not  in  Eeid's. 
Finally,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  imputes  a  similar  error,  no 
longer  to  any  particular  metaphysician,  but  to  the  world 
*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  749.  f  Discussions,  p  25. 


THE  INTERPRETATION  OP   CONSCIOUSNESS.          179 

at  large.  He  says  that  we  do  not  see  the  sun,  but  only 
a  luminous  image,  in  immediate  contiguity  to  the  eye, 
and  that  no  two  persons  see  the  same  sun,  but  every 
person  a  different  one.  Now,  it  is  assuredly  the  universal 
belief  of  mankind  that  all  of  them  see  the  same  sun, 
and  that  this  is  the  very  sun  which  rises  and  sets,  and 
which  is  95  (or  according  to  more  recent  researches  92) 
millions  of  miles  distant  from  the  earth.  Nor  can  any 
of  the  appeals  of  Reid  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton  from  the 
sophistries  of  metaphysicians  to  Common  Sense  and  the 
universal  sentiment  of  mankind,  be  more  emphatic  than 
that  to  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  here  lays  himself  open 
from  Reid  and  from  the  non-metaphysical  world.* 

We  see,  therefore,  that  it  is  not  enough  to  say  that 
something  is  testified  by  Consciousness,  and  refer  all 
dissentients  to  Consciousness  to  prove  it.  Substitute  for 

*  Reid  himself  places  the  "natural  belief,"  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  re- 
jects, on  exactly  the  level  of  those  which  he  most  strenuously  maintains, 
saying  (Works,  Hamilton's  edition,  p.  284),  in  a  passage  which  our  author 
himself  quotes,  "  The  vulgar  are  firmly  persuaded  that  the  very  identical 
objects  which  they  perceive  continue  to  exist  when  they  do  not  perceive 
them  ;  and  are  no  less  firmly  persuaded  that  when  ten  men  look  at  the  sun 
or  the  moon,  they  all  see  the  same  individual  object."  And  Reid  avows 
that  he  agrees  with  the  vulgar  in  both  opinions.  But  Sir  \V.  Hamilton, 
while  he  upholds  the  former  of  these  as  one  to  deny  which  would  be  to 
declare  our  nature  a  lie,  thinks  that  nothing  can  be  more  absurd  than  the 
latter  of  them.  "  Nothing,"  he  says  (Lectures,  ii.  129),  "  can  be  conceived 
more  ridiculous  than  the  opinion  of  philosophers  in  regard  to  this.  For  ex- 
ample, it  has  been  curiously  held  (and  Reid  is  no  exception)  that  in  look- 
ing at  the  sun,  moon,  or  any  other  object  of  sight,  we  arc,  on  the  one  doc- 
trine, actually  conscious  of  these  distant  objects,  or,  on  the  other,  that 
these  distant  objects  are  those  really  represented  in  the  mind.  Nothing 
can  be  more  absurd :  we  perceive,  through  no  sense,  aught  external  but 
what  is  in  immediate  relation  and  in  immediate  contact  with  its  organ.  .  .  . 
Through  the  eye  we  perceive  nothing  but  the  rays  of  light  in  relation  to, 
and  in  contact  with,  the  retina." 

The  basis  of  the  whole  Ideal  System,  which  it  is  thought  to  be  the  great 
merit  of  Reid  to  have  exploded,  was  a  natural  prejudice,  supposed  to  be 
intuitively  evident,  namely,  that  that  which  knows,  must  be  of  a  similar 


180  THE  INTERPRETATION  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Consciousness  the  equivalent  phrase  (in  our  author's  ac- 
ceptation at  least)  Intuitive  Knowledge,  and  it  is  seen 
that  this  is  not  a  thing  which  can  be  proved  by  mere 
introspection  of  ourselves.  Introspection  can  show  us  a 
present  belief  or  conviction,  attended  with  a  greater  or 
a  less  difficulty  in  accommodating  the  thoughts  to  a 
different  view  of  the  subject :  but  that  this  belief,  or 
conviction,  or  knowledge,  if  we  call  it  so,  is  intuitive,  no 
mere  introspection  can  ever  show  ;  unless  we  are  at  lib- 
erty to  assume  that  every  mental  process  which  is  now 
as  unhesitating  and  as  rapid  as  intuition,  was  intuitive  at 
its  outset.  Reid,  in  his  commencements  at  least,  often 
expressed  himself  as  if  he  believed  this  to  be  the  case : 
Sir  W.  Hamilton,  wiser  than  Reid,  knew  better.  With 
him  (at  least  in  his  better  moments)  the  question,  what 
is  and  is  not  revealed  by  Consciousness,  is  a  question  for 

nature  with  that  which  is  known  by  it.  "  This  principle,"  says  our  author 
(foot-note  to  Reid,  p.  300),  "  has,  perhaps,  exerted  a  more  extensive  in- 
fluence on  speculation  than  any  other.  ...  It  would  be  easy  to  show  that 
the  belief,  explicit  or  implicit,  that  what  knows  and  what  is  immediately 
known  must  be  of  an  analogous  nature,  lies  at  the  root  of  almost  every 
theory  of  cognition,  from  the  very  earliest  to  the  very  latest  speculations. 
.  .  .  And  yet  it  has  not  been  proved,  and  is  incapable  of  proof,  —  nay,  is 
contradicted  by  the  evidence  of  consciousness  itself." 

But  though  Sir  W.  Hamilton  manifests  himself  thus  thoroughly  aware 
how  wide  the  differences  of  opinion  may  be  and  are  respecting  our  intui- 
tive perceptions,  I  by  no  means  intend  to  deny  that  he  on  certain  occa 
sions  affirms  the  contrary.  In  the  fourth  volume  of  the  Lectures  (p.  95), 
he  says,  "  I  have  here  limited  the  possibility  of  error  to  Probable  Reason- 
ing, for,  in  Intuition  and  Demonstration,  there  is  but  little  possibility  of 
important  error."  After  a  certain  amount  of  reading  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
one  is  used  to  these  contradictions.  "What  he  here  asserts  to  be  so  nearly 
impossible,  that  no  account  needs  to  be  taken  of  it  in  a  classification  of 
Error,  he  is  continually  fighting  against  in  detail,  and  imputing  to  nearly 
all  philosophers.  And  when  he  says  (Lectures,  i.  266)  that  the  "revela- 
tion "  of  consciousness  is  "  naturally  clear,"  and  only  mistaken  by  phi- 
losophers because  they  resort  to  it  solely  for  confirmation  of  their  own 
opinions,  he  is  merely  transporting  into  psychology  the  dogmatism  of  the- 
ologians. 


THE  INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.          181 

philosophers.  "  The  first  *  problem  of  philosophy  "  is 
"  to  seek  out,  purify,  and  establish,  by  intellectual  anal- 
ysis and  criticism,  the  elementary  feelings  or  beliefs,  in 
which  are  given  the  elementary  truths  of  which  all  are 
in  possession  : "  this  problem,  he  admits,  is  "  of  no  easy 
accomplishment ;  "  and  the  "  argument  from  common 
sense "  is  thus  "  manifestly  dependent  on  philosophy  as 
an  art,  as  an  acquired  dexterity,  and  cannot,  notwith- 
standing the  errors  which  they  have  so  frequently  com- 
mitted, be  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  philosophers. 
Common  Sense  is  like  Common  Law.  Each  may  be 
laid  down  as  the  general  rule  of  decision  ;  but  in  the  one 
case  it  must  be  left  to  the  jurist,  in  the  other  to  the  phi- 
losopher, to  ascertain  what  are  the  contents  of  the  rule ; 
and  though  in  both  instances  the  common  man  may  be 
cited  as  a  witness  for  the  custom  or  the  fact,  in  neither 
can  he  be  allowed  to  officiate  as  advocate  or  as  judge." 

So  far,  good.  But  now,  it  being  conceded  that  the 
question,  what  do  we  know  intuitively,  or,  in  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  phraseology,  what  does  our  consciousness 
testify,  is  not,  as  might  be  supposed,  a  matter  of  simple 
self-examination,  but  of  science,  it  has  still  to  be  deter- 
mined in  what  manner  science  should  set  about  it.  C^nd 
here  emerges  the  distinction  between  two  different  meth- 
ods of  studying  the  problems  of  metaphysics,  forming 
the  radical  difference  between  the  two  great  schools  into 
which  metaphysicians  are  fundamentally  divided. j  One 
of  these  I  shall  call,  for  distinction,  the  introspective 
method  ;  the  other,  the  psychological. 

The  elaborate  and  acute  criticism  on  the  philosophy 
of  Locke,  which  is  perhaps  the  most  striking  portion  of 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  752. 
8* 


182  THE   INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

M.  Cousin's  Lectures  on  the  History  of  Philosophy,  sets 
out  with  a  remark  which  sums  up  the  characteristics  of 
the  two  great  schools  of  mental  philosophy,  by  a  sum- 
mary description  of  their  methods.  M.  Cousin  observes, 
that  Locke  went  wrong  from  the  beginning  by  placing 
before  himself,  as  the  question  to  be  first  resolved,  the 
origin  of  our  ideas.  This  was  commencing  at  the 
wrong  end.  The  proper  course  would  have  been  to  be- 
gin by  determining  what  the  ideas  now  are  ;  to  ascertain 
what  it  is  that  consciousness  actually  tells  us,  postponing 
till  afterwards  the  attempt  to  frame  a  theory  concerning 
the  origin  of  any  of  the  mental  phenomena. 

I  accept  the  question  as  M.  Cousin  states  it,  and  I 
contend,  that  no  attempt  to  determine  what  are  the  direct 
revelations  of  consciousness,  can  be  successful,  or  en- 
titled to  any  regard,  unless  preceded  by  what  M.  Cousin 
says  ought  only  to  follow  it  —  an  inquiry  into  the  origin 
of  our  acquired  ideas,  (ffor  we  have  it  not  in  our  power 
to  ascertain  by  any  direct  process,  what  Consciousness 
told  us  at  the  time  when  its  revelations  were  in  their 
pristine  purity.  It  only  offers  itself  to  our  inspection 
as  it  exists  now,  when  those  original  revelations  are  over- 
laid and  buried  under  a  mountainous  heap  of  acquired 
notions  and  perceptions?) 

It  seems  to  M.  Cousin  that  if  we  examine,  with  care 
and  minuteness,  our  present  states  of  consciousness,  dis- 
tinguishing and  defining  every  ingredient  which  we  find 
to  enter  into  them  —  every  element  that  we  seem  to  recog- 
nize as  real,  and  cannot,  by  merely  concentrating  our 
attention  upon  it,  analyze  into  anything  simpler  —  we 
reach  the  ultimate  and  primary  truths,  which  are  the 
sources  of  all  our.  knowledge,  and  which  cannot  be 


THE  INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  183 

denied  or  doubted  without  denying  or  doubting  the  evi- 
dence of  consciousness  itself,  that  is,  the  only  evidence 
which  there  is  for  anything.  I  maintain  this  to  be  a 
misapprehension  of  the  conditions  imposed  on  inquirers 
by  the  difficulties  of  psychological  investigation.  To 
begin  the  inquiry  at  the  point  where  M.  Cousin  takes  it  up, 
is  in  fact  to  beg  the  question.  For  he  must  be  aware,  if 
not  of  the  fact,  at  least  of  the  belief  of  his  opponents, 
that  the  laws  of  the  mind  —  the  laws  of  association  ac- 
cording to  one  class  of  thinkers,  the  Categories  of  the 
Understanding  according  to  another — are  capable  of 
creating,  out  of  those  data  of  consciousness  which  are  un- 
contested,  purely  mental  conceptions,  which  become  so 
identified  in  thought  with  all  our  states  of  consciousness, 
that  we  seem,  and  cannot  but  seem,  to  receive  them  by 
direct  intuition  ;  and,  for  example,  the  belief  in  Matter,  in 
the  opinion  of  some  of  these  thinkers,  is,  or  at  least  may 
be,  thus  produced.  Idealists,  and  Sceptics,  contend  that 
the  belief  in  Matter  is  not  an  original  fact  of  consciousness, 
as  our  sensations  are,  and  is  therefore  wanting  in  the 
requisite  which,  in  M.  Cousin's  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
opinion,  gives  to  our  subjective  convictions  objective 
authority.  Now,  be  these  persons  right  or  wrong,  they 
cannot  be  refuted  in  the  mode  in  which  M.  Cousin  and 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  attempt  to  do  so — by  appealing  to 
Consciousness  itself.  For  we  have  no  means  of  interro- 
gating consciousness  in  the  only  circumstances  in  which 
it  is  possible  for  it  to  give  a  trustworthy  answer,  ^ould 
we  try  the  experiment  of  the  first  consciousness  in  any  in- 
fant —  its  first  reception  of  the  impressions  which  we  call 
external ;  whatever  was  present  in  that  first  conscious- 
ness would  be  the  genuine  testimony  of  Consciousness, 


184  THE  INTERPRETATION  OP   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

and  would  be  as  much  entitled  to  credit  —  indeed  there 
would  be  as  little  possibility  of  discrediting  it —  as  our 
sensations  themselves/)  But  we  have  no  means  of  now 
ascertaining,  by  direct  evidence,  whether  we  were  con- 
scious of  outward  and  extended  objects  when  we  first 
opened  our  eyes  to  the  light.  That  a  belief  or  knowl- 
edge of  such  objects  is  in  our  consciousness  now,  when- 
ever we  use  our  eyes  or  our  muscles,  is  no  reason  for 
concluding  that  it  was  there  from  the  beginning,  until 
we  have  settled  the  question  whether  it  could  possibly 
have  been  brought  in  since.  If  any  mode  can  be  point- 
ed out  in  which  within  the  compass  of  possibility  it  might 
have  been  brought  in,  the  hypothesis  must  be  examined 
and  disproved  before  we  are  entitled  to  conclude  that  the 
conviction  is  an  original  deliverance  of  consciousness. 
The  proof  that  any  of  the  alleged  Universal  Beliefs,  or 
Principles  of  Common  Sense,  are  affirmations  of  con- 
sciousness, supposes  two  things ;  that  the  beliefs  exist, 
and  that  they  cannot  possibly  have  been  acquired.  The 
first  is  in  most  cases  undisputed,  but  the  second  is  a  sub- 
ject of  inquiry  which  often  taxes  the  utmost  resources 
of  psychology.  Locke  was  therefore  right  in  believing 
that  "  the  origin  of  our  ideas  "  is  the  main  stress  of  the 
problem  of  mental  science,  and  the  subject  which  must 
be  first  considered  in  forming  the  theory  of  the  Mind. 
Being  unable  to  examine  the  actual  contents  of  our  con- 
sciousness until  our  earliest,  which  are  necessarily  our 
most  firmly  knit  associations,  those  which  are  most  inti- 
mately interwoven  with  the  original  data  of  conscious- 
ness, are  fully  formed,  we  cannot  study  the  original 
elements  of  mind  in  the  facts  of  our  present  conscious- 
ness. Those  original  elements  can  only  come  to  light, 


THE   INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS.  J85 

as  residual  phenomena,  by  a  previous  study  of  the  modes 
of  generation  of  the  mental  facts  which  are  confessedly 
not  original ;  a  study  sufficiently  thorough  to  enable  us 
to  apply  its  results  to  the  convictions,  beliefs,  or  sup- 
posed intuitions  which  seem  to  be  original,  and  to  deter- 
mine whether  some  of  them  may  not  have  been  generated 
in  the  same  modes,  so  early  as  to  have  become  inseparable 
from  our  consciousness  before  the  time  at  which  memory 
commences.  ^Fhis  mode  of  ascertaining  the  original 
elements  of  mind  I  call  the  psychological,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  simply  introspective  mode.  It  is  the 
known  and  approved  method  of  physical  science,  adapted 
to  the  necessities  of  psychology^ 

It  might  be  supposed  from  incidental  expressions  of 
Sir  W.  Hamilton,  that  he  was  alive  to  the  need  of  a 
methodical  scientific  investigation,  to  determine  what 
portion  of  our  "  natural  beliefs  "  are  really  original,  and 
what  are  inferences,  or  acquired  impressions,  mistakenly 
deemed  intuitive.*  To  the  declarations  already  quoted 
to  this  effect,  the  following  may  be  added.  Speaking  of 
Descartes'  plan,  of  commencing  philosophy  by  a  recon- 
sideration of  all  our  fundamental  opinions,  he  says, 
"  There  are  among  our  prejudices,  or  pretended  cogni- 
tions, a  great  many  hasty  conclusions,  the  investigation 
of  which  requires  much  profound  thought,  skill,  and 
acquired  knowledge.  ...  To  commence  philosophy  by 
such  a  review,  it  is  necessary  for  a  man  to  be  a  philoso- 
pher before  he  can  attempt  to  become  one.  And  he 
elsewhere  f  bestows  high  praise  upon  Aristotle  for  not 
falling  "into  the  error  of  many  modern  philosophers,  in 
confounding  the  natural  and  necessary  with  the  habitual 

*  Lectures,  iv.  92.  f  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  894. 


186  THE  INTERPRETATION   OF  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

and  acquired  connections  of  thought,"  nor  attempting 
"  to  evolve  the  conditions  under  which  we  think  from  the 
tendencies  generated  by  thinking  ; "  a  praise  which  can- 
not be  bestowed  on  our  author  himself.  But,  notwith- 
standing the  ample  concession  which  he  appeared  to  make 
when  he  admitted  that  the  problem  was  one  of  extreme 
difficulty,  essentially  scientific,  and  ought  to  be  reserved 
for  philosophers,  I  regret  to  say  that  he  as  completely 
sets  at  nought  the  only  possible  method  of  solving  it,  as 
M.  Cousin  himself.  He  even  expresses  his  contempt 
for  that  method.  Speaking  of  Extension,  he  says,* 
"  It  is  truly  an  idle  problem  to  attempt  imagining  the 
steps  by  which  we  may  be  supposed  to  have  acquired 
the  notion  of  Extension,  when,  in  fact,  we  are  unable 
to  imagine  to  ourselves  the  possibility  of  that  notion  not 
being  always  in  our  possession."  That  things  which  we 
"  are  unable  to  imagine  to  ourselves  the  possibility  of," 
may  be,  and  many  of  them  must  be,  true,  was  a  doctrine 
which  we  thought  we  had  learned  from  the  author  of  the 
Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned.  That  we  cannot  im- 
agine a  time  at  which  we  had  no  knowledge  of  Exten- 
sion, is  no  evidence  that  there  has  not  been  such  a  time. 
There  are  mental  laws,  recognized  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
himself,  which  would  inevitably  cause  such  a  state  of 
things  to  become  inconceivable  to  us,  even  if  it  once 
existed.  There  are  artificial  inconceivabilities  equal  in 
strength  to  any  natural.  Indeed  it  is  questionable  if 
there  are  any  natural  inconceivabilities,  or  if  anything 
is  inconceivable  to  us  for  any  other  reason  than  because 
Nature  does  not  afford  the  combinations  in  experience 
which  are  necessary  to  make  it* conceivable. 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  832. 


THE   INTERPRETATION   OP   CONSCIOUSNESS.  187 

(I  do  not  think  that  there  can  be  found,  in  all  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  writings,  a  single  instance  in  which,  before 
registering  a  belief  as  a  part  of  our  consciousness  from 
the  beginning,  he  thinks  it  necessary  to  ascertain  that  it 
could  not  have  grown  up  subsequently.  He  demands, 
indeed,*  "  that  no  fact  be  assumed  as  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness but  what  is  ultimate  and  simple."  But  to  pronounce 
it  ultimate,  the  only  condition  he  requires  is,  that  we  be 
not  able  to  "  reduce  it  to  a  generalization  from  experi- 
ence." This  condition  is  realized  by  its  possessing  the 
"  character  of  necessity."  "  It  must  be  impossible  not  to 
think  it.  In  fact,  by  its  necessity  alone  can  we  recognize 
it  as  an  original  datum  of  intelligence,  and  distinguish  it 
from  any  mere  result  of  generalization  and  custom."  In 
this  Sir  W.  Hamilton  is  at  one  with  the  whole  of  his 
own  section  of  the  philosophical  world ;  with  Reid,  with 
Stewart,  with  Cousin,  with  Whewell,  we  may  add,  with 
Kant,  and  even  with  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  The  test  by 
which  they  all  decide  a  belief  to  be  a  part  of  our  primitive 
consciousness  —  an  original  intuition  of  the  mind  —  is 
the  necessity  of  thinking  it.  (Their  proof  that  we  must 
always,  from  the  beginning,  have  had  the  belief,  is  the 
impossibility  of  getting  rid  of  it  no\^>  This  argument, 
applied  to  any  of  the  disputed  questions  of  philosophy, 
is  doubly  illegitimate ;  neither  the  major  nor  the  minor 
premise  is  admissible.  For,  in  the  first  place,  the  very 
fact  that  the  question  is  disputed,  disproves  the  alleged 
impossibility.  Those  against  whom  it  is  needful  to  de- 
fend the  belief  which  is  affirmed  to  be  necessary,  are  un- 
mistakable examples  that  it  is  not  necessary.  It  may 
be  a  necessary  belief  to  those  who  think  it  so  ;  they  may 

*  Lectures,  i.  268-270. 


188  THE  INTERPRETATION   OF   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

personally  be  quite  incapable  of  not  holding  it.  But  even 
if  this  incapability  extended  to  all  mankind,  it  might  be 
merely  the  effect  of  a  strong  association  ;  like  the  impos- 
sibility of  believing  Antipodes  ;  and  it  cannot  be  shown 
that  even  where  the  impossibility  is,  for  the  time,  real, 
it  might  not,  as  in  that  case,  be  overcome.  (The  history 
of  science  teems  with  inconceivabilities  which  have  been 
conquered,  and  supposed  necessary  truths  which  have 
first  ceased  to  be  thought  necessary,  then  to  be  thought 
true,  and  have  finally  come  to  be  deemed  impossible. 
These  philosophers,  therefore,  and  among  them  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  mistake  altogether  the  true  conditions  of 
psychological  investigation,  when,  instead  of  proving  a 
belief  to  be  an  original  fact  of  consciousness  by  showing 
that  it  could  not  have  been  acquired,  they  conclude  that 
it  was  not  acquired,  for  the  reason,  often  false,  and  never 
sufficiently  substantiated,  that  our  consciousness  cannot 
get  rid  of  it  now. 

Since,  then,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  not  only  neglects,  but 
repudiates,  the  only  scientific  mode  of  ascertaining  our 
original  beliefs,  what  does  he  mean  by  treating  the  ques- 
tion as  one  of  science,  and  in  what  manner  does  he  ap- 
ply science  to  it?  Theoretically,  he  claims  for  science 
an  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  the  whole  domain,  but 
practically  he  gives  it  nothing  to  do  except  to  settle  the 
relations  of  the  supposed  intuitive  beliefs  among  them- 
selves. It  is  the  province  of  science,  he  thinks,  to 
resolve  some  of  these  beliefs  into  others.  He  prescribes, 
as  the  rule  of  judgment,  what  he  calls  "  the  Law  of 
Parcimony."  No  greater  number  of  ultimate  beliefs  are 
to  be  postulated  than  is  strictly  indispensable.  Where 
one  such  belief  can  be  looked  upon  as  a  particular  case 


THE  INTERPRETATION   OF  CONSCIOUSNESS.          189 

of  another  —  the  belief  in  Matter,  for  instance,  of  the 
cognition  of  a  Non-ego  —  the  more  special  of  the  two 
necessities  of  thought  merges  in  the  more  general  one. 
This  identification  of  two  necessities  of  thought,  and 
subsumption  of  one  of  them  under  the  other,  he  is  not 
wrong  in  regarding  as  a  function  of  science.  He  affords 
an  example  of  it,  when,  in  a  manner  which  we  shall 
hereafter  characterize,  he  denies  to  Causation  the  charac- 
ter, which  philosophers  of  his  school  have  commonly  as- 
signed to  it,  of  an  ultimate  belief,  and  attempts  to  identify 
it  with  another  and  more  general  law  of  thought.  This 
limited  function  is  the  only  one  which,  it  seems  to  me,  is 
reserved  for  science  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  mode  of  study- 
ing the  primary  facts  of  consciousness.  In  the  mode  he 
practises  of  ascertaining  them  to  be  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, there  is  nothing  for  science  to  do.  For,  to  call 
them  so  because  in  his  opinion  he  himself,  and  those  who 
agree  with  him,  cannot  get  rid  of  the  belief  in  them, 
does  not  seem  exactly  a  scientific  process.  It  is,  how- 
ever, characteristic  of  what  I  have  called  the  introspec- 
tive, in  contradistinction  to  the  psychological,  method  of 
metaphysical  inquiry.  The  difference  between  these 
methods  will  now  be  exemplified  by  showing  them  at 
work  on  a  particular  question,  the  most  fundamental  one 
in  philosophy,  the  distinction  between  the  Ego  and  the 
Non-ego. 

We  shall  first  examine  what  Sir  W.  Hamilton  has 
done  by  his  method,  and  shall  afterwards  attempt  to  ex- 
emplify the  use  which  can  be  made  of  the  other. 


190    SIB  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OP  THEORIES 


CHAPTER  X. 
SIR  w.  HAMILTON'S  VIEW  or  THE  DIFFERENT  THEORIES 

RESPECTING  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD. 

SIR  W.  HAMILTON  brings  a  very  serious  charge 
against  the  great  majority  of  philosophers.  He  accuses 
them  of  playing  fast  and  loose  with  the  testimony  of 
consciousness ;  rejecting  it  when  it  is  inconvenient,  but 
appealing  to  it  as  conclusive  when  they  have  need  of  it 
to  establish  any  of  their  opinions.  "  No  *  philosopher 
has  ever  openly  thrown  off  allegiance  to  the  authority 
of  consciousness."  No  one  denies  "thatf  as  all  phi- 
losophy is  evolved  from  consciousness,  so,  on  the  truth 
of  consciousness,  the  possibility  of  all  philosophy  is  de- 
pendent." But  if  any  testimony  of  consciousness  be 
supposed  false,  "  the  J  truth  of  no  other  fact  of  con- 
sciousness can  be  maintained.  The  legal  brocard,  Falsus 
in  uno,  falsus  in  omnibus,  is  a  rule  not  more  applicable 
to  other  witnesses  than  to  consciousness.  Thus  every 
system  of  philosophy  which  implies  the  negation  of  any 
fact  of  consciousness  is  not  only  necessarily  unable, 
without  self-contradiction,  to  establish  its  own  truth  by 
any  appeal  to  consciousness ;  it  is  also  unable,  without 
self-contradiction,  to  appeal  to  consciousness  against  the 
falsehood  of  any  other  system.  If  the  absolute  and 
universal  veracity  of  consciousness  be  once  surrendered, 
every  system  is  equally  true,  or  rather  all  are  equally 

*  Lectures,  i.  377.  t  Ibid.  p.  285.  %  Ibid.  p.  283. 


ON   THE   BELIEF  IN   AN   EXTERNAL  WORLD.          191 

false ;  philosophy  is  impossible,  for  it  has  now  no  in- 
strument by  which  truth  can  be  discovered,  no  standard 
by  which  it  can  be  tried ;  the  root  of  our  nature  is  a 
lie.  But  though  it  is  thus  manifestly  the  common  inter- 
est of  every  scheme  of  philosophy  to  preserve  intact  the 
integrity  of  consciousness,  almost  every  scheme  of  phi- 
losophy is  only  another  mode  in  which  this  integrity  has 
been  violated.  If,  therefore,  I  am  able  to  prove  the  fact 
of  this  various  violation,  and  to  show  that  the  facts  of 
coDsciousness  have  never,  or  hardly  ever,  been  fairly 
evolved,  it  will  follow,  as  I  said,  that  no  reproach  can 
be  justly  addressed  to  consciousness  as  an  ill-informed, 
or  vacillating,  or  perfidious  witness,  but  to  those  only 
who  were  too  proud  or  too  negligent  to  accept  its  testi- 
mony, to  employ  its  materials,  and  obey  its  laws."  That 
nearly  all  philosophers  have  merited  this  imputation,  our 
author  endeavors  to  show  by  a  classified  enumeration  of 
the  various  theories  which  they  have  maintained  respect- 
ing the  perception  of  material  objects.  No  instance  can 
be  better  suited  for  trying  the  dispute.  The  question  of 
an  external  world  is  the  great  battle-ground  of  meta- 
physics, not  so  much  from  its  importance  in  itself,  as 
because,  while  it  relates  to  the  most  familiar  of  all  our 
mental  acts,  it  forcibly  illustrates  the  characteristic  dif- 
ferences between  the  two  metaphysical  methods. 

"  We  are  immediately  conscious  in  perception,"  says 
Sir  W.  Hamilton,*  "of  an  ego  and  a  non-ego,  known 
together,  and  known  in  contrast  to  each  other.  This  is 
the  fact  of  the  Duality  of  Consciousness.  It  is  clear 
and  manifest.  When  I  concentrate  my  attention  in  the 
simplest  act  of  perception,  I  return  from  my  observation 

*  Lectures,  i.  288-295. 


192    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

with  the  most  irresistible  conviction  of  two  facts,  or 
rather  two  branches  of  the  same  fact;  that  I  am,  and 
that  something  different  from  me  exists.  In  this  act  I 
am  conscious  of  myself  as  the  perceiving  subject,  and  of 
an  external  reality  as  the  object  perceived ;  and  I  am 
conscious  of  both  existences  in  the  same  indivisible 
moment  of  intuition.  The  knowledge  of  the  subject 
does  not  precede,  nor  follow,  the  knowledge  of  the  ob- 
ject; neither  determines,  neither  is  determined  by,  the 
other.  Such  is  the  fact  of  perception  revealed  in  con- 
sciousness, and  as  it  determines  mankind  in  general  in 
their  almost  equal  assurance  of  the  reality  of  an  external 
world,  as  of  the  existence  of  our  own  minds." 

"We  may,  therefore,  lay  it  down  as  an  undisputed 
truth,  that  consciousness  gives,  as  an  ultimate  fact,  a 
primitive  duality ;  a  knowledge  of  the  ego  in  relation 
and  contrast  to  the  non-ego ;  and  a  knowledge  of  the 
non-ego  in  relation  and  contrast  to  the  ego.  The  ego 
and  non-ego  are  thus  given  in  an  original  synthesis,  as 
conjoined  in  the  unity  of  knowledge,  and  in  an  original 
antithesis,  as  opposed  in  the  contrariety  of  existence. 
In  other  words,  we  are  conscious  of  them  in  an  indivis- 
ible act  of  knowledge  together  and  at  once,  but  we  are 
conscious  of  them  as,  in  themselves,  different  and  exclu- 
sive of  each  other. 

"  Again,  consciousness  not  only  gives  us  a  duality,  but 
it  gives  its  elements  in  equal  counterpoise  and  independ- 
ence. The  ego  and  non-ego  —  mind  and  matter  —  are 
not  only  given  together,  but  in  absolute  co-equality. 
The  one  does  not  precede,  the  other  does  not  follow ; 
and,  in  their  mutual  relation,  each  is  equally  dependent, 
equally  independent.  Such  is  the  fact  as  given  in  and 


ON   THE   BELIEF  IN   AN   EXTERNAL  WORLD.          193 

by  consciousness."  Or  rather  (he  should  have  said) 
such  is  the  answer  we  receive  when  we  examine  and  in- 
terrogate our  present  consciousness.  To  assert  more 
than  this,  merely  on  this  evidence,  is  to  beg  the  question 
instead  of  solving  it. 

"Philosophers  have  not,  however,  been  content  to 
accept  the  fact  in  its  integrity,  but  have  been  pleased  to 
accept  it  only  under  such  qualifications  as  it  suited  their 
systems  to  devise.  In  truth,  there  are  just  as  many 
different  philosophical  systems  originating  in  this  fact, 
as  it  admits  of  various  possible  modifications.  An  enu- 
meration of  these  modifications,  accordingly,  affords  an 
enumeration  of  philosophical  theories. 

"  In  the  first  place,  there  is  the  grand  division  of  phi- 
losophers into  those  who  do,  and  those  who  do  not,  accept 
the  fact  in  its  integrity.  Of  modern  philosophers, 
almost  all  are  comprehended  under  the  latter  category, 
while  of  the  former,  if  we  do  not  remount  to  the  school- 
men and  the  ancients,  I  am  only  aware  of  a  single  phi- 
losopher before  Reid,  who  did  not  reject,  at  least  in  part, 
the  fact  as  consciousness  affords  it. 

"  As  it  is  always  expedient  to  possess  a  precise  name 
for  a  precise  distinction,  I  would  be  inclined  to  denomi- 
nate those  who  implicitly  acquiesce  in  the  primitive 
duality  as  given  in  consciousness,  the  Natural  Eealists, 
or  Natural  Dualists,  and  their  doctrine,  Natural  Real- 
ism or  Natural  Dualism."  This  is,  of  course,  the 
author's  own  doctrine. 

"  In  the  second  place,  the  philosophers  who  do  not 
accept  the  fact,  and  the  whole  fact,  may  be  divided  and 
subdivided  into  various  classes  by  various  principles  of 
distribution. 


194    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

"  The  first  subdivision  will  be  taken  from  the  total,  or 
partial,  rejection  of  the  import  of  the  fact.  I  have 
previously  shown  that  to  deny  any  fact  of  conscious- 
ness as  an  actual  phenomenon  is  utterly  impossible." 
(But  it  is  very  far  from  impossible  to  believe  that  some- 
thing which  we  now  confound  with  consciousness,  may 
have  been  altogether  foreign  to  consciousness  in  its 
primitive  state.)  "But  though  necessarily  admitted  as 
a  present  phenomenon,  the  import  of  this  pha3nomenon 
—  all  beyond  our  actual  consciousness  of  its  existence  — 
may  be  denied.  We  are  able,  without  self-contradic- 
tion, to  suppose,  and  consequently  to  assert,  that  all  to 
which  the  phenomenon  of  which  we  are  conscious  refers, 
is  a  deception  "  (say  rather,  an  unwarranted  inference)  ; 
"  that,  for  example,  the  past,  to  which  an  act  of  memory 
refers,  is  only  an  illusion  involved  in  our  consciousness 
of  the  present,  —  that  the  unknown  subject  to  which 
..fery  phenomenon  of  which  we  are  conscious  involves  a 
.^ference,  has  no  reality  beyond  this  reference  itself, — 
,n  short,  that  all  our  knowledge  of  mind  or  matter  is 
only  a  consciousness  of  various  bundles  of  baseless 
appearances.  This  doctrine,  as  refusing  a  substantial 
reality  to  the  phenomenal  existence  of  which  we  are 
conscious,  is  called  Nihilism ;  and  consequently,  philos- 
ophers, as  they  affirm  or  deny  the  authority  of  conscious- 
ness in  guaranteeing  a  substratum  or  substance  to  the 
manifestation  of  the  ego  and  non-ego,  are  divided  into 
Realists  or  Substantialists,  and  into  Nihilists  or  Non- 
Substantialists.  Of  positive  or  dogmatic  Nihilism  there 
is  no  example  in  modern  philosophy.  .  .  .  But  as  a 
sceptical  conclusion  from  the  premises  of  previous  phi- 
losophers, we  have  an  illustrious  example  of  Nihilism  in 


ON   THE   BELIEF   IN   AN   EXTERNAL   WORLD.          195 

Hume  ;  and  the  celebrated  Fichte  admits  that  the  specu- 
lative principles  of  his  own  idealism  would,  unless  cor- 
rected by  his  practical,  terminate  in  this  result." 

The  Realists,  or  Substantialists,  those  who  do  believe 
in  a  substratum,  but  reject  the  testimony  of  consciousness 
to  an  immediate  cognizance  of  an  Ego  and  a  Non-ego, 
our  author  divides  into  two  classes,  according  as  they 
admit  the  real  existence  of  two  substrata,  or  only  of  one. 
These  last,  whom  he  denominates  Unitarians  or  Monists, 
either  acknowledge  the  ego  alone,  or  the  non-ego  alone, 
or  regard  the  two  as  identical.  Those  who  admit  the 
ego  alone,  looking  upon  the  non^ego  as  a  product  evolved 
from  it  (i.  e. ,  as  sometliing  purely  mental) ,  are  the  Ideal- 
ists. Those  who  admit  the  non-ego  alone,  and  regard 
the  ego  as  evolved  from  it  (i.  e.,  as  purely  material), 
are  the  Materialists.  The  third  class  acknowledge  the 
equipoise  of  the  two,  but  deny  their  antithesis,  main- 
taining "that  mind  and  matter  are  only  phaenomenal 
modifications  of  the  same  common  substance.  This  is 
the  doctrine  of  Absolute  Identity,  a  doctrine  of  which 
the  most  illustrious  representatives  among  recent  philos- 
ophers are  Schelling,  Hegel,  and  Cousin." ' 

There  remain  those  who  admit  the  coequal  reality  of 
the  Ego  and  the  Non-ego,  of  mind  and  matter,  and  also 
their  distinctness  from  one  another,  but  deny  that  they 
are  known  immediately.  These  are  Dualists,  but  "  aref 
distinguished  from  the  Natural  Dualists,  of  whom  we 
formerly  spoke,  in  this  —  that  the  latter  establish  the 
existence  of  the  two  worlds  of  mind  and  matter  on  the 
immediate  knowledge  we  possess  of  both  series  of  phe- 
nomena—  a  knowledge  of  which  consciousness  assures 

*  Lectures,  i.  296,  297.  t  Ibid.  295,  296. 


196    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OP  THEORIES 

us ;  whereas  the  former,  surrendering  the  veracity  of 
consciousness  to  our  immediate  knowledge  of  material 
phenomena,  and  consequently,  our  immediate  knowledge 
of  the  existence  of  matter,  still  endeavor,  by  various 
hypotheses  and  reasonings,  to  maintain  the  existence  of 
an  unknown  external  world.  As  we  denominate  those 
who  maintain  a  Dualism  as  involved  in  the  fact  of  con- 
sciousness, Natural  Dualists,  so  we  may  style  those 
dualists  who  deny  the  evidence  of  consciousness  to  our 
immediate  knowledge  of  aught  beyond  the  sphere  of 
mind,  Hypothetical  Dualists,  or  Cosmothetic  Idealists. 

"  To  the  class  of  Cosmothetic  Idealists,  the  great  ma- 
jority of  modern  philosophers  are  to  be  referred.  Deny- 
ing an  immediate  or  intuitive  knowledge  of  the  external 
reality,  whose  existence  they  maintain,  they,  of  course, 
hold  a  doctrine  of  mediate  or  representative  perception ; 
and,  according  to  the  various  modifications  of  that  doc- 
trine, they  are  again  subdivided  into  those  who  view,  in 
the  immediate  object  of  perception,  a  representative 
entity  present  to  the  mind,  but  not  a  mere  mental  modifi- 
cation, and  into  those  who  hold  that  the  immediate  object 
is  only  a  representative  modification  of  the  mind  itself. 
It  is  not  always  easy  to  determine  to  which  of  these 
classes  some  philosophers  belong.  To  the  former,  or 
class  holding  the  cruder  hypothesis  of  representation,  cer- 
tainly belong  the  followers  of  Democritus  and  Epicurus, 
those  Aristotelians  who  held  the  vulgar  doctrine  of 
species  (Aristotle  himself  was  probably  a  natural  dualist) , 
and  in  recent  times,  among  many  others,  Malebranche, 
Berkeley,  Clarke,  Newton,  Abraham  Tucker,  &c.  To 
these  is  also,  but  problematically,  to  be  referred,  Locke. 
To  the  second,  or  class  holding  the  finer  hypothesis  of 


ON   THE   BELIEF   IN   AN   EXTERNAL   WORLD.          197 

representation,  belong,  without  any  doubt,  many  of  the 
Platonists,  Leibnitz,  Arnauld,  Crousaz,  Condillac,  Kant, 
&c.,  and  to  this  class  is  also  probably  to  be  referred 
Descartes."  In  our  own  country  the  best  known,  and 
typical  specimen  of  this  mode  of  thinking,  is  Brown ; 
and  it  is  upon  him  that  our  author  discharges  most  of 
the  shafts  which  this  class  of  thinkers,  as  being  the  least 
distant  from  him  of  all  his  opponents,  copiously  receive 
from  him.* 

With  regard  to  the  various  opinions  thus  enumerated, 
I  shall  first  make  a  remark  of  general  application,  and 

*  In  one  of  the  Dissertations  on  Reid  (Dissertation  C.)  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
gives  a  much  more  elaborate,  and  more  minutely  discriminated  enumera- 
tion and  classification  of  the  opinions  which  have  been  or  might  be  held 
respecting  our  knowledge  of  mind  and  of  matter.  But  the  one  which  I 
have  quoted  from  the  Lectures  is  more  easily  followed,  and  sufficient  for 
all  the  purposes  for  which  I  have  occasion  to  advert  to  it.  I  shall  only  cite 
from  the  later  exposition  a  single  passage  (p.  817),  which  exhibits  in  a 
strong  light  the  sentiments  of  our  author  towards  philosophers  of  the  school 
of  Brown. 

"Natural  Realism  and  Absolute  Idealism  are  the  only  systems  worthy 
of  a  philosopher ;  for,  as  they  alone  have  any  foundation  in  consciousness, 
so  they  alone  have  any  consistency  in  themselves.  .  .  .  Both  build  upon 
the  same  fundamental  fact,  that  the  extended  object  immediately  perceived 
is  identical  with  the  extended  object  actually  existing;— for  the  truth  of 
this  fact,  both  can  appeal  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind ;  and  to  the 
common  sense  of  mankind  Berkeley  did  appeal  not  less  confidently,  and 
perhaps  more  logically  than  Reid.  .  .  .  The  scheme  of  Hypothetical  Real- 
ism or  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  which  supposes  that  behind  the  non-existent 
world  perceived,  lurks  a  correspondent  but  unknown  world  existing,  is 
not  only  repugnant  to  our  natural  beliefs,  but  in  manifold  contradiction 
with  itself.  The  scheme  of  Natural  Realism  may  be  ultimately  difficult  — 
for,  like  all  other  truths,  it  ends  in  the  inconceivable ;  but  Hypothetical 
Realism  —  in  its  origin  —  in  its  development  —  in  its  result,  although  the 
favorite  scheme  of  philosophers,  is  philosophically  absurd." 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  may  in  general  be  depended  on  for  giving  a  perfectly 
fair  statement  of  the  opinions  of  adversaries ;  but  in  this  case  his  almost 
passionate  contempt  for  the  later  forms  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism  has  misled 
him.  No  Cosmothetic  Idealist  would  accept  as  a  fair  statement  of  his 
opinion,  the  monstrous  proposition  that  a  "  non-existent  world  "  is  "  per- 
ceived." 

VOL.  i.  9 


198    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

shall  then  advert  particularly  to  the  objects  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  more  especial  animadversion,  the  Cosmothetic 
Idealists. 

Concerning  all  these  classes  of  thinkers,  except  the 
Natural  Realists,  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  statement  is,  that 
they  deny  some  part  of  the  testimony  of  consciousness, 
and  by  so  doing  invalidate  the  appeals  which  they  never- 
theless make  to  consciousness  as  a  voucher  for  their  own 
doctrines.  If  he  had  said  that  they  all  run  counter,  in 
some  particular,  to  the  general  sentiment  of  mankind  — 
that  they  all  deny  some  common  opinion,  some  natural 
belief  (meaning  by  natural  not  one  which  rests  on  a 
necessity  of  our  nature,  but  merely  one  which,  in  com- 
mon with  innumerable  varieties  of  false  opinion,  mankind 
have  a  strong  tendency  to  adopt)  ;  had  he  said  only  this, 
no  one  could  have  contested  its  truth  ;  but  it  would  not 
have  been  a  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  his  opponents. 
For  all  philosophers,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  as  much  as  the 
rest,  deny  some  common  opinions,  which  others  might 
call  natural  beliefs,  but  which  those  who  deny  them  con- 
sider, and  have  a  right  to  consider,  as  natural  prejudices  ; 
held,  nevertheless,  by  the  generality  of  mankind  in  the 
persuasion  of  their  being  self-evident,  or,  in  other  words, 
intuitive,  and  deliverances  of  consciousness.  Some  of 
the  points  on  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  is  at  issue  with 
natural  beliefs,  relate  to  the  very  subject  in  hand  —  the 
perception  of  external  things.  We  have  found  him 
maintaining  that  we  do  not  see  the  sun,  but  an  image  of 
it,  and  that  no  two  persons  see  the  same  sun ;  in  contra- 
diction to  as  clear  a  case  as  could  be  given  of  natural 
belief.  And  we  shall  find  him  affirming,  in  opposition 
to  an  equally  strong  natural  belief,  that  we  immediately 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.          199 

perceive  extension  only  in  our  own  organs,  and  not  in 
the  objects  we  see  or  touch.  Beliefs,  therefore,  which 
seem  among  the  most  natural  that  can  be  entertained, 
are  sometimes,  in  his  opinion,  delusive  ;  and  he  has  told 
us  that  to  discriminate  which  these  are,  is  not  within  the 
competence  of  everybody,  but  only  of  philosophers.  He 
would  say,  of  course,  that  the  beliefs  which  he  rejects 
were  not  in  our  consciousness  originally.  And  nearly 
all  his  opponents  say  the  same  thing  of  those  which  they 
reject.  Those,  indeed,  who,  like  Kant,  believe  that 
there  are  elements  present,  even  at  the  first  moment  of 
internal  consciousness,  which  do  not  exist  in  the  object, 
but  are  derived  from  the  mind's  own  laws,  are  fairly  open 
to  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  criticism.  It  is  not  my  business 
to  justify,  in  point  of  consistency  any  more  than  of  con- 
clusiveness,  the  strangely  sophistical  reasoning  by  which 
Kant,  after  getting  rid  of  the 'out  ward  reality  of  all  the 
attributes  of  Body,  persuades  himself  that  he  demon- 
strates the  externality  of  Body  itself.  *  But  as  regards  all 
existing  schools  of  thought  not  descended  from  Kant,  Sir 
W.  Hamilton's  accusation  is  without  ground. 

There  is  something  more  to  be  said  respecting  the 
mixed  multitude  of  metaphysicians  whom  our  author 
groups  together  under  the  title  of  Cosmothetic  Idealists, 
and  whose  mode  of  thought  he  judges  more  harshly  than 
that  of  any  other  school.  He  represents  them  as  hold- 
ing the  doctrine  that  we  perceive  external  objects,  not  by 
an  immediate,  but  by  a  mediate  or  representative  per- 

*  In  the  Lehrsatz  of  the  21st  Supplement  to  the  Kritik  der  Reinen  Ver- 
nnnft;  the  Lemma  at  p.  184  of  Mr.  Hay  wood's  Translation.  See,  also,  in 
Hnywood,  the  note  at  p.  xxxix.  of  the  Second  Preface ;  being  Supplement 
II.  in  Rosenkrauz  and  Schubert's  edition  of  the  collected  works,  vol.  ii., 
p.  G84. 


200    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

ception.  And  he  recognizes  three  divisions  of  them,* 
according  to  three  different  forms  in  which  this  hypothe- 
sis may  be  entertained.  The  supposed  representative 
object  may  be  regarded,  first,  as  not  a  state  of  mind, 
but  something  else  ;  either  external  to  the  mind,  like  the 
species  sensibiles  of  some  of  the  ancients,  and  the 
"  motions  of  the  brain  "  of  some  of  the  early  moderns  ; 
or  in  the  mind,  like  the  Ideas  of  Berkeley."""  Secondly, 
it  may  be  regarded  as  a  state  of  mind,  but  a  state  differ- 
ent from  the  mind's  act  in  perceiving  or  being  conscious 
of  it :  of  this  kind,  perhaps,  are  the  Ideas  of  Locke. 
Or,  thirdly,  as  a  state  of  mind  identical  with  the  act  by 
which  we  are  said  to  perceive  it.  This  last  is  the  form 
in  which,  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton  truly  says,f  the  doctrine 
was  held  by  Brown. 

Now,  the  first  two  of  these  three  opinions  may  fairly 
be  called  what  our  author  calls  them  —  theories  of  me- 
diate or  representative  perception.  The  object  which,  in 
these  theories,  the  mind  is  supposed  directly  to  perceive, 
is  a  tertium  quid,  which  by  the  one  theory  is,  and  by 
the  other  is  not,  a  state  or  modification  of  mind,  but  in 
both  is  distinct  equally  from  the  act  of  perception,  and 
from  the  external  object :  and  the  mind  is  cognizant  of 
the  external  object  vicariously,  through  this  third  thing, 
of  which  alone  it  has  immediate  cognizance  —  of  which 
alone,  therefore,  it  is,  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  sense  of  the 
word,  conscious.  Against  both  these  theories  Reid, 

'  O 

Stewart,  and  our  author,  are  completely  triumphant, 
and  I  am  in  no  way  interested  in  pressing  for  a  rehear- 
ing of  the  cause. 

But  the  third  opinion,  which  is  Brown's,  cannot,  with 

*  Discussions,  p.  57.  t  Ibid.  p.  58. 


ON   THE  BELIEF  IN   AN  EXTERNAL   WORLD.          201 

any  justness  of  thought  or  propriety  of  language,  be 
called  a  theory  of  mediate  or  representative  perception. 
Had  Sir  W.  Hamilton  taken  half  the  pains  to  under- 
stand Brown  which  he  took  to  understand  far  inferior 
thinkers,  he  never  would  have  described  Brown's  doc- 
trine in  terms  so  inappropriate. 

Representative  knowledge  is  always  understood  by  our 
author,  to  be  knowledge  of  a  thing  by  means  of  an  im- 
age of  it;  by  means  of  something  which  is  like  the 
thing  itself.  "  Representative  knowledge/'  he  says,  "is 
only  deserving  of  the  name  of  knowledge  in  so  far  as  it 
is  conformable  with  the  intuitions  which  it  represents."  * 
The  representation  must  stand  in  a  relation  to  what  it 
represents,  like  that  of  a  picture  to  its  original ;  as  the 
representation  in  memory  of  a  past  impression  of  sense, 
does  to  that  past  impression ;  as  a  representation  in  im- 
agination does  to  a  supposed  possible  presentation  of 
sense ;  and  as  the  Ideas  of  the  earlier  Cosmothetic  Ide- 
alists were  supposed  to  do  to  the  outward  objects  of 
which  they  were  the  image  or  impress.  But  the  Mental 
Modifications  of  Brown  and  those  who  think  with  him, 
are  not  supposed  to  bear  any  resemblance  to  the  objects 
which  excite  them.  These  objects  are  supposed  to  be 
unknown  to  us,  except  as  the  causes  of  the  mental  mod- 
ifications. The  only  relation  between  the  two  is  that 
of  cause  and  effect.  Brown,  being  free  from  the  vul- 
gar error  of  supposing  that  a  cause  must  be  like  its 
effect,  and  admitting  no  knowledge  of  the  cause  (beyond 
its  bare  existence)  except  the  effect  itself,  naturally  found 
nothing  in  it  which  it  was  possible  to  compare  with  the 
effect,  or  in  virtue  of  which  any  resemblance  could  be 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  811. 


202    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

affirmed  to  exist  between  the  two.  In  another  place,* 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  makes  an  ostensible  distinction  between 
the  fact  of  resembling,  and  that  of  truly  representing ', 
the  objects ;  but  defines  the  last  expression  to  mean,  af- 
fording us  "  such  a  knowledge  of  their  nature  as  we 
should  have  were  an  immediate  intuition  of  the  reality  in 
itself  competent  to  man."  No  one  who  is  at  all  ac- 
quainted with  Brown's  opinions  will  pretend  him  to  have 
maintained  that  we  have  anything  of  this  sort.  He  did 
not  believe  that  the  mental  modification  afforded  us  any 
knowledge  whatever  of  the  nature  of  the  external  object. 
There  is  no  need  to  quote  passages  in  proof  of  this ;  it 
is  a  fact  patent  to  whoever  reads  his  Lectures.  It  is  the 
more  strange  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  should  have  failed  to 
recognize  this  opinion  of  Brown,  because  it  is  exactly 
the  opinion  which  he  himself  holds  respecting  our  knowl- 
edge of  objects  in  respect  of  their  Secondary  Qualities. 
These,  he  says,  are  "  in  their  own  nature  occult  and  in- 
conceivable," and  are  known  only  in  their  effects  on  us, 
that  is,  by  the  mental  modifications  which  they  produce. f 
Further,  Brown's  is  not  only  not  a  theory  of  representa- 
tive perception,  but  it  is  not  even  a  theory  of  mediate 
perception.  He  assumes  no  tertium  quid,  no  object  of 
thought  intermediate  between  the  mind  and  the  outward 
object.  He  recognizes  only  the  perceptive  act,  which 
with  him  means,  and  is  always  declared  to  mean,  the 
mind  itself  perceiving.  It  will  hardly  be  pretended  that 
the  mind  itself  is  the  "  representative  object "  interposed 
by  him  between  itself  and  the  outward  thing  which  is 
acting  upon  it ;  and  if  it  is  not,  there  certainly  is  no 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  842. 

t  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  846 ;  and  the  fuller  explanation  at  pp.  854 
and  857. 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN   EXTERNAL  WORLD.          203 

other.  But  if  Brown's  theory  is  not  a  theory  of  mediate 
perception,  it  loses  all  that  essentially  distinguishes  it 
from  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  own  doctrine.  For  Brown  also 
thinks  that  we  have,  on  the  occasion  of  certain  sensations, 
an  instantaneous  and  irresistible  conviction  of  an  outward 
object.  And  if  this  conviction  is  immediate,  and  neces- 
sitated by  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  in  what  does 
it  differ  from  our  author's  direct  consciousness  ?  Con- 
sciousness, immediate  knowledge,  and  intuitive  knowl- 
edge, are,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  tells  us,  convertible  ex- 
pressions ;  and  if  it  be  granted  that  whenever  our  senses 
are  affected  by  a  material  object,  we  immediately  and 
intuitively  recognize  that  object  as  existing  and  distinct 
from  us,  it  requires  a  great  deal  of  ingenuity  to  make  out 
any  substantial  difference  between  this  immediate  intui- 
tion of  an  external  world  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  direct 
perception  of  it. 

The  distinction  which  our  author  makes,  resolves  itself, 
as  explained  by  him,  into  the  difference  of  which  he  has 
said  so  much,  but  of  which  he  seemed  to  have  so  con- 
fused an  idea,  between  Belief  and  Knowledge.  In 
Brown's  opinion,  and  I  will  add,  in  Reid's,  the  mental 
modification  which  we  experience  from  the  presence  of 
an  object,  raises  in  us  an  irresistible  belief  that  the  ob- 
ject exists.  No,  says  Sir  W.  Hamilton  :  it  is  not  a 
belief,  but  a  knowledge :  we  have  indeed  a  belief,  and 
our  knowledge  is  certified  by  the  belief;  but  this  belief 
of  ours  regarding  the  object  is  a  belief  that  we  know  it. 
"In  perception,*  consciousness  gives,  as  an  ultimate 
fact,  a  belief  of  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  some- 
thing different  from  self  .  As  ultimate,  this  belief  can- 

*  Discussions,  p.  89. 


204    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

not  be  reduced  to  a  higher  principle ;  neither  can  it  be 
truly  analyzed  into  a  double  element.  We  only  believe 
that  this  something  exists,  because  we  believe  that  we 
know  (are  conscious  of)  this  something  as  existing ;  the 
belief  of  the  existence  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  be- 
lief of  the  knowledge  of  the  existence.  Both  are  ori- 
ginal, or  neither.  Does  consciousness  deceive  us  in  the 
latter,  it  necessarily  deludes  us  in  the  former ;  and  if 
the  former,  though  a  fact  of  consciousness,  is  false,  the 
latter,  because  a  fact  of  consciousness,  is  not  true.  The 
beliefs  contained  in  the  two  propositions, 

"1°.  I  believe  that  a  material  world  exists  ; 

"2°.  I  believe  that  I  immediately  know  a  material 
world  existing  (in  other  words,  I  believe  that 
the  external  reality  itself  is  the  object  of  which 
I  am  conscious  in  perception) , 

though  distinguished  by  philosophers,  are  thus  virtually 
identical.  The  belief  of  an  external  world  was  too  pow- 
erful, not  to  compel  an  acquiescence  in  its  truth.  But 
the  philosophers  yielded  to  nature  only  in  so  far  as  to 
coincide  in  the  dominant  result.  They  falsely  discrimi- 
nated the  belief  in  the  existence,  from  the  belief  in  the 
knowledge.  With  a  few  exceptions,  they  held  fast  by 
the  truth  of  the  first ;  but  they  concurred,  with  singular 
unanimity,  in  abjuring  the  second." 

Accordingly,  Brown  is  rebuked  because,  while  reject- 
ing our  natural  belief  that  we  know  the  external  object, 
he  yet  accepts  our  natural  belief  that  it  exists  as  a  suffi- 
cient warrant  for  its  existence.  But  what  real  distinction 
is  there  between  Brown's  intuitive  belief  of  the  existence 
of  the  object,  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  intuitive  knowledge 
of  it?  Just  three  pages  previous,*  Sir  W.  Hamilton  had 

*  Discussions,  p.  86. 


ON  THE   BELIEF  IN   AN   EXTERNAL   WORLD.          205 

said,  "  Our  knowledge  rests  ultimately  on  certain  facts 
of  consciousness,  which,  as  primitive,  and  consequently 
incomprehensible,  are  given  less  in  the  form  of  cognitions 
than  of  beliefs."  The  consciousness  of  an  external 
world  is,  on  his  own  showing,  primitive  and  incompre- 
hensible ;  it  therefore  is  less  a  cognition  than  a  belief. 
But  if  we  do  not  so  much  know  as  believe  an  external 
world,  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  we  believe  that  we 
know  it?  Either  we  do  not  know,  but  only  believe  it,  — 
and  if  so,  Brown  and  the  other  philosophers  assailed  were 
right, —  or  knowledge  and  belief,  in  the  case  of  ultimate 
facts,  are  identical ;  and  then,  believing  that  we  know  is 
only  believing  that  we  believe,  which,  according  to  our 
author's  and  to  all  rational  principles,  is  but  another 
word  for  simple  believing. 

It  would  not  be  fair,  however,  to  hold  our  author  to 
his  own  confused  use  of  the  terms  Belief  and  Knowledge. 
He  never  succeeds  in  making  anything  like  an  intelligible 
distinction  between  these  two  notions  considered  gener- 
ally, but  in  particular  cases  we  may  be  able  to  find  some- 
thing which  he  is  attempting  to  express  by  them.  In 
the  present  case  his  meaning  seems  to  be,  that  Brown's 
Belief  in  an  external  object,  though  instantaneous  and 
irresistible,  was  supposed  to  be  suggested  to  the  mind  by 
its  own  sensation  ;  while  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  Knowledge 
of  the  object  is  supposed  to  arise  along  with  the  sensa- 
tion, and  to  be  co-ordinate  with  it.  And  this  is  what 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  means  by  calling  Brown's  a  mediate, 
his  own  an  immediate  cognition  of  the  object ;  the  real 
difference  being  that,  on  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  theory,  the 
cognition  of  the  ego  or  its  modification,  and  that  of  the 
non-ego,  are  simultaneous,  while  on  Brown's  the  one 


immediately  precedes  the  other.  Our  author  expresses 
this  meaning,  though  much  less  clearly,  when  he  declares* 
Brown's  theory  to  be  "that  in  perception,  the  external 
reality  is  not  the  immediate  object  of  consciousness,  but 
that  the  ego  is  only  determined  in  some  unknown  man- 
ner to  represent  the  non-ego,  which  representation, 
though  only  a  modification  of  mind  or  self,  we  are  com- 
pelled, by  an  illusion  of  our  nature,  to  mistake  for  a 
modification  of  matter,  or  non-self."  This  being  our 
author's  conception  of  the  doctrine  which  he  has  to 
refute,  let  us  see  in  what  manner  he  proceeds  to  refute  it. 
"You  will  remark,"  he  says,f  "that  Brown  (and 
Brown  only  speaks  the  language  of  all  the  philosophers 
who  do  not  allow  the  mind  a  consciousness  of  aught 
beyond  its  own  states)  misstates  the  phenomenon  when 
he  asserts  that,  in  perception,  there  is  a  reference  from 
the  internal  to  the  external,  from  the  known  to  the  un- 
known. That  this  is  not  the  fact,  our  observation  of  the 
phenomenon  will  at  once  convince  you.  In  an  act  of 
perception,  I  am  conscious  of  something  as  self,  and 
of  something  as  not  self:  this  is  the  simple  fact.  The 
philosophers,  on  the  contrary,  who  will  not  accept  this 
fact,  misstate  it.  They  say  that  we  are  conscious  of 
nothing  but  a  certain  modification  of  mind ;  but  this 
modification  involves  a  reference  to  —  in  other  words,  a 
representation  of —  something  external  as  its  object. 
Now  this  is  untrue.  We  are  conscious  of  no  reference, 
of  no  representation  :  we  believe  that  the  object  of  which 
we  are  conscious  is  the  object  which  exists."  To  this 
argument  (of  the  worth  of  which  something  has  been 
said  already)  I  shall  return  presently.  But  he  subjoins 
a  second. 

*  Lectures,  ii.  86.  t  Ibid.  ii.  106. 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN   AN  EXTERNAL   WORLD.          207 

"  Nor  could  there  possibly  be  such  reference  or  repre- 
sentation ;  for  reference  or  representation  supposes  a 
knowledge  already  possessed  of  the  object  referred  to  or 
represented ;  but  perception  is  the  faculty  by  which  our 
first  knowledge  is  acquired,  and  therefore  cannot  suppose 
a  previous  knowledge  as  its  condition."  And  further 
on  :  *  "  Mark  the  vice  of  the  procedure.  We  can  only, 
1°,  assert  the  existence  of  an  external  world,  inasmuch 
as  we  know  it  to  exist ;  and  we  can  only,  2°,  assert  that 
one  thing  is  representative  of  another,  inasmuch  as  the 
thing  represented  is  known,  independently  of  the  repre- 
sentation. But  how  does  the  hypothesis  of  a  represen- 
tative perception  proceed  ?  It  actually  converts  the  fact 
into  an  hypothesis  ;  actually  converts  the  hypothesis  into 
a  fact.  On  this  theory,  we  do  not  know  the  existence 
of  an  external  world,  except  on  the  supposition  that  that 
which  we  do  know,  truly  represents  it  as  existing.  The 
hypothetical  realist  cannot,  therefore,  establish  the  fact 
of  the  external  world,  except  upon  the  fact  of  its  repre- 
sentation. This  is  manifest.  We  have,  therefore,  next 
to  ask  him,  how  he  knows  the  fact,  that  the  external 
world  is  actually  represented.  A  representation  sup- 
poses something  represented,  and  the  representation  of 
the  external  world  supposes  the  existence  of  that  world. 
Now,  the  hypothetical  realist,  when  asked  how  he  proves 
the  reality  of  the  outer  world,  which,  ex  hypothesi,  he 
does  not  know,  can  only  say  that  he  infers  its  existence 
from  the  fact  of  its  representation.  But  the  fact  of  the 
representation  of  an  external  world  supposes  the  exist- 
ence of  that  world ;  therefore  he  is  again  at  the  point 
from  which  he  started.  He  has  been  arguing  in  a  circle." 

*  Lectures,  ii.  138, 139. 


208    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

Let  me  first  remark  that  this  reasoning  assumes  the 
whole  point  in  dispute  ;  it  presupposes  that  the  supposi- 
tion which  it  is  brought  to  disprove  is  impossible.  The 
theory  of  the  third  form  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism  is, 
that  though  we  are  conscious  only  of  the  sensations 
which  an  object  gives  us,  we  are  determined  by  a  neces- 
sity of  our  nature,  which  some  call  an  instinct,  others  an 
intuition,  others  a  fundamental  law  of  belief,  to  ascribe 
these  sensations  to  something  external,  as  their  substra- 
tum, or  as  their  cause.  There  is  surely  nothing  d  priori 
impossible  in  this  supposition.  The  supposed  instinct  or 
intuition  seems  to  be  of  the  same  family  with  many  other 
Laws  of  Thought,  or  Natural  Beliefs,  which  our  author 
not  only  admits  without  scruple,  but  enjoins  obedience 
to,  under  the  usual  sanction,  that  otherwise  our  intelli- 
gence must  be  a  lie.  In  the  present  case,  however,  he, 
without  the  smallest  warrant,  excludes  this  from  the  list 
of  possible  hypotheses.  He  says  that  we  cannot  infer  a 
reality  from  a  mental  representation,  unless  we  already 
know  the  reality  independently  of  the  mental  representa- 
tion. Now,  he  could  hardly  help  being  aware  that  this  is 
the  very  matter  in  dispute.  Those  who  hold  the  opinion 
he  argues  against,  do  not  admit  the  premise  upon  which 
he  argues.  They  say,  that  we  may  be,  and  are,  necessi- 
tated to  infer  a  cause,  of  which  we  know  nothing  what- 
ever except  its  effect.  And  why  not?  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
thinks  us  entitled  to  infer  a  substance  from  attributes, 
though  he  allows  that  we  know  nothing  of  the  substance 
except  its  attributes. 

But  this  is  not  the  worst,  and  there  are  few  speci- 
mens of  our  author  in  which  his  deficiencies  as  a  phi- 
losopher stand  out  in  a  stronger  light.  As  Burke  in 


ON   THE   BELIEF  IN   AN   EXTERNAL   WORLD.          209 

politics,  so  Sir  W.  Hamilton  in  metaphysics,  was  too 
often  a  polemic  rather  than  a  connected  thinker :  the 
generalizations  of  both,  often  extremely  valuable,  seem 
less  the  matured  convictions  of  a  scientific  mind,  than 
weapons  snatched  up  for  the  service  of  a  particular 
quarrel.  (If  Sir  W.  Hamilton  can  only  seize  upon  some- 
thing which  will  strike  a  hard  blow  at  an  opponent, 
he  seldom  troubles  himself  how  much  of  his '  own  edifice 
may  be  knocked  down  by  the  shock*  Had  he  examined 
the  argument  he  here  uses,  sufficiently  to  determine 
whether  he  could  stand  by  it  as  a  deliberate  opinion,  he 
would  have  perceived  that  it  committed  him  to  the  doc- 
trine that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  representative  knowl- 
edge. But  it  is  one  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  most  positive 
tenets  that  there  is  representative  knowledge,  and  that 
Memory,  among  other  things,  is  an  example  of  it.  Let 
us  turn  back  to  his  discussion  of  that  subject,  and  see 
what  he,  at  that  time,  considered  representative  knowl- 
edge to  be. 

"Every  act,*  and  consequently  every  act  of  knowl- 
edge, exists  only  as  it  now  exists ;  and  as  it  exists  only 
in  the  Now,  it  can  be  cognizant  only  of  a  now-existent 
object.  But  the  object  known  in  memory  is,  ex  hypothesi, 
past ;  consequently,  we  are  reduced  to  the  dilemma, 
either  of  refusing  a  past  object  to  be  known  in  memory 
at  all,  or  of  admitting  it  to  be  only  mediately  known,  in 
and  through  a  present  object.  That  the  latter  alternative 
is  the  true  one,  it  will  require  a  very  few  explanatory 
words  to  convince  you.  What  are  the  contents  of  an 
act  of  memory  ?  An  act  of  memory  is  merely  a  present 
state  of  mind  which  we  are  conscious  of  not  as  abso- 

*  Lectures,  i.  219,  220. 


210    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

lute,  but  as  relative  to,  and  representing,  another  state 
of  mind,  and  accompanied  with  the,  belief  that  the 
state  of  mind,  as  now  represented,  has  actually  been. 
I  remember  an  event  I  saw  —  the  landing  of  George  IV . 
at  Leith.  This  remembrance  is  only  a  consciousness  of 
certain  imaginations,  involving  the  conviction  that 
these  imaginations  now  represent  ideally  what  I  for- 
merly really  experienced.  All  that  is  immediately 
known  in  the  act  of  memory,  is  the  present  mental  mod- 
ification, that  is,  the  representation  and  concomitant 
belief.-  Beyond  this  mental  modification  we  know 
nothing ;  and  this  mental  modification  is  not  only  known 
to  consciousness,  but  only  exists  in  and  by  consciousness. 
Of  any  past  object,  real  or  ideal,  the  mind  knows  and 
can  know  nothing,  for,  ex  hypothesi,  no  such  object 
now  exists ;  or  if  it  be  said  to  know  such  an  object,  it 
can  only  be  said  to  know  it  mediately,  as  represented 
in  the  present  mental  modification.  Properly  speak- 
ing, however,  we  know  only  the  actual  and  present,  and 
all  real  knowledge  is  an  immediate  knowledge.  What 
is  said  to  be  mediately  known,  is,  in  truth,  not  known  to 
be,  but  only  believed  to  be ;  for  its  existence  is  only  an 
inference  resting  on  the  belief,  that  the  mental  mod- 
ification truly  represents  what  is  in  itself  beyond  the 
sphere  of  knowledge." 

Had  Sir  W.  Hamilton  totally  forgotten  all  this,  when 
a  few  lectures  afterwards,  having  then  in  front  of  him  a 
set  of  antagonists  who  needed  the  theory  here  laid  down, 
he  repudiated  it  —  denying  altogether  the  possibility  of 
the  mental  state  so  truly  and  clearly  expressed  in  this 
passage,  and  affirming  that  we  cannot  possibly  recognize 
a  mental  modification  to  be  representative  of  something 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN   AN   EXTERNAL  WORLD.          211 

else,  unless  we  have  a  present  knowledge  of  that  some- 
thing else,  otherwise  obtained?  With  merely  the  altera- 
tion of  putting  instead  of  a  past  state  of  mind,  a  present 
external  object,  the  Cosmothetic  Idealists  might  borrow 
his  language  down  to  the  minutest  detail.  They,  too, 
believe  that  the  mental  modification  is  a  present  state  of 
mind,  which  we  are  conscious  of,  not  as  absolute,  but  as 
relative  to,  and  representing,  "an  external  object,  and 
accompanied  with  the  belief  that "  "  the  object,  as  now 
represented,  actually  "  is  :  that  we  know  something  (viz. , 
matter)  only  "  as  represented  in  the  present  mental 
modification,"  and  that  "  its  existence  is  only  an  infer- 
ence, resting  on  the  belief  that  the  mental  modification 
truly  represents  what  is  in  itself  beyond  the  sphere  of 
knowledge."  They  do  not,  strictly  speaking,  require 
quite  so  much  as  this:  for  the  word  "represents,"  es- 
pecially with  "  truly  "  joined  to  it,  suggests  the  idea  of  a 
resemblance,  such  as  does,  in  reality,  exist  between  the 
picture  of  a  fact  in  memory,  and  the  present  impression 
to  which  it  corresponds  :  but  the  Cosmothetic  Idealists 
only  maintain  that  the  mental  modification  arises  from 
something,  and  that  the  reality  of  this  unknown  some- 
thing is  testified  by  a  natural  belief.  That  they  apply 
to  one  case  the  same  theory  which  our  author  applies  to 
another,  does  not,  of  course,  prove  them  to  be  right; 
but  it  proves  the  suicidal  character  (to  use  one  of  his 
favorite  expressions)  of  our  author's  argument,  when  he 
scouts  the  supposition  of  an  instinctive  inference  from  a 
known  effect  to  an  unknown  cause,  as  an  hypothesis 
which  can  in  no  possible  case  be  legitimate ;  forgetful 
that  its  legitimacy  is  required  by  his  own  psychology, 
one  of  the  leading  doctrines  of  which  is  entirely  grounded 
on  it. 


212 


It  is  not  only  in  treating  of  Memory,  that  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  requires  a  process  of  thought  precisely  similar 
to  that  which,  when  employed  by  opponents,  he  declares 
to  be  radically  illegitimate.  I  have  already  mentioned 
that  in  his  opinion  our  perceptions  of  sight  are  not  per- 
ceptions of  the  outward  object,  but  of  its  image,  a  "  mod- 
ification of  light  in  immediate  relation  to  our  organ  of 
vision,"  and  that  no  two  persons  see  the  same  sun  ;  prop- 
ositions in  direct  conflict  with  the  "  natural  beliefs  "  to 
which  he  so  often  refers,  and  to  which  Eeid,  not  without 
reason,  appeals  in  this  instance ;  for  assuredly  people  in 
general  are  as  firmly  convinced  that  what  they  see  is  the 
real  sun,  as  that  what  they  touch  is  the  real  table.  Let 
us  hear  Sir  W.  Hamilton  once  more  on  this  subject. 
Cjt,  is  *  not  by  perception,  but  by  a  process  of  reason- 
ing, that  we  connect  the  objects  of  sense  with  existences 
beyond  the  sphere  of  immediate  knowledge.  It  is  enough 
that  perception  affords  us  the  knowledge  of  the  non-ego 
at  the  point  of  sense.  To  arrogate  to  it  the  power  of 
immediately  informing  us  of  external  things,  which  are 
only  the  causes  of  the  object  we  immediately  perceive, 
is  either  positively  erroneous,  or  a  confusion  of  language 
arising  from  an  inadequate  discrimination  of  the  phe- 
nomenon-",-*  Here  is  a  case  in  which  we  know  something 
to  be  a  representation,  though,  in  our  author's  opinion, 
that  which  it  represents  not  only  is  not,  at  the  present 
time,  known  to  us,  but  never  was,  and  never  will  be  so. 
The  Cosmothetic  Idealists  desire  only  the  same  liberty 
which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  here  exercises,  of  concluding 
from  a  phenomenon  directly  known,  to  something  un- 
known which  is  the  cause  of  the  phenomenon.  They 

*  Lectures,  ii.  153,  154. 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN   EXTERNAL  WORLD.          213 

postulate  the  possibility  that  what  our  author  holds  to  be 
true  of  the  non-ego  at  a  distance,  may  be  true  of  the 
non-ego  at  the  point  of  sense,  namely,  that  it  is  not 
known  immediately,  but  as  a  necessary  inference  from 
what  is  known.  To  shut  the  door  upon  this  supposition 
as  inherently  inadmissible,  and  make  an  exactly  similar 
one  ourselves  as  often  as  our  system  requires  it,  does  not 
befit  a  philosopher,  or  a  critic  of  philosophers.* 

*  Some  of  the  inconsistencies  here  pointed  out  in  Sir  ~VV.  Hamilton's 
speculations  respecting  Perception  have  been  noticed  and  ably  discussed 
by  Mr.  Bailey,  in  the  fourth  letter  of  the  Second  Series  of  his  Letters  on 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind. 

In  treating  of  Modified  Logic  (Lectures,  iv.  67,  68),  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
justifies,  after  his  own  manner,  the  assumption  made  alike  by  himself  and 
by  the  Cosmothctic  Idealists  ;  and  the  grounds  of  justification  are  as  avail- 
able to  them  as  to  him.  "  Real  truth  is  the  correspondence  of  our  thoughts 
with  the  existences  which  constitute  their  objects.  But  here  a  difficulty 
arises :  how  can  we  know  that  there  is,  that  there  can  be,  such  a  corre- 
spondence ?  All  that  we  know  of  the  objects  is  through  the  presentations 
of  our  faculties ;  but  whether  these  present  the  objects  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  we  can  never  ascertain,  for  to  do  this  it  would  be  requisite  to 
go  out  of  ourselves,  —  out  of  our  faculties,  —  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the 
objects  by  other  faculties,  and  thus  to  compare  our  old  presentations  with 
our  new."  The  very  difficulty  which  we  have  seen  him  throwing  in  the 
teeth  of  the  Cosmothetic  Idealists.  "  But  all  this,  even  were  the  supposi- 
tion possible,  would  be  incompetent  to  afford  us  the  certainty  required. 
For  were  it  possible  to  leave  our  old,  and  to  obtain  a  new,  set  of  faculties, 
by  which  to  test  the  old,  still  the  veracity  of  these  new  faculties  would  be 
equally  ol>noxious  to  doubt  as  the  veracity  of  the  old.  For  what  guar- 
antee could  we  obtain  for  the  credibility  in  the  one  case,  which  we  do  not 
already  possess  in  the  other  ?  The  new  faculties  could  only  assert  their  own 
truth  ;  but  this  is  done  by  the  old  ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  any  pres- 
entations of  the  non-ego  by  any  finite  intelligence  to  which  a  doubt  might 
not  be  raised,  whether  these  presentations  were  not  merely  subjective 
modifications  of  the  conscious  ego  itself."  It  is  a  very  laudable  practice  in 
philosophizing  to  state  the  difficulties  strongly.  But  when  the  difficulty  is 
one  which  in  any  case  has  to  be  surmounted,  we  should  allow  others  to 
surmount  it  in  the  same  mode  which  we  adopt  for  ourselves.  This  mode, 
in  the  present  case,  is  our  author's  usual  one :  "  All  that  could  be  said 
in  answer  to  such  a  doubt,  is  that  if  such  were  true,  our  whole  nature  is  a 
lie ; "  in  other  words,  our  nature  prompts  us  to  believe  that  the  modifica- 
tion of  the  conscious  ego,  points  to,  and  results  from,  a  non-ego  with  cor- 


214    SIB  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OP  THEORIES 

In  the  controversy  with  Brown,  which  forms  the  sec- 
ond paper  in  the  "  Discussions,"  and  much  of  which  was 
transcribed  from  our  author's  Lectures,  the  argument 
which  I  have  now  examined  does  not  reappear.  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  perhaps,  had  meanwhile  become  aware  of  its 
inconsistency  with  his  own  principles.  In  the  room  of 
it,  we  have  the  following  argument.*  If  Brown  is  right, 
"the  mind  either  knows  the  reality  of  what  it  represents, 
or  it  does  not."  The  first  supposition  is  dismissed  for 
the  absurdities  it  involves,  and  because  it  is  inconsistent 
with  Brown's  doctrine.  But  if  the  mind  does  not  know 
the  reality  of  what  it  represents,  the  "  alternative  remains, 
that  the  mind  is  blindly  determined  to  represent,  and 
truly  to  represent,  the  reality  which  it  does  not  know." 
And  if  so,  the  mind  "  either  blindly  determines  itself," 
or  "  is  blindly  determined "  by  a  supernatural  power. 
The  latter  supposition  he  rejects  because  it  involves  a 
standing  miracle,  the  former  as  "utterly  irrational,  inas- 
much as  it  would  explain  an  effect,  by  a  cause  wholly 
inadequate  to  its  production.  On  this  alternative, 
knowledge  is  supposed  to  be  the  effect  of  ignorance  — 
intelligence  of  stupidity  —  life  of  death."  All  this  ar- 
tillery is  directed  against  the  simple  supposition  that  by 
a  law  of  our  nature,  a  modification  of  our  own  minds 
may  assure  us  of  the  existence  of  an  unknown  cause. 
The  author's  persistent  ignorance  of  Brown's  opinion  is 
truly  surprising.  Brown  knows  nothing  of  the  mental 
modification  as  truly  representing  the  unknown  reality ; 
he  claims  no  knowledge  as  arising  out  of  ignorance,  no 

responding  properties.    The  Cosmothetic  Idealists  do  but  say  the  same 
thing :  and  they  have  as  good  a  right  to  say  it  as  our  author. 
*  Discussions,  p.  67. 


ON  THE   BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL   WOULD.          215 

intelligence  growing  out  of  stupidity.  He  claims  only  an 
instinctive  belief  implanted  by  nature  ;  and  the  menacing 
alternative,  that  the  mind  must  either  determine  itself  to 
this  belief,  or  be  determined  to  it  by  a  special  interference 
of  Providence,  could  be  applied  with  exactly  as  much 
justice  to  the  earth's  motion.  But  though  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton's weapon  falls  harmless  upon  Brown,  it  recoils  with 
terrible  effect  upon  his  own  theories  of  representative 
cognition.  A  remembrance,  for  example,  does  repre- 
sent, and  truly  represent,  the  past  fact  remembered ;  and 
we  do,  through  that  representation,  mediately  know  the 
past  fact,  which  in  any  other  sense  of  the  word,  accord- 
ing to  our  author,  we  do  not  know.  Although,  there- 
fore, the  conclusion  "  that  the  mind  is  blindly  determined 
to  represent,  and  truly  to  represent,  the  reality  which 
it  does  not  know,"  is  not  obligatory  upon  Brown,  it  is 
upon  Sir  W.  Hamilton.  On  his  own  showing,  he  has 
to  choose  between  the  absurdity  that  the  mind  "  blindly 
determines  itself,"  and  the  perpetual  miracle  of  its  being 
determined  by  divine  interference.  This  is  one  of  the 
weakest  exhibitions  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  that  I  have  met 
with  in  his  writings.  For  the  difficulty  by  which  he 
thought  to  overwhelm  Brown,  and  which  does  not  touch 
Brown,  but  falls  back  upon  himself,  is  no  difficulty  at  all, 
but  the  merest  moonshine.  (The  transcendent  absurdity, 
as  he  considers  it,  that  the  mind  should  be  blindly  de- 
termined to  represent,  and  truly  to  represent,  the  reality 
winch  "  it  does  not  know,"  instead  of  an  absurdity,  is  the 
exact  expression  of  a  fact.  It  is  a  literal  description  of 
what  takes  place  in  an  act  of  memory.  As  often  as  we 
recollect  a  past  event,  and  on  the  faith  of  that  recollec- 
tion, believe  or  know  that  the  event  really  happened,  the 


216    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

mind,  by  its  constitution,  is  "blindly  determined  to  rep- 
resent, and  truly  to  represent,"  a  fact  which,  except  as 
witnessed  by  that  representation,  "it  does  not  know."  ' 

It  may  generally,  I  think,  be  observed  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  that  his  most  recherche  arguments  are  his 
weakest :  they  certainly  are  so  in  the  present  case.  It 
would  have  been  wiser  in  him  to  have  been  contented 
with  his  first  and  simpler  argument,  that  Brown's  doc- 
trine conflicts  with  consciousness,  inasmuch  as  "  we  are 
conscious  of  no  reference,  of  no  representation  : "  or,  to 
speak  more  clearly,  we  are  not  aware  that  the  existence 
of  an  external  reality  is  suggested  to  us  by  our  sensa- 
tions. We  seern  to  become  aware  of  both  at  once. 

The  fact  is  as  alleged,  but  it  proves  nothing,  being 
consistent  with  Brown's  doctrine.  Whether  the  belief 
in  a  non-ego  arose  in  our  first  act  of  perception,  simul- 
taneously with  the  sensation,  or  not  until  suggested  by 
the  sensation,  we  have,  as  I  before  remarked,  no  means 
of  directly  ascertaining.  As  far  as  depends  on  direct 
evidence,  the  subject  is  inscrutable.  But  this  we  may 
know,  that  even  if  the  suggestion  theory  were  true,  the 
belief  suggested  would  by  the  laws  of  association  become 
so  intimately  blended  with  the  sensations  suggesting  it, 

*  Our  belief  in  the  veracity  of  Memory  is  evidently  ultimate  :  no  reason 
can  be  given  for  it  which  does  not  presuppose  the  belief,  and  assume  it  to  be 
well  grounded.  This  point  is  forcibly  urged  in  the  Philosophical  Intro- 
duction to  Mr.  Ward's  able  work,  "  On  Nature  and  Grace ; "  a  book  the 
readers  of  which  are  likely  to  be  limited  by  its  being  addressed  specially 
to  Catholics,  but  showing  a  capacity  in  the  writer  which  might  otherwise 
have  made  him  one  of  the  most  effective  champions  of  the  Intuitive  school. 
Though  I  do  not  believe  morality  to  be  intuitive  in  Mr.  Ward's  sense,  I 
think  his  book  of  great  practical  worth  by  the  strenuous  manner  in  which 
it  maintains  morality  to  have  another  foundation  than  the  arbitrary  decree 
of  God,  and  shows,  by  great  weight  of  evidence,  that  this  is  the  orthodox 
doctrine  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. 


ON  THE   BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.          217 

that  long  before  we  were  able  to  reflect  on  our  mental 
operations,  we  should  have  become  entirely  incapable  of 
thinking  of  the  two  things  as  other  than  simultaneous. 
An  appeal  to  consciousness  avails  nothing,  when,  even 
though  the  doctrine  opposed  were  true,  the  appeal  might 
equally,  and  with  the  same  plausibility,  be  made.  The 
facts  are  alike  consistent  with  both  opinions,  and,  for 
aught  that  appears,  Brown's  is  as  likely  to  be  true  as 
Sir  W.  Hamilton's.  The  difference  between  them,  as 
already  observed,  is  extremely  small,  and  I  will  add, 
supremely  unimportant.  If  the  reality  of  matter  is 
certified  to  us  by  an  irresistible  belief,  it  matters  little 
whether  we  reach  the  belief  by  two  steps,  or  by  only 
one. 

The  really  important  difference  of  opinion  on  the  sub- 
ject of  Perception,  between  Brown  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
is  far  other  than  this.  It  is,  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
believes  us  to  have  a  direct  intuition  not  solely  of  the 
reality  of  matter,  but  also  of  its  primary  qualities, 
Extension,  Solidity,  Figure,  &c.,  which,  according  to 
him,  we  know  as  in  the  material  object,  and  not  as  modi- 
fications of  ourselves  :  while  Brown  believed  that  matter 
is  suggested  to  us  only  as  an  unknown  something,  all 
whose  attributes,  as  known  or  conceived  by  us,  are  resolv- 
able into  affections  of  our  senses.  In  Brown's  opinion 
we  are  cognizant  of  a  non-ego  in  the  perceptive  act, 
only  in  the  indefinite  form  of  something  external ;  all 
else  we  are  able  to  know  of  it  is  only  that  it  produces 
certain  affections  in  us :  which  is  also  our  author's 
opinion  as  regards  the  Secondary  Qualities.  The  differ- 
ence therefore,  between  Brown  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  is 
not  of  the  kind  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  considers  it  to 


218 


be,  but  consists  mainly  .in  this,  that  Brown  really  held, 
what  Sir  W.  Hamilton  held  only  verbally,  the  doctrine 
of  the  Relativity  of  all  our  knowledge.  I  shall  attempt, 
further  on,  to  show  that  on  the  point  on  which  they 
really  differed,  Brown  was  right,  and  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
totally  wrong.* 

The  considerations  which  have  now  been  adduced  are 
subversive  of  a  great  mass  of  triumphant  animadversion 
by  our  author  on  the  ignorance  and  carelessness  of  Brown, 
and  some  milder  criticism  on  Reid.  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
thinks  it  astonishing  that  neither  of  these  philosophers 
should  have  recognized  Natural  Realism,  and  the  third 
form  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  as  two  different  modes  of 
thought.  Reid,  whom  he  makes  a  great  point  of  claim- 
ing as  a  Natural  Realist,  was,  he  says,  quite  unaware  of 
the  possibility  of  the  other  opinion,  and  did  not  guard 
against  it  by  his  language,  leaving  it,  therefore,  open  to 
dispute  whether,  instead  of  being  a  Natural  Realist,  he 

*  There  is  also  a  difference  between  Brown  and  Sir  "W.  Hamilton  in  the 
particular  category  of  intuitive  knowledge  to  which  they  referred  the  cog- 
nition of  the  existence  of  matter.  Brown  deemed  it  a  case  of  the  belief  in 
causation,  which  again  he  regarded  as  a  case  of  our  intuitive  belief  in  the 
constancy  of  the  order  of  nature.  "  I  do  not,"  he  says  (Lecture  xxiv. 
vol.  ii.  p.  11),  "  conceive  that  it  is  by  any  peculiar  intuition  we  are  led  to 
believe  in  the  existence  of  things  without.  I  consider  this  belief  as  the 
effect  of  that  more  general  intuition,  by  which  we  consider  a  new  conse- 
quent, in  any  series  of  accustomed  events,  as  the  sign  of  a  new  antecedent, 
and  of  that  equally  general  principle  of  association,  by  which  feelings  that 
have  frequently  co-existed,  flow  together  and  constitute  afterwards  one 
complex  whole."  That  is,  he  thought  that  when  an  infant  finds  the  mo- 
tions of  his  muscles,  which  have  been  accustomed  to  take  place  unimpeded, 
suddenly  stopped  by  what  he  will  afterwards  learn  to  call  the  resistance  of 
an  external  object,  the  infant  intuitively  (though  perhaps  not  instantane- 
ously) believes  that  this  unexpected  phenomenon,  the  stoppage  of  a  series 
of  sensations,  is  conjoined  with,  or,  as  we  now  say,  caused  by,  the  presence 
of  some  new  antecedent ;  something  which,  not  being  the  infant  himself, 
nor  a  state  of  his  sensations,  we  may  call  an  outward  object. 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.          219 

was  not,  like  Brown,  a  Cosmothetic  Idealist  of  the  third 
class  ;  while  Brown,  on  the  other  hand,  never  conceived 
Natural  Realism,  nor  thought  it  possible  that  Reid  held 
any  other  than  his  own  opinion,  as  he  invariably  affirms 
him  to  have  done.  I  apprehend  that  both  philosophers 
are  entirely  clear  of  the  blame  thus  imputed  to  them. 
Reid  never  imagined  Brown's  doctrine,  nor  Brown  Reid's, 
as  anything  different  from  his  own,  because  in  truth  they 
were  not  different.  If  the  distinction  between  a  Natural 
Realist  and  a  Cosmothetic  Idealist  of  the  third  class  be, 
that  the  latter  believes  the  existence  of  the  external  object 
to  be  inferred  from,  or  suggested  by,  our  sensations,  while 
the  former  holds  it  to  be  neither  the  one  nor  the  other,  but 
to  be  apprehended  in  consciousness  simultaneously  and 
co-ordinately  with  the  sensations,  Reid  was  as  much  a 
Cosmothetic  Idealist  as  Brown,  and  in  the  very  same 
manner.  The  question  does  not  concern  philosophy,  but 
the  history  of  philosophy,  which  is  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
strongest  point,  and  was  not  at  all  a  strong  point  with 
either  Brown  or  Reid ;  but  the  matter  of  fact  is  worth 
the  few  pages  necessary  for  clearing  it  up,  because  Sir 
W.  Hamilton's  vast  and  accurate  learning  goes  near 
to  obtaining  for  his  statements,  on  any  such  matter, 
implicit  confidence,  and  it  is  therefore  important  to 
show  that  even  where  he  is  strongest,  he  is  sometimes 
wrong. 

In  the  severe  criticism  on  Brown  from  which  I  have 
quoted,  and  which,  though  in  some  respects  unjust,  in 
others  I  cannot  deny  to  be  well  merited,  some  of  the 
strongest  expressions  have  reference  to  the  gross  misun- 
derstanding of  Reid,  of  which  Brown  is  alleged  to  have 
been  guilty  in  not  perceiving  him  to  have  been  a  Natu- 


220    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

ral  Realist.  "  We  proceed,"  says  our  author,*  "  to  con- 
sider the  greatest  of  all  Brown's  errors,  in  itself  and  in 
its  consequences,  his  misconception  of  the  cardinal  posi- 
tion of  Reid's  philosophy,  in  supposing  that  philosopher 
as  a  hypothetical  realist,  to  hold  with  himself  the  third 
form  of  the  representative  hypothesis,  and  not,  as  a 
natural  realist,  the  doctrine  of  an  intuitive  Perception." 
"  Brown's  f  transmutation  of  Reid  from  a  natural  to 
a  hypothetical  realist,  as  a  misconception  of  the  grand 
and  distinctive  tenet  of  a  school,  by  one  even  of  its  disci- 
ples, is  without  a  parallel  in  the  whole  history  of  philoso- 
phy ;  and  this  portentous  error  is  prolific ;  chimcera 
chimceram  parit.  Were  the  evidence  of  the  mistake  less 
unambiguous,  we  should  be  disposed  rather  to  question 
our  own  perspicacity  than  to  tax  so  subtle  an  intellect  with 
so  gross  a  blunder."  And  he  did,  in  time,  feel  some 
misgiving  as  to  his  "  own  perspicacity."  When,  in  pre- 
paring an  edition  of  Reid,  he  was  obliged  to  look  more 
closely  into  that  author's  statements,  we  find  a  remarka- 
ble lowering  of  the  high  tone  of  these  sentences ;  and 
he  felt  obliged,  in  revising  the  paper  for  the  Discussions, 
to  write,  "  This  is  too  strong,"  after  a  passage  in  which  he 
had  said  that  J  "  Brown's  interpretation  of  the  funda- 
mental tenet  of  Reid's  philosophy  is  not  a  simple  mis- 
conception, but  an  absolute  reversal  of  its  real  and  even 
unambiguous  import."  Well  would  it  have  been  for 
Brown's  reputation  if  all  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  attempts  to 
bring  home  blunders  to  him,  had  been  as  little  success- 
ful as  this. 

In  the  work  in  which  Reid  first  brought  his  opinions 
before  the  world,  the  "  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind," 

*  Discussions,  p.  58.  f  Ibid.  p.  56.  J  Ibid.  p.  60. 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.          221 

his  language  is  so  unequivocally  that  of  a  Cosmothetic 
Idealist,  that  it  admits  of  no  mistake.  It  is  almost  more 
unambiguous  than  that  of  Brown  himself.  The  external 
object  is  always  said  to  be  perceived  through  the  medium 
of  "natural  signs:"  these  signs  being  our  sensations, 
interpreted  by  a  natural  instinct.  Our  sensations, 
he  says,*  belong  to  that  "class  of  natural  signs  which 
.  .  .  though  we  never  before  had  any  notion  or  concep- 
tion of  the  thing  signified,  do  suggest  it,  or  conjure  it 
up,  as  it  were,  by  a  natural  kind  of  magic,  and  at  once 
give  us  a  conception  and  create  a  belief  of  it."  "I  take  f 
it  for  granted  that  the  notion  of  hardness,  and  the  belief 
of  it,  is  first  got  by  means  of  that  particular  sensation 
which,  as  far  back  as  we  can  remember,  does  invariably 
suggest  it,  and  that,  if  we  had  never  had  such  a  feeling,  we 
should  never  have  had  our  notion  of  hardness."  Again,  J 
"  when  a  colored  body  is  presented,  there  is  a  certain 
apparition  to  the  eye,  or  to  the  mind,  which  we  have 
called  the  appearance  of  color.  Mr.  Locke  calls  it  an 
idea,  and,  indeed,  it  may  be  called  so  with  the  greatest 
propriety.  This  idea  can  have  no  existence  but  wrhen  it 
is  perceived.  It  is  a  kind  of  thought,  and  can  only  be 
the  act  of  a  percipient  or  thinking  being.  By  the  con- 
stitution of  our  nature,  we  are  led  to  conceive  this  idea 
as  a  sign  of  something  external,  and  are  impatient  till 
we  learn  its  meaning." 

I  must  be  excused  if  I  am  studious  to  prove,  by  an 
accumulation  of  citations,  that  these  are  not  passing 
expressions  of  Reid,  but  the  deliberate  doctrine  of  his 
treatise.  "  I  think  it  appears  from  what  hath  been  said, 

*  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  Works  (Hamilton's  ed.),  P«  122. 
t  Ibid.  J  Ibid.  p.  137. 

VOL.  i.  10 


222    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OP  THEORIES 

that  there  are  natural  suggestions ;  particularly,  that 
sensation  suggests  the  notion  of  present  existence,  and 
the  belief  that  what  we  perceive  or  feel  does  now  exist. 
.  .  .  And,  in  like  manner,  certain  sensations  of  touch, 
by  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  suggest  to  us  exten- 
sion, solidity,  and  motion."  *  "By  an  original  principle 
of  our  constitution,  a  certain  sensation  of  touch  both 
suggests  to  the  mind  the  conception  of  hardness,  and 
creates  the  belief  of  it :  or,  in  other  words,  this  sensa- 
tion is  a  natural  sign  of  hardness."  f  "  The  word  gold 
has  no  similitude  to  the  substance  signified  by  it ;  nor  is 
it  in  its  own  nature  more  fit  to  signify  this  than  any  other 
substance  ;  yet,  by  habit  and  custom,  it  suggests  this,  and 
no  other.  In  like  manner,  a  sensation  of  touch  suggests 
hardness,  although  it  hath  neither  similitude  to  hardness, 
nor,  as  far  as  we  can  perceive,  any  necessary  connection 
with  it.  The  difference  betwixt  these  two  signs  lies  only 
in  this — that,  in  the  first,  the  suggestion  is  the  effect  of 
habit  and  custom ;  in  the  second,  it  is  not  the  effect  of 
habit,  but  of  the  original  constitution  of  our  minds.  J 
"  Extension,  therefore,  seems  to  be  a  quality  suggested 
to  us "  (the  italics  are  Reid's)  "  by  the  very  same  sensa- 
tions which  suggest  the  other  qualities  above  mentioned. 
When  I  grasp  a  ball  in  my  hand,  I  perceive  it  at  once 
hard,  figured,  and  extended.  The  feeling  is  very  simple, 
and  hath  not  the  least  resemblance  to  any  quality  of 
body.  Yet  it  suggests  to  us  three  primary  qualities 
perfectly  distinct  from  one  another,  as  well  as  from  the 
sensation  which  indicates  them.  When  I  move  my  hand 
along  the  table,  the  feeling  is  so  simple  that  I  find  it  dif- 

*  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  "Works,  p.  111. 
t  Ibid.  p.  121.  I  Ibid.  p.  121. 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.          223 

ficult  to  distinguish  it  into  things  of  different  natures, 
yet  it  immediately  suggests  hardness,  smoothness,  exten- 
sion, and  motion — things  of  very  different  natures,  and 
all  of  them  as  distinctly  understood  as  the  feeling  which 
suggests  them."  *  " The  feelings  of  touch,  which  suggest 
primary  qualities,  have  no  names,  nor  are  they  ever  re- 
flected upon.  They  pass  through  the  mind  instantane- 
ously, and  serve  only  to  introduce  the  notion  and  belief 
of  external  things,  which,  by  our  constitution,  are  con- 
nected with  them.  They  are  natural  signs,  and  the  mind 
immediately  passes  to  the  thing  signified,  without  mak- 
ing the  least  reflection  upon  the  sign,  or  observing  that 
there  was  any  such  thing,  "f  This  passage,  with  many 
others  of  like  import,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  might  usefully 
have  meditated  on,  before  he  laid  so  much  stress  on  the 
testimony  of  consciousness  that  the  apprehension  is  not 
through  the  medium  of  a  sign. 

"  Let  a  man  press  his  hand  against  the  table  —  he  feels 
it  hard.  But  what  is  the  meaning  of  this  ?  The  mean- 
ing undoubtedly  is,  that  he  hath  a  certain  feeling  of 
touch,  from  which  he  concludes,  without  any  reasoning 
or  comparing  ideas,  that  there  is  something  external 
really  existing,  whose  parts  stick  so  firmly  together,  that 
they  cannot  be  displaced  without  considerable  force. 
There  is  here  a  feeling,  and  a  conclusion  drawn  from  it, 
or  some  way  suggested  by  it.  ...  The  hardness  of 
the  table  is  the  conclusion,  the  feeling  is  the  medium 
by  which  we  are  led  to  that  conclusion."  \  "  How  a  sen- 
sation should  instantly  make  us  conceive  and  believe  the 
existence  of  an  external  thing  altogether  unlike  to  it,  I 

*  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  Works,  p.  123. 
f  Ibid.  p.  124.  J  Ibid.  p.  125. 


224    SIB  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OP  THEORIES 

do  not  pretend  to  know ;  and  when  I  say  that  the  one 
suggests  the  other,  I  mean  not  to  explain  the  manner  of 
their  connection,  but  to  express  a  fact,  which  every  one 
may  be  conscious  of,  namely,  that  by  a  law  of  our 
nature,  such  a  conception  and  belief  constantly  and  im- 
mediately follow  the  sensation."*  "There  are  three 
ways  in  which  the  mind  passes  from  the  appearance  of  a 
natural  sign  to  the  conception  and  belief  of  the  thing 
signified  —  by  original  principles  of  our  constitution,  by 
custom,  and  by  reasoning.  Our  original  perceptions  are 
got  in  the  first  of  these  ways.  ...  In  the  first  of 
these  ways,  Nature,  by  means  of  the  sensations  of  touch, 
informs  us  of  the  hardness  and  softness  of  bodies ;  of 
their  extension,  figure,  and  motion  ;  and  of  that  space 
in  which  they  move  and  are  placed."  f  "  In  the  testi- 
mony of  Nature  given  by  the  senses,  as  well  as  in  human 
testimony  given  by  language,  things  are  signified  to  us 
by  signs  :  and  in  one  as  well  as  the  other,  the  mind, 
either  by  original  principles  or  by  custom,  passes  from 
the  sign  to  the  conception  and  belief  of  the  things  signi- 
fied. .  .  .  The  signs  in  original  perceptions  are  sensa- 
tions, of  which  Nature  hath  given  us  a  great  variety, 
suited  to  the  variety  of  the  things  signified  by  them. 
Nature  hath  established  a  real  connection  between  the 
signs  and  the  things  signified,  and  Nature  hath  also 
taught  us  the  interpretation  of  the  signs  —  so  that,  pre- 
vious to  experience,  the  sign  suggests  the  thing  signified, 
and  creates  the  belief  of  it."  }  "It  is  by  one  particular 
principle  of  our  constitution  that  certain  features  express 
anger ;  and  by  another  particular  principle  that  certain 

*  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  "Works,  p.  131. 
t  Ibid.  p.  188.  J  Ibid.  pp.  194,  195. 


ON   THE   BELIEF   IN   AN   EXTERNAL   WORLD.          225 

features  express  benevolence.  It  is,  in  like  manner,  by 
one  particular  principle  of  our  constitution  that  a  certain 
sensation  signifies  hardness  in  the  body  which  I  handle ; 
and  it  is  by  another  particular  principle  that  a  certain 
sensation  signifies  motion  in  that  body."* 

I  doubt  if  it  would  be  possible  to  extract  from  Brown 
himself  an  equal  number  of  passages  (and  I  might  have 
cited  many  more)  expressing  as  clearly  and  positively, 
and  in  terms  as  irreconcilable  with  any  other  opinion,  the 
doctrine  which  our  author  terms  the  third  form  of  Cos- 
mothetic  Idealism ;  in  the  exact  shape,  too,  in  which 
Brown  held  it,  unencumbered  by  the  gratuitous  addition 
which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  fastens  on  him,  that  the  sign 
must  "  truly  represent "  the  thing  signified,  —  a  notion 
which  Reid  takes  good  care  that  he  shall  not  be  supposed 
to  entertain,  since  he  repeatedly  declares  that  there  is  no 
resemblance  between  them.  That  Eeid,  at  least  when 
he  wrote  the  Inquiry,  was  a  Cosmothetic  Idealist ;  that 
up  to  that  time  it  had  never  occurred  to  him  that  the 
conviction  of  the  existence  and  qualities  of  external 
objects  could  be  regarded  as  anything  but  suggestions  by, 
and  conclusions  from,  our  sensations  —  is  too  obvious  to 
be  questioned  by  any  one  who  has  the  text  fresh  in  his 
recollection.  Accordingly  Sir  W.  Hamilton  acknowl- 
edges as  much  in  his  edition  of  Reid,  both  in  the  foot- 
notes and  in  the  appended  Dissertations.  After  restating 
his  own  doctrine,  that  our  natural  beliefs  assure  us  of 
outward  objects,  only  by  assuring  us  that  we  are  imme- 
diately conscious  of  them,  he  adds,f  "Reid  himself 
seems  to  have  become  obscurely  aware  of  this  condition ; 

*  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  Works,  p.  195. 
f  Foot-note  to  Reid,  p.  129. 


226    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

and  though  he  never  retracted  his  doctrine  concerning 
the  mere  suggestion  of  extension,  we  find  in  his  Essays 
on  the  Intellectual  Powers  assertions  in  regard  to  the 
immediate  perception  of  external  things,  which  would 
tend  to  show  that  his  later  views  were  more  in  unison 
with  the  necessary  convictions  of  mankind."  And  in 
another  place  *  he  says  of  the  doctrine  maintained  by 
Reid  "  in  his  earlier  work  "  that  it  is  one  which  "  if  he 
did  not  formally  retract  in  his  later  writings,  he  did  not 
continue  to  profess."  It  is  hard  that  Brown  should  be 
charged  with  blundering  to  a  degree  which  is  "  porten- 
tous "  and  "  without  a  parallel  in  the  whole  history  of 
philosophy,"  for  attributing  to  Reid  an  opinion  which  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  confesses  that  Reid  maintained  in  one  of 
his  only  two  important  writings,  and  did  not  retract  in 
the  other.  But  Sir  ~W.  Hamilton  is  still  more  wrong 
than  he  confesses.  He  is  in  a  mistake  when  he  says  that 
Reid,  though  he  did  not  retract  the  opinion,  did  not  con- 
tinue to  profess  it.  For  some  reason,  not  apparent,  he 
did  cease  to  employ  the  word  Suggestion.  But  he  con- 
tinued to  use  terms  equivalent  to  it.  "  Every  different 
perception  is  conjoined  with  a  sensation  that  is  proper  to 
it.  The  one  is  the  sign,  the  other  the  thing  signified."  f 
w  I  touch  the  table  gently  with  my  hand,  and  I  feel  it  to 
be  smooth,  hard,  and  cold.  These  are  qualities  of  the 
table  perceived  by  touch  :  but  I  perceive  them  by  means 
of  a  sensation  which  indicates  them."J  "Observing 
that  the  agreeable  sensation  is  raised  when  the  rose  is 
near,  and  ceases  when  it  is  removed,  I  am  led  by  my 
nature  to  conclude  some  quality  to  be  in  the  rose,  which 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  821. 

f  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  Works,  p.  312.          %  Ibid.  p.  311. 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN   AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.          227 

is  the  cause  of  this  sensation.  This  quality  in  the  rose 
is  the  object  perceived ;  and  that  act  of  my  mind  by 
which  I  have  the  conviction  and  belief  of  this  quality,  is 
what  in  this  case  I  call  perception."  *  Of  this  passage 
even  Sir  W.  Hamilton  honestly  says  in  a  foot-note,  that 
it  "  appears  to  be  an  explicit  disavowal  of  the  doctrine 
of  an  intuitive  or  immediate  perception."  Again : 
"  When  a  primary  quality  is  perceived,  the  sensation 
immediately  leads  our  thought  to  the  quality  signified 
by  it,  and  is  itself  forgot.  .  .  .  The  sensations  belong- 
ing to  primary  qualities  .  .  .  carry  the  thought  to  the 
external  object,  and  immediately  disappear  and  are  for- 
got. Nature  intended  them  only  as  signs;  and  when 
they  have  served  that  purpose  they  vanish. "j  "Nature 
has  connected  our  perception  of  external  objects  with 
certain  sensations.  If  the  sensation  is  produced,  the 
corresponding  perception  follows,  even  when  there  is 
no  object,  and  in  that  case  is  apt  to  deceive  us."  J  "  In 
perception,  whether  original  or  acquired,  there  is  some- 
thing which  may  be  called  the  sign,  and  something  which 
is  signified  to  us,  or  brought  to  our  knowledge  by  that 
sign.  In  original  perception,  the  signs  are  the  various 
sensations  which  are  produced  by  the  impressions  made 
upon  our  organs.  The  things  signified,  are  the  objects 
perceived  in  consequence  of  those  sensations,  by  the 
original  constitution  of  our  nature.  Thus,  when  I  grasp 
an  ivory  ball  in  my  hand,  I  have  a  certain  sensation  of 
touch.  Although  this  sensation  be  in  the  mind,  and 
have  no  similitude  to  anything  material,  yet,  by  the 
laws  of  my  constitution,  it  is  immediately  followed  by 

*  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  p.  310.  t  Ibid.  p.  315. 

t  Ibid/p.  320. 


228    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OP  THEORIES 

the  conception  and  belief,  that  there  is  in  my  hand  a 
hard  smooth  body  of  a  spherical  figure,  and  about  an 
inch  and  a  half  in  diameter.  This  belief  is  grounded 
neither  upon  reasoning,  nor  upon  experience ;  it  is  the 
immediate  effect  of  my  constitution,  and  this  I  call  origi- 
nal perception."  * 

All  these  are  as  unequivocal,  and  the  last  passage  as 
full  and  precise  a  statement  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism,  as 
any  in  the  Inquiry.  In  the  Dissertations  appended  to 
Reid,j-  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  who  never  fails  in  candor, 
acknowledges  in  the  fullest  manner  the  inferences  which 
may  be  drawn  from  passages  like  these,  but  thinks  that 
they  are  balanced  by  others  which  "  seem  to  harmonize 
exclusively  with  the  conditions  of  natural  presentation- 
ism,  "J  and  on  the  whole  is  "  decidedly  §  of  opinion  that, 
as  the  great  end  —  the  governing  principle  —  of  Reid's 
doctrine  was  to  reconcile  philosophy  with  the  necessary 
convictions  of  mankind,  he  intended  a  doctrine  of  natural, 
consequently  a  doctrine  of  presentative,  realism ;  and 
that  he  would  have  at  once  surrendered,  as  erroneous, 
every  statement  which  was  found  at  variance  with  such 
a  doctrine."  But  it  is  clear  that  the  doctrine  of  percep- 
tion through  natural  signs  did  not,  in  Reid's  opinion, 
contradict  "  the  necessary  convictions  of  mankind ;  " 
being  brought  into  harmony  with  them  by  his  doctrine, 
that  the  signs,  after  they  have  served  their  purpose,  are 
"forgot,"  which,  as  he  conclusively  shows  in  many 
places,  it  was  both  natural  and  inevitable  that  they  should 
be.  The  passages  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton  cites  as  in- 
consistent with  any  doctrine  but  Natural  Realism,  are 

*  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  p.  332. 

t  Dissertations  on  Reid,  pp.  819-824  and  882-885. 

J  Ibid.  p.  882.  §  Ibid.  p.  820. 


ON   THE   BELIEF  IN   AN   EXTERNAL   WORLD.          229 

those  in  which  Reid  affirms  that  we  perceive  objects 
immediately,  and  that  the  external  things  which  really 
exist  are  the  very  ones  which  we  perceive.  But  Reid 
evidently  did  not  think  these  expressions  inconsistent 
with  the  doctrine  that  the  notion  and  belief  of  external 
objects  are  irresistibly  suggested  through  natural  signs. 
Saving  this  notion  and  belief  irresistibly  suggested,  is 
what  he  means  by  perceiving  the  external  object)  He 
says  so  in  more  than  one  of  the  passages  I  have  just 
quoted ;  and  neither  in  his  chapter  on  Perception,  nor 
anywhere  else,  does  he  speak  of  perception  as  implying 
anything  more.  In  that  chapter  he  says,*  "  If  we 
attend  to  that  act  of  our  mind  which  we  call  the  percep- 
tion of  an  external  object  of  sense,  we  shall  find  in  it 
these  three  things  :  First,  some  conception  or  notion  of 
the  object  perceived  ;  Secondly,  a  strong  and  irresistible 
conviction  and  belief  of  its  present  existence ;  and, 
Thirdly,  that  this  conviction  and  belief  are  immediate, 
and  not  the  effect  of  reasoning."  We  see  in  this  as  in 
a  hundred  other  places,  what  Reid  meant  when  he  said 
that  our  perception  of  outward  objects  is  immediate. 
CHe  did  not  mean  that  it  is  not  a  conviction  suggested 
by  something  else,  but  only  that  the  conviction  is  not 
the  effect  of  reasoning.  "  This  convictiont  is  not  only 
irresistible,  but  it  is  immediate ;  that  is,  it  is  not  by 
a  train  of  reasoning  and  argumentation  that  we  come 
to  be  convinced  of  the  existence  of  what  we  perceive." 
As  Nature  has  given  us  the  signs,  so  it  is  by  an  original 
law  of  our  nature  that  we  are  enabled  to  interpret  them. 
When  Reid  means  anything  but  this  in  contending  for 

*  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  ii.  chap.  v.  p.  258. 
f  Same  Essay,  p.  259. 
10* 


230    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OF  THEORIES 

an  immediate  perception  of  objects,  he  merely  means  to 
deny  that  it  takes  place  through  an  image  in  the  brain 
or  in  the  mind,  as  maintained  by  Cosmothetic  Idealists 
of  the  first  or  the  second  class. 

The  only  plausible  argument  produced  by  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  in  proof  of  Reid's  Natural  Realism,  and  against 
his  having  held,  as  Brown  thought,  Brown's  own  opin- 
ion, is,  that  when  in  the  speculations  of  Arnauld  he  had 
before  him  exactly  the  same  opinion,  he  failed  to  recog- 
nize it.*  But  on  a  careful  examination  of  Reid's  criti- 
cism on  Arnauld,  it  will  be  seen,  that  as  long  as  Reid  had 
to  do  with  Arnauld's  direct  statement  of  his  opinion, 
he  found  nothing  different  in  it  from  his  own ;  but  was 
puzzled,  and  thought  that  Arnauld  attempted  to  unite 
inconsistent  opinions,  because,  after  throwing  over  the 
"  ideal  theory,"  and  saying  that  the  only  real  ideas  are 
our  perceptions,  he  maintained  that  it  is  still  true,  in  a 
sense,  that  we  do  not  perceive  things  directly,  but  through 
our  ideas.  What !  asks  Reid,  do  we  perceive  things 
through  our  perceptions?  But  if  we  merely  put  the 
word  sensations  instead  of  perceptions,  the  doctrine  is 
exactly  that  of  Reid  in  the  Inquiry  —  that  we  perceive 
things  through  our  sensations.  Most  probably  Arnauld 
meant  this,  but  was  not  so  understood  by  Reid.  If  he 
meant  anything  else,  his  opinion  was  not  the  same  as 
Reid's,  and  we  need  no  explanation  of  Reid's  not  rec- 
ognizing it. 

One  of  the  collateral  indications  that  Reid's  opinion 
agreed  with  Brown's,  and  not  with  Sir  W.  Hamilton's, 
is  that  in  treating  this  question  he  seldom  or  never  uses 

*  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  ii.  chap.  xiii.  For  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  remarks,  see  Lectures,  ii.  50-53 ;  Discussions,  pp.  75-77 ;  and 
Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  823. 


IN   THE  BELIEF  IN   AN  EXTERNAL   WORLD.          231 

the  word  Knowledge,  but  only  Belief.  On  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  doctrine,  the  distinction  between  these  two 
terms,  however  vaguely  and  mistily  conceived  by  him, 
is  indispensable.  The  total  absence  of  any  recognition 
of  it  in  Reid,  shows  that  of  the  two  opinions,  if  there 
was  one  which  he  had  never  conceived  the  possibility  of, 
it  was  not  Brown's,  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton  supposes,  but 
Sir  W.  Hamilton's.  In  our  author's  mind  this  indica- 
tion ought  to  have  decided  the  question  :  for  in  the  case 
of  another  philosopher  he,  on  precisely  the  same  evidence, 
brings  in  a  verdict  of  Cosmothetic  Idealism.  Krug's 
system,  he  says,*  as  first  promulgated,  "was,  like  Kant's, 
a  mere  Cosmothetic  Idealism ;  for  while  he  allowed  a 
knowledge  of  the  internal  world,  he  only  allowed  a  be- 
lief of  the  external." 

It  is  true,  Reid  did  not  believe  in  what  our  author 
terms  "representative  perception,"  if  by  this  be  meant 
perception  through  an  image  in  the  mind,  supposed,  like 
the  picture  of  a  fact  in  memory,  to  be  like  its  original. 
But  neither  (as  I  have  repeatedly  observed)  did  Brown. 
What  Brown  held  was  exactly  the  doctrine  of  Reid,  in 
the  passages  that  I  have  extracted.  He  thought  that 
certain  sensations,  irresistibly,  and  by  a  law  of  our  na- 
ture, suggest,  without  any  process  of  reasoning,  and 
without  the  intervention  of  any  tertium  quid,  the  notion 
of  something  external,  and  an  invincible  belief  in  its  real 
existence.  If  representative  perception  be  this,  both 
Reid  and  Brown  believed  in  it :  if  anything  else,  Brown 
believed  it  no  more  than  Reid.  Not  only  was  Reid  a 
Cosmothetic  Idealist  of  Brown's  exact  type,  but  in  stating 
his  own  doctrine,  he  has  furnished,  as  far  as  I  am  aware, 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  797. 


232    SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON'S  REVIEW  OP  THEORIES 

the  clearest  and  best  statement  extant  of  their  common 
opinion.  They  differed,  indeed,  as  to  our  having,  in 
this  or  in  any  other  manner,  an  intuitive  perception  of 
any  of  the  attributes  of  objects ;  Reid,  like  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  affirming,  while  Brown  denied,  that  we  have 
a  direct  intuition  of  the  Primary  Qualities  of  bodies. 
But  Brown  did  not  deny,  nor  would  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
accuse  him  of  denying,  the  wide  difference  between  his 
opinion  and  Reid's  on  this  latter  point. 

Before  closing  this  chapter,  I  will  notice  the  curious 
fact,  that  after  insisting  with  so  much  emphasis  upon 
the  recognition  of  an  Ego  and  a  Non-ego  as  an  element 
in  all  consciousness,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  is  obliged  to  ad- 
mit that  the  distinction  is  in  certain  cases  a  mistake,  and 
that  our  consciousness  sometimes  recognizes  a  Non-ego 
where  there  is  only  an  Ego.  It  is  a  doctrine  of  his,  re- 
peated in  many  parts  of  his  works,  that  in  our  internal 
consciousness  there  is  no  non-ego.  Even  the  remem- 
brance of  a  past  fact,  or  the  mental  image  of  an  absent 
object,  is  not  a  thing  separable  or  distinguishable  from 
the  mind's  act  in  remembering,  but  is  another  name  for 
that  act  itself.  Now,  it  is  certain,  that  in  thinking  of 
an  absent  or  an  imaginary  object,  we  naturally  imagine 
ourselves  to  be  thinking  of  an  objective  something,  dis- 
tinguishable from  the  thinking  act.  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
being  obliged  to  acknowledge  this,  resolves  the  difficulty 
in  the  very  manner  for  which  he  so  often  rebukes  other 
thinkers  —  by  representing  this  apparent  testimony  of 
consciousness  as  a  kind  of  illusion.  "  The  object,"  he 
says,*  "is  in  this  case  given  as  really  identical  with  the 
conscious  ego,  but  still  consciousness  distinguishes  it, 

*  Lectures,  ii.  432. 


ON  THE  BELIEF  IN   AN   EXTERNAL  WORLD.          233 

as  an  accident,  from  the  ego,  —  as  the  subject  of  that 
accident,  it  projects,  as  it  were,  this  subjective  phe- 
nomenon from  itself, — views  it  at  a  distance, — in  a 
word,  objectifies  it."  But  if,  in  one  half  of  the  domain 
of  consciousness  —  the  internal  half — it  is  in  the  power 
of  consciousness  to  "  project "  out  of  itself  what  is  merely 
one  of  its  own  acts,  and  regard  it  as  external  and  a  non- 
ego,  why  are  those  accused  of  declaring  consciousness  a 
lie,  who  think  that  this  may  possibly  be  the  case  with  the 
other  half  of  its  domain  also,  and  that  the  non-ego  alto- 
gether may  be  but  a  mode  in  which  the  mind  represents 
to  itself  the  possible  modifications  of  the  ego  ?  How  the 
truth  stands  in  respect  to  this  matter  I  will  endeavor,  in 
the  following  chapter,  to  investigate.  For  the  present  I 
content  myself  with  asking,  why  the  same  liberty  in  the 
interpretation  of  Consciousness  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
own  doctrine  cannot  dispense  with,  should  be  held  to  be 
an  insurmountable  objection  to  the  counter-doctrine  ? 


234      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 


CHAPTER   XI. 

THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL    THEORY    OF   THE    BELIEF    IN    AN 
EXTERNAL   WORLD. 

WE  have  seen  Sir  W.  Hamilton  at  work  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  reality  of  Matter,  by  the  introspective  meth- 
od, and,  as  it  seems,  with  little  result.  Let  us  now 
approach  the  same  subject  by  the  psychological.  I  pro- 
ceed, therefore,  to  state  the  case  of  those  who  hold  that 
the  belief  in  an  external  world  is  not  intuitive,  but  an 
acquired  product. 

This  theory  postulates  the  following  psychological 
truths,  all  of  which  are  proved  by  experience,  and  are 
not  contested,  though  their  force  is  seldom  adequately 
felt,  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  and  the  other  thinkers  of  the 
introspective  school. 

It  postulates,  first,  that  the  human  mind  is  capable  of 
Expectation.  In  other  words,  that  after  having  had 
actual  sensations,  we  are  capable  of  forming  the  concep- 
tion of  Possible  sensations  ;  sensations  which  we  are  not 
feeling  at  the  present  moment,  but  which  we  might  feel, 
and  should  feel  if  certain  conditions  were  present,  the 
nature  of  which  conditions  we  have,  in  many  cases, 
learned  by  experience. 

It  postulates,  secondly,  the  laws  of  the  Association  of 
Ideas.  So  far  as  we  are  here  concerned,  these  laws  are 
the  following :  1st.  Similar  phenomena  tend  to  be 
thought  of  together.  2d.  Phenomena  which  have 


BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  235 

either  been  experienced  or  conceived  in  close  contiguity 
to  one  another,  tend  to  be  thought  of  together.  The 
contiguity  is  of  two  kinds ;  simultaneity,  and  immediate 
succession.  Facts  which  have  been  experienced  or 
thought  of  simultaneously,  recall  the  thought  of  one 
another.  Of  facts  which  have  been  experienced  or 
thought  of  in  immediate  succession,  the  antecedent,  or 
the  thought  of  it,  recalls  the  thought  of  the  consequent, 
but  not  conversely.  3d.  Associations  produced  by 
contiguity  become  more  certain  and  rapid  by  repetition. 
When  two  phenomena  have  been  very  often  experienced 
in  conjunction,  and  have  not,  in  any  single  instance, 
occurred  separately  either  in  experience  or  in  thought, 
there  is  produced  between  them  what  has  been  called 
Inseparable,  or  less  correctly,  Indissoluble  Association  : 
by  which  is  not  meant  that  the  association  must  inevita- 
bly last  to  the  end  of  life  —  that  no  subsequent  experi- 
ence or  process  of  thought  can  possibly  avail  to  dissolve 
it ;  but  only  that  as  long  as  no  such  experience  or  pro- 
cess of  thought  has  taken  place,  the  association  is  irre- 
sistible ;  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  think  the  one  thing 
disjoined  from  the  other.  4th.  When  an  association 
has  acquired  this  character  of  inseparability  —  when  the 
bond  between  the  two  ideas  has  been  thus  firmly  riveted, 
not  only  does  the  idea  called  up  by  association  become, 
in  our  consciousness,  inseparable  from  the  idea  which 
suggested  it,  but  the  facts  or  phenomena  answering  to 
those  ideas,  come  at  last  to  seem  inseparable  in  exist- 
ence :  things  which  we  are  unable  to  conceive  apart,  ap- 
pear incapable  of  existing  apart ;  and  the  belief  we  have 
in  their  co-existence,  though  really  a  product  of  experi- 
ence, seems  intuitive.  Innumerable  examples  might  be 


236      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

given  of  this  law.  One.  of  the  most  familiar,  as  well  as 
the  most  striking,  is  that  of  our  acquired  perceptions  of 
eight.  Even  those  who.  with  Mr.  Bailey,  consider  the 
perception  of  distance  by  the  eye  as  not  acquired,  but 
intuitive,  admit  that  there  are  many  perceptions  of  sight 
which,  though  instantaneous  and  unhesitating,  are  not 
intuitive.  What  we  see  is  a  very  minute  fragment  of 
what  we  think  we  see.  We  see  artificially  that  one 
thing  is  hard,  another  soft.  We  see  artificially  that  one 
thing  is  hot,  another  cold.  We  see  artificially  that  what 
we  see  is  a  book,  or  a  stone,  each  of  these  being  not 
merely  an  inference,  but  a  heap  of  inferences,  from  the 
signs  which  we  see,  to  things  not  visible. 

Setting  out  from  these  premises,  the  Psychological 
Theory  maintains,  that  there  are  associations  naturally 
and  even  necessarily  generated  by  the  order  of  our  sen- 
sations and  of  our  reminiscences  of  sensation,  which, 
supposing  no  intuition  of  an  external  world  to  have  exist- 
ed in  consciousness,  would  inevitably  generate  the  belief, 
and  would  cause  it  to  be  regarded  as  an  intuition. 

What  is  it  we  mean  when  we  say  that  the  object  we 
perceive  is  external  to  us,  and  not  a  part  of  our  own 
thoughts?  We  mean,  that  there  is  in  our  perceptions 
something  which  exists  when  we  are  not  thinking  of  it ; 
which  existed  before  we  had  ever  thought  of  it,  and 
would  exist  if  we  were  annihilated ;  and  further,  that 
there  exist  things  which  we  never  saw,  touched,  or 
otherwise  perceived,  and  things  which  never  have  been 
perceived  by  man.  This  idea  of  something  which  is 
distinguished  from  our  fleeting  impressions  by  what,  in 
Kantian  language,  is  called  Perdurability ;  something 
which  is  fixed  and  the  same,  while  our  impressions  vary ; 


BELIEF  IN  AN   EXTERNAL  WORLD.  237 

something  which  exists  whether  we  are  aware  of  it  or 
not,  and  which  is  always  square  (or  of  some  other  given 
figure)  whether  it  appears  to  us  square  or  round,  consti- 
tutes altogether  our  idea  of  external  substance.  Who- 
ever can  assign  an  origin  to  this  complex  conception, 
has  accounted  for  what  we  mean  by  the  belief  in  matter. 
(ftow,  all  this,  according  to  the  Psychological  Theory,  is 
but  the  form  impressed  by  the  known  laws  of  associa- 
tion, upon  the  conception  or  notion,  obtained  by  expe- 
rience, of  Contingent  Sensations^  by  which  are  meant, 
sensations  that  are  not  in  our  present  consciousness,  and 
perhaps  never  were  in  our  consciousness  at  all,  but  which, 
in  virtue  of  the  laws  to  which  we  have  learned  by  experi- 
ence that  our  sensations  are  subject,  we  know  that  we 
should  have  felt  under  given  supposable  circumstances, 
and  under  these  same  circumstances,  might  still  feel. 

I  see  a  piece  of  white  paper  on  a  table.  I  go  into 
another  room,  and  though  I  have  ceased  to  see  it,  I  am 
persuaded  that  the  paper  is  still  there.  I  no  longer 
have  the  sensations  which  it  gave  me  ;  but  I  believe  that 
when  I  again  place  myself  in  the  circumstances  in  which 
I  had  those  sensations,  that  is,  when  I  go  again  into  the 
room,  I  shall  again  have  them  ;  and  further,  that  there 
has  been  no  intervening  moment  at  which  this  would  not 
have  been  the  case.  Owing  to  this  law  of  my  mind, 
my  conception  of  the  world  at  any  given  instant  consists, 
in  only  a  small  proportion,  of  present  sensations.  Of 
these  I  may  at  the  time  have  none  at  all,  and  they  are  in 
any  case  a  most  insignificant  portion  of  the  whole  which 
I  apprehend.  The  conception  I  form  of  the  world  ex- 
isting at  any  moment,  comprises,  along  with  the  sensa- 
tions I  am  feeling,  a  countless  variety  of  possibilities  of 


238      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

sensation ;  namely,  the  whole  of  those  which  past  obser- 
vation tells  me  that  I  could,  under  any  supposable  cir- 
cumstances, experience  at  this  moment,  together  with 
an  indefinite  and  illimitable  multitude  of  others  which 
though  I  do  not  know  that  I  could,  yet  it  is  possible 
that  I  might,  experience  in  circumstances  not  known  to 
me.  These  various  possibilities  are  the  important  thing 
to  me  in  the  world.  My  present  sensations  are  generally 
of  little  importance,  and  are  moreover  fugitive :  the 
possibilities,  on  the  contrary,  are  permanent,  which  is 
the  character  that  mainly  distinguishes  our  idea  of  Sub- 
stance or  Matter  from  our  notion  of  sensation.  These 
possibilities,  which  are  conditional  certainties,  need  a 
special  name  to  distinguish  them  from  mere  vague  pos- 
sibilities, which  experience  gives  no  warrant  for  reckon- 
ing upon.  Now,  as  soon  as  a  distinguishing  name  is 
given,  though  it  be  only  to  the  same  thing  regarded 
in  a  different  aspect,  one  of  the  most  familiar  expe- 
riences of  our  mental  nature  teaches  us,  that  the  differ- 
ent name  comes  to  be  considered  as  the  name  of  a  different 
thing. 

There  is  another  important  peculiarity  of  these  certi- 
fied or  guaranteed  possibilities  of  sensation ;  namely, 
that  they  have  reference,  not  to  single  sensations,  but  to 
sensations  joined  together  in  groups.  When  we  think 
of  anything  as  a  material  substance,  or  body,  we  either 
have  had,  or  we  think  that  on  some  given  supposition 
we  should  have,  not  some  one  sensation,  but  a  great  and 
even  an  indefinite  number  and  variety  of  sensations, 
generally  belonging  to  different  senses,  but  so  linked 
together,  that  the  presence  of  one  announces  the  pos- 
sible presence  at  the  very  same  instant  of  any  or  all  of 


BELIEF  IN   AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  239 

the  rest.  In  our  mind,  therefore,  not  only  is  this  par- 
ticular Possibility  of  sensation  invested  with  the  quality 
of  permanence  when  we  are  not  actually  feeling  any  of 
the  sensations  at  all ;  but  when  we  are  feeling  some  of 
them,  the  remaining  sensations  of  the  group  are  con- 
ceived by  us  in  the  form  of  Present  Possibilities,  which 
miffht  be  realized  at  the  very  moment.  And  as  this 

o  •> 

happens  in  turn  to  all  of  them,  the  group  as  a  whole 
presents  itself  to  the  mind  as  permanent,  in  contrast  not 
solely  with  the  temporariness  of  my  bodily  presence, 
but  also  with  the  temporary  character  of  each  of  the 
sensations  composing  the  group ;  in  other  words,  as  a 
kind  of  permanent  substratum,  under  a  set  of  passing 
experiences  or  manifestations  :  which  is  another  leading 
character  of  our  idea  of  substance  or  matter,  as  distin- 
guished from  sensation. 

Let  us  now  take  into  consideration  another  of  the 
general  characters  of  our  experience,  namely,  that  in 
addition  to  fixed  groups,  we  also  recognize  a  fixed  Order 
in  our  sensations ;  an  Order  of  succession,  which,  when 
ascertained  by  observation,  gives  rise  to  the  ideas  of 
Cause  and  Effect,  according  to  what  I  hold  to  be  the 
true  theory  of  that  relation,  and  is  in  any  case  the  source 
of  all  our  knowledge  what  causes  produce  wrhat  effects. 
Now,  of  what  nature  is  this  fixed  order  among  our  sen- 
sations ?  It  is  a  constancy  of  antecedence  and  sequence. 
But  the  constant  antecedence  and  sequence  do  not  gen- 
erally exist  between  one  actual  sensation  and  another. 
Very  few  such  sequences  are  presented  to  us  by  expe- 
rience. In  almost  all  the  constant  sequences  which  occur 
in  Nature,  the  antecedence  and  consequence  do  not  obtain 
between  sensations,  but  between  the  groups  we  have  been 


240      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

speaking  about,  of  which  a  very  small  portion  is  actual 
sensation,  the  greater  part  being  permanent  possibilities 
of  sensation,  evidenced  to  us  by  a  small  and  variable 
number  of  sensations  actually  present.  Hence,  our  ideas 
of  causation,  power,  activity,  do  not  become  connected 
in  thought  with  our  sensations  as  actual  at  all,  save  in 
the  few  physiological  cases  where  these  figure  by  them- 
selves as  the  antecedents  in  some  uniform  sequence. 
Those  ideas  become  connected,  not  with  sensations,  but 
with  groups  of  possibilities  of  sensation.  The  sensations 
conceived  do  not,  to  our  habitual  thoughts,  present  them- 
selves as  sensations  actually  experienced,  inasmuch  as 
not  only  any  one  or  any  number  of  them  may  be  supposed 
absent,  but  none  of  them  need  be  present.  We  find 
that  the  modifications  which  are  taking  place  more  or 
less  regularly  in  our  possibilities  of  sensation,  are  mostly 
quite  independent  of  our  consciousness,  and  of  our  pres- 
ence or  absence.  Whether  we  are  asleep  or  awake,  the 
fire  goes  out,  and  puts  an  end  to  one  particular  possibil- 
ity of  warmth  and  light.  Whether  we  are  present  or 
absent,  the  corn  ripens,  and  brings  a  new  possibility  of 
food.  Hence  we  speedily  think  to  learn  of  Nature  as 
made  up  solely  of  these  groups  of  possibilities,  and  the 
active  force  in  Nature  as  manifested  in  the  modification 
of  some  of  these  by  others.  The  sensations,  though  the 
original  foundation  of  the  whole,. come  to  bo  looked  upon 
as  a  sort  of  accident  depending  on  us,  and  the  possibili- 
ties as  much  more  real  than  the  actual  sensations,  nay, 
as  the  very  realities  of  which  these  are  only  the  represen- 
tations, appearances,  or  effects.  When  this  state  of 
mind  has  been  arrived  at,  then,  and  from  that  time  for- 
ward, we  are  never  conscious  of  a  present  sensation 


BELIEF  IN   AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  241 

without  instantaneously  referring  it  to  some  one  of  the 
groups  of  possibilities  into  which  a  sensation  of  that  partic- 
ular description  enters  ;  and  if  we  do  not  yet  know  to  what 
group  to  refer  it,  we  at  least  feel  an  irresistible  conviction 
that  it  must  belong  to  some  group  or  other;  i.  e.,  that 
its  presence  proves  the  existence,  here  and  now,  of  a 
great  number  and  variety  of  possibilities  of  sensation, 
without  which  it  would  not  have  been.  The  whole  set 
of  sensations  as  possible,  form  a  permanent  background 
to  any  one  or  more  of  them  that  are,  at  a  given  moment, 
actual ;  and  the  possibilities  are  conceived  as  standing 
to  the  actual  sensations  in  the  relation  of  a  cause  to  its 
effects,  or  of  canvas  to  the  figures  painted  on  it,  or  of  a 
root  to  the  trunk,  leaves,  and  flowers,  or  of  a  substratum 
to  that  which  is  spread  over  it,  or,  in  transcendental  lan- 
guage, of  Matter  to  Form. 

When  this  point  has  been  reached,  the  permanent 
Possibilities  in  question  have  assumed  such  unlikeness  of 
aspect,  and  such  difference  of  position  relatively  to  us, 
from  any  sensations,  that  it  would  be  contrary  to  all  we 
know  of  the  constitution  of  human  nature  that  they 
should  not  be  conceived  as,  and  believed  to  be,  at  least 
as  different  from  sensations  as  sensations  are  from  one 
another.  Their  groundwork  in  sensation  is  forgotten, 
and  they  are  supposed  to  be  something  intrinsically  dis- 
tinct from  it.  We  can  withdraw  ourselves  from  any  of 
our  (external)  sensations,  or  we  can  be  withdrawn  from 
them  by  some  other  agency.  But  though  the  sensations 
cease,  the  possibilities  remain  in  existence ;  they  are 
independent  of  our  will,  our  presence,  and  everything 
which  belongs  to  us.  We  find,  too,  that  they  belong  as 
much  to  other  human  or  sentient  beings  as  to  ourselves. 


242      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

We  find  other  people  grounding  their  expectations  and 
conduct  upon  the  same  permanent  possibilities  on  which 
we  ground  ours.  But  we  do  not  find  them  experiencing 
the  same  actual  sensations.  Other  people  do  not  have 
our  sensations  exactly  when  and  as  we  have  them  :  but 
they  have  our  possibilities  of  sensation  ;  whatever  indi- 
cates a  present  possibility  of  sensations  to  ourselves, 
indicates  a  present  possibility  of  similar  sensations  to 
them,  except  so  far  as  their  organs  of  sensation  may  vary 
from  the  type  of  ours.  This  puts  the  final  seal  to  our 
conception  of  the  groups  of  possibilities  as  the  funda- 
mental reality  in  Nature.  The  permanent  possibilities 
are  common  to  us  and  to  our  fellow-creatures ;  the  ac- 
tual sensations  are  not.  That  which  other  people  be- 
come aware  of  when,  and  on  the  same  grounds  as  I  do, 
seems  more  real  to  me  than  that  which  they  do  not  know 
of  unless  I  tell  them.  The  world  of  Possible  Sensations 
succeeding  one  another  according  to  laws,  is  as  much  in 
other  beings  as  it  is  in  me ;  it  has  therefore  an  existence 
outside  me ;  it  is  an  External  World. 

If  this  explanation  of  the  origin  and  growth  of  the 
idea  of  Matter,  or  External  Nature,  contains  nothing  at 
variance  with  natural  laws,  it  is  at  least  an  admissible 
supposition,  that  the  element  of  Non-ego  which  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  regards  as  an  original  datum  of  consciousness, 
and  which  we  certainly  do  find  in  our  present  conscious- 
ness, may  not  be  one  of  its  primitive  elements  —  may 
not  have  existed  at  all  in  its  first  manifestations.  But  if 
this  supposition  be  admissible,  it  ought,  on  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton's principles,  to  be  received  as  true.  The  first  of 
the  laws  laid  down  by  him  for  the  interpretation  of  Con- 
sciousness, the  law  (as  he  terms  it)  of  Parcimony,  for- 


BELIEF  IN   AN   EXTERNAL   WORLD.  243 

bids  to  suppose  an  original  principle  of  our  nature  in 
order  to  account  for  phenomena  which  admit  of  possible 
explanation  from  known  causes.  If  the  supposed  in- 
gredient of  consciousness  be  one  which  might  grow  up 
(though  we  cannot  prove  that  it  did  grow  up)  through 
later  experience ;  and  if,  when  it  had  so  grown  up,  it 
would,  by  known  laws  of  our  nature,  appear  as  com- 
pletely intuitive  as  our  sensations  themselves ;  we  are 
bound,  according  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  and  all  sound 
philosophy,  to  assign  to  it  that  origin.  Where  there  is 
a  known  cause  adequate  to  account  for  a  phenomenon, 
there  is  no  justification  for  ascribing  it  to  an  unknown 
one.  And  what  evidence  does  Consciousness  furnish  of 
the  intuitiveness  of  an  impression,  except  instantaneous- 
ness,  apparent  simplicity,  and  unconsciousness  on  our 
part  of  how  the  impression  came  into  our  minds  ?  These 
features  can  only  prove  the  impression  to  be  intuitive,  on 
the  hypothesis  that  there  are  no  means  of  accounting  for 
them  otherwise.  If  they  not  only  might,  but  naturally 
would,  exist,  even  on  the  supposition  that  it  is  not  intui- 
tive, we  must  accept  the  conclusion  to  which  we  are  led 
by  the  Psychological  Method,  and  which  the  Introspec- 
tive Method  furnishes  absolutely  nothing  to  contradict.  , .-,  ^ 

Q^atter,  then,  may  be  defined,  a  Permanent  Possibility  ' 
of  SensationJ  If  I  am  asked  whether  I  believe  in 
matter,  I  ask  whether  the  questioner  accepts  this  defini- 
tion of  it.  If  he  does,  I  believe  in  matter :  and  so  do 
all  Berkeleians.  In  any  other  sense  than  this,  I  do  not. 
But  I  affirm  with  confidence,  that  this  conception  of 
Matter  includes  the  whole  meaning  attached  to  it  by  the 
common  world,  apart  from  philosophical,  and  sometimes 
from  theological,  theories.  The  reliance  of  mankind  on 


244      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

the  real  existence  of  visible  and  tangible  objects,  means 
reliance  on  the  reality  and  permanence  of  Possibilities  of 
visual  and  tactual  sensations,  when  no  such  sensations 
are  actually  experienced.  We  are  warranted  in  believ- 
ing that  this  is  the  meaning  of  Matter  in  the  minds  of 
many  of  its  most  esteemed  metaphysical  champions, 
though  they  themselves  would  not  admit  as  much :  for 
example,  of  Reid,  Stewart,  and  Brown.  For  these 
three  philosophers  alleged  that  all  mankind,  including 
Berkeley  and  Hume,  really  believed  in  Matter,  inasmuch 
as  unless  they  did,  they  would  not  have  turned  aside  to 
save  themselves  from  running  against  a  post.  Now,  all 
which  this  mano2uvre  really  proved  is,  that  they  believed 
in  Permanent  Possibilities  of  Sensation.  We  have 
therefore  the  sanction  of  these  three  eminent  defenders 
of  the  existence  of  matter,  for  affirming,  that  to  believe 
in  Permanent  Possibilities  of  Sensation  is  believing  in 
Matter.  It  is  hardly  necessary,  after  such  authorities, 
to  mention  Dr.  Johnson,  or  any  one  else  who  resorts  to 
the  argumentum  baculinum  of  knocking  a  stick  against 
the  ground.  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  a  far  subtler  thinker 
than  any  of  these,  never  reasons  in  this  manner.  Pie 
never  supposes  that  a  disbeliever  in  what  he  means  by 
Matter,  ought  in  consistency  to  act  in  any  different  mode 
from  those  who  believe  in  it.  He  knew  that  the  belief 
on  which  all  the  practical  consequences  depend,  is  the 
belief  in  Permanent  Possibilities  of  Sensation,  and  that 
if  nobody  believed  in  a  material  universe  in  any  other 
sense,  life  would  go  on  exactly  as  it  now  does.  He, 
however,  did  believe  in  more  than  this,  but,  I  think, 
only  because  it  had  never  occurred  to  him  that  mere 
Possibilities  of  Sensation  could,  to  our  artificialized  con- 


BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  245 

sciousness,  present  the  character  of  objectivity  which,  as 
we  have  now  shown,  they  not  only  can,  but  unless  the 
known  laws  of  the  human  mind  were  suspended,  must 
necessarily,  present. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  objected,  that  the  very  possibility 
of  framing  such  a  notion  of  Matter  as  Sir  "W.  Hamil- 
ton's—  the  capacity  in  the  human  mind  of  imagining  an 
external  world  which  is  anything  more  than  what  the 
Psychological  Theory  makes  it — amounts  to  a  disproof 
of  the  theory.  If  (it  may  be  said)  we  had  no  revelation 
in  consciousness,  of  a  world  which  is  not  in  some  way  or 
other  identified  with  sensation,  we  should  be  unable  to 
have  the  notion  of  such  a  world.  (If  the  only  ideas  we 
had  of  external  objects  were  ideas  of  our  sensations, 
supplemented  by  an  acquired  notion  of  permanent  possi- 
bilities of  sensation,  we  must  (it  is  thought)  be  incapable 
of  conceiving,  and  therefore  still  more  incapable  of  fan- 
cying that  we  perceive,  things  which  are  not  sensations 
at  all.  It  being  evident,  however,  that  some  philosophers 
believe  this,  and  it  being  maintainable  that  the  mass  of 
mankind  do  so,  the  existence  of  a  perdurable  basis  of 
sensations,  distinct  from  sensations  themselves,  is  proved, 
it  might  be  said,  by  the  possibility  of  believing  it. 

Let  me  first  restate  what  I  apprehend  the  belief  to 
be.  We  believe  that  we  perceive  a  something  closely 
related  to  all  our  sensations,  but  different  from  those 
which  we  are  feeling  at  any  particular  minute ;  and  dis- 
tinguished from  sensations  altogether,  by  being  perma- 
nent and  always  the  same,  while  these  are  fugitive, 
variable,  and  alternately  displace  one  another.  But 
these  attributes  of  the  object  of  perception  are  properties 
belonging  to  all  the  possibilities  of  sensation  which 


*o     to 

VOL.  I.  11 


246      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

experience  guarantees.  The  belief  in  such  permanent 
possibilities  seems  to  me  to  include  all  that  is  essential 
or  characteristic  in  the  belief  in  substance.  I  believe 
that  Calcutta  exists,  though  I  do  not  percewe  it,  and  that 
it  would  still  exist  if  every  percipient  inhabitant  were 
suddenly  to  leave  the  place,  or  be  struck  dead.  But  when 
I  analyze  the  belief,  all  I  find  in  it  is,  that  were  these 
events  to  take  place,  the  Permanent  Possibility  of  Sen- 
sation which  I  call  Calcutta  would  still  remain ;  that  if 
I  were  suddenly  transported  to  the  banks  of  the  Hoogly, 
I  should  still  have  the  sensations  which,  if  now  present, 
would  lead  me  to  affirm  that  Calcutta  exists  here  and 
now.  We  may  infer,  therefore,  that  both  philosophers 
and  the  world  at  large,  when  they  think  of  matter,  con- 
ceive it  really  as  a  Permanent  Possibility  of  Sensation. 
But  the  majority  of  philosophers  fancy  that  it  is  some- 
thing more ;  and  the  world  at  large,  though  they  have 
really,  as  I  conceive,  nothing  in  their  minds  but  a  Per- 
manent Possibility  of  Sensation,  would,  if  asked  the 
question,  undoubtedly  agree  with  the  philosophers  :  and 
though  this  is  sufficiently  explained  by  the  tendency  of 
the  human  mind  to  infer  difference  of  things  from 
difference  of  names,  I  acknowledge  the  obligation  of 
showing  how  it  can  be  possible  to  believe  in  an  existence 
transcending  all  possibilities  of  sensation,  unless  on  the 
hypothesis  that  such  an  existence  actually  is,  and  that  we 
actually  perceive  it. 

The  explanation,  however,  is  not  difficult.  It  is  an 
admitted  fact,  that  we  are  capable  of  all  conceptions 
which  can  be  formed  by  generalizing  from  the  observed 
laws  of  our  sensations.  Whatever  relation  we  find  to 
exist  between  any  one  of  our  sensations  and  something 


* 

BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  247 

different  from  it,  that  same  relation  we  have  no  difficulty 
in  conceiving  to  exist  between  the  sum  of  all  our  sensa-  j 
tions  and  something  different  from  them.  The  differ- 
ences which  our  consciousness  recognizes  between  one 
sensation  and  another,  give  us  the  general  notion  of  dif- 
ference, and  inseparably  associate  with  every  sensation 
we  have,  the  feeling  of  its  being  different  from  other 
things ;  and  when  once  this  association  has  been  formed, 
we  can  no  longer  conceive  anything,  without  being  able, 
and  even  being  compelled,  to  form  also  the  conception  of 
something  different  from  it.  This  familiarity  with  the  idea 
of  something  different  from  each  thing  we  know,  makes 
it  natural  and  easy  to  form  the  notion  of  something  dif- 
ferent from  all  things  that  we  know,  collectively  as  well 
as  individually.  It  is  true  we  can  form  no  conception  of 
what  such  a  thing  can  be  ;  our  notion  of  it  is  merely  neg- 
ative ;  but  the  idea  of  substance,  apart  from  the  impres- 
sions it  makes  on  our  senses,  is  a  merely  negative  one. 
There  is  thus  no  psychological  obstacle  to  our  forming 
the  notion  of  a  something  which  is  neither  a  Sensation 
nor  a  possibility  of  sensation,  even  if  our  consciousness 
does  not  testify  to  it ;  and  nothing  is  more  likely  than 
that  the  Permanent  Possibilities  of  sensation,  to  which 
our  consciousness  does  testify,  should  be  confounded  in 
our  minds  with  this 'imaginary  conception.  All  experi- 
ence attests  the  strength  of  the  tendency  to  mistake 
mental  abstractions,  even  negative  ones,  for  substantive 
realities ;  and  the  Permanent  Possibilities  of  sensation 
which  experience  guarantees,  are  so  extremely  unlike  in 
many  of  their  properties  to  actual  sensations,  that  since 
we  are  capable  of  imagining  something  which  transcends 
sensation,  there  is  a  great  natural  probability  that  we 
should  suppose  these  to  be  it. 


248      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OP  THE 

But  this  natural  probability  is  converted  into  certainty, 
when  we  take  into  consideration  that  universal  law  of 
our  experience  which  is  termed  the  law  of  Causation,  and 
which  makes  us  unable  to  conceive  the  beginning  of 
anything  without  an  antecedent  condition ,  or  Cause.  The 
case  of  Causation  is  one  of  the  most  marked  of  all  the 
cases  in  which  we  extend  to  the  sum  total  of  our  con- 
sciousness, a  notion  derived  from  its  parts,  (jtt,  is  a 
striking  example  of  our  power  to  conceive,  and  our  ten- 
dency to  believe,  that  a  relation  which  subsists  between 
every  individual  item  of  our  experience  and  some  other 
item,  subsists  also  between  our  experience  as  a  whole, 
and  something  not  within  the  sphere  of  experience.^  By 
this  extension  to  the  sum  of  all  our  experiences,  of  the 
internal  relations  obtaining  between  its  several  parts,  we 
are  led  to  consider  sensation  itself — the  airffrefrate  whole 

oo      o 

of  our  sensations  —  as  deriving  its  origin  from  antece- 
dent existences  transcending  sensation.  That  we  should 
do  this,  is  a  consequence  of  the  particular  character  of 
the  uniform  sequences,  which  experience  discloses  to  us 
among  our  sensations.  As  already  remarked,  the  con- 
stant antecedent  of  a  sensation  is  seldom  another  sensa- 
tion, or  set  of  sensations,  actually  felt.  It  is  much  of- 
tener  the  existence  of  a  group  of  possibilities,  not  neces- 
sarily including  any  actual  sensations,  except  such  as  are 
required  to  show  that  the  possibilities  are  really  present. 
Nor  are  actual  sensations  indispensable  even  for  this  pur- 
pose ;  for  the  presence  of  the  object  (which  is  nothing 
more  than  the  immediate  presence  of  the  possibilities) 
may  be  made  known  to  us  by  the  very  sensation  which 
we  refer  to  it  as  its  effect.  Thus,  the  real  antecedent  of 
an  effect  —  the  only  antecedent  which,  being  invariable 


BELIEF  IN  AN  EXTEENAL  WORLD.  219 

and  unconditional,  we  consider  to  be  the  cause — may 
be,  not  any  sensation  really  felt,  but  solely  the  presence, 
at  that  or  the  immediately  preceding  moment,  of  a 
group  of  possibilities  of  sensation.  Hence  it  is  not 
with  sensations  as  actually  experienced,  but  with  their 
Permanent  Possibilities,  that  the  idea  of  Cause  comes  to 
be  identified  :  and  we,  by  one  and  the  same  process,  ac- 
quire the  habit  of  regarding  Sensation  in  general,  like 
all  our  individual  sensations,  as  an  Effect,  and  also  that 
of  conceiving  as  the  causes  of  most  of  our  individual 
sensations,  not  other  sensations,  but  general  possibilities 
of  sensation.  If  all  these  considerations  put  together  do 
not  completely  explain  and  account  for  our  conceiving 
these  Possibilities  as  a  class  of  independent  and  substan- 
tive entities,  I  know  not  what  psychological  analysis  can 
be  conclusive. 

It  may  perhaps  be  said,  that  the  preceding  theory 
gives,  indeed,  some  account  of  the  idea  of  Permanent 
Existence  which  forms  part  of  our  conception  of  matter, 
but  gives  no  explanation"  of  our  believing  these  perma- 
nent objects  to  be  external,  or  out  of  ourselves.  I  ap- 
prehend, on  the  contrary,  that  the  very  idea  of  anything 
out  of  ourselves  is  derived  solely  from  the  knowledge 
experience  gives  us  of  the  Permanent  Possibilities.  Our 
sensations  we  carry  with  us  wherever  we  go,  and  they 
never  exist  where  we  are  not ;  but  when  we  change  our. 
place  we  do  not  carry  away  with  us  the  Permanent  Pos- 
sibilities of  Sensation :  they  remain  until  we  return,  or 
arise  and  cease  under  conditions  with  which  our  presence 
has  in  general  nothing  to  do.  And  more  than  all  —  they 
are,  and  will  be  after  we  have  ceased  to  feel,  Permanent 
Possibilities  of  sensation  to  other  beings  than  ourselves. 


250  BELIEF  IN   AN  EXTERNAL  WORLD. 

Thus  our  actual  sensations  and  the  permanent  possibili- 
ties of  sensation,  stand  out  in  obtrusive  contrast  to  one 
another  :  and  when  the  idea  of  Cause  has  been  acquired, 
and  extended  by  generalization  from  the  parts  of  our 
experience  to  its  aggregate  whole  /^nothing  can  be  more 
natural  than  that  the  Permanent  Possibilities  should  be 
classed  by  us  as  existences  generically  distinct  from  our 
sensations,  but  of  which  our  sensations  are  the  effect^ 

The  same  theory  which  accounts  for  our  ascribing  to 
an  aggregate  of  possibilities  of  sensation,  a  permanent 
existence  which  our  sensations  themselves  do  not  possess, 
and  consequently  a  greater  reality  than  belongs  to  our 
sensations,  also  explains  our  attributing  greater  objectiv- 
ity to  the  Primary  Qualities  of  bodies  than  to  the  Second- 
ary. For  the  sensations  which  correspond  to  what 
are  called  the  Primary  Qualities  (as  soon  at  least  as  we 
come  to  apprehend  them  by  two  senses,  the  eye  as  well 
as  the  touch)  are  always  present  when  any  part  of  the 
group  is  so.  But  colors,  tastes,  smells,  and  the  like, 
being,  in  comparison,  fugacious,  are  not,  in  the  same 
degree,  conceived  as  being  always  there,  even  when 
nobody  is  present  to  perceive  them.  The  sensations 
answering  to  the  Secondary  Qualities  are  only  occasional, 
those  to  the  Primary,  constant.  The  Secondary,  more- 
over, vary  with  different  persons,  and  with  the  temporary 
sensibility  of  our  organs  :  the  Primary,  when  perceived 
at  all,  are,  as  far  as  we  know,  the  same  to  all  persons 
and  at  all  times. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  AS   APPLIED   TO  MIND.      251 


CHAPTER  XH. 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF   THE   BELIEF  IN  MAT- 
TER,   HOW   FAR   APPLICABLE   TO   MIND. 

IF  the  deductions  in  the  preceding  chapter  are  cor- 
rectly drawn  from  known  and  admitted  laws  of  the 
human  mind,  the  doctrine  which  forms  the  basis  of  Sir 
W.  Hamilton's  system  of  psychology,  that  Mind  and 
Matter,  an  ego  and  a  non-ego,  are  original  data  of  con- 
sciousness, is  deprived  of  its  foundation.  Although  these 
two  elements,  an  Ego  and  a  Non-ego,  are  in  our  con- 
sciousness now,  and  are,  or  seem  to  be,  inseparable  from 
it,  there  is  no  reason  for  believing  that  the  latter  of  them, 
the  non-ego,  was  in  consciousness-  from  the  beginning ; 
since,  even  if  it  was  not,  we  can  perceive  a  way  in  which 
it  not  only  might,  but  must  have  grown  up.  We  can 
see  that,  supposing  it  absent  in  the  first  instance,  it  would 
inevitably  be  present  now,  not  as  a  deliverance  of  con- 
sciousness in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  sense,  —  for  to  call  it  so 
is  to  beg  the  question, — but  as  an  instantaneous  and  ir- 
resistible suggestion  and  inference,  which  has  become  by 
long  repetition  undistinguishable  from  a  direct  intuition. 
I  now  propose  to  carry  the  inquiry  a  step  farther,  and  to 
examine  whether  the  Ego,  as  a  deliverance  of  conscious- 
ness, stands  on  any  firmer  ground  than  the  Non-ego ; 
whether,  at  the  first  moment  of  our  experience,  we 
already  have  in  our  consciousness  the  conception  of  Self 
as  a  permanent  existence ;  or  whether  it  is  formed  subse- 


252          THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  MATTER 

quently,  and  admits  of  a  similar  analysis  to  that  which 
we  have  found  that  the  notion  of  Not-self  is  suscep- 
tible of. 

It  is  evident,  in  the  first  place,  that  our  knowledge  of 
mind,  like  that  of  matter,  is  entirely  relative ;  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  indeed  affirms  this  of  mind,  in  a  much  more 
unqualified  manner  than  he  believes  it  of  matter,  making 
no  reservation  of  any  Primary  Qualities.  "  In  so  far  * 
as  mind  is  the  common  name  for  the  states  of  knowing, 
willing,  feeling,  desiring,  &c.,  of  which  I  am  conscious, 
it  is  only  the  name  for  a  certain  series  of  connected  phe- 
nomena or  qualities,  and  consequently  expresses  only 
what  is  known.  But  in  so  far  as  it  denotes  that  subject 
or  substance  in  which  the  phenomena  of  knowing,  will- 
ing, &c.,  inhere,  —  something  behind  or  under  these 
phenomena,  —  it  expresses  what,  in  itself,  or  in  its  abso- 
lute existence,  is  unknown."  We  have  no  conception 
of  Mind  itself,  as  distinguished  from  its  conscious  mani- 
festations. We  neither  know  nor  can  imagine  it,  except 
as  represented  by  the  succession  of  manifold  feelings 
which  metaphysicians  call  by  the  name  of  States  or 
Modifications  of  Mind.  It  is  nevertheless  true  that  our 
notion  of  Mind,  as  well  as  of  Matter,  is  the  notion  of  a 
permanent  something,  contrasted  with  the  perpetual  flux 
of  the  sensations  and  other  feelings  or  mental  states 
which  we  refer  to  it ;  a  something  which  we  figure  as 
remaining  the  same,  while  the  particular  feelings  through 
which  it  reveals  its  existence,  change.  This  attribute  of 
Permanence,  supposing  that  there  were  nothing  else  to 
be  considered,  would  admit  of  the  same  explanation 
when  predicated  of  Mind,  as  of  Matter.  The  belief  I 

*  Lectures,  i.  138. 


HOW  FAR  APPLICABLE  TO  MIND.        253 

entertain  that  my  mind  exists,  when  it  is  not  feeling,  nor 
thinking,  nor  conscious  of  its  own  existence,  resolves 
itself  into  the  belief  of  a  Permanent  Possibility  of  these 
states.  If  I  think  of  myself  as  in  dreamless  sleep,  or 
in  the  sleep  of  death,  and  believe  that  I,  or  in  other 
words  my  mind,  is  or  will  be  existing  through  these 
states,  though  not  in  conscious  feeling,  the  most  scrupu- 
lous examination  of  my  belief  will  not  detect  in  it  any 
fact  actually  believed,  except  that  my  capability  of  feel- 
ing is  not,  in  that  interval,  permanently  destroyed,  and  is 
suspended  only  because  it  does  not  meet  with  the  combi- 
nation of  outward  circumstances  which  would  call  it  into 
action :  the  moment  it  did  meet  with  that  combination  it 
would  revive,  and  remains,  therefore,  a  Permanent  Possi- 
bility. Thus  far,  there  seems  no  hinder ance  to  our 
regarding  Mind  as  nothing  but  the  series  of  our  sensa- 
tions (to  which  must  now  be  added  our  internal  feelings) , 
as  they  actually  occur,  with  the  addition  of  infinite  pos- 
sibilities of  feeling  requiring  for  their  actual  realization 
conditions  which  may  or  may  not  take  place,  but  which 
as  possibilities  are  always  in  existence,  ard  many  of  them 
present. 

The  Permanent  Possibility  of  feeling,  which  forms  my 
notion  of  Myself,  is  distinguished  by  important  differ- 
ences from  the  Permanent  Possibilities  of  sensation 
which  form  my  notion  of  what  I  call  external  objects. 
In  the  first  place,  each  of  these  last  represents  a  small 
and  perfectly  definite  part  of  the  series  which,  in  its 
entireness,  forms  my  conscious  existence  —  a  single 
group  of  possible  sensations,  which  experience  tells  me  I 
might  expect  to  have  under  certain  conditions ;  as  dis- 
(tinguished  from  mere  vague  and  indefinite  possibilities, 
11  * 


254          THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY   OF  MATTER 

which  are  considered  such  only  because  they  are  not 
known  to  be  impossibilities.  My  notion  of  Myself,  on 
the  contrary,  includes  all  possibilities  of  sensation,  defi- 
nite or  infinite,  certified  by  experience  or  not,  which  I 
may  imagine  inserted  in  the  series  of  my  actual  and  con- 
scious states.  In  the  second  place,  the  Permanent  Pos- 
bt  sibilities  which  I  call  outward  objects,  are  possibilities  of 
sensation  only,  while  the  series  which  I  call  Myself 
includes,  along  with  and  as  called  up  by  these,  thoughts, 
emotions,  and  volitions,  and  Permanent  Possibilities  of 
such.  Besides  that  these  states  of  mind  are,  to  our  con- 
sciousness, generically  distinct  from  the  sensations  of  our 
outward  senses,  they  are  further  distinguished  from  them 
by  not  occurring  in  groups,  consisting  of  separate  ele- 
ments which  coexist,  or  may  be  made  to  coexist,  with  one 
another.  Lastly  (and  this  difference  is  the  most  impor- 
tant of  all)  the  Possibilities  of  Sensation  which  are 
called  outward  objects,  are  possibilities  of  it  to  other 
beings  as  well  as  to  me  :  but  the  particular  series  of  feel- 
ings which  constitutes  my  own  life,  is  confined  to  myself: 
no  other  sentient  being  shares  it  with  me. 

In  order  to  the  further  understanding  of  the  bearings 
of  this  theory  of  the  Ego,  it  is  advisable  to  consider  it 
in  its  relation  to  three  questions,  which  may  very  nat- 
urally be  asked  with  reference  to  it,  and  which  often 
have  been  asked,  and  sometimes  answered  very  erro- 
neously. If  the  theory  is  correct,  and  my  Mind  is  but 
a  series  of  feelings,  or,  as  it  has  been  called,  a  thread  of 
consciousness,  however  supplemented  by  believed  Possi- 
bilities of  consciousness  which  are  not,  though  they  might 
be,  realized  ;  if  this  is  all  that  Mind,  or  Myself,  amounts 
to,  what  evidence  have  I  (it  is  asked)  of  the  existence 


HOW  FAB  APPLICABLE  TO  MIND.        255 

of  my  fellow-creatures?  What  evidence  of  a  hyper- 
physical  world,  or,  in  one  word,  of  God?  and,  lastly, 
what  evidence  of  immortality? 

Dr.  Eeid  unhesitatingly  answers,  None.  If  the  doc- 
trine is  true,  I  am  alone  in  the  universe. 

I  hold  this  to  be  one  of  Reid's  most  palpable  mistakes. 
Whatever  evidence  to  each  of  the  three  points  there  is  on 
the  ordinary  theory,  exactly  that  same  evidence  is  there 
on  this. 

In  the  first  place,  as  to  my  fellow-creatures.  Reid 
seems  to  have  imagined  that  if  I  myself  am  only  a  series 
of  feelings,  the  proposition  that  I  have  any  fellow- 
creatures,  or  that  there  are  any  Selves  except  mine,  is 
but  words  without  a  meaning.  But  this  is  a  misappre- 
hension. All  that  I  am  compelled  to  admit  if  I  receive 
this  theory,  is  that  other  people's  Selves  also  are  but 
series  of  feelings,  like  my  own.  Though  my  Mind,  as  I 
am  capable  of  conceiving  it,  be  nothing  but  the  succes- 
sion of  my  feelings,  and  though  Mind  itself  may  be 
merely  a  possibility  of  feelings,  there  is  nothing  in  that 
doctrine  to  prevent  my  conceiving,  and  believing,  that 
there  are  other  successions  of  feelings  besides  those  of 
wliich  I  am  conscious,  and  that  these  are  as  real  as  my 
own.  The  belief  is  completely  consistent  with  the  meta- 
physical theory.  Let  us  now  see  whether  the  theory 
takes  away  the  grounds  of  it. 

What  are  those  grounds?  By  what  evidence  do  I 
know,  or  by  what  considerations  am  I  led  to  believe, 
that  there  exist  other  sentient  creatures  ;  that  the  walk- 
ing and  speaking  figures  which  I  see  and  hear,  have  sen- 
sations and  thoughts,  or,  in  other  words,  possess  Minds? 
The  most  strenuous  Intuitionist  does  not  include  this 


256          THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  MATTER 

among  the  things  that  I  know  by  direct  intuition.  ^ 
conclude  it  from  certain  things,  which  my  experience  oT 
my  own  states  of  feeling  proves  to  me  to  be  marks  of  it. 
These  marks  are  of  two  kinds,  antecedent  and  subse- 
quent ;  the  previous  conditions  requisite  for  feeling,  and 
the  effects  or  consequences  of  it.  I  conclude  that  other 
human  beings  have  feelings  like  rne,  because,  first,  they 
have  bodies  like  me,  which  I  know,  in  my  own  case,  to 
be  the  antecedent  condition  of  feelings ;  and  because, 
secondly,  they  exhibit  the  acts,  and  other  outward  signs, 
which  in  my  own  case  I  know  by  experience  to  be  caused 
by  feelings.  I  am  conscious  in  myself  of  a  series  of  facts 
connected  by  a  uniform  sequence,  of  which  the  begin- 
ning is  modifications  of  my  body,  the  middle  is  feelings, 
the  end  is  outward  demeanor.  In  the  case  of  other 
human  beings  I  have  the  evidence  of  my  senses  for  the 
first  and  last  links  of  the  series,  but  not  for  the  inter- 
mediate link.  I  find,  however,  that  the  sequence  between 
the  first  and  last  is  as  regular  and  constant  in  those  other 
cases  as  it  is  in  mine.  In  my  own  case  I  know  that  the 
first  link  produces  the  last  through  the  intermediate  link, 
and  could  not  produce  it  without.  Experience,  there- 
fore, obliges  me  to  conclude  that  there  must  be  an  inter- 
mediate link ;  which  must  either  be  the  same  in  others 
as  in  myself,  or  a  different  one :  I  must  either  believe 
them  to  be  alive,  or  to  be  automatons  :  and  by  believing 
them  to  be  alive,  that  is,  by  supposing  the  link  to  be  of 
the  same  nature  as  in  the  case  of  which  I  have  expe- 
rience, and  which  is  in  all  other  respects  similar,  I  bring 
other  human  beings,  as  phenomena,  under  the  same 
generalizations  which  I  know  by  experience  to  be  the 
true  theory  of  my  own  existence.  And  in  doing  so  I 


HOW  FAR  APPLICABLE  TO   MIND.  257 

conform  to  the  legitimate  rules  of  experimental  inquiry. 
The  process  is  exactly  parallel  to  that  by  which  Newton 
proved  that  the  force  which  keeps  the  planets  in  their 
orbits  is  identical  with  that  by  which  an  apple  falls  to  the 
ground.  It  was  not  incumbent  on  Newton  to  prove  the 
impossibility  of  its  being  any  other  force  ;  he  was  thought 
to  have  made  out  his  point  when  he  had  simply  shown, 
that  no  other  force  need  be  supposed.  We  know  the 
existence  of  other  beings  by  generalization  from  the 
knowledge  of  our  own ;  the  generalization  merely  pos- 
tulates that  what  experience  shows  to  be  a  mark  of  the 
existence  of  something  witliin  the  sphere  of  our  con- 
sciousness, may  be  concluded  to  be  a  mark  of  the  same 
thing  beyond  that  sphere. 

This  logical  process  loses  none  of  its  legitimacy  on 
the  supposition  that  neither  Mind  nor  Matter  is  any- 
thing but  a  permanent  possibility  of  feeling.  Whatever 
sensation  I  have,  I  at  once  refer  it  to  one  of  the  perma- 
nent groups  of  possibilities  of  sensation  which  I  call 
material  objects.  But  among  these  groups  I  find  there 
is  one  (my  own  body)  which  is  not  only  composed,  like 
the  rest,  of  a  mixed  multitude  of  sensations  and  possi-' 
bilities  of  sensation,  but  is  also  connected,  in  a  peculiar 
manner,  with  all  my  sensations.  Not  only  is  this  spe- 
cial group  always  present  as  an  antecedent  condition  ot 
every  sensation  I  have,  but  the  other  groups  are  only  en- 
abled to  convert  their  respective  possibilities  of  sensation 
into  actual  sensations,  by  means  of  some  previous  change 
in  that  particular  one.  I  look  about  me,  and  though 
there  is  only  one  group  (or  body)  which  is  connected 
with  all  my  sensations  in  this  peculiar  manner,  I  observe 
that  there  is  a  great  multitude  of  other  bodies,  closely 


258    THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  MATTER 

resembling  in  their  sensible  properties  (in  the  sensations 
composing  them  as  groups)  this  particular  one,  but  whose 
modifications  do  not  call  up,  as  those  of  my  own  body  do, 
a  world  of  sensations  in  my  consciousness.  Since  they 
do  not  do  so  in  my  consciousness,  I  infer  that  they  do  it 
out  of  my  consciousness,  and  that  to  each  of  them  be- 
longs a  world  of  consciousness  of  its  own,  to  which  it 
stands  in  the  same  relation  in  which  what  I  call  my  own 
body  stands  to  mine.  And  having  made  this  generaliza- 
tion, I  find  that  all  other  facts  within  my  reach  agree 
with  it.  Each  of  these  bodies  exhibits  to  my  senses  a 
set  of  phenomena  (composed  of  acts  and  other  manifes- 
tations) such  as  I  know,  in  my  own  case,  to  be  effects 
of  consciousness,  and  such  as  might  be  looked  for  if  each 
of  the  bodies  has  really  in  connection  with  it  a  world  of 
consciousness.  All  this  is  as  good  and  genuine  an  induc- 
tive process  on  the  theory  we  are  discussing,  as  it  is  on 
the  common  theory.  Any  objection  to  it  in  the  one  case 
would  be  an  equal  objection  in  the  other.  I  have  stated 
the  postulate  required  by  the  one  theory :  the  common 
theory  is  in  need  of  the  same.  If  I  could  not,  from  my 
personal  knowledge  of  one  succession  of  feelings,  infer 
the  existence  of  other  successions  of  feelings,  when 
manifested  by  the  same  outward  signs,  I  could  just  as 
little,  from  my  personal  knowledge  of  a  single  spiritual 
substance,  infer  by  generalization,  when  I  find  the  same 
outward  indications,  the  existence  of  other  spiritual  sub- 
stances. 

As  the  theory  leaves  the  evidence  of  the  existence  of 
my  fellow-creatures  exactly  as  it  was  before,  so  does 
it  also  with  that  of  the  existence  of  God.  Supposing 
me  to  believe  that  the  Divine  Mind  is  simply  the  series 


HOW  FAB  APPLICABLE  TO  MIND.  259 

of  the  Divine  thoughts  and  feelings  prolonged  through 
eternity,  that  would  be,  at  any  rate,  believing  God's  ex- 
istence to  be  as  real  as  my  own.  And  as  for  evidence, 
the  argument  of  Paley's  Natural  Theology,  or,  for  that 
matter,  of  his  Evidences  of  Christianity,  would  stand 
exactly  where  it  does.  The  Design  argument  is  drawn 
from  the  analogy  of  human  experience.  From  the  rela- 
tion which  human  works  bear  to  human  thoughts  and 
feelings,  it  infers  a  corresponding  relation  between 
works,  more  or  less  similar  but  superhuman,  and  super- 
human thoughts  and  feelings.  If  it  proves  these,  no- 
body but  a  metaphysician  needs  care  whether  or  not  it 
proves  a  mysterious  substratum  for  them.  Again,  the 
arguments  for  Revelation  undertake  to  prove  by  testi- 
mony, that  within  the  sphere  of  human  experience  works 
were  done  requiring  a  greater  than  human  power,  and 
words  said  requiring  a  greater  than  human  wisdom. 
These  positions,  and  the  evidences  of  them,  neither  lose 
nor  gain  anything  by  our  supposing  that  the  wisdom 
only  means  wise  thoughts  and  volitions,  and  that  the 
power  means  thoughts  and  volitions  followed  by  impos- 
ing phaenomena. 

As  to  Immortality,  it  is  precisely  as  easy  to  conceive, 
that  a  succession  of  feelings,  a  thread  of  consciousness, 
may  be  prolonged  to  eternity,  as  that  a  spiritual  sub- 
stance forever  continues  to  exist ;  and  any  evidence 
which  would  prove  the  one,  will  prove  the  other.  Meta- 
physical theologians  may  lose  the  a  priori  argument  by 
which  they  have  sometimes  flattered  themselves  with 
having  proved  that  a  spiritual  substance,  by  the  essen- 
tial constitution  of  its  nature,  cannot  perish.  But  they 
had  better  drop  this  argument  in  any  case.  To  do  them 
justice,  they  seldom  insist  on  it  now. 


260          THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  MATTER 

The  notion  that  metaphysical  Scepticism,  even  at  the 
utmost  length  to  which  it  ever  has  been,  or  is  capable 
of  being,  carried,  has  for  its  logical  consequence  atheism, 
is  grounded  on  an  entire  misapprehension  of  the  Scep- 
tical argument,  and  has  no  locus  standi  except  for  per- 
sons who  think  that  whatever  accustoms  people  to  a  rigid 
scrutiny  of  evidence  is  unfavorable  to  religious  belief. 
This  is  the  opinion,  doubtless,  of  those  who  do  not  be- 
lieve in  any  religion,  and  seemingly  of  a  great  number 
who  do ;  but  it  is  not  the  opinion  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton, 
who  says*  that  "religious  disbelief  and  philosophical 
scepticism  are  not  merely  not  the  same,  but  have  no 
natural  connection ; "  and  who,  as  we  have  seen,  makes 
use  of  the  veracity  of  the  Deity  as  his  principal  argu- 
ment for  trusting  the  testimony  of  consciousness  to  the 
substantiality  of  Matter  and  of  Mind,  which  would  have 
been  a  gross  petitio  principii  if  he  had  thought  that  our 
assurance  of  the  divine  attributes  required  that  the 
objective  existence  of  Matter  and  Mind  should  be  first 
recognized. 

The  theory,  therefore,  which  resolves  Mind  into  a 
series  of  feelings,  with  a  background  of  possibilities  of 
feeling,  can  effectually  withstand  the  most  invidious  of 
the  arguments  directed  against  it.  But,  groundless  as 
are  the  extrinsic  objections,  the  theory  has  intrinsic 
difficulties  which  we  have  not  yet  set  forth,  and  which  it 
seems  to  me  beyond  the  power  of  metaphysical  analysis 
to  remove.  Besides  present  feelings,  and  possibilities  of 
present  feeling,  there  is  another  class  of  phenomena  to 
be  included  in  an  enumeration  of  the  elements  making 
up  our  conception  of  Mind.  The  thread  of  conscious- 

*  Lectures,  L  394. 


HOW  FAR  APPLICABLE  TO   MIND.  261 

ness  which  composes  the  mind's  phenomenal  life,  consists 
not  only  of  present  sensations,  but  likewise,  in  part, 
of  memories  and  expectations.  Now,  what  are  these? 
In  themselves,  they  are  present  feelings,  states  of  present 
consciousness,  and  in  that  respect  not  distinguished  from 
sensations.  They  all,  moreover,  resemble  some  given 
sensations  or  feelings,  of  which  we  have  previously  had 
experience.  But  they  are  attended  with  the  peculiarity, 
that  each  of  them  involves  a  belief  in  more  than  its  own 
present  existence.  A  sensation  involves  only  this ;  but 
a  remembrance  of  sensation,  even  if  not  referred  to  any 
particular  date,  involves  the  suggestion  and  belief  that  a 
sensation,  of  which  it  is  a  copy  or  representation,  actually 
existed  in  the  past ;  and  an  expectation  involves  the 
belief,  more  or  less  positive,  that  a  sensation  or  other 
feeling  to  which  it  directly  refers,  will  exist  in  the  future.) 
Nor  can  the  phenomena  involved  in  these  two  states  "of 
consciousness  be  adequately  expressed,  without  saying, 
that  the  belief  they  include  is,  that  I  myself  formerly 
had,  or  that  I  myself,  and  no  other,  shall  hereafter  have, 
the  sensations  remembered  or  expected.  The  fact  be- 
lieved is,  that  the  sensations  did  actually  form,  or  will 
hereafter  form,  part  of  the  self-same  series  of  states,  or 
thread  of  consciousness,  of  which  the  remembrance  or 
expectation  of  those  sensations  is  the  part  now  present. 
If,  therefore,  we  speak  of  the  Mind  as  a  series  of  feel- 
ings, we  are  obliged  to  complete  the  statement  by  calling 
it  a  series  of  feelings  which  is  aware  of  itself  as  past 
and  future ;  and  we  are  reduced  to  the  alternative  of 
believing  that  the  Mind,  or  Ego,  is  something  different 
from  any  series  of  feelings,  or  possibilities  of  them,  or  of 
accepting  the  paradox,  that  something  which  ex  hypothesi 


262    THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  MATTER. 

is  but  a  series  of  feelings,  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a 
series. 

The  truth  is,  that  we  are  here  face  to  face  with  that 
\final  inexplicability^  at  which,  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton  ob- 
serves, we  inevitably  arrive  when  we  reach  ultimate 
facts  ;  and  in  general,  one  mode  of  stating  it  only  appears 
more  incomprehensible  than  another,  because  the  whole 
of  human  language  is  accommodated  to  the  one,  and  is 
so  incongruous  with  the  other,  that  it  cannot  be  expressed 
in  any  terms  which  do  not  deny  its  truth.  The  real 
stumbling  block  is  perhaps  not  in  any  theory  of  the  fact, 
but  in  the  fact  itself.  The  true  incomprehensibility  per- 
haps is,  that  something  which  has  ceased,  or  is  not  yet 
in  existence,  can  still  be,  in  a  manner,  present ;  that  a 
series  of  feelings,  the  infinitely  greater  part  of  which  is 
past  or  future,  can  be  gathered  up,  as  it  were,  into  a 
single  present  conception,  accompanied  by  a  belief  of 
reality.  I  think,  by  far  the  wisest  thing  we  can  do,  is 
to  accept  the  inexplicable  fact,  without  any  theory  of 
how  it  takes  place ;  and  when  we  are  obliged  to  speak 
of  it  in  terms  which  assume  a  theory,  to  use  them  with  a 
reservation  as  to  their  meaning. 

I  have  stated  the  difficulties  attending  the  attempt  to 
frame  a  theory  of  Mind,  or  the  Ego,  similar  to  what  I 
have  called  the  Psychological  Theory  of  Matter,  or  the 
Non-ego.  No  such  difficulties  attend  the  theory  in  its 
application  to  Matter ;  and  I  leave  it,  as  set  forth,  to  pass 
for  whatever  it  is  worth  as  an  antagonist  doctrine  to  that 
of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  and  the  Scottish  School,  respecting 
the  non-ego  as  a  deliverance  of  consciousness.* 

*  Mr.  Mansel,  in  his  "  Prolegomena  Logica,"  shows  a  perception  of  the 
difference  here  pointed  out  between  the  character  of  the  Psychological 


THE  PRIMARY  QUALITIES  OP  MATTER.  263 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL   THEORY   OF   THE   PRIMARY 
QUALITIES    OF   MATTER. 

FOR  the  reasons  which  have  been  set  forth,  I  conceive 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  to  be  wrong  in  his  statement  that  a 
Self  and  a  Not-self  are  immediately  apprehended  in  our 
primitive  consciousness.  We  have,  in  all  probability,  no 
notion  of  not-self,  until  after  considerable  experience  of 
the  recurrence  of  sensations  according  to  fixed  laws,  and 
in  groups.  But  without  the  notion  of  not-self,  we  can- 
not have  that  of  self  which  is  contrasted  with  it :  and 
independently  of  this,  it  is  not  credible  that  the  first  sen- 
sation which  we  experience,  awakens  in  us  any  notion  of 
an  Ego  or  Self.  To  refer  it  to  an  Ego  is  to  consider  it 
as  part  of  a  series  of  states^of  consciousness,  some  portion 
of  which  is  already  past.  C.The  identification  of  a  present 
state  with  a  remembered  state  cognized  as  past,  is  what, 
to  my  thinking,  constitutes  the  cognition  that  it  is  I  who 
feel  it.  "  I "  means  he  who  saw,  touched,  or  felt  some- 
thing yesterday  or  the  day  before^  No  single  sensation 
can  suggest  personal  identity :  this  requires  a  series  of 

explanation  of  the  belief  in  Matter,  and  that  of  the  belief  in  Mind  ;  and  he 
resolves  the  question  by  drawing  a  distinction  between  the  two  Noumcna, 
not  often  drawn  by  philosophers  posterior  to  Berkeley.  He  considers  the 
Ego  to  be  a  direct  presentation  of  consciousness,  while  with  regard  to  the 
Non-ego  he  is  not  far  from  adopting  the  Berkeleian  theory.  The  whole  of 
his  remarks  on  the  subject  are  well  worth  reading.  See  Prolegomena 
Logica,  pp.  123,  135. 


264      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

sensations,  thought  of  as  forming  a  line  of  succession, 
and  summed  up  in  thought  into  a  Unity. 

But  (however  this  may  be)  throughout  the  whole  of 
our  sensitive  life  except  its  first  beginnings,  we  unques- 
tionably refer  our  sensations  to  a  me  and  a  not-me.  As 
soon  as  I  have  formed,  on  the  one  hand,  the  notion  of 
Permanent  Possibilities  of  Sensation,  and  on  the  other, 
of  that  continued  series  of  feelings  which  I  call  my  life, 
both  these  notions  are,  by  an  irresistible  association,  re- 
called by  every  sensation  I  have.  They  represent  two 
things,  with  both  of  which  the  sensation  of  the  moment, 
be  it  what  it  may,  stands  in  relation,  and  I  cannot  be 
conscious  of  the  sensation  without  being  conscious  of  it 
as  related  to  these  two  things.  They  have  accordingly 
received  relative  names,  expressive  of  the  double  relation 
in  question.  (The  thread  of  consciousness  which  I  ap- 
prehend the  sensation  as  a  part  of,  is  the  subject  of  the 
sensation.  The  group  of  Permanent  Possibilities  of 
Sensation  to  which  I  refer  it,  and  which  is  partially  real- 
ized and  actualized  in  it,  is  the  object  of  the  sensation. 
The  sensation  itself  ought  to  have  a  correlative  name,  or 
rather,  ought  to  have  two  such  names,  one  denoting  the 
sensation  as  opposed  to  its  Subject,  the  other  denoting 
it  as  opposed  to  its  Object.  But  it  is  a  remarkable  fact, 
that  this  necessity  has  not  been  felt,  and  that  the  need 
of  a  correlative  name  to  every  relative  one  has  been  con- 
sidered to  be  satisfied  by  the  terms  Object  and  Subject 
themselves  ;  the  object  and  the  subject  not  being  attended 
to  in  the  relation  which  they  respectively  bear  to  the 
sensation,  but  being  regarded  as  directly  correlated  with 
one  another.  It  is  true  that  they  are  related  to  one 
another,  but  only  through  the  sensation :  their  relation 


PRIMARY   QUALITIES   OF   MATTER.  265 

to  each  other  consists  in  the  peculiar  and  different  rela- 
tion in  which  they  severally  stand  to  the  sensation.  We 
have  no  conception  of  either  Subject  or  Object,  either 
Mind  or  Matter,  except  as  something  to  which  we  refer 
our  sensations,  and  whatever  other  feelings  we  are  con- 
scious of.  The  very  existence  of  them  both,  so  far  as 
cognizable  by  us,  consists  only  in  the  relation  they  re- 
spectively bear  to  our  states  of  feeling.  Their  relation 
to  each  other  is  only  the  relation  between  those  two  rela- 
tions. The  immediate  correlatives  are  not  the  pair, 
Object,  Subject,  but  the  two  pairs,  Object,  Sensation 
objectively  considered;  Subject,  Sensation  subjectively 
considered.  The  reason  why  this  is  overlooked,  might 
easily  be  shown,  and  would  furnish  a  good  illustration 
of  that  important  part  of  the  Laws  of  Association  which 
may  be  termed  the  Laws  of  Obliviscence. 

I  have  next  to  speak  of  a  psychological  fact,  also  a 
consequence  of  the  laws  of  Association,  and  without  a 
full  appreciation  of  which,  the  idea  of  Matter  can  only 
be  understood  in  its  original  groundwork,  but  not  in  the 
superstructure  which  the  laws  of  our  actual  experience 
have  raised  upon  it.  There  are  certain  of  our  sensations 
which  we  are  accustomed  principally  to  consider  subjec- 
tively, and  others  which  we  are  principally  accustomed 
to  consider  objectively,  (jn  the  case  of  the  first,  the  rela- 
tion in  which  we  most  frequently,  most  habitually,  and 
therefore  most  easily  consider  them,  is  their  relation  to 
the  series  of  feelings  of  which  they  form  a  part,  and 
which,  consolidated  by  thought  into  a  single  conception, 
is  termed  the  Subject.  In  the  case  of  the  second,  the 
relation  in  which  we  by  preference  contemplate  them  is 
their  relation  to  some  group,  or  some  kind  of  group,  of 


266      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

Permanent  Possibilities  of  Sensation,  the  present  exist- 
ence of  which  is  certified  to  us  by  the  sensation  we  are  at 
the  moment  feeling  —  and  which  is  termed  the  Object. 
The  difference  between  these  two  classes  of  our  sensa- 
tions, answers  to  the  distinction  made  by  the  majority  of 
philosophers  between  the  Primary  and  the  Secondary 
Qualities  of  Matter. 

We  can,  of  course,  think  of  all  or  any  of  our  sensa- 
tions in  relation  to  their  Objects,  that  is,  to  the  perma- 
nent groups  of  possibilities  of  sensation  to  which  we 
mentally  refer  them.  This  is  the  main  distinction  be- 
tween our  sensations,  and  what  we  regard  as  our  purely 
mental  feelings.  These  we  do  not  refer  to  any  groups  of 
Permanent  Possibilities  ;  and  in  regard  to  them  the  dis- 
tinction of  Subject  and  Object  is  merely  nominal.  These 
feelings  have  no  Objects,  except  by  metaphor.  There  is 
nothing  but  the  feeling  and  its  Subject.  Metaphysicians 
are  obliged  to  call  the  feeling  itself  the  object.  Our  sen- 
sations, on  the  contrary,  have  all  of  them  objects  ;  they 
all  are  capable  of  being  classed  under  some  group  of  Per- 
manent Possibilities,  and  being  referred  to  the  presence 
of  that  particular  set  of  possibilities  as  the  antecedent 
condition  or  cause  of  their  own  existence.  There  are, 
however,  some  of  our  sensations,  in  our  consciousness  of 
which  the  reference  to  their  Object  does  not  play  so  con- 
spicuous and  predominant  a  part  as  in  others.  This  is 
particularly  the  case  with  sensations  which  are  highly 
interesting  to  us  on  their  own  account,  and  on  which  we 
willingly  dwell,  or  which  by  their  intensity  compel  us  to 
concentrate  our  attention  on  them.  These  are,  of  course, 
our  pleasures  and  pains.  In  the  case  of  these,  our  atten- 
tion is  naturally  given  in  a  greater  degree  to  the  sensa- 


PRIMARY   QUALITIES   OP   MATTER.  267 

tions  themselves,  and  only  in  a  less  degree  to  that  whose 
existence  they  are  marks  of.  And  of  the  two  concep- 
tions to  which  they  stand  in  relation,  the  one  to  which 
we  have  most  tendency  to  refer  them  is  the  Subject ;  be- 
cause our  pleasures  and  pains  are  of  no  more  importance 
as  marks  than  any  of  our  other  sensations,  but  are  of 
very  much  more  importance  than  any  others  as  parts  of 
the  thread  of  consciousness  which  constitutes  our  sentient 
life.  Many,  indeed,  of  our  internal  bodily  pains  we 
should  hardly  refer  to  an  Object  at  all,  were  it  not  for 
the  knowledge,  late  and  slowly  acquired,  that  they  are 
always  connected  with  a  local  organic  disturbance,  of 
which  we  have  no  present  consciousness,  and  which  is, 
therefore,  a  mere  Possibility  of  Sensation.  Those  of  our 
sensations,  on  the  contrary,  which  are  almost  indifferent 
in  themselves,  our  attention  does  not  dwell  on  ;  our  con- 
sciousness of  them  is  too  momentary  to  be  distinct,  and 
we  pass  on  from  them  to  the  Permanent  Possibilities  of 
Sensation  which  they  are  the  signs  of,  and  which  alone 
are  important  to  us.  /  We  hardly  notice  the  relation  be- 
tween these  sensations  and  the  subjective  chain  of  con- 
sciousness of  which  they  form  so  extremely  insignificant 
a  part :  the  sensation  is  hardly  anything  to  us  but  the 
link  which  draws  into  our  consciousness  a  group  of  Per- 
manent Possibilities  ;  this  group  is  the  only  thing  distinct- 
ly present  to  our  thoughts^  The  unimpressive  organic 
sensation  merges  in  the  mere  mental  suggestion,  and  we 
seem  to  cognize  directly  that  which  we  think  of  only  by 
association,  and  know  only  by  inference.  Sensation  is 
in  a  manner  blotted  out,  and  Perception  seems  to  be  in- 
stalled in  its  place.  This  truth  is  expressed,  though  not 
with  sufficient  distinctness,  in  a  favorite  doctrine  of  Sir 


2G8      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

W.  Hamilton,  that  in  the  operations  of  our  senses  Sen- 
sation is  greatest  when  Perception  is  least,  and  least 
when  it  is  greatest ;  or,  as  he,  by  a  very  inaccurate  use  of 
mathematical  language,  expresses  it,  Sensation  and  Per- 
ception are  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  one  another. 

With  regard  to  those  sensations  which,  without  being 
absolutely  indifferent,  are  not,  in  any  absorbing  degree, 
painful  or  pleasurable,  we  habitually  think  of  them  only 
as  connected  with,  or  proceeding  from,  Objects,  And  I 
am  disposed  to  believe,  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  many 
philosophers,  that  any  of  our  senses,  or  at  all  events  any 
combination  of  more  than  one  sense,  would  have  been 
sufficient  to  give  us  some  idea  of  Matter.  If  we  had 
only  the  senses  of  smell,  taste,  and  hearing,  but  had  the 
sensations  according  to  fixed  laws  of  coexistence,  so  that 
whenever  we  had  any  one  of  them  it  marked  to  us  a 
present  possibility  of  having  all  the  others,  I  am  inclined 
to  think  that  we  should  have  formed  the  notion  of  groups 
of  possibilities  of  sensation,  and  should  have  referred 
every  particular  sensation  to  one  of  these  groups,  which, 
in  relation  to  all  the  sensations  so  referred  to  it,  would 
have  become  an  Object,  and  would  have  been  in- 
vested in  our  thoughts  with  the  permanency  and  exter- 
nality which  belong  to  Matter.  But  though  we  might, 
in  this  supposed  case,  have  had  an  idea  of  Matter,  that 
idea  would  necessarily  have  been  of  a  very  different 
complexion  from  what  we  now  have.  For,  as  we  are 
actually  constituted,  our  sensations  of  smell,  taste,  and 
hearing,  and  (as  I  believe,  with  nearly  all  philosophers) 
those  of  sight  also,  are  not  grouped  together  directly, 
but  through  the  connection  which  they  all  have,  by  laws 
of  coexistence  or  of  causation,  with  the  sensations  which 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES   OF  MATTER.  269 

are  referable  to  the  sense  of  touch  and  to  the  muscles ; 
those  which  answer  to  the  terms  (Resistance s  Extension, 
and  Figure^}  These,  therefore,  become  the  leading  and 
conspicuous  elements  in  all  the  groups  :  where  these  are, 
the  group  is  :  every  other  member  of  the  group  presents 
itself  to  our  thoughts,  less  as  what  it  is  in  itself,  than  as 
a  mark  of  these.  As  the  entire  group  stands  in  the 
relation  of  Object  to  any  one  of  the  component  sensa- 
tions which  is  realized  at  a  given  moment,  so  do  these 
special  parts  of  the  group  become,  in  a  manner,  Object, 
in  relation  not  only  to  actual  sensations,  but  to  all 
the  remaining  Possibilities  of  Sensation  which  the  group 
includes.  The  Permanent  Possibilities  of  sensations  of 
touch  and  of  the  muscles,  form  a  group  within  the  group 
—  a  sort  of  inner  nucleus,  conceived  as  more  fundamen- 
tal than  the  rest,  on  which  all  the  other  possibilities  of  sen- 
sation included  in  the  group  seem  to  depend ;  these  being 
regarded,  in  one  point  of  view,  as  effects  of  which  that 
nucleus  is  the  cause,  in  another  as  attributes  of  which  it 
is  the  substratum  or  substance.  In  this  manner  our  con- 
ception of  Matter  comes  ultimately  to  consist  of  Resist- 
ance, Extension,  and -Figure,  together  with  miscellaneous 
powers  of  exciting  other  sensations.  These  three  attri- 
butes become  its  essential  constituents,  and  where  these 
are  not  found,  we  hesitate  to  apply  the  name. 

Of  these  properties,  which  are  consequently  termed 
the  Primary  Qualities  of  Matter,  the  most  fundamental 
is  Resistance ;  as  is  proved  by  numerous  scientific  con- 
troversies^ When  the  question  arises  whether  something 
which  affects  our  senses  in  a  peculiar  way,  as  for  instance 
whether  Heat,  or  Light,  or  Electricity,  is  or  is  not  Mat- 
ter, what  seems  always  to  be  meant  is,  does  it  offer  any, 

VOL.  I.  12 


270  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL   THEORY  OP  THE 

however  trifling,  resistance  to  motion  ?  If  it  were  shown 
that  it  did,  this  would  at  once  terminate  all  doubt. 
That  Resistance  is  only  another  name  for  a  sensation  of 
our  muscular  frame,  combined  with  one  of  touch,  has 
been  pointed  out  by  many  philosophers,  and  can  scarcely 
any  longer  be  questioned.  When  we  contract  the  mus- 
cles of  our  arm,  either  by  an  exertion  of  will,  or  by 
an  involuntary  discharge  of  our  spontaneous  nervous 
activity,  the  contraction  is  accompanied  by  a  state  of 
sensation,  which  is  different  according  as  the  locomotion 
consequent  on  the  muscular  contraction  continues  freely, 
or  meets  with  an  impediment.  In  the  former  case,  the 
sensation  is  that  of  motion  through  empty  space.  After 
having  had  (let  us  suppose)  this  experience  several  times 
repeated,  we  suddenly  have  a  different  experience  :  the 
series  of  sensations  accompanying  the  motion  of  our 
arm  is  brought,  without  intention  or  expectation  on  our 
part,  to  an  abrupt  close.  This  interruption  would  not, 
of  itself,  necessarily  suggest  the  belief  in  an  external 
obstacle.  The  hinderance  might  be  in  our  organs ;  it 
might  arise  from  paralysis,  or  simple  loss  of  power 
through  fatigue.  But  in  either  of  these  cases,  the  mus- 
cles would  not  have  been  contracted,  and  we  should  not 
have  had  the  sensation  which  accompanies  their  contrac- 
tion. We  may  have  had  the  will  to  exert  our  muscular 
force,  but  the  exertion  has  not  taken  place.*  If  it  does 

*  Sir  TV.  Hamilton  thinks  (Dissertations  on  Reid,  pp.  854,  8-55)  that  we 
are  conscious  of  resistance  through  a  "  mental  effort  or  nisus  to  move," 
distinct  both  from  the  original  will  to  move,  and  from  the  muscular  sen- 
sation :  "  for  we  are,"  he  says,  "  conscious  of  it,  though  by  a  narcosis  or 
gtupor  of  the  sensitive  nerves  we  lose  all  feeling  of  the  movement  of  the 
limb  ;  though  by  a  paralysis  of  the  motive  nerves  no  movement  of  the 
limb  follows  the  mental  effort  to  move ;  though  by  an  abnormal  stimulus 
of  the  muscular  fibres  a  contraction  in  them  is  caused  even  in  opposition 


PRIMARY  QUALITIES  OF  MATTER.  271 

take  place,  and  is  accompanied  by  the  usual  muscular 
sensation,  but  the  expected  sensation  of  locomotion  does 
not  follow,  we  have  what  is  called  the  feeling  of  Resist- 
ance, or,  in  other  words,  of  muscular  motion  impeded ; 
and  that  feeling  is  the  fundamental  element  in  the  notion 
of  Matter  which  results  from  our  common  experience. 
But  simultaneously  with  this  feeling  of  Resistance,  we 
have  also  feelings  of  touch ;  sensations  of  which  the 
organs  are  not  the  nerves  diffused  through  our  muscles, 
but  those  which  form  a  network  under  the  skin  ;  the  sen- 
sations which  are  produced  by  passive  contact  with  bodies, 
without  muscular  action.  As  these  skin  sensations  of 
simple  contact  invariably  accompany  the  muscular  sensa- 
tion of  resistance —  for  we  must  touch  the  object  before 
we  can  feel  it  resisting  our  pressure  —  there  is  early 
formed  an  inseparable  association  between  them.  When- 
ever we  feel  resistance,  we  have  first  felt  contact ;  when- 
ever we  feel  contact,  we  know  that  were  we  to  exercise 
muscular  action,  we  should  feel  more  or  less  resistance, 
^jnjthis  manner  is  formed  the  first  fundamental  group  of 
Permanent  Possibilities  of  Sensation  ;  and  as  we  in  time 
recognize  that  all  our  other  sensations  are  connected  in 
point  of  fact  with  Permanent  Possibilities  of  resistance, 
—  that  in  coexistence  with  them  we  should  always,  by 
sufficient  search,  encounter  something  which  would  give 
us  the  feeling  of  contact  combined  with  the  muscular 
sensation  of  resistance,  — our  idea  of  Matter,  as  a  Resist- 
ing Cause  of  miscellaneous  sensations,  is  now  constituted^. 
Let  us  observe,  in  passing,  the  elementary  example 

to  our  will."  If  all  this  is  true  —  though  by  what  experiments  it  has  been 
substantiated  we  are  not  told  —  it  does  not  by  any  means  show  that  there 
is  a  mental  nisus  not  physical,  but  merely  removes  the  seat  of  the  nisus 
from  the  nerves  to  the  brain. 


272      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

here  afforded  of  the  Law  of  Inseparable  Association, 
and  the  efficacy  of  that  law  to  construct  what,  after  it 
has  been  constructed,  is  undistinguishable,  by  any  direct 
interrogation  of  consciousness,  from  an  intuition.  The 
sensation  produced  by  the  simple  contact  of  an  object 
with  the  skin,  without  any  pressure,  —  or  even  with  pres- 
sure, but  without  any  muscular  reaction  against  it,  — is  no 
more  likely  than  a  sensation  of  warmth  or  cold  would  be, 
to  be  spontaneously  referred  to  any  cause  external  to 
ourselves.  But  when  the  constant  coexistence,  in  ex- 
perience, of  this  sensation  of  contact  with  that  of 
Resistance  to  our  muscular  effort  whenever  such  effort 
is  made,  has  erected  the  former  sensation  into  a  mark  or 
sign  of  a  Permanent  Possibility  of  the  latter,  from 
that  time  forward,  no  sooner  do  we  have  the  skin  sensa- 
tion which  we  call  a  sensation  of  contact,  than  we 
cognize,  or,  as  wre  call  it,  perceive,  something  exter- 
nal, corresponding  to  the  idea  we  now  form  of  Matter, 
as  a  resisting  object.  Our  sensations  of  touch  have  be- 
come representative  of  the  sensations  of  resistance  with 
which  they  habitually  coexist ;  just  as  philosophers  have 
shown  that  the  sensations  of  different  shades  of  color 
given  by  our  sense  of  sight,  and  the  muscular  sen- 
sations accompanying  the  various  movements  of  the 
eye,  become  representative  of  those  sensations  of  touch 
and  of  the  muscles  of  locomotion,  which  are  the  only 
real  meaning  of  what  we  term  the  distance  of  a  body 
from  us.* 

*  Sir  W.  Hamilton  draws  a  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  resistance, 
or  rather,  between  two  senses  of  the  word :  the  one,  that  which  I  have 
mentioned,  and  which  is  a  sensation  of  our  muscular  frame  ;  the  other,  the 
property  of  Matter  which  the  old  writers  called  Impenetrability,  bcin£  that 
by  which,  however  capable  of  being  compressed  into  a  smaller  space,  it 


PRIMARY  QUALITIES  OF  MATTER.  273 

The  next  of  the  primary  qualities  of  Body  is  Exten- 
sion ;  which  has  long  been  considered  as  one  of  the 
principal  stumbling  blocks  of  the  Psychological  Theory. 
Reid  and  Stewart  were  willing  to  let  the  whole  question 
of  the  intuitive  character  of  our  knowledge  of  Matter, 
depend  on  the  inability  of  psychologists  to  assign  any 
origin  to  the  idea  of  Extension,  or  analyze  it  into  any 
combination  of  sensations  and  reminiscences  of  sensa- 
tion. Sir  W.  Hamilton  follows  their  example  in  laying 
great  stress  on  this  point. 

The  answer  of  the  opposite  school  I  will  present  in 
its  latest  and  most  improved  form,  as  given  by  Professor 
Bain,  of  Aberdeen,  in  the  First  Part  of  his  great  work 
on  the  Mind.* 

Mr.  Bain  recognizes  two  principal  kinds  or  modes  of 
discriminative  sensibility  in  the  muscular  sense  :  the  one 
corresponding  -to  the  degree  of  intensity  of  the  muscular 
effort  —  the  amount  of  energy  put  forth  ;  the  other  cor- 
responding to  the  duration  —  the  longer  or  shorter  con- 
tinuance of  the  same  effort.  The  first  makes  us  ac- 
quainted with  degrees  of  resistance  ;  which  we  estimate 
by  the  intensity  of  the  muscular  energy  required  to  over- 
refuses  to  part  with  all  its  extension,  and  be  extruded  from  space  alto- 
gether. But  these  two  kinds  of  resistance  are  merely  two  modes  of 
regarding  and  naming  the  same  state  of  consciousness ;  for  if  the  body 
could  be  pressed  entirely  out  of  space,  the  only  way  in  which  we  should 
discover  that  it  had  vanished  would  be  by  the  sudden  cessation  of  all  sen- 
sations of  resistance.  It  is  always  the  muscular  sensation  which  consti- 
tutes the  presence,  and  its  negation  the  absence,  of  body,  in  any  given 
portion  of  space. 

*  "  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect,"  pp.  113-117.  My  first  extract  is  from 
the  original  edition,  for  in  the  one  recently  published  (and  enriched  by 
many  valuable  improvements)  the  exposition  I  now  quote  is  given  more 
summarily,  and  in  a  manner  otherwise  less  suited  for  my  purpose. 


274      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OP  THE 

come  it.  To  the  second  we  owe,  in  Mr.  Bain's  opinion, 
our  idea  of  Extension. 

"  When  a  muscle  begins  to  contract,  or  a  limb  to  bend, 
we  have  a  distinct  sense  of  how  far  the  contraction  and 
the  bending  are  carried  ;  there  is  something  in  the  special 
sensibility  that  makes  one  mode  of  feeling  for  half  con- 
traction, another  mode  for  three  fourths,  and  another  for 
total  contraction.  Our  feeling  of  moving  organs,  or  of 
contracting  muscles,  has  been  already  affirmed  to  be  dif- 
ferent from  our  feeling  of  dead  tension  —  something  more 
intense,  keen,  and  exciting ;  and  I  am  now  led  to  assert, 
from  my  best  observations,  and  by  inference  from  ac- 
knowledged facts,  that  the  extent  of  range  of  a  move- 
ment, the  degree  of  shortening  of  a  muscle,  is  a  matter 
of  discriminative  sensibility.  I  believe  it  to  be  much  less 
pronounced,  less  exact,  than  the  sense  of  resistance  above 
described,  but  to  be  not  the  less  real  and  demonstrable. 

"  If  we  suppose  a  weight  raised,  by  the  flexing  of 
the  arm,  first  four  inches,  and  then  eight  inches,  it  is 
obvious  that  the  mere  amount  of  exertion  or  expended 
power  will  be  greater,  and  the  sensibility  increased  in 
proportion.  In  this  view,  the  sense  of  range  would 
simply  be  the  sense  of  a  greater  or  less  continuance  of 
the  same  effort,  that  effort  being  expended  in  move- 
ment. We  can  have  no  difficulty  in  believing  that  there 
should  be  a  discriminating  sensibility  in  this  case ;  it 
seems  very  natural  that  we  should  be  differently  affected 
by  an  action  continued  four  or  five  times  longer  than 
another.  If  this  be  admitted,  as  true  to  observation, 
and  as  inevitably  arising  from  the  existence  of  any  dis- 
crimination whatsoever  of  degrees  of  expended  power, 
everything  is  granted  that  is  contended  for  at  present. 


PRIMARY  QUALITIES   OF  MATTER.  27f 

It  is  not  meant  to  affirm  that  at  each  degree  of  shorten- 
ing of  a  muscle,  or  each  intermediate  attitude  of  a  limb, 
there  is  an  impression  made  on  the  centres  that  can  be 
distinguished  from  the  impression  of  every  other  position 
or  degree  of  shortening ;  it  is  enough  to  require  that  the 
range  or  amount  of  movement  gone  over  should  be  a 
matter  of  distinct  perception,  through  the  sensibility  to 
the  amount  of  force  expended  in  time,  the  degree  of 
effort  being  the  same.  The  sensibility  now  in  question 
differs  from  the  former  (from  sensibility  to  the  intensity 
of  effort)  chiefly  in  making  the  degree  turn  upon  dura- 
tion, and  not  upon  the  amount  expended  each  instant ; 
arid  it  seems  to  me  impossible  to  deny  that  force  in- 
creased or  diminished  simply  as  regards  continuance,  is 
as  much  a  subject  of  discriminative  sensibility  as  force 
increased  or  diminished  in  the  intensity  of  the  sus- 
tained effort.  .  . 

"  If  the  sense  of  degrees  of  range  be  thus  admitted  as 
a  genuine  muscular  determination,  its  functions  in  out- 
ward perception  are  very  important.  The  attributes  of 
extension  and  space  fall  under  its  scope.  In  the  first 
place,  it  gives  the  feeling  of  linear  extension,  inasmuch 
as  this  is  measured  by  the  sweep  of  a  limb,  or  other  organ 
moved  by  muscles.  The  difference  between  six  inches 
and  eighteen  inches  is  expressed  to  us  by  the  different 
degrees  of  contraction  of  some  one  group  of  muscles ; 
those,  for  example,  that  flex  the  arm,  or,  in  walking, 
those  that  flex  or  extend  the  lower  limb.  The  inward 
impression  corresponding  to  the  outward  fact  of  six  inches 
in  length,  is  an  impression  arising  from  the  continued 
shortening  of  a  muscle,  a  true  muscular  sensibility.  It 
is  the  impression  of  a  muscular  effort  having  a  certain 


276      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OP  THE 

continuance ;  a  greater  length  produces  a  greater  con- 
tinuance (or  a  more  rapid  movement) ,  and  in  consequence 
an  increased  feeling  of  expended  power. 

"The  discrimination  of  length  in  any  one  direction 
includes  extension  in  any  direction.  Whether  it  be 
length,  breadth,  or  height,  the  perception  has  precisely 
the  same  character.  Hence  superficial  and  solid  dimen- 
sions, the  size  or  magnitude  of  a  solid  object,  come  to  be 
felt  in  a  similar  manner.  .  .  . 

"  It  will  be  obvious  that  what  is  called  situation  or 
Locality  must  come  under  the  same  head,  as  these  are 
measured  by  distance  taken  along  with  direction  ;  direc- 
tion being  itself  estimated  by  distance,  both  in  common 
observation  and  in  mathematical  theory.  In  like  man- 
ner, form  or  shape  is  ascertained  through  the  same 
primitive  sensibility  to  extension  or  range. 

"  By  the  muscular  sensibility  thus  associated  with  pro- 
longed contraction  we  can  therefore  compare  different  de- 
grees of  the  attribute  of  space,  in  other  words,  difference 
of  length,  surface,  situation,  and  form.  When  compar- 
ing two  different  lengths  we  can  feel  which  is  the  greater, 
just  as  in  comparing  two  different  weights  or  resist- 
ances. We  can  also,  as  in  the  case  of  weight,  acquire 
some  absolute  standard  of  comparison,  through  the  per- 
manency of  impressions  sufficiently  often  repeated.  We 
can  engrain  the  feeling  of  contraction  of  the  muscles  of 
the  lower  limb  due  to  a  pace  of  thirty  inches,  and  can 
say  that  some  one  given  pace  is  less  or  more  than  this 
amount.  According  to  the  delicacy  of  the  muscular 
tissue  we  can,  by  shorter  or  longer  practice,  acquire  dis- 
tinct impressions  for  every  standard  dimension,  and  can 
decide  at  once  whether  a  given  length  is  four  inches  or 


PRIMARY  QUALITIES  OP  MATTER.  277 

four  and  a  half,  nine  or  ten,  twenty  or  twenty-one.  This 
sensibility  to  size,  enabling  us  to  dispense  with  the  use 
of  measures  of  length,  is  an  acquirement  suited  to  many 
mechanical  operations.  In  drawing,  painting,  and  en- 
graving, and  in  the  plastic  arts,  the  engrained  discrimi- 
nation of  the  most  delicate  differences  is  an  indispensable 
qualification. 

"  The  third  attribute  of  muscular  discrimination  is  the 
velocity  or  speed  of  the  movement.  It  is  difficult  to 
separate  this  from  the  foregoing.  In  the  feeling  of  range, 
velocity  answers  the  same  purpose  as  continuance  ;  both 
imply  an  enhancement  of  effort,  or  of  expended  power, 
different  in  its  nature  from  the  increase  of  dead  effort  in 
one  fixed  situation.  We  must  learn  to  feel  that  a  slow 
motion  for  a  long  time  is  the  same  as  a  quicker  motion 
with  less  duration ;  which  we  can  easily  do  by  seeing 
that  they  both  produce  the  same  effect  in  exhausting  the 
full  range  of  a  limb.  If  we  experiment  upon  the  differ- 
ent ways  of  accomplishing  a  total  sweep  of  the  arm,  we 
shall  find  that  the  slow  movements  long  continued  are 
equal  to  quick  motions  of  short  continuance,  and  we  are 
thus  able  by  either  course  to  acquire  to  ourselves  a  meas- 
ure of  range  and  lineal  extension.  .  .  . 

"  We  would  thus  trace  the  perception  of  the  mathe- 
matical and  mechanical  properties  of  matter  to  the  mus- 
cular sensibility  alone.  We  admit  that  this  perception 
is  by  no  means  very  accurate  if  we  exclude  the  special 
senses,  but  we  are  bound  to  show  at  the  outset  that  these 
senses  are  not  essential  to  the  perception,  as  we  shall  af- 
terwards show  that  it  is  to  the  muscular  apparatus  asso- 
ciated with  the  senses  that  their  more  exalted  sensibility 
must  be  also  ascribed.  The  space  moved  through  by  the 
12* 


278      THE  PYSCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

foot  in  pacing  may  be  .appreciated  solely  through  the 
muscles  of  the  limb,  as  well  as  by  the  movements  of  the 
touching  hand  or  the  seeing  eye.  Whence  we  may  ac- 
cede to  the  assertion  sometimes  made,  that  the  proper- 
ties of  space  might  be  conceived,  or  felt,  in  the  absence 
of  an  external  world,  or  of  any  other  matter  than  that 
composing  the  body  of  the  percipient  being;  for  the 
body's  own  movements  in  empty  space  would  suffice  to 
make  the  very  same  impressions  on  the  mind  as  the 
movements  excited  by  outward  objects.  A  perception 
of  length,  or  height,  or  speed,  is  the  mental  impression, 
or  state  of  consciousness,  accompanying  some  mode  of 
muscular  movement,  and  this  movement  may  be  gener- 
ated from  within  as  well  as  from  without ;  in  both  cases 
the  state  of  consciousness  is  exactly  the  same." 

A  Theory  of  Extension  somewhat  similar,  though  less 
clearly  unfolded,  was  advanced  by  Brown,  and  as  it 
stands  in  his  statement,  fell  under  the  criticism  of  Sir 
W.  Hamilton ;  who  gives  it,  as  he  thinks,  a  short  and 
crushing  refutation,  as  follows  :  *  — 

"  As  far  as  I  can  find  his  meaning  in  his  cloud  of 
words,  he  argues  thus  :  — The  notion  of  Time  or  succes- 
sion being  supposed,  that  of  longitudinal  extension  is 
given  in  the  succession  of  feelings  which  acompanies  the 
gradual  contraction  of  a  muscle ;  the  notion  of  this  suc- 
cession constitutes,  ipso  facto,  the  notion  of  a  certain 
length ;  and  the  notion  of  this  length  (he  quietly  takes 
for  granted)  is  the  notion  of  longitudinal  extension 
sought.  The  paralogism  here  is  transparent.  Length 
is  an  ambiguous  term ;  and  it  is  length  in  space,  exten- 
sive length,  and  not  length  in  time,  protensive  length, 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  869. 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES    OP    MATTER.  279 

whose  notion  it  is  the  problem  to  evolve.  To  convert, 
therefore,  the  notion  of  a  certain  kind  of  length  (and 
that  certain  kind  being  also  confessedly  only  length  in 
time)  into  the  notion  of  a  length  in  space,  is  at  best  an 
idle  begging  of  the  question.  —  Is  it  not  ?  Then  I  would 
ask,  whether  the  series  of  feelings  of  which  we  are 
aware  in  the  gradual  contraction  of  a  muscle,  involves 
the  consciousness  of  being  a  succession  in  length,  (1)  in 
time  alone?  or  (2)  in  space  alone?  or  (3)  in  time  and 
space  together  ?  These  three  cases  will  be  allowed  to  be 
exhaustive.  If  the  first  be  affirmed ;  if  the  succession 
appear  in  consciousness  a  succession  in  time  exclusively, 
then  nothing  has  been  accomplished ;  for  the  notion  of 
extension  or  space  is  in  no  way  contained  in  the  notion 
of  duration  or  time.  Again,  if  the  second  or  third  is 
affirmed ;  if  the  series  appear  to  consciousness  a  succes- 
sion in  length,  either  in  space  alone,  or  in  space  and 
time  together,  then  is  the  notion  it  behooved  to  generate 
employed  to  generate  itself." 

(The  dilemma  looks  formidable,  but  one  of  its  horns 
is  blunt ;  for  the  very  assertion  of  Brown,  and  of  all 
who  hold  the  Psychological  theory,  is,  that  the  notion  of 
length  in  space,  not  being  in  our  consciousness  origi- 
nally, is  constructed  by  the  mind's  laws  out  of  the  notion 
of  length  in  time.  Their  argument  is  not,  as  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  fancied^  a  fallacious  confusion  between  two 
different  meanings  of  the  word  length,  but  an  identifica- 
tion of  them  as  one.  Sir  W.  Hamilton  did  not  fully 
understand  the  argument.  He  saw  that  a  succession  of 
feelings,  such  as  that  which  Brown  spoke  of,  could  not 
possibly  give  us  the  idea  of  simultaneous  existence. 
But  he  was  mistaken  in  supposing  that  Brown's  argu- 


280      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OP  THE 

ment  implied  this  absurdity.  The  notion  of  simulta- 
neity must  be  supposed  to  have  been  already  acquired  ; 
as  it  necessarily  would  be  at  the  very  earliest  period, 
from  the  familiar  fact  that  we  often  have  sensations 
simultaneously.  What  Brown  had  to  show  was,  that 
the  idea  of  the  particular  mode  of  simultaneous  existence 
called  Extension,  might  arise,  not  certainly  out  of  a  mere 
succession  of  muscular  sensations,  but  out  of  that  added 
to  the  knowledge  already  possessed  that  sensations  of 
touch  may  be  simultaneous.  Suppose  two  small  bodies, 
A  and  B,  sufficiently  near  together  to  admit  of  their 
being  touched  simultaneously,  one  with  the  right  hand, 
the  other  with  the  left.  Here  are  two  tactual  sensations 
which  are  simultaneous,  just  as  a  sensation  of  color  and 
one  of  odor  might  be ;  and  this  makes  us  cognize  the 
two  objects  of  touch  as  both  existing  at  once.  The  ques- 
tion then  is,  what  have  we  in  our  minds,  when  we  repre- 
sent to  ourselves  the  relation  between  these  two  objects 
already  known  to  be  simultaneous,  in  the  form  of  Exten- 
sion, or  intervening  Space — a  relation  which  we  do  not 
suppose  to  exist  between  the  color  and  the  odor?  Now 
those  who  agree  with  Brown,  say  that  whatever  the  no- 
tion of  Extension  may  be,  we  acquire  it  by  passing  our 
hand,  or  some  other  organ  of  touch,  in  a  longitudinal 
direction  from  A  to  B  :  that  this  process,  as  far  as  we  are 
conscious  of  it,  consists  of  a  series  of  varied  muscular 
sensations,  differing  according  to  the  amount  of  muscular 
effort,  and,  the  effort  being  given,  differing  in  length  of 
time.  When  we  say  that  there  is  a  space  between  A 
and  B,  we  mean  that  some  amount  of  these  muscular 
sensations  must  intervene ;  and  when  we  say  that  the 
space  is  greater  or  less,  we  mean  that  the  series  of  sen- 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES    OF   MATTER.  281 

sation  (amount  of  muscular  effort  being  given)  is  longer 
or  shorter.  If  another  object,  C,  is  farther  off  in  the 
same  line,  we  judge  its  distance  to  be  greater,  because, 
to  reach  it,  the  series  of  muscular  sensations  must  be 
further  prolonged,  or  else  there  must  be  the  increase  of 
effort  which  corresponds  to  augmented  velocity.  Now, 
this,  which  is  unquestionably  the  mode  in  which  we  be- 
come aware  of  extension,  is  considered  by  the  psycholo- 
gists in  question  to  be  extension.  The  idea  of  Extended 
Body  they  consider  to  be  that  of  a  variety  of  resisting 
points,  existing  simultaneously,  but  which  can  be  per- 
ceived by  the  same  tactile  organ  only  successively,  at  the 
end  of  a  series  of  muscular  sensations  which  constitutes 
their  distance ;  and  are  said  to  be  at  different  distances 
from  one  another  because  the  series  of  intervening  mus- 
cular sensations  is  longer  in  some  cases  than  in  others.* 

*  It  is  not  pretended  that  all  this  was  clearly  seen  by  Brown.  It  is  im- 
possible to  defend  the  theory  as  Brown  stated  it.  He  seems  to  have  thought 
that  the  essence  of  extension  consisted  in  divisibility  into  parts.  "  A  suc- 
cession of  feelings  "  (he  says),  "  when  remembered  by  the  mind  which 
looks  back  upon  them,  was  found  to  involve,  necessarily,  the  notion  of 
divisibility  into  separate  parts,  and  therefore  of  length,  which  is  only  an- 
other name  for  continued  divisibility"  (Lecture  xxiv.  vol.  ii.  p.  3  of  the 
19th  edition,  1851.)  He  thought  that  he  had  explained  all  that  needed  ex- 
planation in  the  idea  of  space,  when  he  had  shown  how  the  notion  of  con- 
tinued divisibility  got  into  it.  This  appears  when  he  says,  "  It  would  not 
be  easy  for  any  one  to  define  matter  more  simply,  than  as  that  which  has 
parts,  and  that  which  resists  our  efforts  to  grasp  it ;  and  in  our  analysis  of 
the  feelings  of  infancy,  we  have  been  able  to  discover  how  both  these 
notions  may  have  arisen  in  the  mind."  But  if  divisibility  into  parts  consti- 
tutes all  our  notion  of  extension,  every  sensation  we  have  must  be  identi- 
fied with  extension,  for  they  are  all  divisible  into  parts  (parts  in  succession, 
which  Brown  thinks  sufficient)  when  they  are  prolonged  beyond  the  short- 
est instant  of  duration  which  our  consciousness  recognizes.  It  is  probable 
that  Brown  did  not  mean  this,  but  thought  that  all  he  had  to  account  for 
in  the  conception  of  space,  was  its  divisibility,  because  he  tacitly  assumed 
that  all  the  rest  of  the  notion  was  already  given  in  the  fact  of  muscular 
movement.  And  this,  properly  understood,  is  maintainable  ;  but  Brown 
cannot  here  be  acquitted  of  a  charge  to  which  he  is  often  liable  —  that  of 
leaving  an  important  philosophical  question  only  half  thought  out. 


282      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OP  THE 

The  theory  may  be  recapitulated  as  follows.  The  sen- 
sation of  muscular  motion  unimpeded  constitutes  our 
notion  of  empty  space,  and  the  sensation  of  muscular 
motion  impeded  constitutes  that  of  filled  space.  Space 
is  Room — room  for  movement ;  which  its  German  name, 
Jtaum,  distinctly  confirms.  We  have  a  sensation  which 
accompanies  the  free  movement  of  our  organs,  say  for 
instance  of  our  arm.  This  sensation  is  variously  modi- 
fied by  the  direction,  and  by  the  amount  of  the  move- 
ment. We  have  different  states  of  muscular  sensation 
corresponding  to  the  movements  of  the  arm  upward, 
downward,  to  right,  to  left,  or  in  any  radius  whatever, 
of  a  sphere  of  which  the  joint,  that  the  arm  revolves 
round,  forms  the  centre.  We  have  also  different  states 
of  muscular  sensation  according  as  the  arm  is  moved 
more,  whether  this  consists  in  its  being  moved  with 
greater  velocity,  or  with  the  same  velocity  during  a 
longer  time  ;  and  the  equivalence  of  these  two  is  speedily 
learned  by  experience.  ^These  different  kinds  and  quali- 
ties of  muscular  sensation,  experienced  in  getting  from 
one  point  to  another  (that  is,  obtaining  in  succession  two 
sensations  of  touch  and  resistance,  the  objects  of  which 
are  regarded  as  simultaneous) ,  are  all  we  mean  by  saying 
that  the  points  are  separated  by  spaces,  that  they  are  at 
different  distances,  and  in  different  directions.  An 
intervening  series  of  muscular  sensations  before  the  one 
object  can  be  reached  from  the  other,  is  the  only  pecu- 
liarity which  (according  to  this  theory)  distinguishes 
simultaneity  in  space  from  the  simultaneity  which  may 
exist  between  a  taste  and  a  color,  or  a  taste  anil  a  smell : 
and  we  have  no  reason  for  believing  that  Space  or  Exten- 
sion in  itself,  is  anything  different  from  that  which  we 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES    OF    MATTER.  283 

recognize  it  by.  It  appears  to  me  that  this  doctrine  is 
sound,  and  that  the  muscular  sensations  in  question  are 
the  sources  of  all  the  notion  of  Extension  which  we 
should  ever  obtain  from  the  tactual  and  muscular  senses 
without  the  assistance  of  the  eye. 

But  the  participation  of  the  eye  in  generating  our 
actual  notion  of  Extension,  very  much  alters  its  charac- 
ter, and  is,  I  think,  the  main  cause  of  the  difficulty  felt 
in  believing  that  Extension  derives  its  meaning  to  us  from 
a  phenomenon  which  is  not  synchronous,  but  successive. 
The  fact  is,  that  the  conception  we  now  have  of  Extension 
or  Space  is  an  eye  picture,  and  comprehends  a  great 
number  of  parts  of  Extension  at  once,  or  in  a  succession 
so  rapid  that  our  consciousness  confounds  it  with  simul- 
taneity. How,  then  (it  is  naturally  asked) ,  can  this  vast 
collection  of  consciousnesses  which  are  sensibly  simul- 
taneous, be  generated  by  the  mind  out  of  its  conscious- 
ness of  a  succession — the  succession  of  muscular  feelings  ? 
An  experiment  may  be  conceived  which  would  throw 
great  light  on  this  subject,  but  which  unfortunately  is 
more  easily  imagined  than  obtained.  There  have  been 
persons  born  blind  who  were  mathematicians,  and  I 
believe  even  naturalists ;  and  it  is  not  impossible  that 
one  day  a  person  born  blind  may  be  a  metaphysician. 
The  first  who  is  so,  will  be  able  to  enlighten  us  on  this 
point.  For  he  will  be  an  experirnentum  crucis  on  the 
mode  in  which  extension  is  conceived  and  known,  inde- 
pendently of  the  eye.  Not  having  the  assistance  of  that 
organ,  a  person  blind  from  birth  must  necessarily  per- 
ceive the  parts  of  extension  —  the  parts  of  a  line,  of  a 
surface,  or  of  a  solid  —  in  conscious  succession.  He 
perceives  them  by  passing  his  hand  along  them,  if  small, 


284      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

or  by  walking  over  them  if  great.  The  parts  of  exten- 
sion which  it  is  possible  for  him  to  perceive  simultane- 
ously, are  only  very  small  parts,  almost  the  minima  of 
extension.  Hence,  if  the  Psychological  theory  of  the 
idea  of  extension  is  true,  the  blind  metaphysician  would 
feel  very  little  of  the  difficulty  which  seeing  metaphy- 
sicians feel,  in  admitting  \.  that  the  idea  of  Space  is,  at 
bottom,  one  of  time — and  that  the  notion  of  extension 
or  distance,  is  that  of  a  motion  of  the  muscles  continued 
for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  duration.  If  this  analysis  of 
extension  appeared  as  paradoxical  to  the  metaphysician 
born  blind,  as  it  does  to  SirW.  Hamilton,  this  would  be 
a  strong  argument  against  the  Psychological  theory. 
But  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  did  not  at  all  startle  him,  that 
theory  would  be  very  strikingly  corroborated. 

We  have  no  experiment  directly  in  point.  But  we 
have  one  which  is  the  very  next  thing  to  it.  We  have 
not  the  perceptions  and  feelings  of  a  metaphysician  blind 
from  birth,  told  and  interpreted  by  himself.  But  we 
have  those  of  an  ordinary  person  blind  from  birth,  told 
and  interpreted  for  him  by  a  metaphysician.  And  the 
English  reader  is  indebted  for  them  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton. 
Platner,  "  a  man  no  less  celebrated  as  an  acute  philoso- 
pher than  as  a  learned  physician  and  an  elegant  scholar," 
endeavored  to  ascertain  by  observation  what  notion  of 
extension  was  possessed  by  a  person  born  blind,  and 
made  known  the  result  in  words  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
has  rendered  into  his  clear  English.*  "  In  regard  to  the 
visionless  representation  of  space  or  extension,  the  at- 
tentive observation  of  a  person  born  blind,  which  I  for- 
merly instituted  in  the  year  1785,  and  again,  in  relation 

*  Lectures,  ii.  174. 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES    OP    MATTER.  285 

to  the  point  in  question,  have  continued  for  three  whole 
weeks  —  this  observation,  I  say,  has  convinced  me,  that 
the  sense  of  touch,  by  itself,  is  altogether  incompetent  to 
afford  us  the  representation  of  extension  and  space,  and 
is  not  even  cognizant  of  local  exteriority ;  in  a  word, 
that  a  man  deprived  of  sight  has  absolutely  no  percep- 
tion of  an  outer  world,  beyond  the  existence  of  some- 
thing effective,  different  from  his  own  feeling  of  passivity, 
and  in  general  only  of  the  numerical  diversity  —  shall  I 
say  of  impressions,  or  of  things?  In  fact,  to  those  born 
blind,  time  serves  instead  of  space.  Vicinity  and  dis- 
tance mean  in  their  mouths  nothing  more  than  the 
shorter  or  longer  time,  the  smaller  or  greater  number  of 
feelings,  which  they  find  necessary  to  attain  from  some 
one  feeling  to  another.  That  a  person  blind  from  birth 
employs  the  language  of  vision  —  that  may  occasion  con- 
siderable error ;  and  did,  indeed,  at  the  commencement 
of  my  observations,  lead  me  wrong ;  but,  in  point  of 
fact,  he  knows  nothing  of  things  as  existing  out  of  each 
other ;  and  (this  in  particular  I  have  very  clearly  re- 
marked) if  objects,  and  the  part  of  his  body  touched  by 
them,  did  not  make  different  kinds  of  impression  on  his 
nerves  of  sensation,  he  would  take  everything  external 
for  one  and  the  same.  In  his  own  body,  he  absolutely 
did  not  discriminate  head  and  foot  at  all  by  their  dis- 
tance, but  merely  by  the  difference  of  the  feelings  (and 
his  perception  of  such  differences  was  incredibly  fine) 
which  he  experienced  from  the  one  and  from  the  other, 
and  moreover  through  time.  In  like  manner,  in  external 
bodies,  he  distinguished  their  figure  merely  by  the 
varieties  of  impressed  feelings ;  inasmuch,  for  example, 
as  the  cube,  by  its  angles,  affected  his  feeling  differently 
from  the  sphere." 


286      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

The  highly  instructive  representation  here  given  by 
Platner,  of  this  person's  state  of  mind,  is  exactly  that 
which  we  have  just  read  in  Mr.  Bain,  and  which  that 
philosopher  holds  to  be  the  primitive  conception  of  ex- 
tension by  all  of  us,  before  the  wonderful  power  of  sight 
and  its  associations,  in  abridging  the  mental  processes, 
has  come  into  play.  The  conclusion  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  Platner  draws  from  the  case,  is,  that  we  obtain  the 
idea  of  extension  solely  from  sight ;  and  even  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  is  staggered  in  his  belief  of  the  contrary.  But 
Platner,  though  unintentionally,  puts  a  false  color  on 
the  matter  when  he  says  that  his  patient  had  no  per- 
ception of  extension.  He  used  the  terms  expressive  of 
it  with  such  propriety  and  discrimination,  that  Platner, 
by  his  own  account,  did  not  at  first  suspect  him  of  not 
meaning  by  those  terms  all  that  is  meant  by  persons 
who  can  see.  He  therefore  meant  something ;  he  had 
impressions  which  the  words  expressed  to  his  mind ;  he 
had  conceptions  of  extension,  after  his  own  manner. 
But  his  idea  of  degrees  of  extension  was  but  the  idea  of 
a  greater  or  smaller  number  of  sensations  experienced  in 
succession  "  to  attain  from  some  one  feeling  to  another ;  " 
that  is,  it  was  exactly  what,  according  to  Brown's  and 
Mr.  Bain's  theory,  it  ought  to  have  been.  And,  the 
sense  of  touch  and  of  the  muscles  not  being  aided  by 
sight,  the  sensations  continued  to  be  conceived  by  him 
only  as  successive  :  his  mental  representation  of  them 
remained  a  conception  of  a  series,  not  of  a  coexistent 
group.  Though  he  must  have  had  experience  of  simul- 
taneity, —  for  no  being  who  has  a  plurality  of  senses  can 
be  without  it, — he  does  not  seem  to  have  thoroughly  real- 
ized the  conception  of  the  parts  of  space  as  simultaneous. 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES    OF   MATTER.  287 

Since  what  was  thus  wanting  to  him,  is  the  principal 
feature  of  the  conception  as  it  is  in  us,  he  seemed  to 
Platner  to  have  no  notion  of  extension.  But  Platner, 
fortunately,  being  a  man  who  could  both  observe,  and 
express  his  observations  precisely,  has  been  able  to  convey 
to  our  minds  the  conception  which  his  patient  really  had 
of  extension ;  and  we  find  that  it  was  'the  same  as  our 
own,  with  the  exception  of  the  element  which,  if  the 
Psychological  theory  be  true,  was  certain  to  be  added 
to  it  by  the  sense  of  sight.  For,  when  this  sense  is 
awakened,  and  its  sensations  of  color  have  become  repre- 
sentative of  the  tactual  and  muscular  sensations  with 
which  they  are  coexistent,  the  fact  that  we  can  receive  a 
vast  number  of  sensations  of  color  at  the  same  instant 
(or  what  appears  such  to  our  consciousness)  puts  us  in 
the  same  position  as  if  we  had  been  able  to  receive  that 
number  of  tactual  and  muscular  sensations  in  a  single 
instant.  (The  ideas  of  all  the  successive  tactual  and  mus- 
cular feelings  which  accompany  the  passage  of  the  hand 
over  the  whole  of  the  colored  surface,  are  made  to  flash  on 
the  mind  at  once  :  and  impressions  which  were  successive 
in  sensation  become  coexistent  in  thoughtA  From  that 
time  we  do  with  perfect  facility,  and  are  even  compelled 
to  do,  what  Platner's  patient  never  completely  succeeded 
in  doing,  namely,  to  think  all  the  parts  of  extension  as 
coexisting,  and  to  believe  that  we  perceive  them  as  such. 
And  if  the  laws  of  inseparable  association,  which  are 
already  admitted  as  the  basis  of  other  acquired  percep- 
tions of  sight,  are  considered  in  their  application  to  this 
case,  it  is  certain  that  this  apparent  perception  of  suc- 
cessive elements  as  simultaneous  would  be  generated, 
and  would  supply  all  that  there  is  in  our  idea  of  exten- 
sion, more  than  there  was  in  that  of  Platner's  patient. 


288      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OP  THE 

I  shall  quote,  in  continuation,  part  of  the  exposition, 
by  Mr.  Bain,  of  the  machinery  by  which  our  conscious- 
ness of  Extension  becomes  an  appendage  of  our  sen- 
sations of  Sight.  It  is  a  striking  example  of  the 
commanding  influence  of  that  sense ;  which,  though  it 
has  no  greater  variety  of  original  impressions  than  our 
other  special  senses,  yet  owing  to  the  two  properties  of 
being  able  to  receive  a  great  number  of  its  impressions 
at  once,  and  to  receive  them  from  all  distances,  takes 
the  lead  altogether  from  the  sense  of  touch ;  and  is  not 
only  the  organ  by  which  we  read  countless  possibilities 
of  actual  and  muscular  sensations  which  can  never,  to 
us,  become  realities,  but  substitutes  itself  for  our  touch 
and  our  muscles  even  where  we  can  use  them  —  causes 
their  actual  use,  as  avenues  to  knowledge,  to  become,  in 
many  cases,  obsolete,  the  sensations  themselves  to  be 
little  heeded  and  very  indistinctly  remembered,  and  com- 
municates its  own  prerogative  of  simultaneousness  to 
impressions  and  conceptions  originating  in  other  senses, 
which  it  could  never  have  given,  but  only  suggests, 
through  visible  marks  associated  with  them  by  experience. 

"  The  distinctive  impressibility  of  the  eye,"  says  Mr. 
Bain,*  "  is  for  Color.  This  is  the  effect  specific  to  it  as 
a  sense.  But  the  feeling  of  Color  by  itself,  implies  no 
knowledge  of  any  outward  object,  as  a  cause  or  a  thing 
wherein  the  color  inheres.  It  is  simply  a  mental  effect 
or  influence,  a  feeling  or  conscious  state,  which  we  should 
be  able  to  distinguish  from  other  conscious  states,  as  for 
example,  a  smell  or  a  sound.  We  should  also  be  able 
to  mark  the  difference  between  it  and  others  of  the  same 

*  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect,  pp.  370, 374.  I  now  quote  from  the  second 
edition  (18(34).  The  corresponding  passage  in  the  first  edition  begins  at 
p.  363. 


PRIMARY  QUALITIES  OF  MATTER.  289 

kind,  more  or  less  vivid,  more  or  less  enduring,  more  or 
less  voluminous.  So  we  should  distinguish  the  qualita- 
tive differences  between  one  color  and  another.  Pleas- 
ure or  pain,  with  discrimination  of  intensity  and  of 
duration,  would  attach  to  the  mere  sensation  of  color. 
Knowledge  or  belief  in  an  external  or  material  colored 
body,  there  would  be  none. 

"  But  when  we  add  the  active  or  muscular  sensibility 
of  the  eye,  we  obtain  new  products.  The  sweep  of  the 
eye  over  the  colored  field  gives  a  feeling  of  a  definite 
amount  of  action,  an  exercise  of  internal  power,  which 
is  something  totally  different  from  the  passive  feeling  of 
light.  This  action  has  many  various  modes,  all  of  the 
same  quality,  but  all  distinctively  felt  and  recognized  by 
us.  Thus  the  movements  may  be  in  any  direction  — 
horizontal,  vertical,  or  slanting ;  and  every  one  of  these 
movements  is  felt  as  different  from  every  other.  In  ad- 
dition to  these,  we  have  the  movements  of  adjustment 
of  the  eye,  brought  on  by  differences  in  the  remoteness 
of  objects.  We  have  distinctive  feelings  belonging  to 
these  different  adjustments,  just  as  we  have  towards  the 
different  movements  across  the  field  of  view.  If  the 
eyes  are  adjusted,  first  to  clear  vision  for  an  object  six 
inches  from  the  eye,  and  afterwards  change  their  adjust- 
ment to  suit  an  object  six  feet  distant,  we  are  distinctly 
conscious  of  the  change,  and  of  the  degree  or  amount 
of  it ;  we  know  that  the  change  is  greater  than  in  ex- 
tending the  adjustment  to  a  three-feet  object,  while  it  is 
less  than  we  should  have  to  go  through  for  a  twenty-feet 
object.  Thus  in  the  alterations  of  the  eyes  for  near  and 
far,  we  have  a  distinctive  consciousness  of  amount  or 
degree,  no  less  than  in  the  movements  for  right  and  left, 


290      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

up  and  down.  Feelings  with  the  character  of  activity 
are  thus  incorporated  with  the  sensibility  to  color ;  the 
luminous  impression  is  associated  with  exertion  on  our 
part,  and  is  no  longer  a  purely  passive  state.  We  find 
that  the  light  changes  as  our  activity  changes  ;  we  recog- 
nize in  it  a  certain  connection  with  our  movements ;  an 
association  springs  up  between  the  passive  feeling  and  the 
active  energy  of  the  visible  [visual]  organ,  or  rather  of 
the  body  generally ;  for  the  changes  of  view  are  owing  to 
movements  of  the  head  and  trunk,  as  well  as  to  the 
sweep  of  the  eye  within  its  own  orbit.  .  .  . 

"  When,  along  with  a  forward  movement,  we  behold 
a  steadily  varying  change  of  appearance  in  the  objects 
before  us,  we  associate  the  change  with  the  locomotive 
effort,  and  after  many  repetitions,  we  firmly  connect  the 
one  with  the  other.  We  then  know  what  is  implied  in  a 
certain  feeling  in  the  eye,  a  certain  adjustment  of  the 
lenses  and  a  certain  inclination  of  the  axes,  of  all  of 
which  we  are  conscious  ;  we  know  that  these  things  are 
connected  with  the  further  experience  of  a  definite  loco- 
motive energy  needing  to  be  expended,  in  order  to  alter 
this  consciousness  to  some  other  consciousness.  Apart 
from  this  association,  the  eye-feeling  might  be  recognized 
as  differing  from  other  eye-feelings,  but  there  could  be 
no  other  perception  in  the  case.  Experience  connects 
these  differences  of  ocular  adjustment  with  the  various 
exertions  of  the  body  at  large,  and  the  one  can  then 
imply  and  reveal  the  others.  The  feeling  that  we  have 
when  the  eyes  are  parallel  and  vision  distinct,  is  asso- 
ciated with  a  great  and  prolonged  effort  of  walking,  in 
other  words,  with  a  long  distance.  An  inclination  of 
the  eyes  of  two  degrees,  is  associated  with  two  paces  to 


PRIMARY   QUALITIES    OP   MATTER.  291 

bring  us  up  to  the  nearest  limit  of  vision,  or  with  a 
stretch  of  some  other  kind,  measured  in  the  last  resort 
by  pacing,  or  by  passing  the  hand  along  the  object.  The 
change  from  an  inclination  of  30°  to  an  inclination  of 
10%  is  associated  with  a  given  sweep  of  the  arm,  carry- 
ing the  hand  forward  over  eight  inches  and  a  half." 

These  slight  changes  in  the  action  of  the  muscles  that 
move  the  eye,  habitually  effected  in  a  time  too  short  for 
computation,  are  the  means  by  which  our  visual  impres- 
sions from  the  whole  of  that  portion  of  the  universe 
which  is  visible  from  the  position  where  we  stand,  may 
be  concentrated  within  an  interval  of  time  so  small  that 
we  are  scarcely  conscious  of  any  interval ;  and  they  are, 
in  my  apprehension,  the  generating  cause  of  all  that  we 
have  in  our  notion  of  extension  over  and  above  what 
Platner's  patient  had  in  his.  He  had  to  conceive  two  or 
any  number  of  bodies  (or  resisting  objects)  with  a  long 
train  of  sensations  of  muscular  contraction  filling  up  the 
interval  between  them  :  while  we,  on  the  contrary,  think 
of  them  as  rushing  upon  our  sight,  many  of  them  at  the 
same  instant,  all  of  them  at  what  is  scarcely  distinguish- 
able from  the  same  instant,  and  this  visual  imagery 
effaces  from  our  minds  any  distinct  consciousness  of  the 
series  of  muscular  sensations  of  which  it  has  become 
representative.  The  simultaneous  visual  sensations  are 
to  us  symbols  of  tactual  and  muscular  ones  which 
were  slowly  successive.  "This  symbolic  relation,  being 
far  briefer,  is  habitually  thought  of  in  place  of  that  it 
symbolizes  :  and  by  the  continued  use  of  such  symbols, 
and  the  union  of  them  into  more  complex  ones,  are  gen- 
erated our  ideas  of  visible  extension  —  ideas  which,  like 
those  of  the  algebraist  working  out  an  equation,  are 


292      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

wholly  unlike  the  ideas  symbolized ;  and  which  yet,  like 
his,  occupy  the  mind  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  ideas 
symbolized."  This  last  extract  is  from  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer,*  whose  Principles  of  Psychology,  in  spite  of 
some  doctrines  which  he  holds  in  common  with  the 
intuitive  school,  are  on  the  whole  one  of  the  finest 
examples  we  possess  of  the  Psychological  Method  in  its 
full  power.  His  treatment  of  this  subject,  and  Mr. 
Bain's,  are  at  once  corroborative  and  supplementary  of 
one  another :  and  to  them  I  must  refer  the  reader  who 
desires  an  ampler  elucidation  of  the  general  question. 
The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  be  devoted  to  the 
examination  of  some  peculiarities  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
treatment  of  it. 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  relies  mainly  upon  one  argument  to 
prove  that  Vision,  without  the  aid  of  Touch,  gives  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  Extension :  which  argument 
had  been  anticipated  in  a  passage  which  he  quotes  from 
D'Alembert.f  The  following  is  his  own  statement  of  it. 
"  It  can  J  easily  be  shown  that  the  perception  of  color 
involves  the  perception  of  extension.  It  is  admitted  that 
we  have  by  sight  a  perception  of  colors,  consequently  a 
perception  of  the  difference  of  colors.  But  a  perception 
of  the  distinction  of  colors  necessarily  involves  the  per- 
ception of  a  discriminating  line ;  for  if  one  color  be  laid 
beside  or  upon  another,  we  only  distinguish  them  as  dif- 
ferent by  perceiving  that  they  limit  each  other,  which 
limitation  necessarily  affords  a  breadthless  line,  —  a  line 
of  demarcation.  One  color  laid  upon  another,  in  fact, 
gives  a  line  returning  upon  itself,  that  is,  a  figure.  But 

*  Principles  of  Psychology,  p.  224.  f  Lectures,  ii.  172. 

J  Ibid.  p.  165. 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES    OF    MATTER.  293 

a  line  and  a  figure  are  modifications  of  extension.  The 
perception  of  extension,  therefore,  is  necessarily  given 
in  the  perception  of  colors." 

And  farther  on,*  "All  parties  are,  of  course,  at  one 
in  regard  to  the  fact  that  we  see  color.  Those  who  hold 
that  we  see  extension,  admit  that  we  see  it  only  as 
colored  ;  and  those  who  deny  ug  any  vision  of  extension, 
make  color  the  exclusive  object  of  sight.  In  regard  to 
this  first  position,  all  are,  therefore,  agreed.  Nor  are 
they  less  harmonious  in  reference  to  the  second  —  that 
the  power  of  perceiving  color  involves  the  power  of  per- 
ceiving the  differences  of  colors.  By  sight  we,  therefore, 
perceive  color,  and  discriminate  one  color,  that  is,  one 
colored  body,  — one  sensation  of  color,  —  from  another. 
This  is  admitted.  A  third  position  will  also  be  denied 
by  none  —  that  the  colors  discriminated  in  vision  are,  or 
may  be,  placed  side  by  side  in  immediate  juxtaposition ; 
or,  one  may  limit  another  by  being  superinduced  partially 
over  it.  A  fourth  position  is  equally  indisputable  —  that 
the  contrasted  colors,  thus  bounding  each  other,  will  form 
by  their  meeting  a  visible  line,  and  that,  if  the  superin- 
duced color  be  surrounded  by  the  other,  this  line  will 
return  upon  itself,  and  thus  constitute  the  outline  of  a 
visible  figure.  These  four  positions  command  a  per- 
emptory assent ;  they  are  all  self-evident.  But  their 
admission  at  once  explodes  the  paradox  under  discus- 
sion"—  (that  extension  cannot  be  cognized  by  sight 
alone) .  "  And  thus  :  A  line  is  extension  in  one  dimen- 
sion,—  length;  a  figure  is  extension  in  two, — length 
and  breadth.  Therefore,  the  vision  of  a  line  is  a  vision 
of  extension  in  length ;  the  vision  of  a  figure,  the  vision 
of  extension  in  length  and  breadth." 

*  Lectures,  ii.  167. 
VOL.  i.  13 


294  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OP  THE 

I  must  acknowledge  that  I  cannot  make  the  answer  to 
this  argument  as  thorough  and  conclusive  as  I  could 
wish ;  for  we  have  not  the  power  of  making  an  experi- 
ment, the  completing  converse  of  Platner's.  There  is 
no  example  of  a  person  born  with  the  sense  of  sight,  but 
without  those  of  touch  and  the  muscles ;  and  nothing 
less  than  this  would  enable  us  to  define  precisely  the  ex- 
tent and  limits  of  the  conceptions  which  light  is  capable 
of  giving,  independent  of  association  with  impressions 
of  another  sense.  There  are,  however,  considerations 
well  adapted  to  moderate  the  extreme  confidence  which 
Sir  W.  Hamilton  places  in  this  argument.  First,  it 
must  be  observed  that  when  the  eye,  at  present,  takes 
cognizance  of  visible  figure,  it  does  not  cognize  it  by 
means  of  color  alone,  but  by  all  those  motions  and  modi- 
fications of  the  muscles  connected  with  the  eye,  which 
have  so  great  a  share  in  giving  us  our  acquired  percep- 
tions of  sight.  To  determine  what  can  be  cognized  by 
sight  alone,  we  must  suppose  an  eye  incapable  of  these 
changes ;  which  can  neither  have  the  curvature  of  its 
lenses  modified  nor  the  direction  of  its  axis  changed  by 
any  mode  of  muscular  action ;  which  cannot  therefore 
travel  along  the  boundary  line  that  separates  two  colors, 
but  must  remain  fixed  with  a  steady  gaze  on  a  definite 
spot.  If  we  once  allow  the  eye  to  follow  the  direction 
of  a  line  or  the  periphery  of  a  figure,  we  have  no  longer 
merely  sight,  but  important  muscular  sensations  super- 
added.  Now,  there  is  nothing  more  certain  than  that  an 
eye  with  its  axis  immovably  fixed  in  one  direction,  gives 
a  full  and  clear  vision  of  but  a  small  portion  of  space, 
that  to  which  the  axis  directly  points,  and  only  a  faint 
and  indistinct  one  of  the  other  points  surrounding  it. 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES   OF   MATTER.  295 

When  we  are  able  to  see  any  considerable  portion  of  a 
surface  so  as  to  form  a  distinct  idea  of  it,  we  do  so  by 
passing  the  eye  over  and  about  it,  changing  slightly  the 
direction  of  the  axis  many  times  in  a  second.  When 
the  eye  is  pointed  directly  to  one  spot,  the  faint  percep- 
tions we  have  of  others  are  barely  sufficient  to  serve  as 
indications  for  directing  the  axis  of  the  eye  to  each  of 
them  in  turn,  when  withdrawn  from  the  first.  Physiolo- 
gists have  explained  this  by  the  fact,  that  the  centre  of 
the  retina  is  furnished  with  a  prodigiously  greater  num- 
ber of  nervous  papillae,  much  finer  and  more  delicate 
individually,  and  crowded  closer  together,  than  any  other 
part.  Whatever  be  its  explanation,  the  fact  itself  is  in- 
dubitable ;  and  seems  to  warrant  the  conclusion  that  if 
the  axis  of  the  eye  were  immovable,  and  we  were  with- 
out the  muscular  sensations  which  accompany  and  guide 
its  movement,  the  impression  we  should  have  of  a  boun- 
dary between  two  colors  would  be  so  vague  and  indistinct 
as  to  be  merely  rudimentary. 

A  rudimentary  conception  must  be  allowed ;  for  it  is 
evident  that  even  without  moving  the  eye  we  are  capable 
of  having  two  sensations  of  color  at  once,  and  that  the 
boundary  which  separates  the  colors  must  give  some 
specific  affection  of  sight,  otherwise  we  should  have  no 
discriminative  impressions  capable  of  afterwards  becom- 
ing, by  association,  representative  of  the  cognitions  of 
lines  and  figures  which  we  owe  to  the  tactual  and  the 
muscular  sense.  But  to  confer  on  these  discriminative 
impressions  the  name  which  denotes  our  matured  and 
perfected  cognition  of  Extension,  or  even  to  assume  that 
they  have  in  their  nature  anything  in  common  with  it, 
seems  to  be  going  beyond  the  evidence.  Sir  W.  Ham- 


296      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

ilton  appears  to  think  that  extension  as  revealed  by  the 
eye  is  identical  with  the  extension  which  we  know  by 
touch,  except  that  it  is  only  in  two  dimensions.  "It  is 
not,"  he  says,*  "all  kind  of  extension  and  form  that  is 
attributed  to  sight.  It  is  not  figured  extension  in  all  the 
three  dimensions,  but  only  extension  as  involved  in  plain 
figures  ;  that  is,  only  length  and  breadth."  But  to  have 
the  notion  of  extension  even  in  length  and  breadth  as  we 
have  it,  is  to  have  it  in  such  a  manner  that  we  might 
know  certain  muscular  facts  Without  having  tried  :  as  for 
instance,  that  if  we  placed  our  finger  on  the  spot  corre- 
sponding to  one  end  of  a  line,  or  boundary  of  a  surface, 
we  should  have  to  go  through  a  muscular  motion  before 
we  could  place  it  on  the  other.  Is  there  the-  smallest 
reason  to  suppose  that  on  the  evidence  of  sight  alone,  we 
could  arrive  at  this  conclusion  in  anticipation  of  the  sense 
of  touch  ?  I  cannot  admit  that  we  could  have  what  is 
meant  by  a  perception  of  superficial  space,  unless  we 
conceived  it  as  something  which  the  hand  could  be 
moved  across  ;  and  whatever  may  be  the  retinal  impres- 
sion conveyed  by  the  line  which  bounds  two  colors,  I 
see  no  ground  for  thinking  that  by  the  eye  alone,  we 
could  acquire  the  conception  of  what  we  now  mean  when 
we  say  that  one  of  the  colors  is  outside  the  other.  On 
this  point  I  may  again  quote  Mr.  Bain.f  "I  do  not  see 
how  one  sensation  can  be  felt  as  out  of  another,  without 
already  supposing  that  we  have  a  feeling  of  space.  If  I 
see  two  distinct  objects  before  me,  as  two  candle  flames, 
I  apprehend  them  as  different  objects,  and  as  distant 
from  one  another  by  an  interval  of  space  ;  but  this  ap- 

*  Lectures,  ii.  160. 

t  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect,  2d  cd.  p.  376 ;  1st  ed.  p.  368. 


PRIMARY   QUALITIES    OF   MATTER.  297 

prehension  presupposes  an  independent  experience  and 
knowledge  of  lineal  extension.  There  is  no  evidence  to 
show  that,  at  the  first  sight  of  these  objects,  and  before 
any  association  is  formed  between  visible  appearances 
and  other  movements,  I  should  be  able  to  apprehend  in 
the  double  appearance  a  difference  of  place.  I  feel  a 
distinctness  of  impression,  undoubtedly,  partly  optical 
and  partly  muscular,  but  in  order  that  this  distinctness 
may  mean  to  me  a  difference  of  position  in  space,  it 
must  reveal  the  additional  fact,  that  a  certain  movement 
of  my  arm  would  carry  my  hand  from  the  one  flame  to 
the  other ;  or  that  some  other  movement  of  mine  would 
change  by  a  definite  amount  the  appearance  I  now  see. 
If  no  information  is  conveyed  respecting  the  possibility 
of  movements  of  the  body  generally,  no  idea  of  space  is 
given,  for  we  never  consider  that  we  have  a  notion  of 
space,  unless  we  distinctly  recognize  this  possibility. 
But  how  a  vision  to  the  eye  can  reveal  beforehand  what 
would  be  the  experience  of  the  hand  or  the  other  .moving 
members,  I  am  unable  to  understand."* 

*  To  this  passage  Mr.  Bain  has  appended,  in  his  second  edition  (p.  377), 
the  following  instructive  note  :  — 

"  In  following  a  wide  ranging  movement,  or  in  expatiating  over  a  large 
prospect,  we  must  move  the  eyes,  or  the  head ;  and  probably  every  one 
would  allow  that,  in  such  a  case,  feelings  of  movement  make  a  part  of  our 
sensation  and  our  subsequent  idea.  The  notion  of  a  mountain  evidently 
contains  feelings  of  visual  movement.  But  when  we  look  at  a  circle,  say, 
one  tenth  of  an  inch  in  diameter,  the  eye  can  take  in  the  whole  of  it  with- 
out movement,  and  we  might  suppose  that  the  sensation  is,  in  that  case, 
purely  optical,  there  being  no  apparent  necessity  for  introducing  the  mus- 
cular consciousness.  A  characteristic  optical  impression  is  produced  ;  we 
should  be  able  to  discriminate  between  the  small  circle  and  a  square,  or  an 
oval ;  or  between  it  and  a  somewhat  larger  or  somewhat  smaller  circle, 
from  the  mere  optical  difference  of  the  effect  on  the  retina.  Why  then 
may  we  not  say,  that,  through  the  luminous  tracing  alone,  we  have  the 
feeling  of  visible  form  ? 

"By  making  an  extreme  supposition  of  this  nature,  it  is  possible  to 


298      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  does  not  limit  the  perception  of  Ex- 
tension to  sight  and  touch,  either  separately  or  combined 
with  one  another.  "The  opinions,"  he  says,*  "so  gener- 
ally prevalent,  that  through  touch,  or  touch  and  muscu- 
lar feeling,  or  touch  and  sight,  or  touch,  muscular  feeling, 
and  sight, — that  through  these  senses,  exclusively,  we 
are  percipient  of  extension,  &c.,  I  do  not  admit.  On 
the  contrary,  I  hold  that  all  sensations  whatsoever  of 
which  we  are  conscious  as  one  out  of  another,  eo  ipso 
afford  us  the  condition  of  immediately  and  necessarily 
apprehending  extension ;  for  in  the  consciousness  itself 
of  such  reciprocal  outness  is  actually  involved  a  percep- 

remove  the  case  from  a  direct  experimental  test.  We  may  still,  however, 
see  very  strong  grounds  for  maintaining  the  presence  of  a  muscular 
element  even  in  this  instance.  In  the  first  place,  our  notions  of  form  are 
manifestly  obtained  by  working  on  the  large  scale,  or  by  the  survey  of 
objects  of  such  magnitude  as  to  demand  the  sweep  of  the  eye,  in  order  to 
comprehend  them.  We  lay  the  foundations  of  our  knowledge  of  visible 
outline  in  circumstances  where  the  eye  must  be  active,  and  must  mix  its 
own  activity  with  the  retinal  feelings.  The  idea  of  a  circle  is  first  gained 
by  moving  the  eye  round  some  circular  object  of  considerable  size.  Having 
done  this,  we  transfer  the  fact  of  motion  to  smaller  circles,  although  they 
would  not  of  themselves  demand  an  extensive  ocular  sweep.  So  that  when 
we  look  at  a  little  round  body,  we  are  already  pre-occupied  with  the  double 
nature  of  visible  form,  and  are  not  in  a  position  to  say  how  we  should 
regard  it,  if  that  were  our  first  experience  of  a  circle. 

"  But,  in  the  second  place,  the  essential  import  of  visible  form  is  some- 
thing not  attainable  without  the  experience  of  moving  the  eye.  If  we 
looked  at  a  little  round  spot,  we  should  know  an  optical  difference  between 
it  and  a  triangular  spot,  and  we  should  recognize  it  as  identical  with  another 
round  spot ;  but  that  is  merely  retinal  knowledge,  or  optical  discrimina- 
tion. That  would  not  be  to  recognize  form,  because  by  form  we  never 
mean  so  little  as  a  mere  change  of  color.  We  mean  by  a  round  form 
something  that  would  take  a  given  sweep  of  the  eye  to  comprehend  it ;  and 
unless  we  identify  the  small  spot  with  the  circles  previously  seen,  we  do 
not  perceive  it  to  be  a  circle.  It  may  remain  in  our  mind  as  a  purely  opti- 
cal meaning  ;  but  we  can  never  cross  the  chasm  that  separates  an  optical 
meaning  from  an  effect  combining  light  and  movement,  in  any  other  way 
than  by  bringing  in  an  experience  of  movement." 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  861. 


PRIMARY    QUALITIES    OF   MATTER.  299 

tion  of  difference  of  place  in  space,  and,  consequently, 
of  the  extended."  It  may  safely  be  admitted  that  when- 
ever we  are  conscious  of  two  sensations  as  "  one  out  of 
another  "  in  the  sense  of  locality,  we  have  a  perception 
of  space ;  for  the  two  expressions  are  equivalent.  But 
to  have  a  consciousness  of  difference  between  two  sensa- 
tions which  are  felt  simultaneously,  is  not  to  feel  them  as 
"  one  out  of  another  "  in  this  sense  :  and  the  very  question 
to  be  decided  is,  whether  any  of  our  senses,  apart  from 
feelings  of  muscular  motion,  gives  us  the  notion  of  "  one 
out  of  another "  in  the  sense  necessary  to  support  the 
idea  of  Extension. 

Sir  "VV.  Hamilton  thinks  that  whenever  two  different 
nervous  filaments  are  simultaneously  affected  at  their 
extremities,  the  sensations  received  through  them  are  felt 
as  one  out  of  the  other.  It  is  extremely  probable  that 
the  affection  of  two  distinct  nervous  filaments  is  the 
condition  of  the  discriminative  sensibility  which  furnishes 
us  with  sensations  capable  of  becoming  representative 
of  objects  one  out  of  the  other.  But  that  is  a  different 
thing  from  giving  us  the  perception  directly.  Undoubt- 
edly we  recognize  difference  of  place  in  the  objects  which 
affect  our  senses,  whenever  we  are  aware  that  those 
objects  affect  different  parts  of  our  organism.  But  when 
we  are  aware  of  this,  we  already  have  the  notion  of 
Place.  We  must  be  aware  of  the  different  parts  of  our 
body  as  one  out  of  another,  before  we  can  use  this 
knowledge  as  a  means  of  cognizing  a  similar  fact  in 
regard  to  other  material  objects.  This  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton admits  ;  and  what,  therefore,  he  is  bound  to  prove 
is,  that  the  very  first  time  we  received  an  impression  of 
touch  or  of  any  other  sense,  affecting  more  than  one 


300      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OP  THE 

nervous  filament,  we  were  conscious  of  being  affected  in 
a  plurality  of  places.  This  he  does  not  even  attempt  to 
do ;  and  direct  proof  is  palpably  unattainable.  As  a 
matter  of  indirect  evidence,  we  may  oppose  to  this  theory 
Mr.  Bain's,  according  to  which,  apart  from  association, 
we  should  not  have  any  impression  of  the  kind,  and 
should  in  general  be  conscious  only  of  a  greater  mass  or 
"volume"  of  sensation  when  we  were  affected  in  two 
places,  than  when  only  in  one ;  like  the  more  massive 
sensation  of  heat  which  we  feel  when  our  bodies  are  im- 
mersed in  a  warm  bath,  compared  with  that  which  we 
feel  when  heat  of  the  same,  or  even  of  greater  intensity, 
is  applied  only  to  our  hands  or  feet.  Mr.  Bain's  doc- 
trine, being  as  consistent  with  the  admitted  facts  of  the 
case  as  Sir  W.  Hamilton's,  has  a  good  claim,  on  his  own 
law  of  Parcimony,  to  be  preferred  to  it.  But,  besides, 
there  are  recorded  facts  which  agree  with  Mr.  Bain's 
theory,  and  are  quite  irreconcilable  with  Sir  W.  Hamil- 
ton's :  and  to  find  such  we  need  not  travel  beyond  Sir 
W.  Hamilton's  own  pages. 

One  of  them  is  the  very  case  we  have  already  had 
before  us,  that  recorded  by  Platner.  The  facts  of  this 
case  are  quite  inconsistent  with  the  opinion,  that  we 
have  a  direct  perception  of  extension  when  an  object 
touches  us  in  more  than  one  place,  including  the  extrem- 
ities of  more  than  one  nervous  filament.  Platner  ex- 
pressly says,  that  his  patient,  when  an  object  touched  a 
considerable  part  of  the  surface  of  his  body,  but  without 
exciting  more  than  one  kind  of  sensation,  was  conscious 
of  no  local  difference  —  no  "  outness  "  of  one  part  of  the 
sensation  in  relation  to  another  part  —  but  only  (we  may 
presume)  of  a  greater  quantity  of  sensation ;  as  Mr.  Bain 


PRIMARY   QUALITIES    OF    MATTER.  301 

would  call  it,  a  greater  volume.  As  Platner  expresses 
it,  "if  objects,  and  the  parts  of  his  body  touched  by 
them,  did  not  make  different  kinds  of  impression  on  his 
nerves  of  sensation,  he  would  take  everything  external 
for  one  and  the  same.  In  his  own  body,  he  absolutely 
did  not  discriminate  head  and  foot  at  all  by  their  distance, 
but  merely  by  the  difference  of  the  feelings."  Such  an 
experiment,  reported  by  a  competent  observer,  is  of 
itself  almost  enough  to  overthrow  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
theory. 

In  like  manner,  the  patient  in  Cheselden's  celebrated 
case,  after  his  second  eye  was  couched,  described  himself 
as  seeing  objects  twice  as  large  with  both  eyes  as  with 
one  only ;  that  is,  he  had  a  double  quantity,  or  double 
volume  of  sensation,  which  suggested  to  his  mind  the 
idea  of  a  double  size.* 

Another  case,  for  the  knowledge  of  which  I  am  also 
indebted  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  —  who  knew  it  through  an 
abstract  given  by  M.  Maine  de  Biran  of  the  original 
report  "by  M.  Key  Re*gis,  a  medical  observer,  in  his 
Histoire  Naturelle  de  1'Ame,"  —  is  as  incompatible  with 

*  I  may  here  observe  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  (and  the  same  mistake  has 
been  made  by  Mr.  Bailey)  considers  Cheseldeu's  case  as  evidence  that  the 
"  perception  of  externality,"  as  distinguished  from  that  of  distance  from 
the  eye,  is  given  by  sight  as  well  as  by  touch,  because  the  young  man  said 
that  objects  at  first  seemed  "  to  touch  his  eyes  as  what  he  felt  did  his  skin." 
(Foot-note  to  Reid,  p.  177.)  He  seems  to  think  that,  on  the  other  theory, 
the  boy  should  have  been  metaphysician  enough  to  recognize  in  the  per- 
ception "  a  mere  affection  of  the  organ,"  or  at  least  should  have  perceived 
the  objects  "  as  if  in  his  eyes."  But  he  was  not  accustomed  to  con- 
ceive tangible  objects  as  if  in  his  fingers.  He  conceived  them  as  touching 
his  fingers ;  and  he  simply  transferred  the  experience  of  touch  to  the  newly- 
acquired  sense.  All  his  notions  of  perception  were  associated  with  direct 
contact ;  and  as  he  did  not  perceive  any  of  the  objects  of  sight  to  be  at  a 
distance  from  the  organ  by  which  he  perceived  them,  he  concluded  that 
they  must  be  in  contact  with  it. 


302      THE  PYSCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

Sir  W.  Hamilton's  theory  as  Platner's  case.  It  is  the 
case  of  a  patient  who  lost  the  power  of  movement  in  one 
half  of  his  body,  apparently  from  temporary  paralysis 
of  the  rnotory  nerves,  while  the  functions  of  the  sensory 
nerves  seemed  unimpaired.  This  patient,  it  was  found, 
had  lost  the  power  of  localizing  his  sensations.  "  Ex- 
periments,* various  and  repeated,  were  made  to  ascertain 
with  accuracy,  whether  the  loss  of  motive  faculty  had 
occasioned  any  alteration  in  the  capacity  of  feeling ;  and 
it  was  found  that  the  patient,  though  as  acutely  alive 
as  ever  to  the  sense  of  pain,  felt,  when  this  was  secretly 
inflicted,  as  by  compression  of  his  hand  under  the  bed- 
clothes, a  sensation  of  suffering  or  uneasiness,  by  which, 
when  the  pressure  became  strong,  he  was  compelled 
lustily  to  cry  out ;  but  a  sensation  merely  general,  he 
being  altogether  unable  to  localize  the  feeling,  or  to  say 
whence  the  pain  proceeded.  .  .  .  The  patient,  as  he 
gradually  recovered  the  use  of  his  limbs,  gradually  also 
recovered  the  power  of  localizing  his  sensations."  It 
would  be  premature  to  establish  a  scientific  inference 
upon  a  single  experiment :  but  if  confirmed  by  repeti- 
tion, this  is  an  experimentum  crucis.  So  far  as  one 
experiment  can  avail,  it  fully  proves,  that  sensation 
without  motion  does  not  give  the  perception  of  difference 
of  place  in  our  bodily  organs  (not  to  speak  of  outward 
objects) ,  and  that  this  perception  is  even  now  entirely  an 
inference,  dependent  on  the  muscular  feelings. 

It  gives  a  very  favorable  idea  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
sincerity  and  devotion  to  truth,  that  he  should  have  drawn 
from  their  obscurity  and  made  generally  known  two  cases 
which  make  such  havoc  with  his  own  opinions  as  this 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  pp.  874, 875. 


PRIMARY  QUALITIES  OP  MATTER.  303 

and  Platner's ;  for  though  he  did  not  believe  the  cases 
to  be  really  inconsistent  with  his  theory,  he  can  hardly 
have  been  entirely  unaware  that  they  could  be  used 
against  it. 

The  only  other  point  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  doctrines 
respecting  the  Primary  Qualities  which  it  is  of  impor- 
tance to  notice,  is  one,  I  believe,  peculiar  to  himself,  and 
certainly  not  common  to  him  with  any  of  his  eminent 
predecessors  in  the  same  school  of  thought.  It  is  the 
doctrine,  that  those  qualities  are  not  perceived  —  are  not 
directly  and  immediately  cognized  —  in  things  external 
to  our  bodies,  but  only  in  our  bodies  themselves.  "A 
Perception,"  he  says,*  "of  the  Primary  Qualities  does 
not,  originally  and  in  itself,  reveal  to  us  the  existence, 
and  qualitative  existence,  of  aught  beyond  the  organism, 
'apprehended  by  us  as  extended,  figured,  divided,  &c. 
The  primary  qualities  of  things  external  to  our  organism 
we  do  not  perceive,  i.  e.,  immediately  know.  For  these 
we  only  learn  to  infer,  from  the  affections  which  we  come 
to  find  that  they  determine  in  our  organs  ;  —  affections 
which,  yielding  us  a  perception  of  organic  extension,  we 
at  length  discover,  by  observation  and  induction,  to  im- 
ply a  corresponding  extension  in  the  extra-organic  agents. " 
Neither,  according  to  him,  do  we  perceive,  or  immediately 
know,  "extension  in  its  true  and  absolute  magnitude;" 
our  perceptions  giving  different  impressions  of  magnitude 
from  the  same  object,  when  placed  in  contact  with  differ- 
ent parts  of  our  body.  "  As  perceived  extension  is  only 
the  recognition  of  one  organic  affection  in  its  outness 
from  another ;  as  a  minimum  of  extension  is  thus  to  per- 
ception the  smallest  extent  of  organism  in  which  sensa- 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  pp.  881,  882. 


304      THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY  OF  THE 

tions  can  be  discriminated  as  plural ;  and  as  in  one  part 
of  the  organism,  this  smallest  extent  is  perhaps  some 
million,  certainly  some  myriad,  times  smaller  than  in 
others ;  it  follows  that,  to  perception,  the  same  real  ex- 
tension will  appear,  in  this  place  of  the  body,  some  mil- 
lion or  myriad  times  greater  than  in  that.  Nor  does  this 
difference  subsist  only  as  between  sense  and  sense ;  for 
in  the  same  sense,  and  even  in  that  sense  which  has 
very  commonly  been  held  exclusively  to  afford  a  knowl- 
edge of  absolute  extension, —  I  mean  Touch  proper, —  the 
minimum  at  one  part  of  the  body,  is  some  fifty  times 
greater  than  it  is  at  another." 

Thus,  according  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  all  our  cogni- 
tions of  extension  and  figure  in  anything  except  our  own 
body,  and  of  the  real  amount  of  extension  even  in  that, 
are  not  perceptions,  or  states  of  direct  consciousness,  but 
M  inferences,"  and  even  inferences  "  by  observation  and 
induction  "  from  our  experience.  Now,  we  know  how 
contemptuous  he  is  of  Brown,  and  other  "  Cosmothetic 
Idealists,"  for  maintaining  that  the  existence  of  exten- 
sion or  extended  objects  otherwise  than  as  an  affection 
of  our  own  minds,  is  not  a  direct  perception,  but  an 
inference.  We  know  how  he  reproaches  this  opinion 
with  being  subversive  of  our  Natural  Beliefs ;  how  of- 
ten he  repeats  that  the  testimony  of  consciousness  must 
be  accepted  entire,  or  not  accepted  at  all ;  how  ear- 
nestly and  in  how  many  places  he  maintains  "  that  we 
have  not  merely  a  notion,  a  conception,  an  imagina- 
tion, a  subjective  representation  of  Extension,  for  ex- 
ample, called  up  or  suggested  in  some  incomprehensible 
manner  to  the  mind,  on  occasion  of  an  extended  object 
being  presented  to  the  sense ;  but  that  in  the  perception 


PRIMARY  QUALITIES  OP  MATTER.  305 

of  such  an  object  we  have,  as  by  nature  we  believe  we 
have,  an  immediate  knowledge  or  consciousness  of  that 
external  object  as  extended.  In  a  word,  that  in  sensitive 
perception,  the  extension,  as  known,  and  the  extension 
as  existing,  are  convertible ;  known  because  existing,  and 
existing,  since  known."*  All  this,  it  appears,  is  only 
true  of  the  extension  of  our  own  bodies.  The  extension 
of  any  other  body  is  not  known  immediately  or  by  per- 
ception, but  as  an  inference  from  the  former.  I  ask  any 
one,  whether  this  opinion  does  not  contradict  our  "nat- 
ural beliefs  "  as  much  as  any  opinion  of  the  Cosmothetic 
Idealists  can  do ;  whether  to  the  natural,  or  non-meta- 
physical man,  it  is  not  as  great  a  paradox  to  affirm  that 
we  do  not  perceive  extension  in  anything  external  to  our 
bodies,  as  that  we  do  not  perceive  extension  in  anything 
external  to  our  minds  ;  and  whether,  if  the  natural  man 
can  be  brought  to  assent  to  the  former,  he  will  find  any 
additional  strangeness  or  apparent  absurdity  in  the  latter. 
This  is  only  one  of  the  many  instances  in  which  the  phi- 
losopher who  so  vehemently  accuses  other  thinkers  of 
affirming  the  absolute  authority  of  Consciousness  when 
it  is  on  their  own  side,  and  rejecting  it  when  it  is  not, 
lays  himself  open  to  a  similar  charge.  The  truth  is,  it 
is  a  charge  from  which  no  psychologist,  not  Reid  him- 
self, is  exempt.  No  person  of  competent  understanding 
has  ever  applied  himself  to  the  study  of  the  human  mind, 
and  not  discovered  that  some  of  the  common  opinions 
of  mankind  respecting  their  mental  consciousness  are 
false,  and  that  some  notions,  apparently  intuitive,  are 
really  acquired.  Every  psychologist  draws  the  line 
where  he  thinks  it  can  be  drawn  most  truly.  Of  course 

*  Dissertations  on  Reid,  p.  842. 


306  THE    PRIMARY   QUALITIES    OP    MATTER. 

it  is  possible  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  drawn  it  in  the 
right  place,  and  Brown  in  the  wrong.  Sir  W.  Hamilton 
would  say  that  the  common  opinions  which  he  contests 
are  not  Natural  Beliefs,  though  mistaken  for  such.  And 
Brown  thinks  exactly  the  same  of  those  which  are  repug- 
nant to  his  own  doctrine.  Neither  of  these  can  justify 
himself  but  by  pointing  out  a  mode  in  which  the  apparent 
perceptions,  supposed  to  be  original,  may  have  been  ac- 
quired ;  and  neither  can  charge  the  other  with  anything 
worse  than  having  made  a  mistake  in  this  extremely 
delicate  process  of  psychological  analysis.  Neither  of 
them  has  a  right  to  give  to  a  mistake  in  such  a  matter, 
the  name  of  a  rejection  of  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness, and  attempt  to  bring  down  the  other  by  an  argu- 
ment which  is  of  no  possible  value  except  ad  invidium, 
and  which  in  its  invidious  sense  is  applicable  to  them 
both,  and  to  all  psychologists  deserving  the  name. 


THE  LAW   OP  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION.  307 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

HOW  SIR  W.    HAMILTON  AND  MR.    MANSEL   DISPOSE  OF 
THE   LAW   OF   INSEPARABLE   ASSOCIATION. 

IT  has  been  obvious  in  the  preceding  discussions,  and  is 
known  to  all  who  have  studied  the  best  masters  of  what 
I  have  called  the  Psychological,  in  opposition  to  the 
merely  Introspective  method  of  metaphysical  inquiry, 
that  the  principal  instrument  employed  by  them  for  un- 
locking the  deeper  mysteries  of  mental  science,  is  the 
Law  of  Inseparable  Association.  This  law,  which  it 
would  seem  specially  incumbent  on  the  Intuitive  school 
of  metaphysicians  to  take  into  serious  consideration,  be- 
cause it  is  the  basis  of  the  rival  theory  which  they  have 
to  encounter  at  every  point,  and  which  it  is  necessary 
for  them  to  refute  first,  as  the  condition  of  establishing 
their  own,  is  not  so  much  rejected  as  ignored  by  them. 
Reid  and  Stewart,  who  had  met  with  it  only  in  Hartley, 
thought  it  needless  to  take  the  trouble  of  understanding 
it.  The  best  informed  German  and  French  philosophers 
are  barely  aware,  if  even  aware,  of  its  existence.*  And 
in  tliis  country  and  age,  in  which  it  has  been  employed 
by  thinkers  of  the  highest  order  as  the  most  potent  of  all 
instruments  of  psychological  analysis,  the  opposite  school 
usually  dismiss  it  with  a  few  sentences,  so  smoothly  glid- 

*  As  lately  as  the  year  1864  has  been  published  the  first  work  (I  believe) 
in  the  French  language,  which  recognizes  the  association  psychology  in  its 
modern  developments  ;  an  able  and  instructive  "  Etude  sur  1'Assoriation 
des  Idees,"  by  M.  P.  M.  Mervoyer. 


308  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION   IGNORED 

ing  over  the  surface  of  the  subject,  as  to  prove  that  they 
have  never,  even  for  an  instant,  brought  the  powers  of 
their  minds  into  real  and  effective  contact  with  it. 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  written  a  rather  elaborate  Dis- 
sertation on  the  Laws  of  Association,  and  the  more 
elementary  of  them  had  engaged  a  considerable  share  of 
his  attention.*  But  he  nowhere  shows  that  he  had  the 
smallest  suspicion  of  this,  the  least  familiar  and  most 
imperfectly  understood  of  these  laws.  I  find  in  all  his 
writings  only  two  or  three  passages  in  which  he  touches, 
even  cursorily,  on  this  mode  of  explaining  mental  phe- 
nomena. The  first  and  longest  of  these  occurs  in  the 
treatment,  not  of  any  of  the  greater  problems  of  mental 
philosophy,  but  of  a  very  minor  question ;  whether,  in 
the  perception  of  outward  objects,  our  cognition  of 
wholes  precedes  that  of  their  component  parts,  or  the 
contrary?  More  fully;  "whether,  in  Perception,  do 
we  first  obtain  a  general  knowledge  of  the  complex 

*  In  this  Dissertation,  which  originally  broke  off  abruptly,  but  the  con- 
clusion of  which  has  recently  been  supplied  from  the  author's  papers,  he 
attempts  to  simplify  the  theory  of  Association,  reducing  Association  by 
Resemblance,  not  indeed  to  Association  by  Contiguity,  but  to  that  com- 
bined with  an  elementary  law,  for  the  first  time  expressly  laid  down  by  Sir 
W.  Hamilton,  though  implied  in  all  Association  and  in  all  Memory  :  viz., 
that  a  present  sensation  or  thought  suggests  the  remembrance  of  what  he 
calls  the  same  sensation  or  thought  (meaning  one  exactly  similar)  ex- 
perienced at  a  former  time.  This  leaves  Resemblance  of  simple  sensations 
as  a  distinct  principle  of  association,  the  foundation  of  all  the  rest,  while  it 
resolves  resemblance  of  complex  phenomena  into  that  simple  principle 
combined  with  the  law  of  Contiguity. 

By  virtue  of  this  speculation,  Sir  "W.  Hamilton  thinks  it  possible  to  re- 
duce Association  to  a  single  law :  "  Those  thoughts  suggest  each  other, 
which  had  previously  constituted  parts  of  the  same  entire  or  total  act  of 
cognition."  (Lectures,  ii.  238,  and  the  corresponding  passages  of  the  Dis- 
sertation.) This  appears  to  me,  I  confess,  far  from  a  happy  effort  of 
generalization  ;  for  there  is  no  possibility  of  bringing  under  it  the  elemen- 
tary case  of  suggestion,  which  our  author  has  the  merit  of  being  the  first 
to  put  into  scientific  language.  The  sweet  taste  of  to-day,  and  the  similar 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AND  MB.   MANSEL.      309 

wholes  presented  to  us  by  sense,  and  then,  by  analysis 
and  limited  attention,  obtain  a  special  knowledge  of 
their  several  parts  ;  or  do  we  not  first  obtain  a  particular 
knowledge  of  the  smallest  parts  to  which  sense  is  com- 
petent, and  then,  by  synthesis,  collect  them  into  greater 
and  greater  wholes  ?  "  *  Sir  W.  Hamilton  declares  for 
the  first  theory,  and  quotes  as  supporters  of  the  second, 
Stewart  and  James  Mill ;  to  the  latter  of  whom,  more 
than  to  any  other  thinker,  mankind  are  indebted  for 
recalling  the  attention  of  philosophers  to  the  law  of  In- 
separable Association,  and  pointing  out  the  important 
applications  of  which  it  is  susceptible.  Through  the 
conflict  with  Mr.  Mill  on  the  very  subordinate  question 
which  he  is  discussing,  Sir  ~W.  Hamilton  is  led  to  quote 
a  part  of  that  philosopher's  exposition  of  Inseparable 
Association ;  and  it  is  a  sign  how  little  he  was  aware  of 
the  importance  of  the  subject,  that  a  theory  of  so  wide 
a  scope  and  such  large  consequences  should  receive  the 

sweet  taste  of  a  week  ago  which  it  reminds  me  of,  have  not  "  previously 
constituted  parts  of  the  same  act  of  cognition  ; "  unless  we  take  literally  the 
expression  by  which  they  are  spoken  of  as  the  same  taste,  though  they  are 
no  more  the  same  taste,  than  two  men  are  the  same  man  if  they  happen  to 
be  exactly  alike.  It  is  a  further  objection,  that  the  attempted  simplifica- 
tion, even  if  otherwise  correct,  would  merely  unite  two  clear  notions  into 
one  obscure  one ;  for  the  notion  of  feelings  which  suggest  one  another 
because  they  resemble,  or  because  they  have  been  experienced  together,  is 
universally  intelligible,  while  that  of  forming  parts  of  the  same  act  of  cog- 
nition involves  all  the  metaphysical  difficulties  which  surround  the  ideas 
of  Unity,  Totality,  and  Parts. 

After  thus,  as  he  fancies,  reducing  all  the  phtenomena  of  Association  to  a 
single  law,  Sir  "W.  Hamilton  asks,  how  is  this  law  itself  explained  ?  and 
justly  observes  that  it  may  be  an  ultimate  law,  and  that  ultimate  laws  are 
necessarily  unexplainable.  But  he  nevertheless  quotes,  with  some  appro- 
bation, an  attempt  by  a  German  writer,  H.  Schmid,  to  explain  it  by  an  A 
priori  theory  of  the  human  mind,  which  may  be  recommended  to  notice  as 
a  choice  specimen  of  a  school  of  German  metaphysicians  who  have  remained 
several  centuries  behind  the  progress  of  philosophical  inquiry,  having  never 
yet  felt  the  influence  of  the  Baconian  reform.  See  Lectures,  ii.  240-243. 

*  Lectures,  ii,  144. 


310  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

only  recognition  he  ever  gives  it  in  a  by-corner  of  his 
work,  incidentally  to  one  of  the  smallest  questions  therein 
discussed.  I  shall  extract  the  very  passages  which  he 
quotes  from  Mr.  Mill,  because,  in  a  small  space,  they 
state  and  illustrate  very  happily  the  two  most  character- 
istic properties  of  our  closest  associations  ;  that  the  sug- 
gestions they  produce  are,  for  the  time,  irresistible  ;  and 
that  the  suggested  ideas  (at  least  when  the  association  is 
of  the  synchronous  kind  as  distinguished  from  the  suc- 
cessive) become  so  blended  together,  that  the  compound 
result  appears,  to  our  consciousness,  simple. 

"Where  two  or  more  ideas,"  says  Mr.  Mill,*  "have 
been  often  repeated  together,  and  the  association  has 
become  very  strong,  they  sometimes  spring  up  in  such 
close  combination  as  not  to  be  distinguishable.  Some 
cases  of  sensation  are  analogous.  For  example ;  when 
a  wheel,  on  the  seven  parts  of  which  the  seven  prismatic 
colors  are  respectively  painted,  is  made  to  revolve  rap- 
idly, it  appears  not  of  seven  colors,  but  of  one  uniform 
color  —  white.  By  the  rapidity  of  the  succession,  the 
several  sensations  cease  to  be  distinguishable;  they  run, 
as  it  were,  together,  and  a  new  sensation,  compounded 
of  all  the  seven,  but  apparently  a  single  one,  is  the  result. 
Ideas,  also,  which  have  been  so  often  conjoined,  that 
whenever  one  exists  in  the  mind,  the  others  immediately 
exist  along  with  it,  seem  to  run  into  one  another,  to 
coalesce,  as  it  were,  and  out  of  many  to  form  one  idea ; 
which  idea,  however  in  reality  complex,  appears  to  be 
no  less  simple  than  any  one  of  those  of  which  it  is  com- 
pounded. .  .  . 

"  It  is  to  this  great  law  of  association  that  we  trace 

*  Analysis  of  the  Human  Mind,  i.  68-75. 


BY  SIB  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AND  MB.   M ANSEL.      311 

the  formation  of  our  ideas  of  what  we  call  external 
objects ;  that  is,  the  ideas  of  a  certain  number  of  sensa- 
tions received  together  so  frequently  that  they  coalesce, 
as  it  were,  and  are  spoken  of  under  the  idea  of  unity. 
Hence  what  we  call  the  idea  of  a  tree,  the  idea  of  a 
stone,  the  idea  of  a  horse,  the  idea  of  a  man. 

"  In  using  the  names,  tree,  horse,  man,  the  names  of 
what  I  call  objects,  I  am  referring,  and  can  be  referring, 
only  to  my  own  sensations ;  in  fact,  therefore,  only 
naming  a  certain  number  of  sensations,  regarded  as  in 
a  particular  state  of  combination ;  that  is,  of  concomi- 
tance. Particular  sensations  of  sight,  of  touch,  of  the 
muscles,  are  the  sensations,  to  the  ideas  of  which,  color, 
extension,  roughness,  hardness,  smoothness,  taste,  smell, 
so  coalescing  as  to  appear  one  idea,  I  give  the  name  idea 
of  a  tree. 

"To  this  case  of  high  association,  this  blending  to- 
gether of  many  ideas,  in  so  close  a  combination  that 
they  appear  not  many  ideas,  but  one  idea,  we  owe,  as  I 
shall  afterwards  more  fully  explain,  the  power  of  clas- 
sification, and  all  the  advantages  of  language.  It  is 
obviously,  therefore,  of  the  greatest  moment,  that  this 
important  phenomenon  should  be  well  understood. 

"  Some  ideas  are  by  frequency  and  strength  of  associ- 
ation so  closely  combined  that  they  cannot  be  separated. 
If  one  exists,  the  other  exists  along  with  it,  in  spite  of 
whatever  effort  we  may  make  to  disjoin  them. 

"  For  example ;  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  think  of 
color,  without  thinking  of  extension ;  or  of  solidity, 
without  figure.  We  have  seen  color  constantly  in  com- 
bination with  extension,  spread,  as  it  were,  upon  a  sur- 
face. We  have  never  seen  it  except  in  this  connection. 


312  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

Color  and  extension  have  been  invariably  conjoined.  The 
idea  of  color,  therefore,  uniformly  comes  into  the  mind, 
bringing  that  of  extension  along  with  it ;  and  so  close  is 
the  association,  that  it  is  not  in  our  power  to  dissolve  it. 
We  cannot,  if  we  will,  think  of  color,  but  in  combina- 
tion with  extension.  The  one  idea  calls  up  the  other, 
and  retains  it,  so  long  as  the  other  is  retained. 

w  This  great  law  of  our  nature  is  illustrated  in  a  man- 
ner equally  striking  by  the  connection  between  the  ideas 
of  solidity  and  figure.  We  never  have  the  sensations 
from  which  the  idea  of  solidity  is  derived,  but  in  con- 
junction with  the  sensations  whence  the  idea  of  figure  is 
derived.  If  we  handle  anything  solid  it  is  always  either 
round,  square,  or  of  some  other  form.  The  ideas  corre- 
spond with  the  sensations.  If  the  idea  of  solidity  rises, 
that  of  figure  rises  along  with  it.  The  idea  of  figure 
which  rises  is,  of  course,  more  obscure  than  that  of  ex- 
tension ;  because,  figures  being  innumerable,  the  general 
idea  is  exceedingly  complex,  and  hence,  of  necessity, 
obscure.  But  such  as  it  is,  the  idea  of  figure  is  always 
present  when  that  of  solidity  is  present ;  nor  can  we,  by 
any  effort,  think  of  the  one  without  thinking  of  the  other 
at  the  same  time." 

Other  illustrations  follow,  concluding  with  these 
words  :  "  The  following  of  one  idea  after  another  idea, 
or  after  a  sensation,  so  certainly  that  we  cannot  prevent 
the  combination,  nor  avoid  having  the  consequent  feeling 
as  often  as  we  have  the  antecedent  is  a  law  of  associa- 
tion, the  operation  of  which  we  shall  afterwards  find  to 
be  extensive,  and  bearing  a  principal  part  in  some  of  the 
most  important  phenomena  of  the  human  mind."  And 
the  promise  of  this  sentence  is  amply  redeemed  in  the 
sequel  to  the  treatise. 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AND   MB.   M ANSEL.      313 

The  only  remark  which  this  highly  philosophical  expo- 
sition suggests  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  is  a  disparaging 
reflection  on  Mr.  Mill's  philosophy  in  general.  He  says 
that  Mr.  Mill  in  his  "  ingenious  "  treatise,  "  has  pushed 
the  principle  of  Association  to  an  extreme  which  refutes 
its  own  exaggeration,  — analyzing  not  only  our  belief  in 
the  relation  of  effect  and  cause  into  that  principle,  but 
even  the  primary  logical  laws,"  so  that  it  is  no  wonder 
he  should  "account  for  our  knowledge  of  complex  wholes 
in  perception,  by  the  same  universal  principle."  Having, 
on  the  strength  of  this  previous  verdict  of  exaggeration, 
dispensed  with  inquiring  how  much  the  law  of  Insepara- 
ble Association  can  really  accomplish,  he  makes  no  use 
of  its  most  obvious  applications,  even  while  transcribing 
them  into  his  own  pages.  One  of  the  psychological  facts 
stated  in  the  passage  quoted,  the  impossibility,  to  us,  of 
separating  the  idea  of  extension  and  that  of  color,  is  a 
truth  strongly  insisted  on  by  Sir  W.  Hamilton  himself. 
In  the  very  next  Lecture  but  one  to  that  from  which  I 
have  been  quoting,  he  strenuously  maintains,  that  we  can 
neither  conceive  color  without  extension,  nor  extension 
without  color.  Even  the  born  blind,  he  thinks,  have  the 
sensation  of  darkness,  that  is,  of  black  color,  and  men- 
tally clothe  all  extended  objects  with  it.*  Except  the 
last  position,  which  has  no  evidence  and  no  probability, f 

*  Lectures,  ii.  168-172. 

f  According  to  the  doctrine  of  all  advanced  psychologists,  to  which  Sir 
W.  Hamilton  gives  an  express  adhesion,  it  is  impossible  to  have  a  con- 
sciousness of  darkness  without  having  had  a  consciousness  of  light.  Be- 
sides, it  is  a  notorious  optical  fact  that  a  completely  black  object  occupying 
the  whole  sphere  of  vision  is  invisible ;  it  reflects  no  light.  Blackness, 
therefore  (the  complete  blackness  of  absolute  darkness),  is  not  a  sensa- 
tion, but  the  total  absence  of  sensation  ;  it  is,  in  fact,  nothing  at  all ;  and 
to  say  that  a  person  born  blind  cannot  imagine  extension  without  clothing 


314  INSEPARABLE   ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

the  doctrine  is  undoubtedly  true,  and  the  fact  is  so  obvi- 
ously a  case  of  the  law  of  association,  that  even  Stewart, 
little  partial  as  he  was  to  that  mode  of  explaining  mental 
phenomena,  does  not  dream  of  attributing  it  to  anything 
else.  "  In  consequence,"  says  Stewart,  "  of  our  always 
perceiving  extension  at  the  same  time  at  which  the  sen- 
sation of  color  is  excited  in  the  mind,  we  find  it  impos- 
sible to  think  of  that  sensation  without  conceiving 
extension  along  with  it."  He  gives  this  as  one  of  the 
instances  "  of  very  intimate  associations  formed  between 
two  ideas  which  have  no  necessary  connection  with  one 
another."  A  mental  analysis  by  way  of  association 
which  was  sufficiently  obvious  to  recommend  itself  to 
Stewart,  will  scarcely  be  charged  with  "  pushing  the 
principle  to  an  extreme."  In  fact,  if  an  association  can 
ever  become  inseparable  by  dint  of  repetition,  how  could 
the  association  between  color  and  extension  fail  of  being 
so  ?  The  two  facts  never  exist  but  in  immediate  conjunc- 
tion, and  the  experience  of  that  conjunction  is  repeated 
at  every  moment  of  life  which  is  not  spent  in  darkness. 
Yet  after  transcribing  this  explanation  both  from  Stewart 
and  from  Mill,  Sir  W.  Hamilton  remains  as  insensible 
to  it  as  if  it  had  never  been  given ;  and  without  a  word 
of  refutation,  composedly  registers  the  inseparableness 
of  the  two  ideas  as  an  ultimate  mental  fact  proving  them 
both  to  be  original  perceptions  of  the  same  organ,  the 
eye.  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  authority  can  have  little  weight 
against  the  doctrine  which  accounts  for  the  more  complex 
parts  of  our  mental  constitution  by  the  laws  of  associa- 

it  with  nothing  at  all,  is  to  assert  something  not  very  intelligible.  In  the 
case  of  a  person  who  has  become  blind,  it  might  have  a  meaning ;  for 
blackness  to  him,  like  darkness  to  us,  does  not  stand  for  mere  inability  to 
see,  but  for  the  usual  effort  to  see,  not  followed  by  the  usual  consequence. 


BY   SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AND  MR.   MANSEL.      315 

tion,  when  it  is  so  evident  that  he  rejected  that  doctrine 
not  because  he  had  examined  it  and  found  it  wanting, 
but  without  examining  it ;  having  taken  for  granted  that 
it  did  not  deserve  examination. 

How  imperfect  was  his  acquaintance  with  the  secon- 
dary laws,  the  axiomata  media  of  association,  is  plainly 
seen  in  his  argument  against  Stewart  and  Mill  on  the 
comparatively  insignificant  question  with  which  he 
started.  The  thesis  he  is  asserting  is,  that  "in  place  of 
ascending  upwards  from  the  minimum  of  perception  to 
its  maxima,  we  descend  from  masses  to  details." 

"  If  the  opposite  doctrine  "  (says  Sir  W.  Hamilton)  * 
were  correct,  what  would  it  involve  ?  It  would  involve 
as  a  primary  inference,  that,  as  we  know  the  whole 
through  the  parts,  we  should  know  the  parts  better 
than  the  whole.  Thus,  for  example,  it  is  supposed  that 
we  know  the  face  of  a  friend,  through  the  multitude  of 
perceptions  which  we  have  of  the  different  points  of 
which  it  is  made  up ;  in  other  words,  that  we  should 
know  the  whole  countenance  less  vividly  than  we  know 
the  forehead  and  eyes,  the  nose  and  mouth,  &c.,  and 
that  we  should  know  each  of  these  more  feebly  than  we 
know  the  various  ultimate  points,  in  fact,  unconscious 
minima  of  perceptions,  which  go  to  constitute  them. 
According  to  the  doctrine  in  question,  we  perceive  only 
one  of  these  ultimate  points  at  the  same  instant,  the 
others  by  memory  incessantly  renewed.  Now,  let  us  take 
the  face  out  of  perception  into  memory  altogether.  Let 
us  close  ,our  eyes,  and  let  us  represent  in  imagination 
the  countenance  of  our  friend.  This  we  can  do  with  the 
utmost  vivacity ;  or,  if  we  see  a  picture  of  it,  we  can 

*  Lectures,  ii.  149,  150. 


316  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

determine  with  a  consciousness  of  the  most  perfect  accu- 
racy, that  the  portrait  is  like  or  unlike.  It  cannot, 
therefore,  be  denied  that  we  have  the  fullest  knowledge 
of  the  face  as  a  whole,  — that  we  are  familiar  with  its 
expression,  with  the  general  result  of  its  parts.  On  the 
hypothesis,  then,  of  Stewart  and  Mill,  how  accurate 
should  be  our  knowledge  of  these  parts  themselves  !  But 
make  the  experiment.  You  will  find,  that  unless  you 
have  analyzed,  — unless  you  have  descended  from  a  con- 
spectus of  the  whole  face  to  a  detailed  examination  of 
its  parts,  —  with  the  most  vivid  impression  of  the  con- 
stituted whole,  you  are  almost  totally  ignorant  of  the 
constituent  parts.  You  may  probably  be  unable  to  say 
what  is  the  color  of  the  eyes,  and  if  you  attempt  to  de- 
lineate the  mouth  or  nose,  you  will  inevitably  fail.  Or 
look  at  the  portrait.  You  may  find  it  unlike,  but  unless, 
as  I  said,  you  have  analyzed  the  countenance,  unless  you 
have  looked  at  it  with  the  analytic  scrutiny  of  a  painter's 
eye,  you  will  assuredly  be  unable  to  say  in  what  respect 
the  artist  has  failed, — you  will  be  unable  to  specify 
what  constituent  he  has  altered,  though  you  are  fully 
conscious  of  the  fact  and  effect  of  the  alteration.  What 
we  have  shown  from  this  example  may  equally  be  done 
from  any  other  —  a  house,  a  tree,  a  landscape,  a  concert 
of  music,  &c."  * 

I  have  already  made  mention  of  a  very  important  part 
of  the  Laws  of  Association,  which  may  be  termed  the 

*  Those  who  are  acquainted  with  Mr.  Bailey's  attempt  to  disprove 
Berkeley's  Theory  of  Vision,  will  be  reminded  by  this  passage  of  an  ex- 
actly similar  argument  employed  by  that  able  thinker  and  writer,  to  prove 
the  intuitive  character  of  what  philosophers  almost  unanimously  consider 
as  the  acquired  perceptions  of  sight.  I  have  given  the  same  answer  to 
Mr.  Bailey  on  another  occasion,  which  I  give  to  Sir  W.  Hamilton  here. 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AND  MR.   MANSEL.      317 

Laws  of  Obliviscence.  If  Sir  W.  Hamilton  had  suffi- 
ciently attended  to  those  laws,  he  never  could  have 
maintained,  that  if  we  knew  the  parts  before  the  whole, 
we  must  continue  to  know  the  parts  better  than  the 
whole.  It  is  one  of  the  principal  Laws  of  Obliviscence, 
that  when  a  number  of  ideas  suggest  one  another  by 
association  with  such  certainty  and  rapidity  as  to  coalesce 
together  in  a  group,  all  those  members  of  the  group 
which  remain  long  without  being  specially  attended  to, 
have  a  tendency  to  drop  out  of  consciousness.  Our  con- 
sciousness of  them  becomes  more  and  more  faint  and 
evanescent,  until  no  effort  of  attention  can  recall  it  into 
distinctness,  or  at  last  recall  it  at  all.  Any  one  who 
observes  his  own  mental  operations  will  find  this  fact 
exemplified  in  every  day  of  his  life.  Now,  the  law  of 
Attention  is  admitted  to  be,  that  we  attend  only  to  that 
which,  either  on  its  own  or  on  some  other  account, 
interests  us.  In  consequence,  what  interests  us  only 
momentarily  we  only  attend  to  momentarily ;  and  do  not 
go  on  attending  to  it,  when  that,  for  the  sake  of  which 
alone  it  interested  us,  has  been  attained.  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton would  have  found  these  several  laws  clearly  set 
forth,  and  abundantly  exemplified,  in  the  work  of  Mr. 
Mill  which  he  had  before  him.  It  is  there  shown  how 
large  a  proportion  of  all  our  states  of  feeling  pass  off 
without  having  been  attended  to,  and  in  many  cases  so 
habitually  that  we  become  finally  incapable  of  attending 
to  them.  This  subject  was  also  extremely  well  under- 
stood by  Reid,  who,  little  as  he  had  reflected  on  the 
principle  of  Association,  was  much  better  acquainted 
with  the  laws  of  Obliviscence  than  his  more  recent  fol- 
lowers, and  has  excellently  illustrated  and  exemplified 

VOL.  I.  14 


318  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

some  of  them.*  Among  those  which  he  has  illustrated 
the  most  successfully,  one  is,  that  the  very  great  number 
of  our  states  of  feeling  which,  being  themselves  neither 
painful  nor  pleasurable,  are  important  to  us  only  as 
signs  of  something  else,  and  which  by  repetition  have 
come  to  do  their  work  as  signs  with  a  rapidity  which  to 
our  feelings  is  instantaneous,  cease  altogether  to  be  at- 
tended to ;  and  through  that  inattention  our  consciousness 
of  them  either  ceases  altogether,  or  becomes  so  fleeting 
and  indistinct  as  to  leave  no  revivable  trace  in  the  mem- 
ory. This  happens,  even  when  the  impressions  which 
serve  the  purpose  of  signs  are  not  mere  ideas,  or  remi- 
niscences, of  sensation,  but  actual  sensations.  After 
reading  a  chapter  of  a  book,  when  we  lay  down  the 
volume,  do  we  remember  to  have  been  individually  con- 
scious of  the  printed  letters  and  syllables  which  have 
passed  before  us?  Could  we  recall,  by  any  effort  of 
mind,  the  visible  aspect  presented  by  them,  unless  some 
unusual  circumstance  has  fixed  our  attention  upon  it 
during  the  perusal?  Yet  each  of  these  letters  and 
syllables  must  have  been  present  to  us  as  a  sensation  for 
at  least  a  passing  moment,  or  the  sense  could  not  have 
been  conveyed  to  us.  But  the  sense  being  the  only  thing 
in  which  we  are  interested,  —  or,  in  exceptional  cases,  the 
sense  and  a  few  of  the  words  or  sentences,  — we  retain 
no  impression  of  the  separate  letters  and  syllables.  This 
instance  is  the  more  instructive,  inasmuch  as,  the  whole 
process  taking  place  within  our  means  of  observation, 
we  know  that  our  knowledge  began  with  the  parts,  and 
not  with  the  whole.  We  know  that  we  perceived  and 

*  See  his  Inquiry  into  the  Human  Mind,  chap.  v.  sections  2  and  8 ;  chap, 
vi.  sects.  2,  3,  4,  7,  8,  19 ;  Intellectual  Powers,  Essay  ii.  chaps.  16  and  17. 


BY  SIB  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AND  MB.   MANSEL.      319 

distinguished  letters  and  syllables  before  we  learned  to 
understand  words  and  sentences ;  and  the  perceptions 
could  not,  at  that  time,  have  passed  unattended  to ;  on 
the  contrary,  the  effort  of  attention  of  which  those  letters 
and  syllables  must  have  been  the  object,  was  probably, 
while  it  lasted,  equal  in  intensity  to  any  which  we  have 
been  called  upon  to  exercise  in  after  life.  Were  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  argument  valid,  one  of  two  things  would  fol- 
low. Either  we  have  even  now,  when  we  read  in  a 
book,  a  more  vivid  consciousness  of  the  letters  and  sylla- 
bles than  of  the  words  and  sentences,  and  a  more  vivid 
consciousness  of  the  words  and  sentences  than  of  the 
general  purport  of  the  discourse ;  or  else,  we  could  read 
sentences  off  hand  at  first,  and  only  by  subsequent 
analysis  discovered  the  letters  and  syllables.  If  ever 
there  was  a  reductio  ad  absurdum,  this  is  one. 

The  facts  on  which  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  argument 
rests,  are  obviously  accounted  for  by  the  laws  which  he 
ignores.  In  our  perceptions  of  objects,  it  is  generally 
the  wholes,  and  the  wholes  alone,  that  interest  us.  In 
his  example,  that  of  a  friend's  countenance,  it  is  (special 
motives  apart)  only  the  friend  himself  that  we  are  in- 
terested about ;  we  care  about  the  features  only  as  signs 
that  it  is  our  friend  whom  we  see,  and  not  another  per- 
son. Unless,  therefore,  the  face  commands  our  atten- 
tion by  its  beauty  or  strangeness,  or  unless  we  stamp  the 
features  on  our  memory  by  acts  of  attention  directed 
upon  them  separately,  they  pass  before  us,  and  do  their 
work  as  signs,  with  so  little  consciousness  that  no  dis- 
tinct trace  may  be  left  in  the  memory.  We  forget  the 
details  even  of  objects  which  we  see  every  day,  if  we 
have  no  motive  for  attending  to  the  parts  as  distinguished 


320  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

from  the  wholes,  and  have  cultivated  no  habit  of  doing 
so.  That  this  is  consistent  with  having  known  the  parts 
earlier  than  the  wholes,  is  proved  not  only  by  the  case 
of  reading,  but  by  that  of  playing  on  a  musical  instru- 
ment, and  a  hundred  other  familiar  instances  ;  by  every- 
thing, in  fact,  which  we  learn  to  do.  When  the  wholes 
alone  are  interesting  to  us,  we  soon  forget  our  knowledge 
of  the  component  parts,  unless  we  purposely  keep  it 
alive  by  conscious  comparison  and  analysis. 

This  is  not  the  only  fallacy  in  Sir  W.  Hamilton's  ar- 
gument. Considered  as  a  reply  to  Mr.  Mill's  explanation 
of  the  origin  of  our  ideas  of  objects,  it  entirely  misses 
the  mark.  If  the  argument  and  examples  had  proved 
their  point,  —  which  it  has  been  seen  that  they  do  not, 
—  they  would  have  proved  that  we  perceive  and  know,  to 
some  extent  or  other,  the  object  as  a  whole,  before  know- 
ing its  integrant  parts.  But  it  is  not  of  integrant  parts 
that  Mr.  Mill  was  speaking ;  and  he  might  have  ad- 
mitted all  that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  contends  for,  without 
surrendering  his  own  opinion.  The  question  does  not 
relate  to  parts  in  extension.  It  does  not  concern  Mr. 
Mill's  theory  whether  we  know,  or  do  not  know,  a  man 
as  such,  before  we  distinguish,  in  thought  or  in  percep- 
tion, his  head  from  his  feet.  What  Mr.  Mill  said  was, 
that  our  idea  of  an  object,  whether  it  be  of  the  man,  or 
of  his  head,  or  of  his  feet,  is  compounded  by  association 
from  our  ideas  of  the  color,  the  shape,  the  resistance,  <£c., 
which  belong  to  those  objects.  These  are  what  phi- 
losophers have  called  the  metaphysical  parts,  not  the 
integrant  parts,  of  the  total  impression.  OSow,  I  have 
never  heard  of  any  philosopher  who  maintained  that  these 
parts  were  not  known  until  after  the  objects  which  they 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AND  MR.   M ANSEL.      321 

characterize;  that  we  perceive  the  body  first,  and  its 
color,  shape,  form,  &c.,  only  afterwards^  Our  senses, 
which  on  all  theories  are  at  least  the  avenues  through 
which  our  knowledge  of  bodies  comes  to  us,  are  not 
adapted  by  nature  to  let  in  the  perception  of  the  whole 
object  at  once.  They  only  open  to  let  pass  single  attri- 
butes at  a  time.  And  this  is  as  much  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
opinion  as  any  one's  else,  except  where  he  is  sustaining 
an  argument  which  makes  him  blind  to  it. 

As  is  often  the  case  with  our  author,  the  conclusion 
he  is  maintaining  is  worth  more  than  his  argument  to 
prove  it,  and  though  not  the  whole  truth,  has  truth  in 
it.  That  we  perceive  the  whole  before  the  parts  will  not 
stand  examination  as  a  general  law,  but  is  very  often 
true  as  a  particular  fact :  our  first  impression  is  often 
that  of  a  confused  mass,  of  which  all  the  parts  seem 
blended,  and  our  subsequent  progress  consists  in  elabo- 
rating this  into  distinctness.  It  was  well  to  point  out 
this  fact :  but  if  our  author  had  paid  more  attention  to 
its  limits,  he  might  have  been  able  to  give  us  a  complete 
theory  of  it,  instead  of  leaving  it,  as  he  has  done,  an 
empirical  observation,  which  waits  for  some  one  to  raise 
it  into  a  scientific  law. 

The  same  want  of  comprehension  of  the  power  of  an 
inseparable  association,  which  was  shown  by  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  in  the  case  of  Color  and  Extension,  is  ex- 
hibited in  the  only  other  case  in  which  he  adduces  any 
argument  to  prove  that  an  idea  was  not  produced  by 
association.  The  case  is  that  of  causality,  and  the  argu- 
ment is  the  ordinary  one  of  metaphysicians  of  his  school. 
"The  necessity*  of  so  thinking  cannot  be  derived  from 

*  Discussions,  Appendix  i.  on  Causality,  p.  615. 


322  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

&  custom  of  so  thinking.  -The  force  of  custom,  influen- 
tial as  it  may  be,  is  still  always  limited  to  the  customary ; 
and  the  customary  never  reaches,  never  even  approaches 
to  the  necessary."  The  pavier  who  cannot  use  his 
rammer  without  the  accustomed  cry,  the  orator  who  had 
so  often  while  speaking  twirled  a  string  in  his  hand  that 
he  became  unable  to  speak  when  he  accidentally  dropped 
it,  are,  it  seems  to  me,  examples  of  a  "  customary  "  which 
did  approach  to,  and  even  reach,  the  "necessary."  ^5^~ 
sociatiou  may  explain  a  strong  and  special,  but  it  can  never 
explain  a  universal  and  absolutely  irresistible  belief,^/ 
Not  when  the  conjunction  of  facts  which  engenders  the 
association,  is  itself  universal  and  irresistible?  "  What* 
I  cannot  but  think,  must  be  d  priori,  or  original  to 
thought :  it  cannot  be  engendered  by  experience  upon 
custom."  As  if  experience,  that  is  to  say,  association, 
were  not  perpetually  engendering  both  inabilities  to 
think,  and  inabilities  not  to  think.  "  We  can  f  think 
away  each  and  every  part  of  the  knowledge  we  have 
derived  from  experience."  Associations  derived  from 
experience  are  doubtless  separable  by  a  sufficient  amount 
of  contrary  experience ;  but,  in  the  cases  we  are  consid- 
ering, no  contrary  experience  is  to  be  had.  On  the 
theory  that  the  belief  in  causality  results  from  associa- 
tion, "  when  {  association  is  recent,  the  causal  judgment 
should  be  weak,  and  rise  only  gradually  to  full  force,  as 
custom  becomes  inveterate."  And  how  do  we  know 
that  it  does  not  ?  The  whole  process  of  acquiring  our 
belief  in  causation  takes  place  at  an  age  of  which  we 
have  no  remembrance,  and  which  precludes  the  possi- 

*  Lectures,  ii.  191.  t  Ibid.  iv.  74. 

%  Discussions,  ut  supra.  . 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AND  ME.   MANSEL.      323 

bility  of  testing  the  matter  by  experiment :  and  all  the- 
ories agree  that  our  first  type  of  causation  is  our  own 
power  of  moving  our  limbs ;  which  is  as  complete  as  it 
can  be,  and  has  formed  as  strong  associations  as  it  is 
capable  of  forming,  long  before  the  child  can  observe  or 
communicate  its  mental  operations. 

It  is  strange  that  almost  all  the  opponents  of  the 
Association  psychology  should  found  their  main  or  sole 
argument  in  refutation  of  it  upon  the  feeling  of  neces- 
sity ;  for  if  there  be  any  one  feeling  in  our  nature  which 
the  laws  of  association  are  obviously  equal  to  producing, 
one  would  say  it  is  that.  Necessary,  according  to  Kant's 
definition,  —  and  there  is  none  better,  —  is  that  of  which 
the  negation  is  impossible.  <Jfjwe  find  it  impossible,  by 
any  trial,  to  separate  two  ideas,  we  have  all  the  feeling 
of  necessity  which  the  mind  is  capable  ofT)  Those,  there- 
fore, who  deny  that  association  can  generate  a  necessity 
of  thought,  must  be  willing  to  affirm  that  two  ideas  are 
never  so  knit  together  by  association  as  to  be  practically 
inseparable.  But  to  affirm  this  is  to  contradict  the  most 
familiar  experience  of  life.  Many  persons  who  have 
been  frightened  in  childhood  can  never  be  alone  in  the 
dark  without  irrepressible  terrors.  Many  a  person  is 
unable  to  revisit  a  particular  place,  or  to  think  of  a  par- 
ticular event,  without  recalling  acute  feelings  of  grief  or 
reminiscences  of  suffering.  If  the  facts  which  created 
these  strong  associations  in  individual  minds,  had  been 
common  to  all  mankind  from  their  earliest  infancy,  and 
had,  when  the  associations  were  fully  formed,  been  for- 
gotten, we  should  have  had  a  Necessity  of  Thought 
—  one  of  the  necessities  which  are  supposed  to  prove 
an  objective  law,  and  an  d  priori  mental  connection 

^^^  T 


324  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

between  ideas.  Now,  in  all  the  supposed  natural  beliefs 
and  necessary  conceptions  which  the  principle  of  Insep- 
arable Association  is  employed  to  explain,  the  generating 
causes  of  the  association  did  begin  nearly  at  the  begin- 
ning of  life,  and  are  common  either  to  all,  or  to  a  very 
large  portion  of  mankind. 

The  beggarly  account  now  exhibited,  is,  I  believe,  all 
that  Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  anywhere  written  against  the 
Association  psychology.  But  it  is  not  all  that  has  been 
said  against  that  psychology  from  Sir  W.  Hamilton's 
point  of  view.  In  this,  as  in  various  other  cases,  to 
supply  what  Sir  W.  Hamilton  has  omitted,  recourse  may 
advantageously  be  had  to  Mr.  Mansel. 

Mr.  Mansel,  though  in  some  sense  a  pupil  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton,  is  a  pupil  who  may  be  usefully  consulted  even 
after  his  master.  Besides  that  he  now  and  then  sees 
things  which  his  master  did  not  see,  he  very  often  fights 
a  better  battle  against  adversaries.  Moreover,  as  I  be- 
fore remarked,  he  has  a  decided  taste  for  clear  statements 
and  definite  issues  ;  and  this  is  no  small  advantage  when 
the  object  is,  not  victory,  but  to  understand  the  subject. 

Mr.  Mansel  joins  a  distinct  issue  with  the  Association 
psychology,  and  brings  the  question  to  the  proper  test. 
"  It  has  been  already  observed,"  he  says  in  his  Prole- 
gomena Logica,*  "  that  whatever  truths  we  are  compelled 
to  admit  as  everywhere  and  at  all  times  necessary,  must 
have  their  origin,  not  without,  in  the  laws  of  the  sen- 
sible world,  but  within,  in  the  constitution  of  the  mind 
itself.  Sundry  attempts  have,  indeed,  been  made  to 
derive  them  from  sensible  experience  and  constant  asso- 
ciation of  ideas ;  but  this  explanation  is  refuted  by  a 

*  Beginning  of  chap.  iv.  p.  90. 


BY  SIB  WILLIAM   HAMILTON   AND  MR.   MANSEL.      325 

criterion  decisive  of  the  fate  of  all  hypotheses  :  it  does 
not  account  for  the  phenomena.  It  does  not  account  for 
the  fact  that  other  associations,  as  frequent  and  as  uni- 
form, are  incapable  of  producing  a  higher  conviction 
than  that  of  a  relative  and  physical  necessity  only" 

This  is  coming  to  the  point,  and  evinces  a  correct 
apprehension  of  the  conditions  of  scientific  proof.  If 
other  associations,  as  close  and  as  habitual  as  those  exist- 
ing in  the  cases  in  question,  do  not  produce  a  similar 
feeling  of  necessity  of  thought,  the  sufficiency  of  the 
alleged  cause  is  disproved,  and  the  theory  must  fall.  Mr. 
Mansel  is  within  the  true  conditions  of  the  Psychological 
Method,  j 

But  what  are  these  cases  of  uniform  and  intimate 
association,  which  do  not  give  rise  to  a  feeling  of  mental 
necessity  ?  The  following  is  Mr.  Mansel's  first  example 
of  them  :  *  "I  may  imagine  the  sun  rising  and  setting 
as  now  for  a  hundred  years,  and  afterwards  remaining 
continually  fixed  in  the  meridian.  Yet  my  experiences 
of  the  "alternations  of  day  and  night  have  been  at  least 
as  invariable  as  of  the  geometrical  properties  of  bodies. 
I  can  imagine  the  same  stone  sinking  ninety-nine  times 
in  the  water,  and  floating  the  hundredth,  but  my  experi- 
ence invariably  repeats  the  former  phenomenon  only." 
\^The  alternation  of  day  and  night  is  invariable  in  our 
experience  ;  but  is  the  phenomenon  day  so  closely  linked 
in  our  experience  with  the  phenomenon  night,  that  we 
never  perceive  the  one,  without,  at  the  same  or  the 
immediately  succeeding  moment,  perceiving  the  other? 
That  is  a  condition  present  in  the  insejmrable  associations 
which  generate  necessities  of  thought  y  Uniformities  of 

*  Prolegomena  Logica,  pp.  96,  97. 
14* 


326  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

sequence  In  which  the  phenomena  succeed  one  another 
only  at  a  certain  interval,  do  not  give  rise  to  inseparable 
associations.  There  are  also  mental  conditions,  as  well 
as  physical,  which  are  required  to  create  such  an  associa- 
tion. Let  us  take  Mr.  Mansel's  other  instance,  a  stone 
sinking  in  the  water.  We  have  never  seen  it  float,  yet 
we  have  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  it  floating.  But,  in 
the  first  place,  we  have  not  been  seeing  stones  sinking  in 
water  from  the  first  dawn  of  consciousness,  and  in  nearly 
every  subsequent  moment  of  our  lives,  as  we  have  been 
seeing  two  and  two  making  four,  intersecting  straight 
lines  diverging  instead  of  enclosing  a  space,  causes  fol- 
lowed by  effects  and  effects  preceded  by  causes.  But 
there  is  a  still  more  radical  distinction  than  this.  No 
frequency  of  conjunction  between  two  phenomena  will 
create  an  inseparable  association,  if  counter-associations 
are  being  created  all  the  while.  If  we  sometimes  saw 
stones  floating  as  well  as  sinking,  however  often  we 
might  have  seen  them  sink,  nobody  supposes  that  we 
should  have  formed  an  inseparable  association  between 
them  and  sinking.  We  have  not  seen  a  stone  float,  but 
we  are  in  the  constant  habit  of  seeing  either  stones  or 
other  things  which  have  the  same  tendency  to  sink,  re- 
maining in  a  position  which  they  would  otherwise  quit, 
being  maintained  in  it  by  an  unseen  force.  The  sinking 
of  a  stone  is  but  a  case  of  gravitation,  and  we  are  abun- 
dantly accustomed  to  see  the  force  of  gravity  counter- 
acted. Every  fact  of  that  nature  which  we  ever  saw  or 
heard  of,  is  pro  tanto  an  obstacle  to  the  formation  of  the 
inseparable  association  which  would  make  a  violation  of 
the  law  of  gravity  inconceivable  to  us.  Resemblance  is 
a  principle  of  association,  as  well  as  contiguity  :  and 


BY  SIB  WILLIAM  HAMILTON  AND  MB.   M ANSEL.      327 

however  contradictory  a  supposition  may  be  to  our  expe- 
rience in  hac  materid,  if  our  experience  in  alia  ma- 
teria  furnishes  us  with  types  even  distantly  resembling 
what  the  supposed  phenomenon  would  be  if  realized,  the 
associations  thus  formed  will  generally  prevent  the  spe- 
cific association  from  becoming  so  intense  and  irresistible, 
as  to  disable  our  imaginative  faculty  from  embodying  the 
supposition  in  a  form  moulded  on  one  or  other  of  those 
types. 

Again,  says  Mr.  Mansel,*  "experience  has  uniformly 
presented  to  me  a  horse's  body  in  conjunction  with  a 
horse's  head,  and  a  man's  head  with  a  man's  body ;  just 
as  experience  has  uniformly  presented  to  me  space  en- 
closed within  a  pair  of  curved  lines,  and  not  within  a  pair 
of  straight  lines  :  "  yet  I  have  no  difficulty  in  imagining 
a  centaur,  but  cannot  imagine  a  space  enclosed  by  two 
straight  lines.  "  Why  do  I,  in  the  former  case,  consider 
the  results  of  my  experience  as  contingent  only  and 
transgressible,  confined  to  the  actual  ph&nomena  of  a 
limited  field,  and  possessing  no  value  beyond  it ;  while, 
in  the  latter,  I  am  compelled  to  regard  them  as  necessary 
and  universal?  Why  can  I  give  in  imagination  to  a 
quadruped  body  what  experience  assures  me  is  possessed 
by  bipeds  only?  And  why  can  I  not,  in  like  manner, 
invest  straight  lines  with  an  attribute  which  experience 
has  uniformly  presented  in  curves  ?  " 

I  answer  :  —  Because  our  experience  furnishes  us  with 
a  thousand  models  on  which  to  frame  the  conception  of 
a  centaur,  and  with  none  on  which  to  frame  that  of  two 
straight  lines  enclosing  a  space.  Nature,  as  known  in 
our  experience,  is  uniform  in  its  laws,  but  extremely 

*  Prolegomena  Logica,  pp.  99, 100. 


828  INSEPARABLE  ASSOCIATION  IGNORED 

varied  in  its  combinations'.  The  combination  of  a  horse's 
body  with  a  human  head  has  nothing,  primd  facie,  to 
make  any  wide  distinction  between  it  and  any  of  the 
numberless  varieties  which  we  find  in  animated  nature. 
To  a  common,  even  if  not  to  a  scientific  mind,  it  is  with- 
in the  limits  of  the  variations  in  our  experience.  Every 
similar  variation  which  we  have  seen  or  heard  of,  is  a 
help  towards  conceiving  this  particular  one ;  and  tends 
to  form  an  association,  not  of  fixity,  but  of  variability, 
which  frustrates  the  formation  of  an  inseparable  associa- 
tion between  a  human  head  and  a  human  body  exclu- 
sively. (We  know  of  so  many  different  heads,  united  to 
so  many  different  bodies,  that  we  have  little  difficulty  in 
imagining  any  head  in  combination  with  any  body.  Nay, 
the  mere  mobility  of  objects  in  space  is  a  fact  so  universal 
in  our  experience,  that  we  easily  conceive  any  object 
whatever  occupying  the  place  of  any  other  :  we  imagine 
without  difficulty  a  horse  with  his  head  removed,  and  a 
human  head  put  in  its  place.  But  what  model  does  our 
experience  afford  on  which  to  frame,  or  what  elements 
from  which  to  construct,  the  conception  of  two  straight 
lines  enclosing  a  space?  There  are  no  counter-associa- 
tions in  that  case,  and  consequently  the  primary  associa- 
tion, being  founded  on  an  experience  beginning  from 
birth,  and  never  for  many  minutes  intermitted  in  our 
waking  hours,  easily  becomes  inseparable.  Had  but  ex- 
perience afforded  a  case  of  illusion,  in  which  two  straight 
lines  after  intersecting  had  appeared  again  to  approach, 
the  counter-association  formed  might  have  been  sufficient 
to  render  such  a  supposition  imaginable,  and  defeat  the 
supposed  necessity  of  thought.  In  the  case  of  parallel 
lines,  the  laws  of  perspective  do  present  such  an  illusion  : 


BY  SIR  WILLIAM   HAMILTON  AND  MR.   MANSEL.      329 

they  do,  to  the  eye,  appear  to  meet  in  both  directions, 
and  consequently  to  enclose  a  space  :  and  by  supposing 
that  we  had  no ^access,  to  the  evidejoc^  which  proves  that 
they  do  not  really  meet,  an  ingenious  thinker,  whom  I 
formerly  quoted,  was  able  to  give  the  idea  of  a  constitu- 
tion of  nature  in  which  all  mankind  might  have  believed 
that  two  straight  lines  could  enclose  a  space.  That  we 
are  unable  to  believe  or  imagine  it  in  our  present  circum- 
stances, needs  no  other  explanation  than  the  laws  of 
association  afford :  for  the  case  unites  all  the  elements 
of  the  closest,  intensest,  and  most  inseparable  associa- 
tion, with  the  greatest  freedom  from  conflicting  counter- 
associations  which  can  be  found  within  the  conditions  of 
human  life. 

In  all  the  instances  of  phenomena  invariably  con- 
joined which  fail  to  create  necessities  of  thought,  I  am 
satisfied  it  would  be  found  that  the  case  is  wanting  in 
some  of  the  conditions  required  by  the  Association  psy- 
chology, as  essential  to  the  formation  of  an  association 
really  inseparable.  It  is  the  more  to  be  wondered  at  that 
Mr.  Mansel  should  not  have  perceived  the  easy  answer 
which  could  be  given  to  his  argument,  since  he  himself 
comes  very  near  to  giving  the  same  explanation  of  many 
impossibilities  of  thought,  which  is  given  by  the  Associ- 
ation theory.  "We  can  only,"  he  says,*  "conceive  in 
thought  what  we  have  experienced  in  presentation  ;  "  ur.d 
no  other  reason  is  necessary  for  our  being  unable  to  con- 
ceive a  thing,  than  that  we  have  never  experienced  it. 
He  even  holds  that  the  stock  example  of  a  necessity  of 
thought,  the  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  the  course  of  na- 
ture, can  be  accounted  for  by  experience,  without  any 

*  Prolegomena  Logiea,  p.  112. 
H* 


330          THE  LAW  OF  INSEPARABLE    ASSOCIATION. 

objective  necessity  at  all.  "We  cannot  conceive,"  he 
says,*  "  a  course  of  nature  without  uniform  succession, 
as  we  cannot  conceive  a  being  who  sees  without  eyes  or 
hears  without  ears  ;  because  we  cannot,  under  existing  cir- 
cumstances, experience  the  necessary  intuition.  But  such 
things  may  nevertheless  exist ;  and  under  other  circum- 
stances, they  might  become  objects  of  possible  concep- 
tion, the  laws  of  the  process  of  conception  remaining 
unaltered."  I  am  aware  that  when  Mr.  Mansel  uses  the 
words  Presentation  and  Intuition,  he  does  not  mean  ex- 
clusively presentation  by  the  senses.  Nevertheless,  if  he 
had  only  written  the  preceding  passage,  no  one  would 
have  suspected  that  he  could  have  required  any  other 
cause  for  our  inability  to  conceive  a  bilineal  figure,  than 
the  impossibility  of  our  perceiving  one.  It  is  sufficient, 
in  his  opinion,!  to  constitute  any  propositions  necessary, 
that  "  while  our  constitution  and  circumstances  remain 
as  they  are,  we  cannot  but  think  them."  It  is  super- 
abundantly manifest  that  many  propositions  which  all 
admit  to  be  grounded  only  on  experience,  are  necessary 
under  this  definition.  Mr.  Mansel  even  asserts  a  more 
complete  dependence  of  our  possibilities  of  thought  upon 
our  opportunities  of  experience,  than  there  appears  to 
me  to  be  ground  for  ;  since  he  affirms  that  "  we  can  only 
conceive  in  thought  what  we  have  experienced  in  pres- 
entation," while  in  reality  it  is  sufficient  that  we  should 
have  experienced  in  presentation  things  bearing  some 
similarity  to  it. 

*  Prolegomena  Logics,  p.  149.  f  Ibid.  p.  150. 


END   OF   VOL.    I. 


THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SANTA  CRUZ 


This  book  is  due  on  the  last  DATE  stamped  below. 

FEB 1  7  197| 


FEBS   '77 


OOm-8,'65  (F6282s8 )  2373 


